The rules and standards of scientific practice, as a commonality of attitudes and apparent consistency, are, the author believes, the prerequisites for normal science, the genesis and continuity of a certain direction of research. At the same time, he replaces a number of recognized terms with one, a paradigm, which is the basis of a “more esoteric type of research” and, in this case, as the author believes, “is a sign of the maturity of the development of any scientific discipline.” Making an excursion into the history of science, the author also says that "research has approached the esoteric type (secret knowledge) at the end of the Middle Ages and again acquired a more or less understandable form for everyone. Where is the combination of incompatible concepts "esoteric", that is, knowledge hidden from the masses, with the term "universal intelligibility".

Evaluating this proposed theory of science and its ideology, the philosopher of science P. Feyrabend, to whom the author expresses gratitude for consultations in the preface, notes the impossibility of agreeing with it and, being an apologist for “epistemological anarchism”, speaks of it as providing “the prosperity of the most vain and narrow-minded specialization ". Seeing also the author's legal nihilism in the methodology of science, he further says that "every Kuhn's statement about normal science will remain true if the words "normal science" are replaced by the words "organized crime", and any of his statements about the "individual scientist" are equally applicable to a separate safecracker.

It is possible, without taking the philosophical positions of this researcher, to agree with his conclusion, adding his indication of the problem that is born in science and society by esotericism, which is repeatedly and favorably mentioned by the author in this work. On the basis of which the Nazi ideology and the Third Reich were built. Including the savage "scientific experiments" on living prisoners in concentration camps. The feat of arms of the people of Orthodox Russia, accomplished in unity with the sane Christian community, stopped the atrocities of those criminals against humanity. And they were brought to justice by justice on the basis of the ideology of law and law, built on Christian philanthropy, truth and the law of God, revealed by God the Heavenly Father in Christ the Savior and His Body of the Church, enlightening minds with the fullness of truth, freedom and grace of Holy Orthodoxy.

Chapter 3 The Nature of Normal Science

The author puts in one row the professionalism and isotherism of scientific research, which becomes possible after the adoption by a group of scientists of one paradigm. In its development, normal science solves three classes of problems: "the establishment of significant facts, the comparison of facts and theory, the development of a theory." Although the emergence of extraordinary problems is also allowed, which, in the opinion of the author, "should not particularly concern us here." Work within the framework of the paradigm cannot proceed otherwise; if the paradigm is abandoned, scientific research also stops.

From how it develops and what results “normal”, according to Kuhn, science leads to, we can judge its nature, that is, its origin, far from God and Christ, God’s truth and philanthropy. To such a “scientific community”, the words of Christ are addressed: “Your father is the devil; and you want to do the desires of your father. He was a murderer from the beginning and did not stand in the truth, for there is no truth in him. When he speaks a lie, he speaks his own, for he is a liar and the father of lies” (John 8:44). Moreover, the science of knowing God, oneself and God's creation began at the moment when the Creator breathed into the face of the first man "the breath of life, and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7).

Chapter 4 Normal Science as Puzzle Solving

The peculiarity of normal science, as the author notes, is that it is to a small extent focused on major discoveries in the field of new facts or theories. At the same time, a new scientific term "puzzle problem" is introduced, a definition is given and the corresponding qualification "specialist in solving puzzle problems" is established. Puzzle problems are a category of problems that have rules and a guaranteed solution, serving to test the talent and skill of the researcher. At the same time, it points to the elimination of the need to explain the goals of scientific research, “why scientists storm them with such passion and enthusiasm.” And the motives of the researchers are noted: "the desire to succeed, inspiration from the discovery of a new field, the hope to find a pattern and the desire for a critical examination of established knowledge."

The paradigm serves as a criterion for choosing solvable and socially important problems (puzzles) for a given community, the rest are considered only distractions. Laws are replaced by the author with prescriptions subdivided into a number of levels of their sets, the highest of which is metaphysical. The existence of such a network of prescriptions, conceptual, instrumental and methodological, likens normal science to solving puzzles and reveals its nature. At the same time, it is not rules that determine the solution of puzzles, but paradigms (communities of researchers), which themselves can conduct research even in the absence of rules.

The highest criterion of truth in this chapter is a certain collective, and the ideology of the metaphysician, in the elimination from science and its laws, the Orthodox Church, God's love for mankind and humility to God in Christ. Presumably, the result of the activity of such a group will be the creation of a totalitarian organization, varying in size from a small sect to an entire state. What can we see on the historical example of the development of various totalitarianism of the 20th century and the devastation brought to society as a result of its activities. “But how, having known God, they did not glorify Him as God, and were not thankful, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened, calling themselves wise, they became fools” (Rom. 1: 21, 22), - the Epistle says Romans, where the true content of the proposed "puzzles" is revealed - destroyed thinking, the mind plunging into darkness, and hence the whole life of man and society.

Chapter 5 The Priority of Paradigms

The relation between rules, paradigms and normal science is considered. It is noted that it is easier to find a paradigm than the rules, which for one paradigm may differ and the search for the basis of which constantly leads to deep disappointments. The existence of a paradigm may not exist without a complete set of rules, but it determines the direction of research, allowing the scientist to develop for himself the rules of the game, which, however, are not binding on him. Normal science can develop without rules as long as the scientific community enjoys the achievements of previous researchers. The relevance of the rules arises from the loss of confidence in the paradigm.

Indeed, according to Kuhn, “normal science”, like any criminal organization, can exist without legal laws until the last piece of bread baked by workers according to the rules, truth and law of God is eaten.

Chapter 6 Anomaly and the emergence of scientific theories

Normal science does not aim to find a new fact or theory,” the author believes. This leads to the conclusion that the emergence of a scientific theory in such paradigms is, of course, an anomaly for them. At the same time, the professionalization noticed in the scientific community by this researcher is "the development of an esoteric vocabulary and skill, and the refinement of concepts, the similarity of which with their prototypes taken from the field of common sense is continuously decreasing."

Another example typical of the process of existence and development of criminal organizations and sects. Creating your own terminology, ambiguous, coded, with a constantly changing meaning to maintain conspiracy. And in the case of sects, for the disorganization of social relations and the thinking of adherents, introduced into a state of easy manipulation of their consciousness and behavior. And not only individuals, but also society. In the context of the Jewish origin of this work, one should recall the history of the development of the Jewish heresy and the conspiracy initiated in Russia at the end of the 15th century by Shakharia, who, as I. Volotsky points out, was trained in “sorcery and black books, astrology and astrology” and began his work with the destruction of the Orthodox faith and seduction in the secret organization of priests.

Chapter 7 Crisis and the emergence of scientific theories

Scientific discoveries are causes or factors contributing to a change in paradigm through the emergence of a crisis.

The state of mind, family, economy or politics in society, "suddenly" scientifically discovered in a hangover from esoteric research, is a factor in changing the composition or leadership of such organizations. For example, the realization of deceit, which came in the hunger, cold and unwashed state of the taiga camp, after all the labors of waiting for the coming of Christ with the corresponding transfer of property, finances and housing into the hands of "legitimate representatives of the coming Kingdom of God." If these souls do not return to the Orthodox Church and to the order she creates in the mind, family and society, then they continue to wander in search and development of new “scientific theories”.

Chapter 8 Crisis response

"Crises are a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of new theories", arising as a result of the corresponding reaction of scientists. At the same time, the author says, during the period of crisis, scientists of normal science do not turn to philosophy as the basis of scientific knowledge, to the extent that a paradigm exists. In the process of crisis, there is a transition from normal science to extraordinary. The symptoms of which are "an increase in competing options, a willingness to try something else, expressing clear discontent, seeking help from philosophy, and discussing fundamentals."

Scripture gives direction to a wise response to a crisis, always turning souls to God and His truth, as well as to its true bearers: Do not follow the majority to evil, and do not decide litigation, departing from the truth for the majority ... ”(Ex. 23: 1, 2). And Christ teaches to always first seek the Kingdom of God and His righteousness (Mt. 6:33). Calls to go to Him in prayer, listening and fulfilling His instructions, so that instead of vanity, we will find the peace of the Lord, His power of wisdom, love and fruitfulness (Matt. 11:28-30; John 15:1-9).

Chapter 9 The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions

A definition is given, "scientific revolution" - non-cumulative episodes in the development of science, during which the old paradigm is largely or completely replaced by a new one. A parallel is drawn between science and politics, the paradigm is compared with institutions of power that have ceased to fulfill their functions and are being replaced by methods prohibited by these institutions. There is a choice between competing paradigms. At the same time, logic and experiment are not used due to their uselessness proven by history.

An exact and demonstrative example of such a scientific revolution was the fall of man (Gen. 3), who doubted the truth of the commands and laws of God, and accordingly abandoned logic, replacing a fruitful experiment prescribed by God in the performance of good deeds with fatal atrocities inspired by the evil one. At the same time, a person falls into a crisis, changing the Kingdom of God to a paradigm, a “scientific community” with Satan and the spirits of clouding the mind.

As a result of the loss of peace and the guidance of God, man finds himself in a revolt that fights in his members and community, plunging everyone into endless revolutions driven by the spirits of destruction and death. “Wish - and do not have; you kill and envy - and you cannot reach; you quarrel and fight, and you have not” (James 4:2), says Jacob about problems and driving forces such revolutions. “Adulterers and adulterers! Do you not know that friendship with the world is enmity against God? (James 4:4), - the Lord asks through the mouth of the apostle the wicked, who for the most part became deaf to the Word of God, who desired the omnipotence of God, but received clouding of mind by membership in "paradigms", incomprehensible terminologies, theories and corresponding communities.

Chapter 10 Revolution as a change of view of the world

Based on the history of the development of science, it is shown that “after the revolution, scientists work in a different world”, that is, with a changed worldview and social institutions and environment. Fascinated by the new paradigm, scientists are getting new tools and applications.

This fully corresponds to the position of man after his revolutionary fall into sin, the removal of the presence of God and the acquisition of a community of ungodly spirits and human souls captivated by them.

Attempts at revolution in the Orthodox Church began with the Garden of Eden and continue to this day. In Russia, the heresies of the Judaizers stand out, the essence of which lies in various mixtures of Judaism with the occult. About which Joseph Volotsky warns, admonishing to fight them with all the methods prescribed by God. Firstly, education, as well as the conduct of church and state investigations and legal proceedings, with the sincere and reasonable support of the entire society, followed by the punishment of the guilty, up to capital punishment, and the encouragement of all faithful to the Orthodox Church and Fatherland.

Chapter 11 The indistinguishability of revolutions

The examples used in the previous chapter to characterize scientific revolutions are actually considered by the author, in his own words, not as revolutions, but as additions to existing knowledge. At the same time, it is hypothesized that there are the highest degree there are good reasons for not clearly distinguishing their boundaries, and the revolutions are almost invisible.

The author proposes to consider a special aspect of scientific work, "which most clearly distinguishes it from any other creative research, with the possible exception of theology." The source of authority is taken from textbooks, popular science publications and philosophical works that describe the achievements of past times and form the basis of normal science. During revolutions they are rewritten, supplemented by new data.

Based on the reasoning of the author himself, it can be concluded that the title of the work and the emphasis on the revolutionary nature of the development of normal science are inconsistent, most likely caused by the desire to demonstrate the sensationalism of the material of the work, which is characteristic of the creators of the base tabloid press, thus attracting the attention of an idle public.

Chapter 12 Resolution of Revolutions

The revolution produces textbooks that become the basis of a new tradition and normal science. Their data are the result of the choice of paradigms, programs and theories by researchers from alternative ones. The researchers' decisions are determined by faith. From the infancy, the paradigm is thus formed into a mature one and attracts more and more supporters to this community.

“Have the faith of God” (Mark 11:23), teaches Christ and the Orthodox Church, feeding souls with the Word of God, in the formation of this faith. In deviation from which such revolutions and their consequences arise. And Basil the Great directs souls to stay in the glory of God, to the true height, to enlightenment with the wisdom of God, to amuse eternal life and its benefits, warning not to cultivate more false, which leads to the fall and loss of everything. Continuing, he says that since the time of the fall of man, “the greatest salvation for him, the cure for illness and the means to return to the primitive state is modesty, that is, in order not to invent from himself the vestment of some kind of glory, but to seek glory from God. This will only correct his mistake; this will cure the disease; through this he will return to the sacred commandment which he left.

Chapter 13 Progress that revolutions bring

The author puts a number of questions at the end of the work, the answers of which are not formulated as conclusions necessary in a work of any genre close to science, but refers the reader to the previous text with the proviso that these questions still remain open. Let's list them:
- Why the evolutionary process should be carried out?
- What should be nature, including man, for science to be possible at all?
- Why should scientific communities achieve a strong consensus that is unattainable in other areas?
- Why should coherence accompany the transition from one paradigm shift to another?
“And why should a change in paradigm continually create tools that are better in every way than what was known before?”

One conclusion is made that a person and his environment must have a certain nature capable of developing science.

You must be born again (John 3:7), says Christ the Savior, directing every person into obedience to God the Father and the knowledge of His truth and love, into submission to Him, His truth, judgment and mercy, leading the humble to God with the Word and the feat of the Cross into His Church and Kingdom of God.

1969 additions

Made after many years of reflection on the issues raised in the book, in an attempt to clarify their insufficiently clear descriptions.

1. Paradigms and structure of the scientific community

The concept of a paradigm is separated from the concept of the scientific community. The definition is given "a paradigm is what unites members of the scientific community, and, conversely, the scientific community consists of people who recognize the paradigm." The structure of scientific communities as founders and architects of scientific knowledge is considered. In a professional form, the scientific activity of which is esoteric and aimed at solving puzzles (explicitly solvable problems), based on proven facts. In the transition to a new paradigm, such a scientific community is ready to sacrifice something very significant and at the same time acquire new tools for work.

2. Paradigms as sets of prescriptions for a scientific group

The proposed term "paradigm", as practice has shown, is used in several dozen ways. Therefore, it needs clarification. The author gives another definition of the paradigm - the main philosophical elements of the book. That which gives completeness of professional communication and unanimity in judgments.

The term disciplinary matrix is ​​proposed, corresponding to the scientific discipline and the ordering of its constituent elements. Including prescriptions, which the author calls a paradigm, expresses formally and characterizes as a powerful apparatus of mathematical and logical formulas used in solving puzzles.

The second type of components of the disciplinary matrix, metaphysical paradigms or metaphysical parts of paradigms, by which generally accepted prescriptions are meant, as beliefs in specific models.

The third component of the matrix is ​​the values ​​that form the unity of a group of researchers, although they can be individual.

The fourth, but not the last component is samples, specific solutions to problems, complemented by technical solutions.

3. Paradigms as universally recognized patterns

"The paradigm, as a universally recognized pattern, is the central element of what I now consider the newest and least understood aspect of this book," the author notes. And after demonstrating a number of examples, he characterizes it as "implicit knowledge, which is acquired more by practical participation in scientific research than by the assimilation of the rules governing scientific activity."

4. Implicit knowledge and intuition

The appeal to implicit knowledge and the corresponding rejection of rules highlights another problem and will serve as the basis for accusations of subjectivity and irrationalism, the author states and explains this by the opponents’ misunderstanding of the principles of intuition, which have a collective origin and use, and also professes the immutability of ideas that protects against individual and collective solipsism. Thus, again returning to patterns and rules, however, as we see, through the denial of the logic of rational thinking, replaced by internal motives, will and values ​​of a certain group.

5. Patterns, incommensurability and revolution

“The superiority of one theory over another cannot be definitively established in the course of such discussions. Instead, as I have already emphasized, each participant is trying, guided by their convictions, to "convert" others to their faith, ”says the author. Clarifying that the main criteria of scientific character, such as accuracy, simplicity, effectiveness, and others, are the values ​​of these groups. Each of the groups begins to develop its own language and there is a breakdown in communication, requiring the additional participation of interpreters to restore. At the same time, “neither sufficient grounds nor translation from one language into another provide persuasion. It is such a process that we must explain in order to understand an important form of change in scientific knowledge.”

6. Revolutions and relativism

Reflecting on the development of science and the consistent change of its theories, the author admits: “Although the temptation to characterize such a position as relativistic is quite understandable, this opinion seems to me erroneous. Conversely, if this position means relativism, then I cannot understand what the relativist lacks in order to explain the nature and development of the sciences.” Scientific development, like the development of the biological world, is a unidirectional and irreversible process. Later scientific theories are better than earlier ones at solving puzzles in the often very different contexts in which they are applied. This is not a relativistic position, and it reveals the meaning that defines my belief in scientific progress.

7. The nature of science

In this section, regardless of its title, the author sums up his work.

- "My descriptive generalizations are obvious from the point of view of theory precisely because they can also be derived from it, while from other points of view on the nature of science they lead to anomalies."
- Firstly, "the book depicts the development of science as a succession of periods linked by the bonds of tradition, interrupted by non-cumulative leaps."
- And also, "apparently, the concept of a paradigm as a specific achievement, as a model is my second contribution to the development of problems in the development of science."
- "In this book, I intended to consider issues of a slightly different nature, which many of her readers could not see clearly."

Emphasizes "the need to study the community as a structural unit in the organization of scientific activity ... the need for a close, and above all comparative, study of relevant communities in other areas."

Conclusion

The paper touches upon an important and relevant topic for society in the development of science, its foundations and nature. When developing it, the author does not indicate the use of a certain philosophical methodology for covering these issues, but speaks of metaphysics as the highest supersensory level of the rules of the paradigm, and of esotericism, by definition, not accessible to all knowledge, dividing society into clans of more or less chosen ones. Previous works on science are rated by him as "tourist guides". Accordingly, there are no references, for example, to the works of Aristotle on the first principles and causes of everything, the “first philosophy”, called metaphysics, which Plato already consciously used as a scientific method.

The work is distinguished from positivism, apart from the mentioned metaphysics, by the absence of its characteristic verified logical order in the presentation of facts. Which is more in line with the irrationalism of the postmodern time of the previous century, for example, Nietzsche. This is also evidenced by the priority in determining the truth given to the paradigm (“scientific” community), as an expression of collective consensual voluntarism. And the disorder in the construction of reasoning, replete with violations of the laws of classical logic, is probably an attempt to give the work a sign of isotericity, hiding secret knowledge in the depths of confused reasoning. The style of which, to convey the "logic" and spirit of the work, is partially preserved in the abstract in a summary of the chapters.

The work does not mention dialectics and one of its main laws of the transition of quantity into quality. The building of the theory of the development of science, as scientific revolutions, is further built from data that are doubtful even for the author, with his reservation that the boundaries of the described revolutions are blurred. A number of “scientific” terms are introduced into circulation, such as extraordinary and normal science, paradigm, anomaly, disciplinary matrix, which do not have a clear logical definition and contribute to the disorganization of thinking and scientific work, and as a consequence, the destruction of public order and amenities. What, together with a very noticeable legal nihilism in the methodology research work and the formation of scientific communities, is more characteristic of the process of creating totalitarian-destructive sects and criminal organizations, as a rule, with a significant religious, nationalist or racial component.

In general, the work is built without taking into account previous studies in the field of general philosophy, history, philosophy and theory of science, with a number of violations of the logic of definitions and judgments, does not have reliable generalized provisions, significant conclusions and novelty in the results. Inclines readers to resort to esoteric knowledge.

The work can be used in criminological studies of criminal, administrative, canon law and other related branches of science and practice, as a fact of the formation of the ideology of legal and methodological nihilism. What is relevant for consideration and prevention in modern state, church and public construction. In particular, in the context of a historically visible trend towards the development of Judaizing heresies and sects in Orthodox Russia, which is also noted by the Jewish origin of the author of the work.

Explaining the reason for all the disturbances that are characteristic of those who are far from the truth of Holy Orthodoxy, Gregory the Theologian says that this is the natural ardor and pride of the spirit, “however, not simple ardor and greatness (I do not in the least condemn that ardor, without which it is impossible to succeed either in piety or in another virtue), but firmness, combined with imprudence, ignorance and the evil offspring of the latter - insolence, for insolence is the fruit of ignorance. And then he shows the basis of true theology in the purity and order of thinking and life, and hence the performance of any scientific work, warning: "Talking about God is a great thing, but much more - to purify yourself for God."

In modern Western philosophy, the problem of the growth and development of knowledge is central. The proponents of post-positivism - Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and others - developed the problem especially actively.

Thomas Kuhn ("The Structure of Scientific Revolutions") considered science to be a social institution in which social groups and organizations. The main unifying principle of the society of scientists is a single style of thinking, the recognition by this society of certain fundamental theories and methods. Kuhn called these provisions that unite the community of scientists a paradigm.

According to Kuhn, the development of science is a spasmodic, revolutionary process, the essence of which is expressed in a change of paradigms. The development of science, like the development of the biological world, is a unidirectional and irreversible process. kun paradigm philosophy scientific

The scientific paradigm is a set of knowledge, methods, patterns of problem solving, values ​​shared by the scientific community.

The paradigm performs two functions: "cognitive" and "normative".

The next level of scientific knowledge after the paradigm is scientific theory. The paradigm is based on past achievements - theories. These achievements are considered a model solution scientific problems. Theories existing within different paradigms are not comparable.

Kuhn identifies 4 stages in the development of science:

I - Pre-paradigm (example, physics before Newton);

The appearance of anomalies - inexplicable facts.

An anomaly is the fundamental inability of a paradigm to solve a problem. As anomalies accumulate, trust in the paradigm decreases.

An increase in the number of anomalies leads to the emergence of alternative theories. The rivalry of different schools begins, there are no generally accepted concepts of research. It is characterized by frequent disputes about the legitimacy of methods and problems. At a certain stage, these discrepancies disappear as a result of the victory of one of the schools.

II - the formation of a paradigm, the result of which is the appearance of textbooks that reveal the paradigm theory in detail;

III - the stage of normal science.

This period is characterized by a clear program of activities. Predicting new kinds of phenomena that don't fit into the dominant paradigm is not the goal of normal science. Thus, at the stage of normal science, the scientist works within the rigid framework of the paradigm, i.e. scientific tradition.

Scientists in the mainstream of normal science do not set themselves the goal of creating new theories, and usually, moreover, they are intolerant of the creation of such theories by others.

Kuhn singles out activities characteristic of normal science:

• 1. The facts that are most indicative from the point of view of the paradigm are highlighted, theories are refined. To solve such problems, scientists invent more and more complex and subtle equipment.
• 2. Search for factors that confirm the paradigm.
• 3. The third class of experiments and observations is related to the elimination of existing ambiguities and the improvement of solutions to those problems that were initially resolved only approximately. Establishment of quantitative laws.
• 4. Improving the paradigm itself. A paradigm cannot be perfect all at once.

The original experiments of the creators of the paradigm in a purified form are then included in textbooks, according to which future scientists learn science. Mastering these classic examples of solving scientific problems in the process of learning, the future scientist comprehends the basic principles of science more deeply, learns to apply them in specific situations. With the help of samples, the student not only assimilates the content of theories, but also learns to see the world through the eyes of a paradigm, to transform his feelings into scientific data. The assimilation of another paradigm is required in order for the same sensations to be described in other data.

IV - extraordinary science - the crisis of the old paradigm, the revolution in science, the search and formation of a new paradigm.

Kuhn describes this crisis both from the content side of the development of science (inconsistency of new methods with the old ones), and from the emotional-volitional side (loss of confidence in the principles of the current paradigm on the part of the scientific community).

A scientific revolution begins with a group of scientists abandoning an old paradigm and adopting a set of other theories, hypotheses, and standards as a basis. The scientific community is divided into several groups, some of which continue to believe in the paradigm, while others put forward a hypothesis that claims to be a new paradigm.

During this period of crisis, scientists set up experiments aimed at testing and weeding out competing theories. Science becomes like philosophy, for which the competition of ideas is the rule.

When all the other representatives of this science join this group, the scientific revolution has taken place, a revolution has taken place in the minds of the scientific community, and from that moment a new scientific tradition begins, which is often incompatible with the previous tradition. A new paradigm is emerging and the scientific community is regaining unity.

In times of crisis, scientists abolish all rules except those appropriate to the new paradigm. To characterize this process, Kuhn uses the term "prescription reconstruction" - which means not just the rejection of rules, but the preservation of positive experiences that fit the new paradigm.

In the course of the scientific revolution, there is a change in the conceptual grid through which scientists viewed the world. Changing the grid necessitates changing the methodological rules. Scientists are beginning to look for another system of rules that can replace the previous one and which would be based on a new conceptual grid. For these purposes, scientists, as a rule, turn to philosophy for help, which was not characteristic of the normal period of science.

Kuhn believes that the choice of theory for the role of a new paradigm is carried out through the consent of the relevant community.

The transition to a new paradigm cannot be based on purely rational arguments, although this element is significant. It requires volitional factors - conviction and faith. The change of fundamental theories looks to the scientist as an entry into new world, in which there are completely different objects, conceptual systems, other problems and tasks are found.

An example of changing scientific paradigms:

The first scientific revolution - destroyed the geocentric system of Ptolemy and approved the ideas of Copernicus

The second scientific revolution is connected with Darwin's theory, the study of molecules.

The third revolution is the theory of relativity.

Kuhn defines a "paradigm" as a "disciplinary matrix". They are disciplinary, because they force scientists to a certain behavior, style of thinking, and matrices - because they consist of ordered elements of various kinds. It consists of:

• - symbolic generalizations - formalized statements generally recognized by scientists (for example, Newton's law);
• - philosophical parts - these are conceptual models;
• - value installations;
• - generally accepted patterns of decision making in certain situations.

Kuhn rejected the principle of fundamentalism. The scientist sees the world through the prism of the paradigm accepted by the scientific community. The new paradigm does not include the old one.

Kuhn puts forward the thesis about the incommensurability of paradigms. Theories that exist within the framework of paradigms are not comparable. This means that when changing paradigms, it is impossible to carry out the continuity of theories. When the paradigm changes, the whole world of the scientist changes.

Thus, the scientific revolution as a paradigm shift is not subject to rational-logical explanation, because has a random heuristic character.

However, if you look at the development of science as a whole, then progress is obvious in it, expressed in the fact that scientific theories provide more and more opportunities for scientists to solve puzzles. However, later theories cannot be considered better reflecting reality.

The concept of the scientific community is closely related to the concept of paradigm.

If you don't share a belief in a paradigm, you are left out of the scientific community. Therefore, for example, modern psychics, astrologers, flying saucer researchers are not considered scientists, they are not included in the scientific community, because they all put forward ideas that are not recognized by modern science.

Kuhn breaks with the tradition of "objective knowledge" independent of the subject; for him, knowledge is not something that exists in the imperishable logical world, but something that is in the minds of people of a certain historical era weighed down by their own prejudices.

Kuhn's greatest merit is that, unlike Popper, he contributes to the problem of the development of science " human factor”, paying attention to social and psychological motives.

Kuhn proceeds from the concept of science as a social institution in which certain social groups and organizations operate. The main unifying principle of the society of scientists is a single style of thinking, the recognition by this society of certain fundamental theories and research methods.

Disadvantages of Kuhn's theory: it unnecessarily automates the work of scientists, the nature of scientists during the formation of science.

Koon Thomas

After "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions"

THE ROAD SINCE STRUCTURE

Translation from English by A.L. Nikiforova

Cover design: E.E. Kuntysh

Exclusive rights to publish the book in Russian belong to AST Publishers. Any use of the material in this book, in whole or in part, without the permission of the copyright holder is prohibited.

Reprinted with permission from The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, USA

© The University of Chicago, 2000

© Translation. AL. Nikiforov, 2011

© Russian edition AST Publishers, 2014

Foreword

Tom's preface to an early collection of his philosophical papers, The Essential Tension, published in 1977, is a history of the research that led him to write The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and continued after its publication. Some details of his biography were mentioned there, explaining how he moved from physics to historiography and philosophy.

This book focuses on the philosophical and meta-historical issues that, according to the author, "today ... interest me to the greatest extent and about which I have long wanted to speak." In the introduction to this new book, the publishers have linked each article to topical and therefore constantly under consideration problems: this is an important point in the continuous search for a solution. The book does not represent the goal of Tom's research, but the stage at which this research was interrupted.

The title of the book again alludes to the journey, and the final part, containing an interview with Tom at the University of Athens, is nothing more than a more detailed account of his life. I am extremely pleased that the interviewers and the publishing board of the Neusis magazine, where this interview first appeared, gave permission to publish it here.

I was present at this and was delighted with the knowledge, sensitivity and sincerity of the colleagues who received us in Athens. Tom felt completely at ease and spoke freely, assuming he would review the interview before it went to press. However, time passed, and this task went to me and other participants.

I know Tom would have made significant changes to the text, not because of his pedantry, which was not characteristic of him, but because of his inherent delicacy. In his conversation with his Athenian colleagues there are expressions and assessments that he would certainly have corrected or crossed out. However, I don't think it should be done by me or anyone else. For the same reason, we did not fix some grammatical inconsistencies oral speech and complete unfinished phrases.

I must thank colleagues and friends for help, in particular Karl Hufbauer, who corrected minor errors in the chronology and helped decipher some of the names.

The circumstances under which Jim Conant and John Hougeland undertook the publication of this book are set out on the following pages. I can only add: they did everything to justify Tom's trust, and I am sincerely grateful to them. Equally grateful to Susan Abrams for her friendly and professional advice in both this project, as well as in the past. I was also helped in everything and always by Sarah, Lisa and Nathaniel Kuhn.

Jehane R. Kuhn

From publishers

Change happens

Almost everyone knows that in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn argued that the history of science is not continuous and cumulative, it is often interrupted by more or less radical "paradigm shifts". Less well known are Kuhn's own efforts to understand and describe as best as possible the episodes in the development of science that are associated with such important changes. The writings collected in this book represent later attempts to rethink and expand on his own "revolutionary" hypotheses.

Kuhn and I discussed the contents of the book shortly before his death. Although he could no longer delve into the details, he had a very definite idea of ​​\u200b\u200bwhat the book should become. Trying to involve us in his plans, he expressed various wishes, considered the arguments "for" and "against" when discussing some cases and situations, formulated four main ideas that we had to follow. For those who are interested in how the selection of articles was carried out, we will briefly outline these main ideas.

The first three ideas that we had to follow were based on Kuhn's idea that this book should be a continuation of his "The Essential Tension" published in 1977. In that collection, Kuhn included only articles in which, in his opinion, philosophically important topics were developed (albeit in the context of historical as well as historiographic considerations), as opposed to questions devoted to the consideration of specific historical episodes. Therefore, the guiding ideas were as follows: 1) to select articles of a clearly philosophical nature; 2) written in the last two decades of Kuhn's life; 3) these should be weighty works, not short notes or speeches.

The fourth idea related to the material that Kuhn considered as the basis for writing a book that he was working on in last years. Since we consider it our duty to prepare this particular book for publication, we decided to abandon this material. Three important series of lectures fell under the restriction: "The Nature of Conceptual Change" (Perspectives on the Philosophy of Science, University of Notre Dame, 1980), "The Development of Science and Lexical Change" (Thalheimer Lectures, Johns Hopkins University, 1984) and "The Presence of Past Science" ( Sherman Lectures, University College London, 1987). Although recordings of these lectures have been circulated and occasionally quoted in the publications of some authors, Kuhn did not want them to appear in this form in this book.

* * *

The articles included in this book are devoted to four main topics. First, Kuhn repeats and defends the idea, which goes back to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (hereinafter simply "Structure"), that science is a cognitive empirical study of nature, exhibiting a special kind of progress, although this progress cannot be thought of as "increasingly approaching to reality." Progress is rather expressed as an improvement in the technical ability to solve puzzles, controlled by strict, though always traditional, standards of success or failure. This kind of progress, which in its fullest expression is unique to science, is the prerequisite for the extremely subtle (and often very expensive) research that characterizes scientific knowledge and for obtaining amazingly accurate and detailed knowledge.

Second, Kuhn develops the idea, again stemming from The Structure, that science is essentially a social enterprise. This is clearly manifested in periods of doubt, fraught with more or less radical changes. It is only because of this that individuals working within the framework of a common research tradition are able to come to different assessments of the difficulties that arise before them. While some tend to develop alternative (often seeming ridiculous, as Kuhn liked to point out) possibilities, while others persist in trying to solve problems within a recognized framework.

The fact that when such difficulties arise, the latter are in the majority is important for diverse scientific practices. Problems can usually be solved - and eventually solved. In the absence of a sufficient margin of perseverance in the search for solutions, the scientist could not reach the end in those rare but defining cases when efforts to carry out a complete conceptual revolution are fully justified. On the other hand, if no one tried to develop alternatives, major transformations could not occur even when they are really needed.

Thus, it is the social scientific tradition that is able to "distribute conceptual risks" in a way that no individual could do, which allows it to ensure the long-term viability of science.

Third, Kuhn clarifies and emphasizes the analogy between the progressive development of science and biological evolution, an analogy that he touches on only in passing in the last pages of the Structure. In developing this theme, he departs from his original scheme, according to which periods of normal science with a single field of study are sometimes torn apart by crushing revolutions. Instead, he introduces a new scheme, where periods of development within a single tradition are sometimes replaced by periods of "splitting" into two different traditions with different areas of study. Of course, the possibility remains that one of these traditions will gradually weaken and die. In this case, we return to the old scheme of revolutions and paradigm shifts.

However, in the history of science, both subsequent traditions often do not quite resemble the previous tradition common to them and develop as new scientific "specialties". In science, speciation manifests itself as specialization.

The structure of scientific revolutions Thomas Kuhn

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Title: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

About The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn

Thomas Kuhn is one of the most famous and influential American historians and philosophers of science of the 20th century. His sensational book entitled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of the most popular and cited works of the entire period of the development of science. The theory of scientific revolutions presented by him as a paradigm shift served as a solid foundation for the formation of methodology, as well as the philosophy of science, having made a big breakthrough in understanding science and evaluating scientific knowledge in modern society. This work will be interesting to read not only for researchers, but also for everyone who is connected by their hobbies or occupation with philosophy, history and culture.

Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a fundamental and rigorous analysis of the history of science. Its publication led to great changes in the field of the sociology of knowledge, and, in addition, introduced the concept of a paradigm into everyday life. This term is based on generally accepted scientific achievements, which, over a period of time, provide the scientific community with a kind of model for posing a question and ways of answering it. According to the author, the development of scientific knowledge occurs in leaps and bounds, with the help of the so-called scientific revolutions. At the same time, any information matters only within the framework of a specific paradigm, a historically formed system of principles and beliefs. The scientific revolution in this context is a change in existing paradigms or their fundamental replacement with new ones.

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn urges his readers to abandon the boring notion of science as a socio-historical mechanism for gathering facts about the world. We present to our attention a fascinating essay devoted to the sociology of science, which is basically an attempt to understand and comprehend how many generations of scientists produce revolutionary shifts in their perception of reality. The book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" examines the most general and universal patterns inherent in scientific knowledge as an integral part of the universal cultural heritage. This work at one time received the widest response and recognition, so it will be useful to read it both for historians of science and specialists in various subject areas.

On our site about books lifeinbooks.net you can download for free without registration or read online book"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" by Thomas Kuhn in epub, fb2, txt, rtf, pdf formats for iPad, iPhone, Android and Kindle. The book will give you a lot of pleasant moments and a real pleasure to read. Buy full version you can have our partner. Also, here you will find the latest news from the literary world, learn the biography of your favorite authors. For beginner writers there is a separate section with useful tips and recommendations interesting articles, thanks to which you yourself can try your hand at literary skills.

My friends and colleagues sometimes ask me why I write about certain books. At first glance, this choice may seem random. Especially given the very wide range of topics. However, there is still a pattern. First, I have "favorite" topics on which I read a lot: the theory of constraints, systems approach, management accounting, Austrian School of Economics, Nassim Taleb, Alpina Publisher… Secondly, in books that I like, I pay attention to the references of the authors and the list of references.

So it is with Thomas Kuhn's book, which, in principle, is far from my subject. For the first time, Stephen Covey gave her a "tip". Here is what he writes in: “The term paradigm shift was first introduced by Thomas Kuhn in his famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn shows that almost any significant breakthrough in the field of science begins with a break with traditions, old thinking, old paradigms.

The second time I met Thomas Kuhn was mentioned by Mikael Krogerus in: “Models clearly demonstrate to us that everything in the world is interconnected, they advise how to act in a given situation, they suggest what is better not to do. Adam Smith knew about this and warned against excessive enthusiasm for abstract systems. After all, models are, after all, a matter of faith. If you're lucky, for approval you can get Nobel Prize like Albert Einstein. Historian and philosopher Thomas Kuhn came to the conclusion that science basically works only to confirm existing models and shows ignorance when the world once again does not fit into them.

And finally, Thomas Corbett in the book, speaking about the paradigm shift in management accounting, writes: “Thomas Kuhn distinguishes two categories of “revolutionaries”: (1) young people who have just been trained, learned the paradigm, but have not put it into practice and (2) older people moving from one field of activity to another. People in both of these categories are, first, operationally naive in the area they have just moved into. They do not understand many of the delicate points of the paradigm-united community they want to join. Second, they don't know what not to do."

So, Thomas Kuhn. The structure of scientific revolutions. – M.: AST, 2009. – 310 p.

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Thomas Kuhn is an outstanding historian and philosopher of science of the 20th century. His theory of scientific revolutions as a paradigm shift became the foundation of modern methodology and philosophy of science, predetermining the very understanding of science and scientific knowledge in modern society.

Chapter 1. The Role of History

If science is seen as a collection of facts, theories and methods collected in textbooks in circulation, then scientists are people who more or less successfully contribute to the creation of this collection. The development of science in this approach is a gradual process in which facts, theories and methods are added up to an ever-increasing stock of achievements, which is scientific methodology and knowledge.

When the specialist can no longer avoid the anomalies that destroy the existing tradition of scientific practice, non-traditional research begins, which eventually leads the entire branch of science to a new system of prescriptions, to a new basis for the practice of scientific research. The exceptional situations in which this change of professional prescriptions occurs will be considered in this paper as scientific revolutions. They are additions to tradition-bound activities in the period of normal science that destroy tradition. We will meet more than once with the great turning points in the development of science associated with the names of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier and Einstein.

Chapter 2. On the way to normal science

In this essay, the term "normal science" means research that is firmly based on one or more past scientific achievements - achievements that have been recognized for some time by a certain scientific community as the basis for its future practical activities. Today such achievements are expounded, though seldom in their original form, in textbooks, either elementary or advanced. These textbooks clarify the essence of the accepted theory, illustrate many or all of its successful applications, and compare these applications with typical observations and experiments. Before such textbooks became widespread, which happened at the beginning of the 19th century (and even later for the newly emerging sciences), a similar function was performed by the famous classical works of scientists: Aristotle's Physics, Ptolemy's Almagest, Newton's Elements and Optics , "Electricity" by Franklin, "Chemistry" by Lavoisier, "Geology" by Lyell and many others. For a long time, they implicitly determined the legitimacy of the problems and methods of research in each field of science for subsequent generations of scientists. This was possible due to two essential features of these works. Their creation was unprecedented enough to attract for a long time a group of supporters from competing lines of scientific research. At the same time, they were open enough that new generations of scientists could find unsolved problems of any kind within them.

Achievements that have these two characteristics, I will call hereinafter "paradigms", a term closely related to the concept of "normal science". By introducing this term, I meant that some generally accepted examples of the actual practice of scientific research - examples that include law, theory, their practical application and the necessary equipment - all together give us models from which specific traditions of scientific research arise.

The formation of a paradigm and the emergence of a more esoteric type of research on its basis is a sign of the maturity of the development of any scientific discipline. If the historian traces the development of scientific knowledge about any group of related phenomena back into the depths of time, then he will probably encounter a repetition in miniature of the model that is illustrated in this essay by examples from the history of physical optics. Modern physics textbooks tell students that light is a stream of photons, that is, quantum mechanical entities that exhibit some wave properties and at the same time some properties of particles. The investigation proceeds according to these ideas, or rather according to the more developed and mathematicized description from which this ordinary verbal description is derived. This understanding of light, however, has no more than half a century of history. Before it was developed by Planck, Einstein and others at the beginning of this century, physics textbooks said that light is the propagation of transverse waves. This notion was a derivation from a paradigm that goes back ultimately to the work of Jung and Fresnel in optics relating to early XIX centuries. At the same time, the wave theory was not the first to be accepted by almost all researchers in optics. During the 18th century, the paradigm in this field was based on Newton's "Optics", who argued that light is a stream of material particles. At the time, physicists were looking for proof of the pressure of light particles hitting solids; the early adherents of the wave theory did not aspire to this at all.

These transformations of the paradigms of physical optics are scientific revolutions, and the gradual transition from one paradigm to another through a revolution is a common model for the development of a mature science.

When an individual scientist can accept a paradigm without proof, he does not have to rebuild the entire field in his work, starting from the original principles, and justify the introduction of each new concept. This can be provided to the authors of the textbooks. The results of his research will no longer be presented in books addressed, like Franklin's Experiments in Electricity or Darwin's On the Origin of Species, to anyone who is interested in the subject of their research. Instead, they tend to be published as short articles intended only for professional colleagues, only for those who supposedly know the paradigm and are able to read articles addressed to him.

Since prehistoric times, one science after another has crossed the border between what the historian can call the prehistory of a given science as a science, and its proper history.

Chapter 3 The Nature of Normal Science

If a paradigm is a job that is done once, for everyone, then what problems does it leave for the subsequent solution of this group? The concept of a paradigm means an accepted model or pattern. Like a court decision under a general law, it is an object for further development and specification in new or more difficult conditions.

Paradigms acquire their status because their use leads to success rather than competing methods of solving some of the problems that the research team recognizes as the most pressing. The success of the paradigm at the outset is mainly the prospect of success in solving a number of problems of a special kind. Normal science consists in realizing this perspective as knowledge of the facts partially outlined within the framework of the paradigm expands.

Few who are not actually researchers in mature science are aware of how much routine work of this kind is carried out within a paradigm, or how attractive such work can be. It is the restoring of order that most scientists are engaged in in the course of their scientific activities. This is what I call normal science here. One gets the impression that they are trying to “squeeze” nature into the paradigm, as if into a prefabricated and rather cramped box. The goal of normal science in no way requires the prediction of new kinds of phenomena: phenomena that do not fit into this box are often, in fact, generally overlooked. Scientists in the mainstream of normal science do not set themselves the goal of creating new theories, and usually, moreover, they are intolerant of the creation of such theories by others. On the contrary, research in normal science is aimed at developing those phenomena and theories, the existence of which the paradigm presupposes.

The paradigm forces scientists to explore some fragment of nature in such detail and depth as it would be unthinkable under other circumstances. And normal science has its own mechanism to relax these limitations, which make themselves felt in the process of research whenever the paradigm from which they follow ceases to serve effectively. From this point on, scientists begin to change their tactics. The nature of the problems they study is also changing. However, up to that point, as long as the paradigm is functioning successfully, the professional community will solve problems that its members could hardly imagine and, in any case, could never solve if they did not have a paradigm.

There is a class of facts which, as the paradigm testifies, are especially indicative of revealing the essence of things. By using these facts to solve problems, the paradigm tends to refine and recognize them in an ever wider range of situations. From Tycho Brahe to E. O. Lorenz, some scientists have earned their reputation as greats not for the novelty of their discoveries, but for the accuracy, reliability, and breadth of the methods they have developed to refine previously known categories of facts.

Great effort and ingenuity to bring theory and nature into closer and closer correspondence with each other. These attempts to prove such a correspondence constitute the second type of normal experimental activity, and this type is even more explicitly paradigm-dependent than the first. The existence of a paradigm presupposes that the problem is solvable.

For an exhaustive idea of ​​the activity of accumulating facts in normal science, I think we must point to a third class of experiments and observations. He presents the empirical work that is being undertaken to develop a paradigm theory in order to resolve some of the remaining ambiguities and improve the resolution of problems that have previously been touched only superficially. This class is the most important of all the others.

Examples of work in this direction include the determination of the universal gravitational constant, the Avogadro number, the Joule coefficient, the charge of the electron, etc. Very few of these carefully prepared attempts could have been made, and none of them would have borne fruit without paradigm theory that formulated the problem and guaranteed the existence of a certain solution.

Efforts aimed at developing a paradigm can be aimed, for example, at discovering quantitative laws: Boyle's law, relating the pressure of a gas to its volume, Coulomb's law of electric attraction, and Joule's formula, relating the heat radiated by a conductor through which a current flows, with the strength of the current and resistance. Quantitative laws arise through the development of a paradigm. In fact, there is such a general and close connection between the qualitative paradigm and the quantitative law that, after Galileo, such laws were often correctly guessed by means of the paradigm many years before the instruments for their experimental detection were created.

From Euler and Lagrange in the 18th century to Hamilton, Jacobi, Hertz in the 19th century, many of the brilliant European mathematical physicists repeatedly tried to reformulate theoretical mechanics in a way that would give it a more logically and aesthetically satisfying form without changing its basic content. In other words, they wanted to present the overt and covert ideas of the Elements and all of continental mechanics in a logically more coherent way, one that was both more unified and less ambiguous in its application to the newly developed problems of mechanics.

Or another example: the same researchers who, in order to mark the boundary between different theories of heating, set up experiments by increasing pressure, were, as a rule, those who offered different options for comparison. They worked with both facts and theories, and their work gave not only new information, but also a more accurate paradigm by removing the ambiguities that lurked in the original form of the paradigm they were working with. In many disciplines, most of the work that falls within the realm of normal science is just that.

These three classes of problems - the establishment of significant facts, the comparison of facts and theory, the development of theory - exhaust, I think, the field of normal science, both empirical and theoretical. Work within the framework of a paradigm cannot proceed otherwise, and to abandon a paradigm would mean to stop the scientific research that it defines. We will soon show what makes scientists abandon a paradigm. Such paradigm breaks represent moments when scientific revolutions occur.

Chapter 4

By mastering the paradigm, the scientific community has a criterion for choosing problems that can be considered in principle solvable, as long as this paradigm is accepted without proof. To a large extent, these are only those issues that the community recognizes as scientific or worthy of the attention of members of this community. Other problems, including many previously considered standard, are dismissed as metaphysical, as belonging to another discipline, or sometimes simply because they are too questionable to waste time on. The paradigm in this case can even isolate the community from those socially important problems that cannot be reduced to the type of puzzles, since they cannot be represented in terms of the conceptual and instrumental apparatus that the paradigm suggests. Such problems are seen only as diverting the researcher's attention from the real problems.

A problem classified as a puzzle should be characterized by more than just the fact that it has a guaranteed solution. There must also be rules that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which those solutions are reached.

After about 1630, and especially after the appearance of the scientific works of Descartes, which had an unusually large impact, most physicists admitted that the universe consists of microscopic particles, corpuscles, and that all natural phenomena can be explained in terms of corpuscular shapes, corpuscular dimensions, movement. and interactions. This set of prescriptions turned out to be both metaphysical and methodological. As a metaphysical one, he pointed out to physicists what kinds of entities really take place in the Universe and which do not: there is only matter that has a form and is in motion. As a methodological set of prescriptions, he pointed out to physicists what the final explanations and fundamental laws should be: laws should determine the nature of corpuscular motion and interaction, and explanations should reduce any given natural phenomenon to a corpuscular mechanism that obeys these laws.

The existence of such a rigidly defined network of prescriptions - conceptual, instrumental and methodological - provides the basis for a metaphor that likens normal science to solving puzzles. Insofar as this network provides rules that indicate to the researcher in the field of mature science what the world and the science that studies it are, so far he can calmly concentrate his efforts on the esoteric problems determined for him by these rules and existing knowledge.

Chapter 5

Paradigms can determine the nature of normal science without the intervention of discoverable rules. The first reason is the extreme difficulty of discovering the rules that govern scientists within particular traditions of normal research. These difficulties are reminiscent of the dilemma that a philosopher faces when trying to figure out what all games have in common. The second reason is rooted in the nature of science education. For example, if a student of Newtonian dynamics ever discovers the meaning of the terms “force”, “mass”, “space” and “time”, then not so much incomplete, but generally useful definitions will help him in this. in textbooks, how much observation and application of these concepts in problem solving.

Normal science can develop without rules only as long as the relevant scientific community accepts without doubt the already achieved solutions to certain particular problems. Rules, therefore, must gradually acquire fundamental importance, and the characteristic indifference to them must disappear whenever confidence in paradigms or models is lost. It is curious that this is exactly what is happening. As long as paradigms remain in place, they can function without any rationalization and regardless of whether attempts are made to rationalize them.

Chapter 6

In science, discovery is always accompanied by difficulties, meets with resistance, is affirmed contrary to the basic principles on which expectation is based. At first, only the expected and the ordinary are perceived, even under circumstances in which an anomaly is later discovered. However, further familiarization leads to the realization of some errors or to finding a connection between the result and what from the previous one led to the error. This awareness of the anomaly opens a period when conceptual categories are adjusted until the resulting anomaly becomes the expected result. Why is it that normal science, not striving directly for new discoveries and intending at first even to suppress them, can nevertheless constantly effective tool generating these discoveries?

In the development of any science, the first generally accepted paradigm is usually considered quite acceptable for most of the observations and experiments available to specialists in this field. Therefore, further development, usually requiring the creation of an elaborate technique, is the development of esoteric vocabulary and skill and the refinement of concepts, the resemblance of which to their prototypes taken from the realm of common sense is constantly decreasing. Such professionalization leads, on the one hand, to a strong limitation of the scientist's field of vision and to stubborn resistance to any changes in the paradigm. Science is becoming more and more rigorous. On the other hand, within those areas to which the paradigm directs the efforts of the group, normal science leads to the accumulation of detailed information and to a refinement of the correspondence between observation and theory that could not be achieved otherwise. The more precise and advanced the paradigm, the more sensitive it is as an indicator for anomaly detection, thereby leading to a change in the paradigm. In the normal pattern of discovery, even resistance to change is beneficial. While ensuring that the paradigm is not thrown off too easily, resistance also ensures that the attention of scientists cannot be easily diverted and that only anomalies that permeate scientific knowledge to its very core will lead to a paradigm shift.

Chapter 7

The emergence of new theories, as a rule, is preceded by a period of pronounced professional uncertainty. Perhaps this uncertainty stems from the constant inability of normal science to solve its puzzles as much as it should. The bankruptcy of existing rules means a prelude to the search for new ones.

The new theory appears as a direct reaction to the crisis.

Philosophers of science have repeatedly shown that more than one theoretical construct can always be built on the same set of data. The history of science shows that, especially in the early stages of the development of a new paradigm, it is not very difficult to create such alternatives. But such an invention of alternatives is precisely the means to which scientists rarely resort. As long as the means presented by a paradigm allow us to successfully solve the problems it generates, science advances most successfully and penetrates to the deepest level of phenomena, confidently using these means. The reason for this is clear. As in production, in science, changing tools is an extreme measure, which is resorted to only in case of real need. The significance of crises lies precisely in what they say about the timeliness of a change of instruments.

Chapter 8

Crises are a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of new theories. Let's see how scientists react to their existence. A partial answer, as obvious as it is important, can be obtained by first considering what scientists never do when faced with even strong and prolonged anomalies. Although they may gradually lose confidence in the old theories from this point on and then think about alternatives to get out of the crisis, nevertheless, they never easily give up the paradigm that plunged them into the crisis. In other words, they do not consider anomalies as counterexamples. Once it reaches the status of a paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative version is suitable to take its place. There is not yet a single process revealed by the study of the history of scientific development, which on the whole would resemble the methodological stereotype of refuting a theory by means of its direct comparison with nature. The verdict that leads a scientist to abandon a previously accepted theory is always based on something more than a comparison of the theory with the world around us. The decision to abandon a paradigm is always at the same time a decision to adopt another paradigm, and the judgment that leads to such a decision includes both the comparison of both paradigms with nature and the comparison of paradigms with each other.

In addition, there is a second reason to doubt that the scientist abandons paradigms as a result of encountering anomalies or counterexamples. Defenders of the theory will invent countless ad hoc interpretations and modifications of their theories in order to eliminate apparent contradiction.

Some scientists, although history will hardly record their names, no doubt were forced to leave science because they could not cope with the crisis. Like artists, creative scientists must sometimes be able to get through hard times in a world that is falling into disarray.

Any crisis begins with paradigm doubt and subsequent loosening of the rules of normal research. All crises end in one of three possible outcomes. Sometimes normal science eventually proves its ability to solve the problem that gives rise to the crisis, despite the despair of those who saw it as the end of the existing paradigm. In other cases, even apparently radically new approaches do not correct the situation. Scientists may then conclude that, given the state of affairs in their field of study, a solution to the problem is not in sight. The problem is labeled appropriately and left aside as a legacy to future generations in the hope that it will be solved with better methods. Finally, there is a case that will be of particular interest to us when the crisis is resolved with the emergence of a new contender for the place of the paradigm and the subsequent struggle for its acceptance.

The transition from a paradigm in a period of crisis to a new paradigm from which a new tradition of normal science may be born is a process far from cumulative and not one that could be brought about by a clearer development or extension of the old paradigm. This process is more like a reconstruction of a field on new grounds, a reconstruction that changes some of the most elementary theoretical generalizations in the field, as well as many of the methods and applications of the paradigm. During the transition period, there is a large but never complete overlap of problems that can be solved using both the old paradigm and the new one. However, there is a striking difference in the methods of solution. By the time the transition ends, the professional scientist will have already changed his point of view on the field of study, its methods and goals.

Almost always, the people who successfully undertake the fundamental development of a new paradigm were either very young or new to the field they paradigm-transformed. And perhaps this point does not need clarification, since obviously they, being little connected by previous practice with the traditional rules of normal science, may most likely see that the rules are no longer suitable, and begin to select another system of rules that can replace the previous one. .

Faced with an anomaly or crisis, scientists take different positions in relation to existing paradigms, and the nature of their research changes accordingly. The increase in competing options, the willingness to try something else, the expression of obvious dissatisfaction, the appeal to philosophy for help, and the discussion of fundamental positions are all symptoms of the transition from normal research to extraordinary. It is on the existence of these symptoms, more than on revolutions, that the concept of normal science rests.

Chapter 9. The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions

Scientific revolutions are considered here as such not cumulative episodes in the development of science, during which the old paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by a new paradigm that is incompatible with the old one. Why should a paradigm shift be called a revolution? Given the broad, essential difference between political and scientific development, what parallelism can justify a metaphor that finds revolution in both?

Political revolutions begin with a growing consciousness (often limited to some part of the political community) that existing institutions have ceased to adequately respond to the problems posed by the environment they have partly created. Scientific revolutions in much the same way begin with an increase in consciousness, again often limited to a narrow division of the scientific community, that the existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the study of that aspect of nature to which this paradigm itself previously paved the way. In both political and scientific development, the realization of a dysfunction that can lead to a crisis is the prerequisite for revolution.

Political revolutions aim to change political institutions in ways that those institutions themselves prohibit. Therefore, the success of revolutions forces us to partially abandon a number of institutions in favor of others. Society is divided into warring camps or parties; one party is trying to defend the old social institutions, others are trying to establish some new ones. When this polarization occurred, political way out of the situation is impossible. Like the choice between competing political institutions, the choice between competing paradigms turns out to be a choice between incompatible patterns of community life. When paradigms, as they should, fall into the mainstream of debates about paradigm choice, the question of their meaning necessarily falls into vicious circle: Each group uses its own paradigm to argue for that same paradigm.

Questions of paradigm choice can never be clearly decided solely by logic and experiment.

The development of science could be truly cumulative. New kinds of phenomena might simply reveal orderliness in some aspect of nature where no one had previously noticed it. In the evolution of science, new knowledge would replace ignorance, and not knowledge of a different and incompatible kind. But if the emergence of new theories is caused by the need to resolve anomalies in relation to existing theories in their connection with nature, then a successful new theory must allow predictions that differ from those derived from previous theories. Such a difference might not exist if the two theories were logically compatible. Although the logical incorporation of one theory into another remains a valid option in relation to successive scientific theories, from the point of view of historical research this is implausible.

The most famous and striking example of such a limited understanding of scientific theory is the analysis of the relationship between Einstein's modern dynamics and the old equations of dynamics that followed from Newton's Elements. From the point of view of the present work, these two theories are completely incompatible in the same sense in which the incompatibility of Copernican and Ptolemaic astronomy was shown: Einstein's theory can be accepted only if it is recognized that Newton's theory is erroneous.

The transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics illustrates with complete clarity the scientific revolution as a change in the conceptual grid through which scientists viewed the world. Although an obsolete theory can always be regarded as a special case of its modern successor, it must be reformed for this purpose. Transformation, on the other hand, is something that can be done using the benefits of hindsight—a distinct application of more recent theory. Moreover, even if this transformation was intended to interpret an old theory, the result of its application must be a theory limited to such an extent that it can only reformulate what is already known. Because of its economy, this reformulation of the theory is useful, but it cannot be sufficient to guide research.

Chapter 10

The change in paradigm forces scientists to see the world of their research problems in a different light. Since they see this world only through the prism of their views and deeds, we may be tempted to say that after the revolution, scientists are dealing with a different world. During a revolution, when the normal scientific tradition begins to change, the scientist must learn to re-perceive the world- in some well-known situations, he must learn to see a new gestalt. A prerequisite for perception itself is a certain stereotype resembling a paradigm. What a person sees depends on what he is looking at and what his prior visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see.

I am keenly aware of the difficulties involved in saying that when Aristotle and Galileo considered the vibrations of the stones, the former saw the fall restrained by the chain, and the latter saw the pendulum. Although the world does not change with a change in paradigm, the scientist after this change works in a different world. What happens in a period of scientific revolution cannot be wholly reduced to a new interpretation of isolated and immutable facts. The scientist who accepts the new paradigm acts rather than as an interpreter, but as a person looking through a lens that reverses the image. Given a paradigm, interpretation of the data is the main element of the scientific discipline that studies them. But interpretation can only develop a paradigm, not correct it. Paradigms cannot be corrected at all within the framework of normal science. Instead, as we have seen, normal science ultimately only leads to the realization of anomalies and crises. And the latter are resolved not as a result of reflection and interpretation, but due to a somewhat unexpected and non-structural event, like a gestalt switch. After this event, scholars often speak of a “veil falling from the eyes” or “illumination” that illuminates a previously intricate puzzle, thereby adapting its components to be seen from a new perspective, allowing for the first time to reach its solution.

The operations and measurements that the scientist undertakes in the laboratory are not "ready-made data" of experience, but rather data "collected with great difficulty." They are not what the scientist sees, at least until his research bears its first fruits and his attention is focused on them. Rather, they are specific indications of the content of more elementary perceptions, and as such they are selected for careful analysis in the mainstream of normal research only because they promise rich opportunities for the successful development of an accepted paradigm. Operations and measurements are determined by the paradigm much more explicitly than the direct experience from which they partly derive. Science does not deal with all possible laboratory operations. Instead, it selects operations that are relevant in terms of matching the paradigm to the direct experience that the paradigm partially defines. As a result, with the help of various paradigms, scientists engage in specific laboratory operations. The measurements to be taken in the pendulum experiment do not correspond to those in the case of a restrained fall.

No language, limited to a description of the world known exhaustively and in advance, can give a neutral and objective description. Two people with the same image on the retina can see different things. Psychology gives many facts of this effect, and the doubts that follow from this are easily reinforced by the history of attempts to represent the actual language of observation. No modern attempt to reach such an end has so far come even close to a universal language of pure perception. The same attempts that have brought the others closer to this goal have one general characteristics, which significantly reinforces the main theses of our essay. From the very beginning they assume the existence of a paradigm taken either from a given scientific theory or from fragmentary reasoning from the standpoint of common sense, and then they try to eliminate all non-logical and non-perceptual terms from the paradigm.

Neither the scientist nor the amateur is accustomed to seeing the world piece by piece or point by point. Paradigms define large areas of experience at the same time. The search for an operational definition or pure observational language can only be started after experience has been thus determined.

After the scientific revolution, many old measurements and operations become inexpedient and are replaced accordingly by others. The same test operations cannot be applied to both oxygen and dephlogisticated air. But changes of this kind are never universal. Whatever the scientist sees after the revolution, he is still looking at the same world. Moreover, much of the language apparatus, like most laboratory instruments, is still the same as it was before the scientific revolution, although the scientist may begin to use them in new ways. As a result, science after a period of revolution always includes many of the same operations, carried out by the same instruments, and describes objects in the same terms as in the pre-revolutionary period.

Dalton was not a chemist and had no interest in chemistry. He was a meteorologist interested (for himself) in the physical problems of absorption of gases in water and water in the atmosphere. Partly because his skills were acquired for another specialty, and partly because of his work in his specialty, he approached these problems from a paradigm different from that of contemporary chemists. In particular, he considered the mixture of gases or the absorption of gases in water as a physical process in which the types of affinity played no role. Therefore, for Dalton, the observed homogeneity of solutions was a problem, but a problem that he believed could be solved if it were possible to determine the relative volumes and weights of the various atomic particles in his experimental mixture. It was necessary to determine these dimensions and weights. But this problem led Dalton to finally turn to chemistry, suggesting from the very beginning the assumption that in a certain limited series of reactions considered as chemical, atoms can only combine in a one-to-one ratio or in some other simple, integer proportion. This natural assumption helped him to determine the sizes and weights of elementary particles, but turned the law of constancy of relations into a tautology. For Dalton, any reaction whose components did not obey multiple ratios was not yet ipso facto (thus) purely chemical process. A law that could not be established experimentally before Dalton's work, with the recognition of this work, becomes a constitutive principle, by virtue of which no set of chemical measurements can be violated. After Dalton's work, the same chemical experiments as before became the basis for completely different generalizations. This event may serve as perhaps the best typical example of the scientific revolution for us.

Chapter 11

I suggest that there are eminently good reasons why revolutions are almost invisible. The purpose of the textbooks is to teach the vocabulary and syntax of the modern scientific language. Popular literature seeks to describe the same applications in a language closer to that of everyday life. And the philosophy of science, especially in a world that speaks English language, analyzes logical structure the same complete knowledge. All three types of information describe the established achievements of past revolutions and thus reveal the basis of the modern tradition of normal science. To perform their function, they do not need reliable information about the way in which these bases were first found and then accepted by professional scientists. Therefore, at least textbooks are distinguished by features that will constantly disorient readers. Textbooks, being a pedagogical vehicle for the perpetuation of normal science, must be rewritten in whole or in part whenever the language, problem structure, or standards of normal science change after every scientific revolution. And once this procedure of rewriting textbooks is completed, it inevitably masks not only the role, but even the existence of the revolutions that brought them to light.

Textbooks narrow scholars' sense of the history of the discipline. Textbooks refer only to that part of the work of scientists of the past, which can be easily perceived as a contribution to the formulation and solution of problems that correspond to the paradigm adopted in this textbook. Partly due to the selection of material and partly due to its distortion, the scientists of the past are unreservedly portrayed as scientists working on the same set of persistent problems and with the same set of canons to which the last revolution in scientific theory and method secured the prerogatives of scientificity. Not surprisingly, textbooks and the historical tradition they contain must be rewritten after every scientific revolution. And it is not surprising that as soon as they are rewritten, science in a new presentation each time acquires to a large extent external signs of cumulativeness.

Newton wrote that Galileo discovered the law according to which a constant force of gravity causes a motion whose speed is proportional to the square of time. In fact, Galileo's kinematic theorem takes such a form when it enters Newton's matrix of dynamical concepts. But Galileo said nothing of the sort. His consideration of the fall of bodies rarely concerns forces, and even more so the constant gravitational force, which is the cause of the fall of bodies. By attributing to Galileo an answer to a question that Galileo's paradigm did not even allow to be asked, the Newtonian description masked the impact of a slight but revolutionary reformulation in the questions that scientists posed about motion, as well as in the answers they thought they could accept. But this just constitutes the type of change in the formulation of questions and answers that explains (much better than new empirical discoveries) the transition from Aristotle to Galileo and from Galileo to Newtonian dynamics. By ignoring such changes and seeking to present the development of science in a linear way, the textbook hides the process that lies at the origin of most significant events in the development of science.

The foregoing examples reveal, each in the context of a particular revolution, the sources of the reconstruction of history, which constantly culminates in the writing of textbooks reflecting the post-revolutionary state of science. But such a “completion” leads to even more serious consequences than the false interpretations mentioned above. False interpretations make the revolution invisible: textbooks, which give a rearrangement of the visible material, depict the development of science in the form of a process that, if it existed, would make all revolutions meaningless. Because they are designed to quickly introduce the student to what the modern scientific community considers to be knowledge, textbooks interpret the various experiments, concepts, laws, and theories of existing normal science as separate and successive as continuously as possible. From the point of view of pedagogy, this technique of presentation is impeccable. But such a presentation, combined with the spirit of complete non-historicity that permeates science, and with systematically repeated errors in interpretation historical facts discussed above, inevitably leads to the strong impression that science reaches its present level through a series of separate discoveries and inventions, which - when put together - form a system of modern concrete knowledge. At the very beginning of the formation of science, as the textbooks present, scientists strive for those goals that are embodied in the current paradigms. One by one, in a process often compared to building a brick building, scientists add new facts, concepts, laws, or theories to the body of information contained in today's textbooks.

However, scientific knowledge does not develop along this path. Many of the puzzles of modern normal science did not exist until after the last scientific revolution. Very few of them can be traced back to the historical origins of the science within which they currently exist. The earlier generations explored their own problems by their own means and according to their own canons of solutions. But it's not just the problems that have changed. Rather, it can be said that the entire network of facts and theories that the textbook paradigm brings into line with nature is undergoing replacement.

Chapter 12

Any new interpretation of nature, whether it be a discovery or a theory, first appears in the head of one or more individuals. These are the ones who are the first to learn to see science and the world differently, and their ability to make the transition to a new vision is facilitated by two circumstances that are not shared by most other members of the professional group. Constantly their attention is intensely focused on the problems that cause the crisis; moreover, they are usually scientists so young or new to a field in crisis that established research practice links them to worldviews and rules that are defined by the old paradigm less strongly than most contemporaries.

In the sciences, the verification operation never consists, as it does in solving puzzles, simply in comparing a particular paradigm with nature. Instead, verification is part of the competition between two competing paradigms to win over the scientific community.

This formulation reveals unexpected and perhaps significant parallels with two of the most popular contemporary philosophical theories of verification. Very few philosophers of science are still looking for an absolute criterion for the verification of scientific theories. Noting that no theory can be subjected to all possible relevant tests, they ask not whether the theory has been verified, but rather its likelihood in the light of the evidence that actually exists, and to answer this question , one of the influential philosophical schools is forced to compare the possibilities of various theories in explaining the accumulated data.

A radically different approach to this whole complex of problems was developed by K. R. Popper, who denies the existence of any verification procedures at all (see, for example, ). Instead, he emphasizes the need for falsification, that is, testing that requires the refutation of an established theory because its result is negative. It is clear that the role thus ascribed to falsification is in many respects similar to the role assigned in this work to anomalous experience, that is, experience which, by causing a crisis, prepares the way for a new theory. However, an anomalous experience cannot be identified with a falsifying experience. In fact, I even doubt whether the latter actually exists. As has been repeatedly emphasized before, no theory ever solves all the puzzles it faces at a given time, nor is there any solution already achieved that is completely flawless. On the contrary, it is precisely the incompleteness and imperfection of the existing theoretical data that makes it possible at any moment to determine the many puzzles that characterize normal science. If every failure to establish the correspondence of a theory to nature were grounds for its refutation, then all theories could be refuted at any moment. On the other hand, if only serious failure is sufficient to disprove the theory, then Popper's followers will need some criterion of "improbability" or "degree of falsifiability." In developing such a criterion, they will almost certainly encounter the same series of difficulties that the advocates of various probabilistic verification theories face.

The transition from the recognition of one paradigm to the recognition of another is an act of "conversion" in which there can be no place for coercion. Lifelong resistance, especially those whose creative biographies connected with a debt to the old tradition of normal science, does not constitute a violation of scientific standards, but is feature the nature of scientific research itself. The source of resistance lies in the conviction that the old paradigm will eventually solve all problems, that nature can be squeezed into the framework provided by this paradigm.

How is the transition made and how is resistance overcome? This question refers to the technique of persuasion, or to arguments or counterarguments in a situation where there can be no evidence. The most common claim made by advocates of the new paradigm is that they can solve the problems that brought the old paradigm into crisis. When it can be made convincingly enough, such a claim is most effective in arguing for the proponents of the new paradigm. There are also other kinds of considerations that may lead scientists to abandon the old paradigm in favor of the new one. These are arguments that are rarely stated clearly, definitely, but appeal to an individual sense of convenience, to an aesthetic feeling. It is believed that the new theory should be "clearer", "more convenient" or "simpler" than the old one. The value of aesthetic evaluations can sometimes be decisive.

Chapter 13

Why is progress always and almost exclusively an attribute of the kind of activity we call scientific? Note that in a sense this is a purely semantic issue. To a large extent, the term "science" is just intended for those branches of human activity, the paths of progress of which are easily traced. Nowhere is this more evident than in the recurring debate about whether this or that modern social discipline is truly scientific. These disputes have parallels in the pre-paradigm periods of those fields that are today without hesitation endowed with the title "science".

We have already noted that once a common paradigm is adopted, the scientific community is freed from the need to continually reconsider its basic principles; members of such a community can focus exclusively on the subtlest and most esoteric phenomena that interest him. This inevitably increases both the efficiency and effectiveness with which the entire group tackles new problems.

Some of these aspects are consequences of the unparalleled isolation of the mature scientific community from the requests not professionals and everyday life. As far as the degree of isolation is concerned, this isolation is never complete. However, there is no other professional community where individual creative work would be so directly addressed to other members of the professional group and judged by them. Precisely because he works only for an audience of colleagues - an audience that shares his own assessments and beliefs - a scientist can accept without proof a single system of standards. He doesn't have to worry about what other groups or schools think, and so he can put one problem aside and move on to the next faster. than those who work for a more diverse group. Unlike engineers, most physicians, and most theologians, the scientist does not need to choose problems, since the latter themselves urgently demand their solution, even regardless of the means by which this solution is obtained. In this aspect, thinking about the difference between natural scientists and many social scientists is very instructive. The latter often resort (while the former almost never do) to justify their choice of research problem, whether it be the consequences of racial discrimination or the causes of economic cycles, mainly on the basis of the social significance of solving these problems. It is not difficult to understand when - in the first or in the second case - one can hope for a speedy solution to problems.

The consequences of isolation from society are greatly exacerbated by another characteristic of the professional scientific community - the nature of its scientific education in order to prepare for participation in independent research. In music, fine arts and literature, a person is educated by getting acquainted with the work of other artists, especially earlier ones. Textbooks, excluding manuals and reference books on original works, play only a secondary role here. In history, philosophy and social sciences educational literature is more important. But even in these areas, an elementary university course involves parallel reading of original sources, some of which are classics of the field, others of which are modern research reports that scientists write for each other. As a result, a student of any of these disciplines is constantly aware of the huge variety of problems that the members of his future group intend to solve over time. More importantly, the student is constantly in a circle of multiple competing and disparate solutions to these problems, solutions that he must ultimately judge for himself.

In the modern sciences, the student relies mainly on textbooks until, in the third or fourth year of an academic course, he begins his own research. If there is trust in the paradigms underlying the method of education, few scholars are eager to change it. Why, after all, should a student of physics, for example, read the works of Newton, Faraday, Einstein, or Schrödinger, when everything he needs to know about these works is set out in much shorter, more precise, and more systematic form in many modern textbooks?

Every civilization documented has had technology, art, religion, political system, laws and so on. In many cases, these aspects of civilizations were developed in the same way as in our civilization. But only a civilization that originates in the culture of the ancient Hellenes has a science that has really come out of its infancy. After all, the bulk of scientific knowledge is the result of the work of European scientists in the last four centuries. In no other place, at no other time, were special communities founded that were so scientifically productive.

When a new paradigm candidate comes into existence, scientists will resist accepting it until they are convinced that the two most important conditions are satisfied. First, the new candidate must apparently be solving some controversial and generally recognized problem that cannot be solved in any other way. Second, the new paradigm must promise to retain much of the real problem-solving ability that has accumulated in science through previous paradigms. Novelty for the sake of novelty is not the goal of science, as is the case in many other creative fields.

The process of development described in this essay is a process of evolution from primitive beginnings, a process whose successive stages are characterized by ever-increasing detail and a more perfect understanding of nature. But nothing that has been or will be said makes this process of evolution directed to anything. We are too accustomed to regard science as an undertaking which is continually drawing nearer and nearer to some goal predetermined by nature.

But is such a goal necessary? If we learn to replace "evolution towards what we hope to know" with "evolution from what we know," then a lot of the problems that irritate us can disappear. It is possible that the problem of induction belongs to such problems.

When Darwin first published in 1859 his book on the theory of evolution explained by natural selection, most professionals were probably not concerned with the concept of species change and the possible origin of man from apes. All of the well-known pre-Darwinian evolutionary theories of Lamarck, Chambers, Spencer, and the German natural philosophers presented evolution as a purposeful process. The “idea” of man and modern flora and fauna must have been present from the first creation of life, perhaps in the mind of God. This idea (or plan) provided the direction and guiding force for the entire evolutionary process. Each new stage of evolutionary development was a more perfect realization of the plan that existed from the very beginning.

For many people, the refutation of evolution of this teleological type was the most significant and least pleasant of Darwin's proposals. The Origin of Species did not recognize any goal set by God or nature. Instead of this natural selection, dealing with the interaction of a given environment and the real organisms that inhabit it, has been responsible for the gradual but steady emergence of more organized, more developed, and much more specialized organisms. Even such wonderfully adapted organs as the eyes and hands of man - organs whose creation in the first place provided powerful arguments in defense of the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe existence of a supreme creator and an original plan - turned out to be the products of a process that steadily developed from primitive beginnings, but not in the direction of to some purpose. The belief that natural selection, stemming from a simple competitive struggle among organisms for survival, could create man, along with highly evolved animals and plants, was the most difficult and troubling aspect of Darwin's theory. What could the terms "evolution", "development" and "progress" mean in the absence of a specific goal? For many, such terms seemed self-contradictory.

The analogy that links the evolution of organisms to the evolution of scientific ideas can easily be carried too far. But for the consideration of the issues of this final section, it is quite suitable. The process described in Section XII as the resolution of revolutions is the selection, through conflict within the scientific community, of the most suitable mode of future scientific activity. The net result of the exercise of such a revolutionary selection, determined by periods of normal research, is the wonderfully adapted set of tools that we call modern scientific knowledge. Successive stages in this process of development are marked by an increase in concreteness and specialization.

Addition 1969

There is scientific schools, that is, communities that approach the same subject from incompatible points of view . But in science this happens much less frequently than in other areas of human activity.; such schools always compete with each other, but the competition usually ends quickly.

One of the fundamental aids by which the members of a group, whether it be an entire civilization or a community of specialists included in it, learn to see the same things, given the same stimuli, is by showing examples of situations that their predecessors in the group already learned to see similar to one another and unlike situations of a different kind.

When using the term vision interpretation begins where perception ends. The two processes are not identical, and what perception leaves for interpretation depends decisively on the nature and extent of prior experience and training.

I chose this edition for its compactness and paperback (if you have to scan, then hardcover books are less suitable for this). But… the quality of printing turned out to be quite low, which made it really difficult to read. So I recommend choosing another edition.

Another mention of operational definitions. This is a very important topic not only in science but also in management. See, for example,

Phlogiston (from the Greek φλογιστός - combustible, flammable) - in the history of chemistry - a hypothetical "hyperfine matter" - a "fiery substance" that allegedly fills all combustible substances and is released from them during combustion.