Helping the Prague Uprising A month has passed. The war was over. Berlin fell. On May 6, the chief of intelligence, General Ivan Lenchik, conveyed the order of Marshal Konev: Major Skripka to arrive in Dresden, where the front headquarters was located. As the army scouts joked: an old warrior is wise

On April 22, 1945, in the afternoon, a daily operational meeting began in the Reich Chancellery in Hitler's bunker. In addition to Hitler, Keitel and Jodl, General Krebs, General Burgdorf, Martin Bormann, Ribbentrop liaison officer M. Hevel and several adjutants were also present.

In the morning, Hitler demanded to contact the command post of the 11th Army, which was located in Liebenwerde. In addition, Hitler ordered SS Obergruppenfuehrer Steiner, the former commander of the 11th Army, to gather all the forces at his disposal and throw them into the defense of the Reich capital. At that moment, units of the Red Army were already on the outskirts of Berlin. The haste of this order was due to the fact that the 9th Army, located southwest of Frankfurt, was surrounded between Cottbus and Barut.

Around this time, fighting began on the eastern outskirts of Berlin. Here, resistance to the units of the Red Army was provided by units of the LVI (56th) Panzer Corps, the commander of which was General of Artillery Weidling. Anticipating the development of events, Weidling, on the night of April 22, moved the location of the corps headquarters from Schöneiche to the building of a nursing home located in Biesdorf (South). By this time, the Oder front, up to its northern part, had completely collapsed.

The operational meeting with Hitler began with a report by Colonel-General Jodl. Then General Krebs took the floor. Both of them, shortly before the start of the meeting, received a message that General Waffen-SS Steiner did not have enough troops at his disposal to break through to Berlin. Colonel General Jodl had to report that Soviet troops had crushed the southern flank of the 3rd German Panzer Army and that the troops under the command of Marshal Zhukov could at any time begin an assault on Troienbritzen and Zossen located south of Berlin. But before Jodl could finish his report, Hitler interrupted him abruptly. The Fuehrer wanted to know where the SS Obergruppenfuehrer Steiner was and when his army could strike at the units of the Red Army located near Berlin. Now the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht was forced to declare that the general of the SS troops Steiner had not yet launched an offensive on Berlin, and his army had not even been formed - it existed only on paper. Hitler suffered a nervous breakdown, which was not uncommon at the end of the war. He screamed and stamped his feet. He stated that he remained in Berlin only to shoot himself "if the Soviets infiltrated him." He ended his angry stream of words with the words: "It's all of course ... It's over ..."

Everyone present at the meeting gazed silently at Hitler. Five minutes of oppressive silence passed. After that, all the generals in turn tried to convince Hitler that he had to leave the capital of the Reich without fail. But it was all useless. Hitler took up a new business - he began to dictate his next radio address.

When, some time later, Jodl was called to the telephone, Keitel turned to Hitler and asked to talk with him face to face. Hitler expelled everyone from the cabinet, after which the Field Marshal said that the Fuehrer had only two options. On the one hand, to offer surrender. On the other hand, there was an opportunity to fly to Bertechsgaden to start negotiations from there. Field Marshal Keitel did not have time to finish when Hitler interrupted him: “I have already made a decision. I will not leave Berlin. I will defend the city until the very end. Either I will win the battle for the capital of the Reich, or I will fall as a symbol of the empire. "

After Jodl was able to continue his report, he did not fail to report to Hitler on the plan he had just invented. This plan, according to the colonel-general, was the only way to save Berlin by breaking through the ring of the Soviet encirclement around it. The main idea of ​​this plan was to restore the line of the Western Front along the Elbe again, to stop the further advance of the Western allies on this river, and then to concentrate all free forces on the fight against the Red Army. From this point of view, the 12th Army, located on the banks of the Elbe, had to be removed from these positions and sent to the East in order to break through the encirclement around the German capital with a powerful blow to the rear of the Soviet troops.

Field Marshal Keitel interrupted Jodl and volunteered to go personally to the headquarters of the 12th Army to convey the order of the Fuehrer to General Walter Wenck. He himself wanted to make sure that all measures for the speedy advance of the 12th Army in the direction of Berlin were taken as soon as possible. In addition, Field Marshal Keitel said that Wenck would save Berlin, even if the city was in the tight ring of the Soviet siege. To begin with, Wenck's army could unblock the 9th Army, after which, by combining their forces, they could defeat the Red Army units near Berlin. Hitler approved the plan.

After that, Jodl went to the Wehrmacht Operational Headquarters, which was now located in Krampnitz near Potsdam, and Field Marshal Keitel headed west to General Wenck.

Colonel General Heinrici, who on April 22, 1945, hoped that with Hitler's consent, the 9th Army would start retreating, found himself in a most difficult situation. Soviet troops could destroy his army at any time. In any case, by the evening of April 22, it was split into several parts. Heinrici tried to get General Krebs to take at least some measures to save her. But the chief of the German Army High Command conveyed to the commander of Army Group Vistula only the Fuehrer's order that the 3rd Panzer Army was to push back the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front (Marshal Rokossovsky) to the Oder. When Colonel General Heinrici called the Army High Command on April 22, 1945 for the third time, General Krebs had already gone to report to Hitler at the Reich Chancellery. General Detleffsen answered the phone. Heinrici almost begged him to make at least some decision. The general called Krebs. He called back from the Fuhrer's bunker at about 2:50 pm and informed the commander of Army Group Vistula that Hitler had agreed that the 9th Army should leave the area of ​​Frankfurt an der Oder and retreat to the northern sector of the front along this river.

In Frankfurt itself, the battle group under the command of Colonel Bieler continued to fiercely defend themselves. He did not have the slightest opportunity with his group to break out of the ring of the Soviet encirclement.

Two hours later, General Krebs contacted the commander of Army Group Vistula again. This time, he informed Colonel General Heinrici that during an operational meeting with the Fuhrer, it was decided to withdraw Wenck's army from the Western Front. Its units were to launch a diversionary offensive northeast of Berlin.

Colonel General Heinrici, who believed that the 9th German Army was still strong enough to break through the ring of the Soviet encirclement and break out of it in the western direction, demanded that General Busse be given the order to start the breakthrough. As soon as this order was given, Heinrici personally called the commander of the 9th Army, General Busse. He informed him of the new positions that his army was to occupy. Busse himself had to gather into a fist all the most combat-ready units of his army so that they could break through the ring of the Soviet encirclement and move westward towards the 12th Army.

Meanwhile, Field Marshal Keitel was heading from Berlin to the location of Wenck's army. The roads to the west and southwest of Berlin were packed with columns of refugees. The car had to be stopped more than once, since Soviet aviation regularly carried out raids. By nightfall, the German Field Marshal had reached Wiesenburg, which was located southwest of Belzig. The command post of the XX Army Corps was located here. General Koehler immediately reported to Keitel about the state of affairs at the front and the state of the divisions he was assigned to command. A little later, the chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht went to the forest estate "Alte Hölle". During the night trip, he lost his way more than once. Until he finally reached the command of the 12th Army.

The Wenck army itself was only able to repel several American attacks on April 21, 1945, which were undertaken from the southwest in the direction of Dessau, as well as in the Mulde area. They tried to overcome the constant raids of allied aviation with the help of anti-aircraft artillery, but due to the domination of the Anglo-Americans in the air over West Germany, each time it turned out more and more difficult.

In the afternoon of April 22, 1945, the command of the Wenck army received proof that not only the Clausewitz Panzer Division, but also the Schlageter Division, which, according to the order, was supposed to advance from Julzen through Braunschweig to Fallersleben, was completely defeated. Wenck's army lost two divisions in a few days.

German refugees near the Elbe

Under these conditions, General Wenck set before his headquarters the task of protecting civilians, refugees and wounded from the advancing from the east of the Red Army for as long as possible. As long as possible. From his numerous visits to the front, visits to the division, Wenck made a firm conviction that the most powerful weapon in this situation was the faith of the soldiers, as well as an unshakable desire to save the civilian population from the tyranny of the victorious allies (first of all, the units of the Red Army were meant). To achieve this goal, General Wenck had to use the forces at his disposal very rationally. In addition, purely human feelings spoke in him, and he did not want to set initially impossible tasks for military units. In recent days, he traveled around the area day and night to provide the refugees with food. Where possible, he tried to make it easier for them to cross the Elbe.

When the telephone rang on April 23 at about one in the morning at the headquarters of the 12th Army, General Wenck was dozing in his chair - he had just returned from a trip to the front. He didn't even have time to take off his field uniform.

The general answered the phone. On the line was the officer on duty, who announced that Field Marshal Keitel had arrived. Walter Wenck immediately summoned his chief of staff. Colonel Reichhelm immediately arrived at the army commander. Wenck informed him: “It looks like we have distinguished guests. General-Field Marshal Keitel has arrived. " The visit of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command did not cause a surge of optimism either from Wenck or from Colonel Reichhelm. If the head of the High Command himself arrived at the headquarters of the army, then it was hardly possible to talk about insignificant things. Outside, there was the sound of a car pulling up.

Field Marshal Keitel in full dress, with a marshal's baton in hand, entered the army command post. The adjutant followed him. Wenck was immediately struck by Keitel's nervousness. Wenck and Reichhelm responded with restraint to the Field Marshal's greeting. While the Field Marshal's adjutant was unfolding the map on the table, Keitel pointed his wand at the dark spot that Berlin appeared to be on the map, and said without any introduction: "We must free the Fuhrer!" Judging by the faces of Wenck and Reichhelm, Keitel realized that he had made a mistake and did not start with where it was worth starting the conversation. After that, he asked General Wenck to give him an operational information on the situation of the 12th Army, at the same time he ordered coffee and sandwiches to be served.

After Wenck finished his short report, Field Marshal Keitel rose abruptly. Then Wenck and Reichhelm silently listened as the chief of the Wehrmacht High Command spoke about the beginning of the battle for Berlin and that the fate of Hitler himself, and therefore the whole of Germany, was at stake. The Field Marshal looked at Wenck expressively: "It is your duty to attack and save Berlin!" General Wenck, who knew from his own experience exactly how to talk to Field Marshal Keitel, immediately replied: "The army will attack, Herr Field Marshal!"

"Good!- answered Keitel, nodding his head. - You will launch an attack on Berlin from the Belzig-Troienbritzen area. " During the trip, the field marshal finalized the plan proposed by Jodl. As it was presented, General Wenck understood more and more clearly that this operation was planned on the Fuehrer's duty card, on which flags were displayed indicating the divisions, which either completely ceased to exist, or were the miserable remnants of divisions. Meanwhile, new divisions still continued to form.

Keitel ordered the 12th Army to withdraw from the front along the Elbe to the Wittenberg-Niemegk sector, from where it was to move to its original positions (Belzig-Troienbritzen), in order to then launch an offensive on Jüterbog. Throwing back the Soviet troops from this city, the 12th Army was to unite with the 9th Army, and then they jointly had to break through the encirclement around Berlin from the north and "save the Fuhrer". Since German radio intelligence provided fairly accurate data on the real position of the 9th Army, General Wenck imagined that he could hardly count on support during the planned offensive. But nevertheless, he did not see a fantastic idea solely on his own to break through to Jüterbog, in order to then help the 9th Army move westward. Such a strategic plan seemed to him quite real. Among other things, such a strategic decision made it possible to buy time for refugees who were heading from east to west. Similar considerations arose in the head of General Walter Wenck while Field Marshal Keitel laid out the details of the plan for the upcoming offensive.

However, Wenck did not fully agree with Keitel's proposed plan. On the map, he showed that the encircled 9th Army could hardly play a significant role in the proposed German offensive on Berlin. He also stressed that there are sufficient forces for this offensive only near Rathenov, which the Germans continued to control, and therefore the offensive could successfully develop in an eastern direction only from the vicinity of Havel. General Wenck concluded: “Only there it is possible to concentrate all the forces of the army. Only there it is possible to avoid the division of the army into two extended military groups. " At the same time, the 9th Army itself, which could hardly completely break free from the forceps of the Soviet encirclement, could only make its way to the south, to the army group of Ferdinand Schörner. Of course, the exit of the 12th Army to Havel would have required a couple of days more, but this could have prevented a military catastrophe. General Wenck ended his message with the words that only XX Army Corps could quickly reach positions north of Havel. Waiting for all the forces of the 12th Army to gather near Havel would be a waste of precious time. At the same time, an offensive south of Havel solely by the forces of the XX Army Corps could not give the expected result - Berlin would not have been released. General Wenck's proposal to assemble the forces of the 12th Army, nevertheless, to the north of Havel was categorically rejected by Keitel. He said irritably, "We can't wait two days!" The situation in Berlin was critical. Keitel believed that every hour counted. The 12th Army was to immediately begin preparations to carry out the orders of the Fuehrer. Keitel got up to leave the Alte Hölle. At the door, he turned. "Yes, I wish you success!" - he threw in parting.

General Wenck spent the whole night with Colonel Reichhelm over the map. It was then that the officers became friends for the rest of their lives. They were ready to take responsibility for all the measures they took. Responsibility for both our soldiers and the civilian population that ended up in the combat zone. Despite all indications, they continued to plan to strike to the east in order to unblock the 9th Army and save as many refugees as possible. The commander of the 12th Army, as well as its chief of staff, understood perfectly well that in this case it was not about the fate of individuals, but about the fate of tens of thousands of people. If there was even the slightest opportunity to break through to Berlin, then Wenck and his army intended to take advantage of this, albeit insignificant, chance. By and large, the German capital had no other chance of salvation. General Wenck himself said on this occasion: “It should be noted that our army was able to save thousands and thousands of refugees who followed to West Germany. They fled from Silesia, from the Oder and Warthe, from Pomerania and other occupied areas. The soldiers who saw these terrible pictures, who heard about the suffering of the people who fled, leaving all their property, who experienced the horrors of the entry of the Russian troops, were ready with all the courage to confront the enemy. Even if the situation was completely hopeless, they were ready to fight to give women and children an opportunity to take refuge in the West. This is where the roots of the rare heroism that our soldiers demonstrated in the April and May days of 1945 lie. They fought even if they could not change the fate of the last German army. " General Wenck and Colonel Reichhelm did not want senseless bloodshed, which Field Marshal Keitel insisted on. They wanted the coming offensive to help thousands of people.

In the early morning of April 23, 1945, American aircraft abruptly stopped bombing all positions of the 12th Army. The German soldiers could catch their breath. The terrible bombing of the Anglo-American allies in many ways fettered the actions of the Wenck army command.

In the sector of the front, which was held by the forces of the Ulrich von Hutten division (Bitterfeld and the surrounding area), Lieutenant General Engel only under these conditions was able to begin to prepare a defensive line facing the East. His division had to go over to him if Red Army units entered Berlin. By the evening of April 23, 1945, the headquarters of the Ulrich von Hutten division no longer doubted that the Red Army's shock groups had already taken the heights to the south and north of the capital of the Reich. This development of events did not come as a surprise. In addition, there were no signs that the Americans were going to cross the Elbe and move further eastward. As a result, most of the headquarters of the 12th Army (from the regiment and above) were ordered to occupy defensive positions, facing not to the west, but to the east.

Tank barriers or anti-tank lines of anti-aircraft guns, which were equipped with vehicles carrying them, excluded the possibility of any unexpected breakthrough of the Red Army from the east. All reserves located in the German rear, as well as parts of the supply, were transformed into detachments of tank destroyers. They were armed with faust cartridges, and for mobility they were given motorcycles or bicycles. These teams were supposed to conduct continuous reconnaissance in the southwestern, eastern and northeastern sectors of the front, in order to stop the advance of Soviet tanks if necessary. Thanks to these precautions, the Germans managed to keep the vicinity of Jüterbog, where the first Soviet tank units appeared already on April 23, 1945.

Lieutenant General Gephardt Engel, commander of the Ulrich von Hutten infantry division (still in the rank of colonel in the photo)

Lieutenant General Engel decided to send the division's reserve - an infantry regiment with a subordinate artillery battalion, tank destroyers and assault guns - to the site of the proposed battles, so that the division could launch an offensive eastward at any time. When, finally, on April 24, 1945, an order from the Wehrmacht High Command was received on the radio, according to which the 12th Army, with the forces of one division, was to launch an offensive in the eastern direction, the Ulrich von Hutten division immediately took action. On April 24, Lieutenant General Engel ordered to engage in battle with the Americans only if they themselves launch an attack. On the same day, divisions of the 12th Army were ordered to abandon their positions along the Mulda and Elbe and march east. Their first task was to create a large foothold on the east bank of the Elbe near Wittenberg. After such a regrouping, units of the 12th Army were supposed to block the path of Soviet troops (from three to four divisions), which were advancing on Wittenberg. On the night of April 25, units formed by construction battalions, personnel of party institutions and collectives of industrial enterprises were to be transferred to Wittenberg. The division itself was to shuttle at least two regiments to the area. To do this, they had to travel 40-50 kilometers.

Lieutenant General Engel himself recalled the first battle with the Red Army in this sector of the front as follows: “In the morning hours of April 25, 1945, both of these regiments, with the artillery and assault guns attached to them, took up positions east and southeast of Wittenberg, a city associated with Luther's life. There they fought three Russian rifle divisions. It was here that a very rare phenomenon in the war happened - the troops advancing towards each other met in battle. Nobody knew about the location of their opponent. And, as often happened in this war, without false modesty, I have grounds for such statements, our units have shown great courage and iron will. Two regiments, insignificant artillery units that we had during this offensive, and anti-aircraft guns that occupied unchanged positions, which until now covered positions along the Elbe - that's all the forces thanks to which in the first half of the day we managed to throw three Soviet divisions back to 10 kilometers. We tore the German units out of the encirclement and were able to form a bridgehead 30 kilometers wide and 15 kilometers deep near Wittenberg. This foothold was decisive for all subsequent hostilities of the 12th Army, which had already begun a hasty regrouping for the attack on Berlin. This was an important precondition for saving hundreds of thousands of lives of civilians and our soldiers. "

Throughout April 25, Soviet troops repeatedly launched an offensive on the bridgehead near Wittenberg, which was then held by the forces of the Ulrich von Hutten division. But each time the units of the Red Army, which suffered heavy losses, had to retreat. Affected by the fact that at the disposal of the command of the division "Ulrich von Hutten" appeared tanks and assault guns.

When reports began to arrive at the division headquarters that the German defensive posts on the right flank were surrounded by Soviet units, Lieutenant General Engel gave the order to form a special strike group, which was to release them. The Germans struck a swift blow to the southeast, and the task assigned to the group was completed.

On April 26, as well as in the early morning of April 27, the battles for the bridgehead at Wittenberg continued with the previous fierceness. But now the positions of the "Ulrich von Hutten" division began to storm the tank units of the Red Army. The first Soviet tanks, mainly T-34s, began their attack on the night of April 27th. The onslaught on the position of the Ulrich von Hutten division was so powerful that it was decided to withdraw all military units from the city, leaving only a small garrison there. Even the day before, on the evening of April 26, 1945, Lieutenant General Engel received an order from the command of the 12th Army to leave positions near Wittenberg and relocate the next night to their starting positions near Belzig in order to take part in the planned offensive against Berlin.

In order to withdraw his division from the blow of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Engel decided to apply the knowledge that he had once received on the Eastern Front. He knew that in a surprise offensive, Soviet troops were very cautious about launching a counterattack. Indeed, in this situation, very rare Soviet commanders went to the oncoming battle. In this situation, the Ulrich von Hutten division could leave its positions only by taking decisive action.

Late in the evening and at night, operatively formed German battle groups, which were reinforced by reconnaissance detachments armed with faust cartridges and several assault guns and tanks, attacked Soviet positions under cover of darkness. The swift attack of the Germans achieved its goal: the Soviet troops went over to the defensive, they lost their tactical initiative. Under these conditions, neither side intended to develop an offensive. Units of the Red Army waited, and the Ulrich von Hutten division safely left its positions, without the risk that Soviet troops would strike it from the rear or flank. The tactics of concealing the withdrawal of the German division proved to be very successful. The German units remaining in Wittenberg were again attacked only at noon on April 27. That is, the Ulrich von Hutten division had about 10-12 hours to withdraw to new positions. Lieutenant General Engel was able to buy much-needed time for him. As the Soviet forces approached Wittenberg, most of the division (including artillery, tanks and assault guns) moved along the Elbe through the forests that stretched north of Cozwig. In the previous positions, only one artillery battery was left, which was supposed to conduct continuous fire on the Soviet troops, covering and thereby masking the division's retreat.

Despite the fact that the Ulrich von Hutten division was involved in fierce battles, in the end it was able to quite safely reach Belzig and reach its original positions. Forward to the east, the command of the division launched heavy reconnaissance vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles from the 3rd battalion of tank destroyers. They had to take positions on a wide front to protect the division from a surprise Soviet attack.

What was going on in the High Command at this time?

On the afternoon of April 24, 1945, Soviet troops crossed the "canal" near the town of Nieder-Neuendorfer, which was located north-west of Spandau. The Wehrmacht High Command located in Krampnitz was forced to urgently evacuate. It moved to a country building near Fürstenberg. An hour after German generals left their previous building, there were already Soviet tankers.

It is immediately worth noting that the command of the Red Army, which until April 23 did not know anything about the new German army located on the banks of the Elbe, on April 24 turned out to be dumbfounded by this news. They learned about him almost from a German propaganda leaflet, which set out the order of the Fuehrer.

Soldiers of Wenck's army!

I am giving an order that will be of great importance to you. You must leave your strategic footholds against our western enemy and head east. Your assignment is very clear:

Berlin must remain German!

The goals set for you must certainly be achieved, since otherwise the Bolsheviks who have begun the assault on the capital of the empire will eradicate Germany. But Berlin will never surrender to the Bolsheviks. The defenders of the Reich capital were enthusiastic about the news of your speech. They continue to fight bravely in the hope that they will soon hear the thunder of your guns.

The Fuhrer has called you. Start, as in the old days, a hurricane onslaught on the enemy. Berlin is waiting for you. Berlin misses your hot hearts. "

After reading this pompous pathetic text, General Walter Wenck ordered that this leaflet should not be distributed in parts, but its main circulation should be burned.

Meanwhile, by the morning of April 24, 1945, Soviet troops crushed the right flank of the 3rd German Panzer Army. The Germans were driven back to the Ruppiner Canal. And the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front continued to press on the flanks of Manteuffel's army. At the same time, the troops of Marshal Rokossovsky, having a tenfold advantage over the Germans, continued their offensive in the lowland near the Oder. If the 3rd German Army wanted to retain at least part of its divisions, then it had to retreat behind the bend of the Rand River. General of the Panzer Forces Hasso requested permission from the Wehrmacht High Command on behalf of Manteuffel to retreat. In response, Colonel-General Jodl categorically forbade even talking about the possibility of a retreat. However, it was clear to experienced generals that the destruction of the 3rd German Panzer Army by the troops of Marshal Rokossovsky was only a matter of time. Her weak defenses could be breached at any moment. Apparently, Hitler's Headquarters hoped for a miracle. They continued to rely on armies, which in fact no longer existed. Nobody wanted to face facts. In the Reich Chancellery, reality frightened everyone. Only the commanders of the divisions that fought at the front understood perfectly well that their formations could not be saved by a miracle. They could only be saved by retreat.

At noon on April 24, when the command of the 12th Army was ready to give the order to attack Berlin XX Army Corps, divisions "Ulrich von Hutten", "Theodor Körner", "Ferdinand von Schill" and XXXXI Panzer Corps, from the Wehrmacht High Command came new order.

“The army must select the strongest formation, at least a division, and lead it to the Wittenberg-Troienbrzen area for an offensive to the east. Details of the objectives and objectives of the offensive will be communicated later. From this moment on, the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn Infantry Division becomes subordinate to the High Command of the German Ground Forces. The commander of the division must be ready, regardless of the completion of its formation, at the very first order of the High Command of the German Ground Forces to march in an east or north direction. "

This order was immediately transmitted by the command of the 12th Army to Colonel Weller, the commander of the Friedrich Ludwig Jan division. The colonel himself immediately contacted the High Command of the Ground Forces. At the same time, he ordered the immediate arming of all divisions of the division. By telephone from the High Command of the Ground Forces, he received the following order: "Immediately march in the direction of Potsdam, where you are placed at the disposal of General Reimann, commander of the Potsdam corps group."

Colonel Franz Weller, Commander of the Friedrich Ludwig Jan Infantry Division from 25 April to 3 May 1945

Together with the chief of the operational department of the headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Pretorius, Colonel Weller began to pave the route on the map for individual columns and the division as a whole. At the moment when the soldiers of the division began to issue weapons, a general alarm was announced. The fact is that some of the Soviet tank units, which bypassed Berlin and Potsdam from the south, unexpectedly turned towards Jüterbog. A Soviet tank wedge crashed into the position of the Friedrich Ludwig Jan division. Soviet tank crews opened hurricane fire at the Germans from machine guns and tank guns. A fierce battle began. The Germans had no weapons at their disposal, except for the faust cartridges, which could stop a tank breakthrough. But the Germans managed to quickly rectify the situation. Having withstood the first onslaught, they launched detachments of tank destroyers along the flanks. Then the strike group of the Friedrich Ludwig Jan division was moved to the front line, which had assault guns at its disposal. It was she who was able to stop the sudden Soviet attack. However, the fact turned out to be a fact. In this battle, the Friedrich Ludwig Jan division suffered huge losses.

An hour after the Soviet tank attack, the divisional columns were already on the march. During their movement north, they repeatedly encountered small units of the Red Army, which were conducting reconnaissance in the western direction. Almost immediately, they were completely destroyed. Twice during the march, the Germans had to use assault guns, thanks to which the path to Potsdam was paved. As a result, the division nevertheless reached this city, where it joined up with the Potsdam corps group.

Two hours after the order came from the High Command of the Wehrmacht, a new order followed, addressed to the command of the 12th Army. The chief of staff of the 12th Army, Colonel Reichhelm, recalled him: “All strong combat units had to be withdrawn from the Western Front and sent to the east. Urgently submit proposals on the combat strength and calendar dates. The direction of the offensive and its objectives will be reported separately. "

Meanwhile, on April 24, 1945, units of the "Theodor Körner" division attacked Troienbritzen, into whose territory Red Army units were able to penetrate. The soldiers from the Jaeger Battalion followed the German assault guns that had been attached to the battalion to attack the city. The Germans managed to break through the Soviet defense line. After several Soviet tanks were knocked out, the German huntsmen began to sweep the city. Street fighting ensued. At a certain moment, the advancing Germans came across a defensive line formed from several machine-gun nests and anti-tank guns. I had to pull up the assault guns again. The crews of the German assault guns, staffed by experienced front-line soldiers who fought while they were on the Eastern Front, fired shell after shell. After half an hour of the battle, the defensive line was destroyed. Jaegers shouting "hurray!" followed the cars. Troienbritzen was again controlled by the Germans. The Theodor Körner Division took up positions facing east.

On April 25, 1945, the 12th Army was ready to launch an offensive eastward. The Ulrich von Hutten division was supposed to march from Wittenberg, Ferdinand von Schill from Niemegk, Scharnhorst just east of Zerbst, and Theodor Körner from the newly captured Troienbrissen. Early in the morning of April 25, an order from the High Command of the Wehrmacht arrived at the headquarters of Wenck's army. It reported: "Units of the 12th Army must immediately advance with all available forces to the east along the Wittenberg-Niemegk line in the direction of Jüterbogh, in order to unite there with the 9th Army, which is making its way to the west, and then jointly unblock Berlin from the north."

As of April 24-25, 1945, the general situation of the 12th Army was as follows. After the start of the general offensive of the Soviet troops, the command of the Wenck army had to make a clear decision where it would be applied: in the east against the Red Army or in the west against the Anglo-American allies? Such a decision was necessary, even if there were no commands from higher authorities or such orders were contradictory. Fighting simultaneously on two fronts was tantamount to senseless death. For the command of the 12th Army itself, the decision was quite obvious - in the current conditions, it had to act against the Red Army. Officers, soldiers, even civilians and numerous refugees who arrived from East Germany were guided by this. To all this was added the circumstance that could facilitate the actions of Wenck's army. Based on indirect signs (intelligence data, the cessation of bombing by the Anglo-American air force), which, of course, were very difficult to verify, the command of the 12th Army came to the conclusion that the Americans were not going to develop their offensive across the Elbe and Mulde. There was, quite rightly, the impression that the demarcation line between the positions of the Red Army and the Americans had to pass exactly along the Elbe.

Nevertheless, General Walter Wenck did not exclude the possibility that the Americans could nevertheless launch an offensive from the Zerbst - Barbie bridgehead in the direction of Berlin. In such a situation, it was necessary to urgently turn the front of action against the Americans. But in this case, the German units were ordered to open fire only in the presence of a valid American offensive.

The unexpected blow of tank units, which the Red Army swiftly inflicted on both sides of Berlin, clearly showed how the Germans were inferior in their forces to the Soviet troops. Throughout the entire Eastern Front, the Germans were deprived not only of any reserves, but also of real tank support. In addition, the Germans showed a complete absence of heavy guns and air force.

From day to day, Soviet troops could completely encircle the German capital. Since the tanks of the Red Army could at any time strike at the rear units and command posts of the divisions that were supposed to hold the Western Front along the Elbe, an urgent decision was required. In addition, the situation changed in the east almost hourly. Information came from Jüterbog that Soviet tanks had broken into the location of the Friedrich Ludwig Jan division, after which the division itself suffered huge losses.

For this reason, at the end of April 24, 1945, the command of the 12th Army issued an order: “a) XXXXI Panzer Corps, leaving only insignificant parts of cover on the Elbe, sends all the forces at its disposal in an eastern direction in order to first break through to the defensive line, passing east of Brandenburg, then passing through the chain of lakes between Brandenburg and Potsdam and then establishing contact with the rear units of Army Group Vistula;

b) the commander of the XX Army Corps, General of the Cavalry Köhler, whose headquarters are once again ready for use in full force, is tasked with preparing and starting the fight in the east. But first, the Scharnhorst division in its bulk must be left, following the previous order, at the beachhead near Barbie. At the same time, the corps command should locate the most combat-ready units along the Elbe between Cozwig and Dessau to cover positions from the south. From now on, the Ulrich von Hutten division is subordinate to the command of the Theodor Körner division. After which she must arrive in the Belzig area;

c) the Ulrich von Hutten division, under the cover of the darkness of the night, breaks away from the enemy forces, leaving only insignificant cover in its former positions, and marching from Grafheinichen to Wittenberg.

Assignment for the Ulrich von Hutten division:

Creation of a defensive line facing east and northeast, on the bridgehead near Wittenberg, covering the Elbe in the south - between Wittenberg and Cozwig. To accomplish this task, he is subordinate to the headquarters of the XX Army Corps;

d) Division "Theodor Körner" concentrates its forces in the Belzig area to carry out the following mission: defense and reconnaissance in the northeast, east and southeast, maintaining contact with the division "Ulrich von Hutten" north of Wittenberg. To complete the assignment, he is subordinate to the headquarters of the XX Army Corps;

e) Division "Ferdinand von Schill" finishes its formation and is guided by April 25 to march through Ciesar in the direction of Nimegka. Subordinate to the headquarters of the XX Army Corps;

f) XXXXVIII Panzer Corps continues to carry out its previous mission. To do this, he must quickly prepare for the performance of all the most combat-ready units on April 25 through the Elbe (between Wittenberg and Dessau). Further task: defense of positions on the Elbe between Wittenberg and Dessau, facing south. "

In the early morning of April 25, 1945, all divisions of the 12th Army, after exhausting marches, reached their established positions. They were let through by the rear units. By this time, the Ulrich von Hutten division was already fighting north of Wittenberg, as well as on the eastern outskirts of the city. Its units at first managed to repel all Soviet attacks. But let us immediately make a reservation that the Red Army sent in very insignificant forces in this direction.

On April 25, Cavalry General Koehler ordered, despite the existing threat of a continuation of the American offensive to the east, to withdraw the Scharnhorst division from the bridgehead between Zerbst and Barbie. It was planned that this connection was to enter its initial positions, which were located north of Wittenberg. Only two construction battalions were left on the Western Front. They came under the command of sapper officers, natives of the sapper school. As a result, both battalions were immediately ordered to mine all positions around the American bridgehead.

Actually, on the Eastern Front on April 25, things were much worse for the Germans. For the command of the 12th Army great importance had the circumstance that it was on this day that the 9th Army was completely surrounded. She tried to fight defensive battles east of Barut. Almost immediately after the Friedrich Ludwig Jan division marched north towards Potsdam, Uterbog was occupied by Soviet troops. The most powerful Soviet units were almost instantly deployed east of Wittenberg. They attacked this city continuously. Here, as before, were the units of the Ulrich von Hutten division, which tried to hold back the Soviet offensive, thereby preserving the front of the army corps.

However, south of Niemegk, between the undisguised northern flank of the Ulrich von Hutten division and the southern flank of the Theodor Körner division, there was a small gap in the German line of defense. It was here that the Soviet troops struck. On this day, Red Army tanks repeatedly probed German positions east of Brandenburg (Havel). The Soviet onslaught on the new defensive lines of XXXXI Panzer Corps grew steadily. In this situation, the command of the 12th Army could not seriously plan an attack on Yüterbog. In addition, German intelligence reported that it was here that the powerful forces of the Red Army were concentrated.

As a result, Wenck's army could only offer feasible resistance to the advanced detachments of the Red Army, trying to constrain their actions to the west of Berlin. At this moment, the command of the 12th Army made the following decision: “An offensive on encircled Berlin, where it was still possible, could not release the city. A decisive offensive by disciplined and well-proven units can be undertaken to inflict tangible damage on the enemy, as a result of which the path can be opened for countless German refugees. "

Indeed, the numerous refugees from the eastern territories of Germany, who had accumulated in the places of the alleged hostilities, became perhaps the most serious problem for the command of the 12th Army. All these civilians wanted to get across the Elbe as quickly as possible. But they did not know that the Americans should have prevented the passage of civilians across the Elbe.

As a result, the command of the 12th Army decided to gain time. To do this, it was necessary with all available forces to stop the Soviet offensive to the west. At the same time, the possibility of taking an offensive was not ruled out. Two possibilities were considered as the direction of the offensive.

1. At the suggestion of the command of the XX Army Corps, it was possible to attack from the Belzig area in the direction of Berlin (via Potsdam). The undoubted advantage of this plan was the fact that on the eve of the night the divisions of the 12th Army completed all the regroupings necessary for this. In addition, German intelligence reported that it was in this direction that the weakest resistance of the Red Army units could be expected. And, finally, in this situation, it was very possible to release the 9th Army, which could break through the ring of the Soviet encirclement to the west north of Troienbritsen.

2. The offensive of XXXXI Panzer Corps units between the chain of lakes that lay north of Havel. At the same time, the offensive itself could bring the 12th Army to the left flank of Army Group Vistula, whose positions seemed to have stabilized at Fairbellin. However, the implementation of this operation, the possibility of which General Wenck reported to General-Field Marshal Keitel on April 23, assumed the next regrouping of German troops. But with all this, the command of the 12th Army saw several advantages in this direction of a possible offensive:

a) the 12th Army was stretched out in a long thin line, which was the last connecting link between the German troops fighting in the south and north of Germany. Communication with the south of Germany had to be abandoned, especially since XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, which was ordered to withdraw to the Elbe between Wittenberg and Dessau, was not able to maintain it. A decision naturally suggested itself, which involved the concentration of German troops in northern Germany. In this case, the 12th Army would have taken the brunt of the blow. But after regrouping, she could avoid encirclement, and at least two combat-ready corps could take part in an offensive against the Red Army;

b) if Army Group "Vistula" failed to mobilize forces southeast of Fairbellin in order to strike from there to the north in the direction of Berlin, then, when interacting with units of the 12th Army, the Germans could inflict significant damage on the Red Army units that would have been attacked from west to northwest of the German capital. As a result of these actions, the path would be open for refugees. They could have moved west through Brandenburg, Gentin and Havelberg;

c) the lakes near Havel could be used as a natural barrier, which made it possible to avoid complex actions with fire support and flank cover of the advancing units of the 12th Army.

From the reply that came over the radio, it followed that the High Command of the Wehrmacht basically refused the second option of the offensive proposed by the command of the 12th Army. But despite this, Army Group Vistula was still ordered to attack the northern approaches to Berlin. This was an indication that the Wehrmacht High Command still hoped to win the battle for the German capital with such modest forces. In fact, Army Group Vistula, even under ideal circumstances, could achieve only very modest tactical successes. She could only gain time to "bargain" for herself the most favorable conditions for surrender.

As expected, the Wehrmacht High Command began to insist that the Wenck army carry out the first offensive plan. Wenck himself was extremely clear that with this development events, he will quickly lose any connection with the German units, which continued to fight in northern Germany.

Lieutenant General Karl Arndt (pictured Colonel), Commander of XXXIX Panzer Corps

In the early morning of April 26, 1945, the XXXIX Panzer Corps was subordinated to the command of the 12th Army, which, after the almost complete destruction of the Clausewitz and Schlageter divisions, was reorganized. It was commanded by Lieutenant General Arndt. To carry out the reorganization of the Panzer Corps, he was sent to Dömnitz, a place near the Elbe on the northern border of the 12th Army's positions. By order of the Wehrmacht High Command, this time the corps was to consist of the Hamburg Reserve Division, the Meyer Division, units of the 84th Infantry Division and the remnants of the Clausewitz Division. Both divisions could not be called full-fledged formations - in two weeks of heavy and bloody battles, tank divisions lost more than two-thirds of their personnel. The newly formed German units, which in total made up one reinforced regiment, were to be sent to the 3rd Panzer Army in the shortest possible time. However, in the future they became a source of replenishment for the divisions of the 12th Army and the XXXXI Panzer Corps located on the Eastern Front.

In the early morning of April 28, 1945, General Wenck had a conversation with the chief of staff of the 12th Army, Colonel Reichhelm. The commander of the 12th Army planned to launch an offensive against the encircled 9th Army that day. In this case, the divisions "Ferdinand von Schill" and "Ulrich von Hutten" had to act in the direction of Potsdam. They were supposed to break through the ring of the Soviet encirclement and, if this operation was successful, unite with the 9th Army, after which it was planned to recapture Potsdam from the Red Army from two sides (from the west the Friedrich Ludwig Jan division). “If we succeed, then after that we will retreat to the Elbe and surrender to the Americans. This is our last combat mission ", said General Wenck.

On 28 April, XX Army Corps soldiers were still in their positions between Belzig and Wittenberg. When the sun rose, a command was heard, which many had already been expecting for several days: "We are advancing to the east!" On the left flank of the Ulrich von Hutten division, several strike groups of the Ferdinand von Schill division launched an offensive. They attacked in a northeasterly direction, intending to advance towards the forest area better known as Laninersky Bor.

"Assault guns, go ahead!" Major Nebel's loud voice came over the headphones. The assault gun brigade, which was part of the Ferdinand von Schill division, began to move. On the left flank of the offensive, they formed an armored wedge, which simultaneously covered the division's positions from the north. The vehicle commanders drove their heads out of the hatches. Some time later, German assault guns came across the first Soviet tanks. It was part of the Red Army, which bivouacked in the middle of the field.

"Ready for battle." The commanders of the German assault guns closed the hatches, the loaders sent a shell. The gunners were waiting for the order to open fire. The swift attack of the German assault guns proved fatal for the Soviet unit, in a fleeting battle it was almost completely destroyed. Actually, the relaxation of the Red Army was largely explainable. Many of them, who were away from Berlin, believed that the war was over for them. With undisguised joy they awaited the fall of the German capital. Most of them were satisfied that they did not have to take part in the "Berlin meat grinder". And suddenly, in front of them, as if out of thin air, the advancing Germans appeared. The forces of the Ferdinand von Schill division went like a knife through butter through the positions of the relaxed Soviet unit. The Red Army battalion was destroyed. But then the Germans did not have to count on such luck. Near a small village, Major Nebel gave the order to go around it from the flank. The motorized infantry battalion "Schill" was to join the battle with the Red Army men who were in it. A battle ensued in the village. The Germans again succeeded in pushing the Soviet troops out. The Red Army chose to retreat. The village was recaptured from the Red Army. It seemed that Germany was by no means losing the war. The guns paved the way for the German infantry.

On the right flank of the Ferdinand von Schill division, units of the Ulrich von Hutten division went over to the offensive. They were advancing in the direction of the Beelitser sanatorium. Then they had to move in the direction of Potsdam. The Ulrich von Hutten division itself, according to General Wenck's plan, was to become a striking force, which, moving east from Belzig on both sides of the railway line, was supposed to break any Soviet resistance and still reach Potsdam. Since the divisional commander considered it too dangerous to undertake an offensive without cover on the flanks and conducting reconnaissance, he sent a powerful forward detachment ahead on the night of April 28. It was made up of several eight-wheeled reconnaissance armored vehicles equipped with a 75 mm short cannon, motorcycle riflemen and a company of armored personnel carriers. In addition, this division's shock forward detachment was covered from the east by a powerful reconnaissance group, which had at its disposal several trucks and 50-mm field guns. Meanwhile, on the broad right flank of the 12th Army, which was held by the Theodor Körner and Scharnhorst divisions, from April 27, 1945, there were continuous fierce battles.

Panzer reconnaissance division "Ulrich von Hutten", which was distinguished by intricate forests, suddenly came across northeast of Belzig on Soviet units, which offered strong resistance to the Germans. The Germans did not want to miss the tactical initiative in any way. But if the plans of General Wenck became clear to the Soviet command, in particular the offensive of the Ulrich von Hutten division was revealed, then the units of the Red Army could apply effective countermeasures. So, for example, the possibility of a Soviet offensive on the right flank was not ruled out, which, if successful, could end with the complete destruction of the 12th Army. For this reason, the tanks were ordered to retreat, as if portraying a "wandering" group of the Wehrmacht.

But already closer to noon, Red Army units launched a powerful offensive against the positions of the Ulrich von Hutten division. But the Germans once again launched their assault guns into battle. They managed to repel the Soviet attack and drive back the Red Army units to the east. The destroyed Soviet reconnaissance armored vehicles allowed the command of the German division to come to the conclusion that the Germans were mainly opposed here by motorized reconnaissance units. But the situation was constantly changing during the day. The closer the Ulrich von Hutten division approached the forests southwest of Potsdam, the stronger the Soviet defenses became. Soviet anti-tank guns began to appear. At first they were isolated. Then anti-tank barriers began to emerge from them. By day the German offensive had died out. Under these conditions, Lieutenant General Engel faced a dilemma: should he stop the offensive or, on the contrary, throw new forces into battle to continue. Engel himself chose the latter.

Parts of the division managed to break through the second line of Soviet defense, which ran 15 kilometers northeast of Belzig. For this, blasting and tracer charges were used. As the German officers recalled, this tactic had a very strong "influence" on the confused Red Army soldiers. Soviet troops were forced to retreat. The artillery shots and the noise of the battle rang out on the right flank showed the command of the Ulrich von Hutten division that neighboring divisions were also waging a bloody battle.

On the afternoon of April 28, the Ulrich von Hutten division and the Ferdinand von Schill divisions on the left flank were able to penetrate the Laninersky Bor. The intended goal - the crossing of Havel to the southwestern outskirts of Potsdam - seemed to be on the doorstep. The Ulrich von Hutten division was only 15 kilometers away from it. But on the night of April 29, the positions of the division were attacked several times by Soviet reconnaissance battalions. For the subsequent offensive, which was scheduled for April 29, the lieutenant general allocated two regiments, which were moved to the front line under cover of darkness. The first regiment was reinforced with a company of assault guns, and the second with two tank platoons. They were to move forward, and the shock groups of the German infantry were to sit on their armor. This was the only way to move quickly along forest and field roads. At the same time, Lieutenant General Engel had to take into account the possible presence of significant Soviet forces in Laninersky Bor. To neutralize a possible threat from the flanks, he appointed several armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance armored vehicles as cover. It was in this order that the Ulrich von Hutten division launched its offensive on 29 April. Both regiments had to make their way in bloody forest battles. In some places, the Germans still managed to break through the Soviet defenses. On the glades, special teams of faust patrons were used to fire on Soviet tanks.

The Taube (Pigeons) mobile radio vehicles directed for flank reconnaissance constantly reported to the division headquarters the movements of the flank groups, as well as the movements of the units of the neighboring Ferdinand von Schill division, which were also involved in forest battles. Looking ahead, let us say that on the eve of the division "Ferdinand von Schill" was reinforced with parts of the corps group of Reimann from Potsdam. By noon, during the fighting, units of the Ulrich von Hutten division managed to recapture at least six forest villages and farmsteads from the Red Army units. Reports from the Scharnhorst and Theodor Körner divisions indicated that they, fighting fiercely for Belzig, were drawn into battle against two Soviet mechanized corps. These divisions could hardly hold back the Soviet onslaught, but continued to fight, as this was the main prerequisite for the Ulrich von Hutten and Ferdinand von Schill divisions to reach Potsdam.

Meanwhile, a strong battle began for the interchange on the motorway, which was located southeast of Potsdam. Here, units of the Red Army launched into battle heavy tanks IS-3 ("Joseph Stalin-3"), which were armed with 152-mm guns. While units of the German division "Ferdinand von Schill" held positions on the left flank of the division "Ulrich von Hutten", there was some guarantee that the Soviet troops could not take the above-mentioned interchange, which was known as the "Leipzig Triangle", on the move. This transport junction was of strategic importance for the command of the 12th Army, since it was through it that the 9th German Army could get out of the encirclement.

Lieutenant General Engel decided to reuse the most experienced assault gun crews. The command was again distributed: "Assault guns, forward!" The machines rushed to the attack. Experienced tankers and "assault gunners" even on the Eastern Front knew well one weak side of the "steel giants", Soviet tanks of the IS type. After the shot, the crew reloaded the gun for a long time. To do this, it was necessary to lower the barrel of the tank gun somewhat. At this point, the German assault guns could successfully attack the seemingly unapproachable ISs.

Hiding behind the bushes that grew along the highway, the assault guns rushed forward. They walked in such order that they could only come under fire from a single Soviet tank. As soon as the Soviet IS fired a shot, the German assault gun burst out of cover. In a few seconds given to the German crew, a shot could be fired. Usually the Germans aimed at the weak point of the IS - the gap between the turret and the hull of the tank. The shell that got there completely disabled the Soviet tank. So, during this battle, German assault guns managed to knock out six "armored colossi". At the same time, the Germans themselves did not lose a single car.

As you can see, the German assault guns again predetermined the outcome of the battle. The Germans were able to reach an intermediate defensive line, to which the 9th Army was supposed to retreat. Meanwhile, the main units of the Ulrich von Hutten division were able to reach Lake Havel. In addition, they were able to take positions on the northern and southern shores of Lake Shvilov. This made it possible to cover the flanks of the division without unnecessary trouble. Now Lieutenant General Engel sent one of the regiments to Beelitz to support the Theodor Körner and Scharnhorst divisions that were fighting there.

On the 12th Army's right flank, the Theodor Körner Division advanced forward to deliver the main attack with its left wing in the direction of Potsdam and Berlin. But here the division ran into a powerful Soviet defense. Periodically, units of the Red Army tried to launch counterattacks, but all of them were repelled by the Germans in the second half of April 27, and in the first half of April 28.

Along with the Ulrich von Hutten division, Beelitz attacked the Malov regiment of the Scharnhorst division (it was named so in honor of the regiment commander Major Malov, who died at Zerbst). As a result, on the right flank, units of the Ulrich von Hutten division were closely connected with this battle group of the Scharnhorst division. The commander of the Malov regiment (also a major - his name was not preserved in German historiography) personally led the soldiers into the attack on the Beelitz sanatorium occupied by the Red Army. There was clearly a shortage of officers in the regiment. Shortly before that, the headquarters of the 2nd battalion was blown up in the forest by a direct hit from a mine. But, despite this, the battalion continued its offensive. In the second half of April 28, German armored personnel carriers broke through to the POW camp, located near the sanatorium. It housed about 3 thousand wounded German soldiers. The guard, consisting of several Red Army men, preferred to retreat. The Germans began to storm the sanatorium. One of the officers of the Malov regiment was able to infiltrate the Soviet communications point, where he cut off all the wires. Five minutes later, the sanatorium was in German hands. The staff of the sanatorium (doctors, nurses), as well as the German wounded themselves, could not believe what had happened. No one expected the appearance of units of the 12th Army in Beelitsa.

The officers immediately contacted General Wenck. He hastened to assure the chief physician of the German sanatorium: “The army will do everything possible to take out all the wounded as soon as possible. Any wounded who can move independently should immediately go west on foot. Our roads in the rear up to the Elbe are not yet occupied by the enemy. " The command of the 12th Army immediately gave the order to send all available vehicles to transport the wounded. Ambulances and buses shuttled the wounded under the Barbie. However, this did not mean the end of the offensive itself. On April 28, the advance units of the XX Army Corps had already reached Verch, which was located slightly south of Potsdam.

Meanwhile, XXXXVIII Panzer Corps crossed the Elbe. This allowed the command of the 12th army to send the remnants of the 20th army corps remaining in this sector into battle. We must immediately stipulate that in this situation representatives of the Red Cross intervened. One of them, by a purely coincidental coincidence, ended up in the German-occupied Beelitz sanatorium. On April 29, he went to the Americans to agree on the possibility of transporting most of the wounded from the sanatorium to their zone of occupation.

In the afternoon of April 28, a radio message from German units defending in Potsdam arrived at the headquarters of the 12th Army. It read as follows: “XX Army Corps has reached Ferhe. We are looking for all possible means and establishing contact with the 12th Army. " General Reimann immediately took action. To break through the ring of the Soviet encirclement, he gathered about 20 thousand German soldiers. After that, he managed to establish contact with the Ferdinand von Schill and Ulrich von Hutten divisions that had escaped from Laninersky Bor. While the assault guns of the Ferdinand von Schill division tried to unblock Potsdam from the southwest, its German defenders attempted to move towards them and break through the ring of the Soviet encirclement.

After that, General Wenck instructed General Reimann to begin in the afternoon a breakthrough across the coast of the lakes near Alt-Geltov. It was easier to break through the Red Army ring there. The uniform meat grinder began. The Germans, who tried to escape, repeated their attempts again and again. Some of them found gaps in the encirclement ring.

Lieutenant Colonel Müller led his division along the forest towards the groups that had escaped from the encirclement. Major Nebel with a brigade of assault guns "Schill" from a clearing tried to destroy the Soviet tanks advancing from the left flank. He tried to keep the gap through which the Germans left Potsdam. One of these groups almost reached the positions of the Ulrich von Hutten division, but was suddenly hit by Soviet tanks. As a result, she was forced to break through to the Ferdinand von Schill division. The small space between Laninersky Bor and the lakes turned into one continuous battlefield, from which small groups of Germans tried to escape in the western direction.

At some point, General Reimann was able to get to Lieutenant Colonel Müller. Both German officers shook hands without another word. And if the general was forced to go to the headquarters of the 12th Army, then his subordinates (corps group Potsdam), who were lucky enough to break out of the encirclement, had to replenish the ranks of the Ferdinand von Schill division.

From his command post in Pritserba, General Wenck transmitted to the High Command of the Wehrmacht a message about the unblocking of Potsdam, about the successes in Ferha and Beelitz. At this time, units of the Red Army were already fighting on the outskirts of the German capital. The news from Wenk might have inspired some optimism. As a result, the liaison officers immediately transmitted this message. With lightning speed, this news was delivered from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Fuhrer's bunker. At the same time, the surrounded 9th Army learned about the military successes of General Wenck. General Wenck himself constantly maintained radio contact with the 9th Army. He could not hide his disappointment with her position. The "cauldron" shrank narrower and narrower with each passing hour. He himself understood perfectly well that the forces of the 9th Army were already running out. General Busse, even if he managed to withdraw the army from the encirclement, was unlikely to be able to launch an offensive on Berlin. The units at his disposal were exhausted in the battles.

On the morning of April 29, 1945, another radio message arrived at Wencku's headquarters, describing the situation in the "cauldron". General Busse himself did not try to gloss over the situation. At the end of this summary, he reported: “The physical and mental state of soldiers and officers, as well as the lack of fuel and ammunition, not only do not imply the possibility of breaking through the enemy's encirclement, but also hardly allow counting on a long-term defense. A separate problem is presented by the needs of the civilian population, which has found itself in a constantly shrinking ring. Only the measures carried out by all the generals at once make it possible to control the units so far. It goes without saying that the 9th Army will fight to the last. "

Wenck was very disappointed. As a result, he turned to the headquarters of the 12th army with a request to try to plan the last attempt to release the 9th army.

Meanwhile, rumors circulated in Berlin: "Wenck is already near Potsdam!" This message tore the Germans out of their horror and gave them one last vague hope. Although the most literate of them were skeptical: why is there no official information about this? This omission was quickly corrected. One day General Wenck's orderly was listening to the radio at the command post. Suddenly he got up and addressed the army commander: “Mr. General! You should definitely hear it. " General Wenck and all the staff officers clung to the radio. We were transmitting a summary of the Wehrmacht. What they heard amazed them no less than angered them.

“The command of the Wehrmacht announces. In the heroic struggle of Berlin, the fateful struggle of the entire German people against Bolshevism found its expression. As the unprecedented battle for our capital unfolds in history, our units on the Elbe turned from the Americans and rushed to the aid of the heroic defenders of Berlin. The divisions transferred from the west in fierce battles threw back the enemy on a wide front and are now approaching Ferkha. " The staff officers looked at each other in amazement. After some silence, General Wenck said indignantly: “If our goals were announced to the whole world in such a shameless way, then tomorrow we will not be able to move a single step forward. Now the Russians will throw all their strength on us. "

Fighting 12th Army east of the Elbe, including the breakthrough to Potsdam

Shortly before this event, General Wenck again contacted the headquarters of the 9th Army by radio. During the communication session, he pointed out that the outskirts of Jüterbog, which were occupied by Soviet troops, were too "cramped" to break through the encirclement there. Indeed, in this case, the Red Army could concentrate considerable forces between Jüterbog and Troienbritzen! However, there was no particular concentration of Soviet troops south of Beelitsa. The units of the Red Army there were dispersed over a fairly wide area. The breakthrough of the encirclement around the 9th Army could only succeed in this sector of the front. It was there that the 12th Army was preparing an intermediate defensive line for the 9th Army, holding back the steadily increasing onslaught of the Soviet troops.

By the evening of April 29, 1945, the situation of the 12th Army became menacing. Soviet troops could crush its flanks at any moment. In the south, units of the Red Army, supported by numerous tanks, tried to break through to the Troienbritzen area in order to encircle the advanced units of Wenck's army. At the same time, Soviet tank units again and again attacked Beelitz from the east. Both divisions ("Theodor Körner" on the right flank and "Scharnhorst" in Beelitz itself) managed to repel Soviet attacks. But this could not last forever. On that day, as support, they received from Lieutenant General Engel one of the regiments of the Ulrich von Hutten division, which was transferred to another sector of the front. During the battles, the Beelitz sanatorium passed from hand to hand three times. But even in these conditions, the Germans tried to continue the offensive. But without tank support, only with the "little man's anti-tank gun" (as they called the faustpatron), German soldiers could hardly break through the barriers from Soviet tanks. The wooded area was in many ways favored by groups of tank destroyers and small machine-gun groups who could take positions using the landscape at the forks of forest roads leading from east to west.

As a result, by the end of the day, three tank wedges launched an offensive on the Jüterbog-Troienbritzen front sector. Having mobilized all the available forces, the huntsmen and the German motorized infantry went on the defensive. They understood that the transportation of refugees and wounded from the sanatorium had to continue for at least a couple of days. The 9th Army also needed these two days to break through the encirclement. But two days in these battles was a very long time.

On the right flank, the onslaught of Soviet troops was held back by the Theodor Körner and Scharnhorst divisions. At the same time, the Ulrich von Hutten and Ferdinand von Schill divisions were fighting on the left flank. Their positions were somewhat pushed forward. This made it possible to cover from the cautiously advancing Red Army units from Potsdam ahead of the Leninersky Bor, and the transport interchange on the motorway - the "Leipzig Triangle". Nevertheless, the Soviet infantry, which had considerable experience in fighting in the forests, gradually seeped into the Laninersky Bor. The German assault guns were forced to retreat slowly but steadily.

At about this very time, Brandenburg, located to the west of Berlin, from the south and from the east, was taken into the Soviet "pincers". The entire northern flank of the 12th Army was now exposed. The "Ferdinand von Schill" division, supported by the "Potsdam" battle group, under any circumstances had to hold the northern flank so that the Soviet troops could not encircle the 12th Army, bypassing it from the north and from the west.

In the nearby copses, separate groups of German assault guns tried to attack units of the Red Army. Supported by German infantry, they employed surprise attack tactics. Suddenly, they drove out of the thicket, opened hurricane fire on the Red Army men, and after they retreated, they again hid in the forest. Individual Soviet tank units that were able to break into the forest were usually shot from an ambush with hiding assault guns. At the same time, the aim of the fire was quite high. Usually the Germans opened fire when Soviet vehicles approached a hundred meters away. Under these conditions, each shot from the ambush was a direct hit. Some time later, almost all forest roads and glades were clogged with burning Soviet tanks. As a result, the Soviet troops had to look for new ways to attack. But at the same time, it was impossible to forget that on a very elongated line of hostilities, the 12th Army very quickly exhausted its forces. By April 29, the command of the 12th Army believed that there were only two main tasks before it.

First, to wrest the 9th Army out of the "cauldron", with which the headquarters of the XX Army Corps maintained constant radio communications. The headquarters of the 9th Army itself was supposed to plan a breakthrough not at all in the Jüterbog-Troienbritzen sector, where the Red Army had a powerful grouping, but south of Beelitsa, where the Soviet positions were not stable. For the command of the 12th Army, it was extremely clear that to complete this task it was necessary to hold the captured positions for several days, which meant fighting until the last bullet. However, the Germans were not deprived of some military sacrifice. Later, many of them pointed to the fulfillment of their comradely duty. Second, an orderly departure across the Elbe. If it was possible, then the continuation of hostilities in northern Germany, in the area of ​​Havelberg.

Orally, the headquarters of all German units were informed that the command of the 12th Army intended to fight against the Red Army, so to speak, "to the last bullet," after which it planned to start negotiations with the Americans. It was assumed that the 12th Army was to surrender on honorable terms, that is, whole military units with weapons in their hands were to surrender. The second task was complicated by the fact that on April 29, 1945, the Americans from the beachhead in Barbie launched a rapid attack on Wittenberg. It lasted until May 2 inclusive and risked ending with the complete encirclement of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps. Fortunately for the Germans, the American offensive did not develop in full force. The Germans managed to keep the southern flank, which later became a prerequisite for an orderly withdrawal of the 12th Army.

Hitler's last radio message sent to Jodl

The battles of the 12th Army with units of the Red Army continued on April 29, 1945. Now Wenck's army, surrounded on three sides, had to go on the defensive. All divisions, without exception, took part in the battles - the army had no reserves. In the second half of April 29, Wenck gave the order to send the following radiogram to the High Command of the Wehrmacht in Fürstenberg: “The army, and in particular the XX Army Corps, which was tasked with reestablishing communication with the Potsdam garrison and which was completed, was squeezed along the entire front line, in connection with which an offensive on Berlin is no longer possible, especially in conditions where we have to count on the support of the 9th Army, which has lost its combat power ”. This radio message was never transmitted by the High Command of the Wehrmacht to Berlin. The very same command in the afternoon of April 29 departed from the camp near Fürstenberg in a northern direction. In the evening of the same day, the German generals reached the Dobbin estate, where they settled. It was there, at about 11 pm, that Hitler's last radiogram arrived. Her text read:

“To the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational Headquarters, Colonel-General Jodl.

1. Where are the advanced parts of Wenk?

2. When will they perform?

3. Where is the 9th Army?

4. Where is the Holste group?

5. When will she perform?

Signed by Adolf Hitler. "

Despite the brevity of these words, they do not need comments. In this case, you don't even need to be able to read between the lines to understand - even on April 29, 1945, Hitler still hoped for salvation. Apparently, in the Fuehrer's bunker, they also hoped to release the capital of the Reich by the forces of Wenck's army. There was no need to answer these questions. When the High Command of the Wehrmacht received this radiogram, Soviet troops controlled most of Berlin. Eighteen hours later, Hitler committed suicide.

Walter Wenck(German Walther Wenck; September 18, 1900, Wittenberg, German Empire - May 1, 1982, Bad Rothenfelde, Germany) - one of the youngest generals of the German army in World War II. Took part in the Battle of Berlin. At the end of the war, he surrendered with his army to the United States, in order not to fall into Soviet captivity.

Biography

The third son of Officer Maximilian Wenck, Walter was born in Wittenberg, Germany. In 1911 he entered the Naumburg Cadet Corps of the Prussian Army. From the spring of 1918 - to the secondary military school in Gross-Lichterfeld. He was in the ranks of Freikor, in whose ranks in February 1919 he was wounded during the assault on one of the newspaper publishers. On May 1, 1920, he was enlisted as a private in the 5th Infantry Regiment of the Reichswehr, and on February 1, 1923 he was promoted to non-commissioned officer. In February 1923 he graduated from the infantry school in Munich.

For some time he was the adjutant of Hans von Seeckt.

The Second World War

Wenck met World War II with the rank of major. On September 18, 1939, he received the 2nd Class Iron Cross, and two weeks later, on October 4, the 1st Class Iron Cross.

From 1939 to 1942, Wenck was the chief of the operations department of the 1st Panzer Division. In 1940, for the quick capture of the city of Belfort, Wenck was awarded the rank of colonel. On December 28, 1942, he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, promoted (March 1, 1943) to major general. In 1942 he was an instructor at the Military Academy, chief of staff of the 57th Panzer Corps and chief of staff of the 3rd Romanian Army on the Eastern Front.

From 1942 to 1943, Wenck served as Chief of Staff of the Hollidt Army Group (later reorganized into the 6th Army), assigned to the same 3rd Romanian Army. In 1943 he became Chief of Staff of the 6th Army. From 1943 to 1944, Wenck served as chief of staff of the 1st Panzer Army. In 1943 he withdrew his 1st army from the Kamenets-Podolsk boiler. In 1944 - Chief of Staff of Army Group South Ukraine.

From February 15, 1945, at the insistence of Heinz Guderian, Wenck commanded the German troops involved in Operation Solstice (German: Unternehmen Sonnenwende). This was one of the last tank offensive operations of the Third Reich. Approximately 1,200 German tanks attacked Soviet positions in Pomerania. However, the operation was poorly planned, the troops did not have sufficient support, and on February 18 it ended in the defeat of the attackers.

In February 1945, he was seriously injured in a car accident (5 ribs were damaged). After the accident, he had to wear a corset.

Western front

On April 10, 1945, with the rank of general of the tank forces, Wenck commanded the 12th Army, located by that time to the west of Berlin. It was faced with the task of protecting Berlin from the advancing allied forces on the Western Front. But, since the troops of the Western Front moved to the east and vice versa, the German troops, which were opposite fronts, were actually pressed against each other. As a result, in the rear of Wenck's army, east of the Elbe, a vast camp of German refugees emerged, fleeing the approaching Soviet troops. Wenck tried his best to provide the refugees with food and accommodation. According to various estimates, for some time, the 12th Army provided food for more than a quarter of a million people every day.

Berlin's last hope

On April 21, Hitler ordered SS Obergruppenfuehrer and SS General Felix Steiner to attack the positions of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal Zhukov. Zhukov's forces surrounded Berlin from the north, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal Konev from the south. Steiner was to attack Zhukov with his army group Steiner. With few active tanks and about an infantry division, he refused to do so. Instead, he retreated, fleeing encirclement and total annihilation.

On April 22, following the retreat of Steiner's troops, General Wenck's 12th Army became Hitler's last hope to save Berlin. Wenck was ordered to deploy his troops east and link up with General Theodor Busse's 9th Army. According to the plan, they were supposed to surround the Soviet units from the west and from the south. Meanwhile, the 41st Panzer Corps, under the command of General Holste, was to attack from the north. Unfortunately for the Germans in Berlin, the majority of Holste's troops consisted of the remnants of Steiner's units.

WENK, WALTER

(Wenk), General of the German Army. Born September 18, 1900 in Wittenberg. In 1911 he entered the cadet school in Naumberg, in 1918 - in the military school in Groß - Lichterfeld. In 1920 he joined the Reichswehr as a private, in 1923 he was promoted to non-commissioned officer. In May 1933 Wenck was transferred to the 3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Regiment with the rank of lieutenant. After completing a training course at the General Staff, Wenck in 1936 was enrolled in the headquarters of the tank corps, stationed in Berlin. On May 1, 1939, he was promoted to major and appointed staff officer of the 1st Panzer Division in Weimar. As part of this division, Wenck took part in hostilities in Poland and on the Western Front, where he was wounded in the leg. December 1, 1940 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel. On June 22, 1941, the 1st Panzer Division was transferred to the Eastern Front, where it participated in the battles near Leningrad, and then near Moscow. In December 1941, the division was surrounded, but thanks to the plan developed by Wenk, it managed to break out of the encirclement, for which Wenck was awarded the Golden Cross and accepted into the General Staff Academy. On June 1, 1942, he was promoted to colonel and again sent as a staff officer to the Eastern Front. Wenck took part in the battle for the Caucasus. During the Battle of Stalingrad, he was the chief of staff of the 3rd Romanian army, where he managed to form combat-ready units defending Rostov from the defeated and demoralized units. On December 28, 1942, Wenck was awarded the Knight's Cross, and on February 1, 1943 he was promoted to major general. On March 11, 1943, he became chief of staff of the 1st Panzer Army, which took part in the hardest battles near Kamenets-Podolsk and, thanks to Venk's talent and abilities, managed to break out of the encirclement in the Dniester region. After that, Wenk was appointed Chief of Staff of Army Group South Ukraine and was promoted to Lieutenant General. Shortly thereafter, he became Chief of Operations and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces. Now he conveyed his reports directly to Hitler, who was able to appreciate the directness, dignity and intelligence of Wenck. In mid-February 1945, when Soviet troops reached the banks of the Oder, the German General Staff developed a plan for a counterstrike, which was to be carried out by the Fistula grouping under the command of SS Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler. The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Heinz Guderian, persuaded the Fuhrer to appoint Wenck to the post of Chief of Staff of the Fistula grouping, which gave at least some hope of success. The coordinated counterattacks developed by Wenck yielded early results. However, on February 14, 1945, forced to travel from the front line to meetings in Berlin every day, overcoming several hundred kilometers, a completely exhausted Wenck got into a car accident, receiving serious injuries. Without a counterattack sent to the hospital by Wenck, the groups were completely drowned out. On April 1, 1945, while still undergoing medical treatment, Wenck was promoted to general of the tank forces.

After hastily formed the 12th Army, Wenck was appointed its commander. The poorly staffed army was initially thrown against the Americans, and on April 20 it was transferred to the Berlin area with an order to stop the Soviet units on the outskirts of the city and save the 9th Army of General Theodor Busse, which had been encircled near Potsdam, from defeat. However, the only thing that the 12th Army, which did not have sufficient resources, succeeded in delaying the enemy's rapid offensive until May 1 and allowing the refugees to escape to the west, and the separate units of the 9th Army that broke through from the encirclement to join up with Wenck's troops. Having gathered together all the forces, burdened with thousands of refugees from the civilian population, Wenck managed to break through to the west, cross the Elbe and surrender to the Americans on May 7, 1945. After the war, Wenck worked in various commercial and industrial firms, becoming a member of the board of directors in 1953 and chairman of the board of one of them in 1955. In the late 60s. Wenck is retired.

Encyclopedia of the Third Reich. 2012

See also interpretations, synonyms, meanings of the word and what is WENK, WALTER in Russian in dictionaries, encyclopedias and reference books:

• WALTER
  MP-L - German thirty-two-shot submachine gun of 9 mm caliber. Length with stock 737 mm, without stock 455 mm. Weight 3000 ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MP-K - German thirty-two-shot submachine gun of 9 mm caliber. Length with stock 653 mm, without stock 368 mm. Weight 2800 ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 9 A - German pocket ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 9 - German pocket ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 8 - German pocket ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 7 - Walter modification, model ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 6 - modification of Walther, model 3. Was an army ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 5 - Walther modification, model ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 4 - Walter modification, model ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 3 - modification of Walther, model 2 caliber 7, 65 ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 2 - Walther's modification, model ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 1317 (1317 Hijri corresponds to 1939) - Iranian copy of Walter PP in caliber 9 ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MODEL 1 - German pocket automatic ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  MARK II - French automatic pistol of the system ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  SUPER PP is a seven-shot gas pistol of 9 mm caliber. Length 165 mm. Weight 600 ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  PPK is a German seven-shot automatic gas pistol of 8 mm caliber. Length 155 mm. Weight 570 ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  PP - French automatic pistol of the system ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  P 88 COMPACT is a ten-shot gas pistol of 9 mm caliber. Length 181 mm. Weight 1050 ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  P 88 - modification of Walter P ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  1910 - see walther, model ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  1909 - see Walther, model ...
• WALTER in the Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons:
  - the system of German automatic pistols of the Karl ...
• WALTER in the Big Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  automatic 8-round pistol of the German company "Walter", caliber 9 mm. Was in service with the German fascist army (sample 1938), used in the 2nd world ...
• WALTER
  Walther von der Vogelweide (c. 1170 - c. 1230), German. poet-minnesinger. Landscape and love lyrics, satirical. ...
• WALTER in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  WALTER SCOTT, see Scott ...
• WALTER in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  WALTER, automatic 8-round pistol mute. firm "Walter", caliber 9 mm. Was in service with German-fasc. army (sample 1938), was used in the 2nd ...
• WALTER in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  WALTER Peter Al-dr. (1888-1947), mechanic, c. USSR Academy of Sciences (1933). Main works on aerodynamics and hydrodynamics. Unreasonably ...

"If I started a war with such commanders as Wenck," said Hitler in April 1945, "I would have won it." One of the youngest generals of the Wehrmacht, Walter Wenck, is in the portrait gallery of Elena Syanova.

The project was prepared for the "Price of Victory" program of the radio station "Echo of Moscow".

My generation, who went to school in the 70s, met the name of General Wenck in the history textbook in the section “Storming Berlin. Victory". Remember: Hitler is sitting in his bunker, shaken by the blows of Soviet howitzers, bricks are already falling on his head, and he is still waiting for some mythical General Wenck, who is about to burst into Berlin surrounded by Russians, rescue his Fuhrer and, in general, break situation.

“I still have a Wenk, I still have a Wenk,” Hitler repeats as a spell, shaking his hands through the grimy map. Many of these pictures, illustrating the existence of the Third Reich, are close to its true existence, like clown numbers to real life. But Hitler in the bunker, relying on Wenck as his own savior - this is the image left to us in the wiretaps, which was able to establish in some rooms of the second level of Himmler's spy, SS General Berger.

Walter Wenck was the Fuhrer's last hope for salvation

And here's another picture: “Hitler with his face red with anger, his fists raised, stood in front of me, shaking with rage all over. After another flash, he began to run back and forth on the carpet, while he screamed so that his eyes bulged out of his sockets, the veins in his temples turned blue and swollen. " This is the famous description of the scene in the Reich Chancellery in early February 1945, left in his famous "Notes of a Soldier" by General Guderian.

Walter Wenck

Hitler and Guderian fought, as they say, to the death, and, by the way, over Wenck. Guderian demanded the appointment of a young general (in fact, instead of Himmler) to command the upcoming February 15 counteroffensive. Hitler's apparent inconsistency as commander frightened, infuriated, but he recognized it and ultimately surrendered. The counteroffensive began. On February 16 and 17, it developed successfully.

Hitler: "I would win a war with commanders like Wenck"

After the victory, American specialists subjected the military operations of the Germans in 1945 to a thorough analysis and concluded that the leadership of Wenck seriously threatened to turn the tide by delaying the advance of the Red Army. This opinion was later ridiculed by Soviet generals. However, now that we know about the actions that were taken by the American secret service to conclude a separate peace with Germany, we understand that the price of even the local success of the Germans was very high.

On the 18th, Wenck was in a serious car accident. However, three weeks later, in the hospital, he received a new order: by the forces of the 12th Army, which did not have a single tank, to contain the Americans, at the same time ensure the breakthrough of the 9th Army, and then, deploying both armies, of which only one name remained, to break through to Berlin ... This order was given on April 25, and on the 28th Wenck was already in Potsdam and even established contact with the bunker. So, as you can see, Hitler's hopes of salvation are by no means psychosis. "General Wenck's breakthrough to Potsdam and, in general, the whole situation around this guy is truly amazing," wrote Colonel Garrison, an employee of Allen Dulles' staff.

Heinz Guderian and Walter Wenck

Walter Wenck belonged to a new generation of cadre German officers who had not gone through the First World War, had not been broken by its defeats and had not become bitter. Maybe that's why he fought differently. What is it worth, for example, the capture of it by a division French city Belfort in the 40th year. It's just that there was still a lot of fuel in the tanks of his tanks, and the young lieutenant colonel, without an order, immediately captured another city, a key city in the entire operation. “Wenck made his own decision,” Guderian writes delicately about this.

To be honest, this incident turned for me any idea of ​​German lieutenant colonels during the blitzkrieg to Europe. Wenck fought near Moscow, near Leningrad, in the Caucasus, in Stalingrad, rapidly moving up the career ladder. It was he who made the famous comparison of the Eastern Front at the end of 1944 with Swiss cheese, in which there are only holes. The enraged Hitler from Wenck endured this statement and even smiled, and then snapped at Keitel, for which, apparently, his authorship was appropriated. "If I started a war with commanders like Wenck," Hitler said in April 1945, "I would have won it."

After the war, Walter Wenck was considered to be the leader of the Bundeswehr

After the war, Wenck, along with generals Heusenger and Speidel, were planning to become the leaders of the Bundeswehr, but for you to understand something, I’ll just give an excerpt from his letter addressed to Hess’s sister Margarita in 1949: mistreating prisoners of war, deportations, frowning and following orders. You're right, the order is not an excuse. There is no more excuse or order in my life. But there is a feeling of abomination that no one blames me. Even the Russians spat on me. Why the hell did I surrender to them? Why the hell did I surrender to myself? I remember, as a child, in the cadet corps, our entire platoon was punished for something. Everyone but me. The humiliation made me sick. "

After the war, Walter Wenck lived for another 37 years. 37 years. With a feeling of disgust and nausea. But that's another story.