Japanese battleships of the second world yamato and musashi. Battleships of the "Yamato" type

A few years after the end of the First World War in the naval departments different countries talking about linbark... It was believed that these warships are still the main force of any fleet.

Designed for close combat formation. It is armed with offensive and defensive combat assets, concentrated in the most rational degree: in the first place are artillery, armor and unsinkability, in the second place - speed and range. The requirement for the maximum possible simultaneous strengthening of offensive means and means of protection is the easier it is to fulfill, the larger the warship, since on a larger ship, a significant percentage of the total mass can be allocated to all these means: this explains the increase in displacement battleships in the course of their evolution.

Taking a course to strengthen the armed forces, Japan in 1934 decided to no longer adhere to the London Agreement of 1930 on the limitation of naval weapons and adopted the so-called "Marusai" Program, according to which it was planned to build a number of the latest warships for the Imperial Navy, including several battleships, and paramount importance was attached not to the quantity, but to the quality of the new military equipment.

The basis for the development of new battleships put the idea of superiority over similar American ships, which, according to Japanese experts, due to the obligatory condition of passing through the Panama Canal, should have had limited tactical and technical data: a displacement of no more than 63,000 tons, armament of guns with a caliber of no more than 406 mm and a speed of up to 23 nodes. The lead ship was supposed to be battleship».

battleship «»

Construction battleships Yamato and Musashi » was conducted in the strictest secrecy. High fences were erected around the slipways, covered with camouflage nets on top, the windows of nearby buildings facing the shipyard were walled up. They took a nondisclosure agreement from the shipbuilders about the facility at which they work. In addition, the work was organized in such a way that none of the employees had a complete picture of the object and even the designers were given only separate parts of the project documentation. A strictly limited circle of people had a complete idea of the project.

battleship "Yamato" was launched on August 8, 1940, and entered service in December 1941

The combat career of battleships of this class is not particularly eventful. Battleship"Yamato", being the flagship of Admiral I. Yamamoto, during the battle at Midway Atoll, having received a message about the defeat of the Japanese aircraft carrier forces, withdrew from the battle without using its huge guns. Battleship « Musashi » held the flag of Admiral M. Koga, who became the commander of the United Fleet after the death of I. Yamamoto. Both warships were almost all the time off the island of Truk.

December 25, 1943, located north of the island, battleship» was hit by a torpedo from the American submarine Skate. This incident prompted the improvement of mine protection on ships of this type.

During the war on Pacific When aviation began to convincingly prove its leading role in military operations at sea, the huge guns were useless, and both Japanese battleships were soon sunk by American carrier-based aircraft.

battleship "Yamato"

battleship "Musashi" - in August 1942

From 23 November 1944 battleship» based in Japan, from where he left on his last campaign in April 1945. He took part in Operation Tenichigo. The goal of the operation is to reach the American landing site on the island of Okinawa, where American troops invaded on April 1. During a collision with American aircraft, three torpedoes hit the battleship. The auxiliary steering gear was damaged. Battleship « » shot down one torpedo bomber. After some time, two more torpedoes hit the warship, causing damage to electrical equipment, which made part of the artillery out of order. The position of the ship had not yet become critical, but the reserves of survivability and stability were on the verge of depletion. Then the final attack began, during which at least four torpedoes hit the ship. On the battleship « » at that time only one propeller shaft was in operation, and soon all boiler rooms were flooded and abandoned by personnel. The ship immediately lost its speed. The roll to the left side reached 15-16 degrees.

battleship "Yamato" explosion of cellars

When the battleship « » lay on board with a roll of about 80 degrees, there was a monstrous explosion, which was heard for many miles around. The reflection of this explosion was seen on the ships of the American formation located several tens of miles from the site of the tragedy on the island of Kagoshima. The plume of smoke rose over the warship to a height of 6 km and looked like a "nuclear mushroom". The explosion flame rose 2 km. Undoubtedly, only the explosion of the cellars (about 500 tons of explosives) could have had a similar effect, but what caused the explosion is unknown. Some American specialists it is believed that the explosion occurred due to an armor-piercing bomb hitting the tower and through it into the main cellars. The explosion led to terrible losses in the crew of the battleship « Yamato ". Of the 2,767 crew members, 2,498 people died, including the formation commander and the ship's commander. All in all, in addition to the battleship Yamato, the battle cruiser and four destroyers were destroyed in the battle, on which 3,665 people were killed or drowned. In his last fight battleship"Yamato" shot down only five and damaged twenty aircraft, and in total the formation destroyed ten aircraft: four dive bombers, three torpedo bombers and three fighters.

By the beginning of World War II, the Imperial Japanese Navy was rightfully considered one of the best. However, this was not enough for the Japanese admirals, they dreamed of world leadership. Their dreams were destroyed by the USA and Great Britain, to which they were inferior.

In 1937, they began construction of a new super-battleship, which had no analogues in the world. According to the plan, the Japanese were to build 4 such ships.

The main task of the Japanese was to surpass Navy USA.

To this day, this ship is rightfully considered the largest in the world in its kind.

It differs from its counterparts in its large displacement, more powerful armor, as well as artillery. No battleship in history can compare with it.

Among these four ships, the most important was the battleship Yamato.

The armament of this vessel was also impressive, it was equipped with 457-mm cannons, which were loaded with shells weighing almost 1,500 kg.

"Yamato" could destroy enemy targets at a distance of 42,000 meters. Despite the size of the guns and shells, its rate of fire reached from 1.5 to 2 rounds per minute.

Thanks to its powerful armor, it was estimated that it could withstand the impact of a 460mm projectile from a distance of 20,100 to 30,170 meters.

Many to this day are struck by its aviation armor, although its anti-torpedo protection was flawed and ineffective. Although this did not play a fatal role.

The construction of this giant began on November 4, 1937, it was launched 3 years later - on July 8, 1940. But it was completely completed in December 1941.

Immediately after the Yamato, the second super-battleship Musashi was launched. At the same time, the third battleship "Sinamo", which was part of this series, was converted into a heavy aircraft carrier for reasons of changing the course of the war.

And the fourth ship from this series remained on the drawings of the engineers.

The Yamato, like the rest of the battleships of its type, excited the mind with its beauty and power. But, despite their advantage over the rest of the enemy's warships, they entered the fray only after the advantage in the Pacific Ocean of Japan began to pass to the US Navy.

The most vulnerable point of these giants was that they were not protected from the carrier-based aircraft of American aircraft carriers, although their armor was strong, it could not withstand numerous blows. Therefore, Japanese admirals, who admired the beauty of these ships, rarely used them during the war.

As a result, both of these ships lie at the bottom, although the Americans had to spend a lot of time and effort to destroy them.

The battleship "Musashi" sailed to the bottom of Leyte Bay in October 1944. For these purposes, the Americans had to fire at least 19 torpedoes at him, but only after 17 direct hits he was defeated.

The Yamato was a little more fortunate than the previous vessel, intercepted in April 1945 in the East China Sea, when it was hurrying to the aid of the besieged Japanese forces in Okinawa.

According to some reports, it is known that at least 386 aircraft of the US Navy took part in its assault. In order to destroy it, they needed at least 15 torpedoes, as well as 7 direct hits.

The performance characteristics of the battleship "Yamato"

Maneuvering the battleship Yamato from bombs dropped by American planes

An aerial bomb hit the bow compartment of the battleship "Yamato" photo from above

Explosion and death of "Yamato"

Irina Shvedova

They were the largest and most armed battleships in history. Only two ships of this type were built - Yamato and Musashi. Their death marked the end of the era of battleships.

The 1922 Washington Maritime Agreement limited the number of battleships of Great Britain, the United States and Japan to a ratio of 15: 15: 9. This did not allow the Japanese fleet to achieve numerical superiority over its likely opponents. Therefore, in 1934, the Japanese government made a secret decision to refuse to comply with the restrictions on the maximum tonnage, according to the London Maritime Treaty of 1930 - 35,000 tons - and to create ships of the highest possible power - the Marusai program. The Japanese proceeded from the erroneous assumption that the United States could not build ships of this size due to restrictions on the passage of the Panama Canal.

PROJECT

The basis for the creation of projects of battleships under the Marusai program was the concept according to which, when spending the same funds on building a fleet, a country that has a smaller number of battleships with a large displacement of each ship has an advantage, since the combat power of a ship grows with an increase in displacement much faster than its cost ...

The huge displacement made it possible to equip the Yamato-class battleships with the largest 460 mm guns. Armor protection (up to 410 mm) was a record thickness, but its real effectiveness was reduced by the low quality of Japanese steel. The anti-torpedo protection also had a record performance, but it was not entirely well designed. Anti-aircraft artillery was clearly insufficient, but it was significantly strengthened during the modernization.

BUILDING

The laying down of the lead ship of the Yamato series took place on November 4, 1937 at the naval arsenal in Kure. The second battleship - "Musashi" - was laid down in March 1938 in Nagasaki, the third battleship - "Shinano" - was laid down in April 1940 in Yokosuka, the fourth ship number 111 - in September 1940 in the same dock where earlier under construction "Yamato". Despite the fact that "Shinano" was assembled to the level of the main deck, its construction was suspended in December 1941, in 1944 it was converted into an aircraft carrier, keeping the name. Ship number 111, which did not receive its own name, was never completed. It was planned to build three more battleships with reinforced anti-aircraft artillery, while the last two were supposed to carry six 510 mm guns, but their laying was canceled. The Yamato was launched on August 8, 1940. "Musashi" - in November of the same year.

COMBAT SERVICE

Having entered service on December 16, 1941, the Yamato was declared operational only on May 27, 1942. Already on June 4-6, 1942, as a flagship, he formally participated in the famous battle of Midway Atoll. At that moment, the commander of the United Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, was aboard the Yamato. In this battle, the battleship had no collisions with the enemy, since it was 300 miles behind the Japanese aircraft carriers. Until early 1943, Yamato was based on Truk Island.

Musashi entered service in August 1942. Until the end of the year, the battleship was undergoing tests, additional equipment and combat training in Japanese waters. In January 1943, he arrived at Truk, replacing the Yamato as the flagship of the combined fleet.

On March 29, 1943, Musashi left the bay of Truk Island, evading an attack by American carrier-based aircraft, but at sea was attacked by the US SS-282 Tunney and was hit by a torpedo in the bow. The ship received 3,000 tons of water, the loss was 18 people. Repairs were carried out in Kure until the end of April, and in May 1943, Musashi took part in an operation off the Aleutian Islands. On December 25, 1943, during a transport mission to transport an infantry regiment northeast of Truk Yamato, the American SS-305 Skate submarine was torpedoed. One torpedo hit the starboard side of the main battery turret. About 3000 tons of water got inside. The transport operation was interrupted, and the Yamato, accompanied by part of the combined forces, went to the port of Kure for repairs. By February 3, 1944, the repair was completed, and by March 18, the next modernization of the battleship was carried out.

In October, both battleships were sent to Leyte Gulf in the Philippines, where the Japanese command planned to give general sea battle the US Navy, developing Operation Se-Go (Victory).

THE DEATH OF SUPERLINCORS

It was in the Philippines, in the Sibuyan Sea, that the battleship Musashi was killed on October 24, 1944. The battleship was carried out six air raids, in which about 260 aircraft participated. It was hit by a total of 6 to 17 heavy bombs and 16 to 20 aircraft torpedoes. After the last bomb hit, the roll on the left side increased to 30 °. Soon the battleship capsized and sank. Of the 2399 people on board, 1023 were killed. In the same battle, the Yamato was damaged by an aerial bomb.

The Yamato returned to Japan on November 22, 1944, and was delivered for repairs and a final upgrade, which ended in January 1945. By this time, the war had moved to the shores of Japan. On April 7, 1945, the Yamato was sailing as part of a small formation to the island of Okinawa. There was no air cover at the compound, and three raids were made on the discovered battleship, in which about 200 aircraft took part. "Yamato" received hits from 4 to 12 heavy bombs and from 7 to 12 aircraft torpedoes, and almost all hit the ship on the left side. The Yamato began to roll slowly and exploded at 14:23. It was one of the most powerful explosions of the pre-atomic era, equivalent to about 500 tons of explosives. The flame shot up 2 km, the column of smoke - 6 km. Of the 3,332 crew members of the battleship, 3,055 died, including the ship's commander, Vice Admiral Kosaku Aruga.

CONSTRUCTION AND WEAPON

The design and construction of Yamato-class battleships was so effectively classified that the Americans did not know the true tactical and technical characteristics of these ships until the very end of the war.

The design of the Yamato-class battleships met the highest requirements for the survivability of a ship. For example, when all compartments not protected by armor were flooded, the buoyancy of the armored citadel was supposed to ensure that the ship was afloat and maintain its stability. And when all the empty compartments of one side were flooded, the roll angle should not have exceeded 18 °.

BODY

The hull of the battleship "Yamato", like all Japanese ships, had an undulating "humpback" profile. This shape made it possible to maximize seaworthiness and speed performance with a minimum hull weight. The ship had a narrow long nose, which provided good seaworthiness, but made the bow compartments vulnerable to torpedoes. To ensure the minimum possible draft, the midship of the ship was designed almost rectangular. The nasal bulb also served to improve driving performance.

The hull was riveted, the use of welding during construction did not exceed 6%. For the manufacture of the hull and superstructure, high strength steel was used. A minimum of equipment was located on the deck - this was required to protect the main battery from muzzle gases. The command posts were located mainly on a tower-like superstructure (28 m high), which was practically unarmored, with the exception of a small conning tower.

RESERVATION

Ships of the Yamato class had the most powerful booking in the history of battleship construction. The thickness of the side armor belt reached 410 mm. The side armor was located with a collapse at an angle of 20 °. Theoretically, at distances over 18.5 km, it was not penetrated by any foreign shells. Below the main belt was placed another armor belt 200 mm thick, protecting against "undershoots".

But it should be noted that, with the exception of the tiller compartments and deck armor on the bow and stern, the armor protection was limited to the citadel, which occupied only 53.5% of the ship's length. The conning tower was most powerfully protected. The thickness of its walls was 500 mm, the roof - 200 mm, the floor - 75 mm, and the cylindrical shaft leading to it from the main deck had a wall thickness of 300 mm. The main fire control post was protected by 150 mm plates.

The anti-torpedo protection was designed to counteract a TNT charge weighing up to 400 kg.

MAIN POWER PLANT

The battleships had the main power plant(GEM), which includes four turbo-gear units of the "Kampon" brand and 12 boilers of the same company. Each boiler and turbine was installed in a separate compartment. According to American experts, the power plant was technically backward and had too large dimensions, but, according to the Japanese, the power plant coped well with its tasks.

In the forced mode, the power plant produced a power of up to 165,000 liters. from. At the same time, the battleship developed a speed of 27.7 knots. The economical course was provided with a capacity of only 18,000 liters. from. The use of electricity on battleships was limited - wherever possible, steam engines were used.

WEAPON

The armament of the Yamato-class battleships matched its enormous dimensions: the main-caliber guns of the Type 94 - 3 x 3 x 460 mm, the medium-caliber guns of the Type 3 - 2 x 3 x 155 mm, the anti-aircraft guns of the Type 89 - 12 x 2 x 127 mm, Type 96 anti-aircraft guns - 52 x 3 x 25 mm, Type 93 machine guns - 4 x 13.2 mm.

The ship had a perfect (for that time) main caliber fire control system - "Type 98". It consisted of two electromechanical computers. This partially compensated for the lack of good fire control radars. The device provided very small dispersion of projectiles in a salvo and dispersion of volleys.

The battleship carried seven O-class two-seater reconnaissance-spotter seaplanes. They were transported with folded wings in the hangar and climbed up by crane. Two onboard catapults, each 18 m long, were placed in the stern on pylons to launch them.

OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT

In general, the electronic equipment of Japanese ships was backward. "Yamato" and "Musashi" had the usual radio stations for Japanese ships, with significantly increased power, which made it possible to use them as flagship.

Musashi was the first battleship to receive the Type 21 radar in September 1942. The radar was unreliable and weak. He only detected surface targets at a short distance. Only in the middle of 1944, the battleships Yamato and Musashi received sets of six radars of three different types to detect sea and air targets. But it was impossible to control the fire of the main or anti-aircraft artillery with their help. The technical level of the Japanese radars of 1944 corresponded to the level of the American and British ones of 1941. Ships of the Yamato class had a set of hydrophones. At the end of the war, they received radio detectors and infrared devices.

Following the example of Hitler's Germany, the Japanese government in 1934 ceased to comply with the Versailles Peace Treaty and the London Convention on the Limitation of Armaments, which ordered the country not to have large warships, a class higher than a cruiser. State officials decided that it was no longer worth obeying the policy imposed from the outside and it was time to follow its own course, according to which the development and immediate construction of large battleship-class warships was to begin.

The program for the construction of the latest warships was named "Marusai" and was personally controlled by the emperor. The Japanese took the American battleships of the same class as a model, trying to surpass them in power and equipment. The shipbuilding project was kept in the strictest confidence, the secret of construction was known only to a few senior government officials, who exactly owned it is not known until now.

The designers and engineers who took part in the construction memorized the drawings, receiving them only in separate parts. All personnel involved in the construction signed a nondisclosure agreement and were notified of the responsibility to be incurred for the release of classified information to spies. The shipyards, on which the battleships were laid, were fenced off by the Japanese with a high fence, which was almost impossible to approach because of the barbed wire. In order to ensure complete safety also from the air, the base was covered with an impenetrable protective film, and the windows of nearby high-rise buildings overlooking the shipyards were walled up.

Japanese battleship "Yamato"

The precautions taken were so serious that it became known about the construction started only after the descent of the first battleship, which received the name "Yamato" on the water. This battleship was to become the flagship of Admiral Yamato and take part in the upcoming hostilities against America and its allies.

The length of the battleship was more than 263 meters, the width was almost 40 meters, the draft exceeded 10 meters, and the displacement was over 72 thousand tons. The Yamato was driven by a steam turbine unit with four shafts. The battleship was able to reach a speed of over 27 knots, which was practically the maximum value for the time of its construction, since even the most modern American battleships, due to the need to follow through the Panama Canal, were able to develop a speed not exceeding 23 knots per hour.

The Japanese battleship was armed with conventional and anti-aircraft artillery installations, as well as seaplanes, used mainly for reconnaissance missions. The Yamato was launched in August 1939, but it entered service as a warship only in December 1941, just over a week after Japan's attack on the American base at Pearl Harbor. Before embarking on combat patrols, the battleship went through a number of training tests and only in May 1942 was it recognized as a ship fit for combat missions.

However, the Japanese failed to boast of either its size or firepower, for 8 years since the first rivet was laid in the Yamoto's skin, a lot has changed, and above all - military technology, the battleship is so outdated that it could not cope with air or with underwater attacks.

As the flagship of the Japanese fleet, Yamoto took part in the operation at Midway Atoll, but only formally, since he did not fire a single shot in this battle. At the end of December 1943, the battleship was damaged as a result of being hit by a torpedo, its holds were severely flooded, and the further movement of the ship was hampered, because of which it was forced to undergo long-term repairs, which lasted almost a whole year.

Major Naval Battle of Midway Atoll

In the summer of 1944, the Yamato was summoned to take part in the battle near the Philippine Islands, near which the battleship fired its first shots at the enemy, which, as it later turned out, did not even appear in the area, and therefore, as it turned out later, the Yamoto inflicted serious damage to your own squadron.

The unexpected failure did not cool the ardor of the Japanese command, but among the sailors of the Japanese navy the thought was ripening that the battleships are just as useful as the pyramids of Egypt, the study of which is interesting, but does not bring any significant benefit to mankind.

In October 1944, after another survey and repair, the Yamato was once again sent to the Philippines to prevent the landing of American troops as part of a squadron, which included another battleship of this class, Musashi. The Japanese forces were in many ways superior to the American fleet, but the latter, in addition to cruisers, battleships and battleships, had fairly well-armed aircraft carriers, which the Japanese ships were simply unable to defend against.

In the Philippines, two naval battles with the participation of the Yamato took place at once - a battle in the Sibuyan Sea and a battle in Leyte Gulf. In both battles, the battleship received Active participation, firing at the enemy aircraft carriers, but as further studies showed, the Yamato team failed to make a single accurate shot, all the shells passed by. In retaliation, the Americans lifted their planes into the air and almost completely destroyed the Japanese fleet, the Yamato miraculously managed to escape and return for repairs to Japan.

Battle in the Sibuyan Sea of the battleship "Yamato"

In April 1945, the Americans began landing on a Japanese island. Okinawa, in order to prevent their actions, the battleship Yamato was recalled from the repair, it was intended to attack the landing American troops, which was not just stupid, but suicidal, since the American aviation would not allow a single step to be taken in this direction. On April 6, the Yamato and 9 other ships, including a battle cruiser and destroyers, were to launch an attack on the enemy fleet and auxiliary vessels, trying to divert air forces to themselves, while the Americans would be attacked by Japanese kamikaze. If this maneuver turned out to be a failure, the Yamato was ordered to throw itself onto the beach and from there continue to provide fire cover for the Japanese paramilitary formations.

In the morning following the receipt of the order, the day "Yamato" and the squadron he led was discovered by the Americans on the approaches to Okinawa, it was immediately attacked from the air and sank most of the ships, including the flagship. Of the more than 3 thousand people in the crew, a little more than two hundred sailors managed to survive. The losses of the American side did not exceed 10 aircraft shot down by the Yamato crew, and this despite the fact that its firepower was designed for hundreds of such aircraft.

This was the last mission of the best battleship of the Japanese fleet, its brother - "Musashi" was sunk by American aircraft a few months before the events near Okinawa.

Battleship Yamato

Battleships of the Yamato class
大和 (戦艦)

"Yamato" on trial. 1941 g.
basic information
A type	Battleship
Flag state
Parameters
Tonnage	standard 63 200 full 72 810 t
Length	243,9/256/263
Width	36.9 m
Draft	10.4 m
Reservation	board - 410 mm; traverses - 300 mm; main deck - 200-230 mm; upper deck - 35-50 mm; GK turrets - 650 mm (forehead), 250 mm (side), 270 mm (roof); GK barbets - up to 560 mm; turrets of 155 mm guns - 25-75 mm; turret barbets of 155 mm guns - 75 mm; wheelhouse - 500 mm (side), 200 mm (roof)
Technical data
Power point	4 TZA Kampon
Power	150.000 l. from.
Speed	27.5 knots
Swimming autonomy	7,200 miles at 16 knots
Crew	2500 people
Armament
Artillery	3x3- 460-mm / 45, 4x3- 155-mm / 60 (later reduced to 2x3)
Anti-aircraft armament	6x2 127 mm / 40 (later increased to 12x2), 8x3 25 mm (later 52x3), 2x2 13.2 mm machine gun
Aviation	2 catapults, 7 seaplanes

The final version was approved in March 1937 and provided for the replacement of the mixed installation with a purely steam turbine. This was due to the revealed unreliability of Japanese-made diesel installations and the difficulties in dismantling such massive units.

The Japanese admirals, who considered battleships the main striking force of the fleet, believed that ships of this type, if built in sufficient numbers, would provide the Imperial Navy with a decisive advantage in the proposed general battle with the US Pacific Fleet. Only the authoritative Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku was of the opinion about the decisive role of aircraft carriers and the insignificant potential of battleships.

These ships are reminiscent of the calligraphic religious scrolls that old people hang in their homes. They have not proven their worth. It's just a matter of faith, not reality ... battleships will be useful to Japan in a future war, just like a samurai sword

Building

For example, it was necessary to modernize metallurgical plants, create new floating cranes, tugs, and build a special vessel with a displacement of 13,800 tons to transport the towers of the main caliber. To ensure further construction of the series, the Japanese began the construction of 4 large docks, but did not have time to complete the work completely.

The next two battleships of the Yamato class were ordered under the Fourth Fleet Replenishment and Replacement Program of 1939. On May 4, 1940, the battleship Shinano was laid down at the Yokosuka Navy shipyard. The last ship of this type began construction on November 7, 1940 in Kure under number 111, but the name was never given. It was planned to order another ship of this type under No. 797, but it did not come to bookmarking. On these battleships, it was supposed to sharply strengthen anti-aircraft artillery by installing 20 100-mm guns in twin towers instead of the middle 155-mm guns. The booking was supposed to be somewhat weakened in comparison with the Yamato.

The Shinano construction was halted in the summer of 1942 at 50% completion. The Japanese fleet, which was defeated at Midway, needed aircraft carriers much more and it was decided to convert the battleship into a ship of this class. The construction of battleship No. 111 was stopped in March 1942 at 30% readiness, and the hull was dismantled for metal.

The "Fifth Program of 1942" planned the construction of two more battleships, No. 798 and No. 799, which were improved in comparison with the Yamato type. Their standard displacement should have been 72,000 tons, side armor up to 460 mm, and artillery would have consisted of 6 510-mm guns in two-gun turrets. It didn't come to ordering these battleships.

Design

Housing and architecture

"Yamato", 1945. The side turrets of the auxiliary caliber were replaced with 127-mm anti-aircraft guns. Scheme

Like all Japanese ships, the Yamato had a wavy hull when viewed from the side. This shape was dictated by the desire to maximize seaworthiness and speed with a minimum weight of the hull structures. When viewed from above, the battleship was a pear-shaped main body with a narrow long nose. This provided good naval qualities, but made the bow structure vulnerable to torpedoes. One of the requirements for the developers was to ensure the minimum possible draft, due to which the midship of the ship turned out to be almost rectangular. Nevertheless, the driving performance of the Yamato turned out to be quite good. A whole set of hydrodynamic studies was carried out, which made it possible to achieve significant improvements, in particular the installation of a nasal bulb, which saved power.

The body was assembled on rivets, the use of welding was minimal and did not exceed 6%. As the main building material steel was used DS (ducol steel) increased strength. Characteristic feature the new battleships had a deck with a minimum of equipment, which was required to protect the main battery from muzzle gases. Command posts were located mainly in a tower-like superstructure towering over upper deck by 28 meters. Although critical centers were located there, the superstructure was practically unarmored, with the exception of a small conning tower.

Power plant

The power plant included 4 turbo-gear units and 12 boilers, all of the Kampon brand. Each boiler and turbine was installed in a separate compartment. According to American experts, the power plant was technically backward and was too large. However, the Japanese did not complain about the vehicles of their battleships.

The power plant was designed for boost, in which the power reached 165,000 hp, and the speed was 27.7 knots. The economic course was provided with a capacity of only 18,000 hp. A characteristic feature of battleships was a strict restriction in the use of electricity - wherever possible, steam engines were used. Thus, with the loss of steam sources, the ship was doomed.

Reservation

Formally having the thickest armor among battleships, the Yamato was not the most protected. Japanese metallurgy of the 1930s lagged behind Western ones, and the deterioration of Anglo-Japanese relations made it impossible to access the latest technology. New Japanese type armor VH (Vickers Hardened) was developed on the basis of the British VC (Vickers Cemented), produced in Japan under license since 1910.According to American specialists who studied this armor after the war, its protective effectiveness was estimated by a coefficient of 0.86 in relation to American class armor "A"... Extra high quality British armor CA the Japanese sample was inferior by almost a third, that is, for the equivalent of 410 mm VH 300 mm was enough CA .

The lag in the quality of armor material in combination with the enormous dimensions of the battleships being designed led the designers to the idea of solving the problem of protection "head-on", that is, by maximizing the thickness of the armor. Battleships of the Yamato class were armored according to the "all or nothing" scheme, which implied the creation of an armored citadel that protected the vital centers of the ship, providing a buoyancy reserve, but leaving everything else unprotected. Citadel "Yamato" was the shortest among the battleships built in the 30s in relation to the length of the ship - only 53.5%.

The experience of the war has shown that the "soft" extremities can literally be turned into a sieve even without a direct hit, and the transverse waterproof partitions do not restrict flooding, since they themselves can be easily pierced by shrapnel.

Having set out to protect the battleship from any shells, the developers positioned a record-breaking side belt (410 mm) at an angle of 20 °. Theoretically, at distances over 18.5 km, it could not be penetrated by any foreign weapons. Attaching special importance to undershot hits, the Japanese placed another 200 mm thick armor belt below the main one.

The thickness of the armored traverses was significantly less than the belt, since they were located at an angle of 30 °. The resulting armored box was covered by the main armored deck, which also had a record thickness - 200 mm in the central part and 230 mm on the bevels. Since only individual armored destinations were located above (in front of the front and aft towers), the fate of the ship when hit by bombs depended only on a single armored deck.

The armor protection of the main caliber turrets looked absolutely fantastic. The thickness of their frontal plate was 650 mm at an angle of 45 °. It was believed that such armor could not be pierced even when firing at close range, but the Americans have their own special opinion... The roofs of the towers and barbets also received very strong protection. The rest of the ship, with the exception of the conning tower and the steering gear compartment, was practically not armored.

The generalized assessment of the quality of armor and its assembly on the latest battleships in Japan leaves much to be desired. This is explained, first of all, by the scale of the problems posed to the creators of the world's largest battleships…. the quality of the booking in general turned out to be mediocre, that is, worse than it could be with such a large size and thickness of the armor.

Armament

Main caliber

When developing the project, special attention was paid to ensuring fire superiority over any enemy. Only two options were presented to choose from: 410-mm and 460-mm (in accordance with the caliber adopted in the Japanese fleet for battleships of the "Nagato" type and developed for battleships of the shipbuilding program of the 20s, not implemented as a result of the Washington Treaty. that before the same agreement, the USA and Great Britain developed several models of 18 "guns (457 mm), due to which the already existing 410 mm guns were considered insufficiently powerful and the decision was made in favor of the 460 mm guns. The development of these guns was started in 1934 and completed by 1939. In order to maintain secrecy, they were called “ 40-SK model 94". The design was a combination of modern bonded technology with archaic wire winding (due to the continuity from the development of the early 20s). Barrel length was 45 calibers, barrel weight 165 tons. A total of 27 barrels were produced. Loading was carried out at a fixed angle of + 3 °, the rate of fire, depending on the firing range, was 1.5 - 2 rounds per minute. Each of the three gun turrets weighed 2,510 tons.

460 mm armor-piercing projectile. Its length is 195.4 cm.

From the point of view of ballistics, a combination of a relatively light projectile for such a caliber and a high muzzle velocity was adopted. The Type 91 armor-piercing projectile weighed 1460 kg and contained 33.85 kg TNA... Its features were a special tip that made it possible to maintain the trajectory of movement in water and an unusually long deceleration time of the fuse - 0.4 seconds. The projectile was designed to defeat enemy ships in case of under-flight, but was not very effective under normal conditions, especially when hitting unarmored parts of ships. Nevertheless, due to its enormous weight and good ballistic characteristics, the projectile had high armor penetration. The initial speed was 780 m / s, the maximum range was 42050 meters.

Even more unusual was the Type 3 projectile, weighing 1360 kg. In fact, it was an anti-aircraft projectile and contained 900 incendiary and 600 fragmentation submunitions. However, American pilots considered it more effective than effective.

American pilots, against whom the Type 3 shells of all calibers were mainly used, called them "more effective than effective".

Both shells were too specialized. Some sources report the existence of a high-explosive projectile for 460-mm guns, but no information about this has been preserved in the archives, and the Japanese battleships did not use such projectiles in battles. The paradox of history: the best Japanese battleships found themselves in the position of the Russians, during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 - without high-explosive shells and with light armor-piercing shells.

Fire control system

The main battery fire was controlled by the most sophisticated and possibly the most advanced system of the pre-electronic era, the Type 98. It included the following components:

1. Five rangefinders, four of them with a record base of 15 meters. The quality of Japanese optics corresponded to world standards;

2.Two directors who provided data on the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance;

3. Device for tracking the target;

4. The device for the production of shooting;

5.Electromechanical computer, the former highlight of the system. The three blocks included in its structure not only made it possible to calculate data on the course of the target and the pointing angles of its own guns, but also made it possible to introduce all kinds of corrections, including even geographic latitude and dependence on the day of the calendar.

In general, the system was very effective and, in good visibility conditions, was in no way inferior to similar American ones based on the use of radars. However, with poor visibility, and even more so at night, the Japanese found themselves in an extremely disadvantageous position, especially at the end of the war. After the war, American specialists carefully studied this system.

According to their conclusions, the devices studied were far from perfect, unjustifiably complex, had numerous shortcomings, but ... had high potential capabilities. Having started "for the repose", the artillery specialists ended up "in good health", recommending that they be adopted "in view of the obvious benefits."

Medium caliber artillery

Medium caliber artillery according to the project included 12 155-mm guns in 4 three-gun turrets. These weapons were “attached” to battleships after the Mogami-class heavy cruisers were re-equipped with 203mm artillery. This decision predetermined the advantages and disadvantages of weapons. On the one hand, each tower received an 8-meter rangefinder, which was very unusual for a secondary caliber by battleship standards, while the efficiency of the system on a huge and stable battleship was, of course, higher. On the other hand, the towers turned out to be very cramped and extremely weakly armored. But the main drawback of the second caliber was the impossibility of firing at air targets, which significantly reduced the strength of the ships' air defense.

The guns themselves were very powerful for their caliber, distinguished by an enviable range, but a low rate of fire (5-6 rpm). However, they did not have to shoot at sea or coastal targets, and as a result, the side towers were replaced with the more popular 127-mm anti-aircraft guns.

Long-range anti-aircraft artillery

To fire at enemy aircraft at a considerable distance, a 127-mm type 89 gun with a barrel length of 40 calibers was used. Initially, battleships housed 12 of these guns in twin mounts. On "Yamato" from March 1944, their number was increased to 24 (12x2). The gun itself was quite satisfactory, although it was inferior to the American 127-mm universal gun in the initial projectile velocity and rate of fire. The disadvantages of paired installations include relatively low guidance speeds. The Type 94 fire control system, based on optical rangefinders and electromechanical computers, was quite effective by the standards of the late 1930s and comparable to the American one. Mk37, but was outdated by the end of the war. The main components of effective anti-aircraft fire were radio range finders and shells with a radar fuse, but the Japanese had neither the first nor the second. As a result of the anti-aircraft artillery of the battleships, it was never possible to successfully repel massive air attacks.

Short-range anti-aircraft artillery

The short-range anti-aircraft battery can be assessed as unsatisfactory. The main anti-aircraft machine gun was a 25-mm Type 96 gun, which, in turn, was the Japanese version of the French Hotchkiss gun. Most of these guns were located in built-in installations, initially - mainly in closed ones (primarily in order to protect the crews from a monstrous shock wave when fired from the main caliber). The built installations added later were for the most part open. In fact, instead of two echelons of automatic anti-aircraft artillery that were available on the ships of the US Navy - 40-mm Bofors and 20-mm Erlikons - the Japanese battleship had only one. Moreover, it absorbed the worst features of both: from the first - the excessive weight of the installation and a low rate of fire, from the second - a small effective range and a small projectile volume, which did not allow the use of remote fuses. The practical rate of fire was low, the firing range was insufficient, and the destructive effect of the projectile was too weak. The power of the installation drive (1 hp) was insufficient and, as a result, the angular guidance rate, especially in the horizontal plane. The quality of control systems for anti-aircraft guns corresponded to the level of the mid-1930s, and even those were not enough. An attempt by the Japanese to solve the problem "head-on" by setting the maximum guns were unsuccessful. Although the number of light anti-aircraft guns on ships exceeded a hundred, their actual effectiveness was very low. This was especially true for single-barrel units with a manual drive.

The meaning of their existence was perhaps only in the moral influence on the pilots, and on their own team - at the time of the air attack it is much calmer, when he is busy with his own business and his guns are firing around.

As for anti-aircraft machine guns, the experience of the war has shown their complete uselessness.

Equipment

The instrumentation of the battleships when they entered service was very meager by Western standards. In fact, "Yamato" and "Musashi" had a set of radio stations usual for Japanese ships, but significantly increased power, which made it possible to use them as flagships.

At the beginning of 1942, not a single ship of the Imperial Navy had a radar. Work on this important device began in the Japanese navy only after the capture of British radars in Singapore. In September 1942, the Musashi was the first of the battleships to receive a Type 21 radar. It was an extremely unreliable device that could detect surface targets at short range. Ultimately, Yamato and Musashi received sets of 6 radars by mid-1944 three different types, but they were all used only to detect sea and air targets. It was impossible to control the fire of either the main or anti-aircraft artillery with their help. In fact, the Japanese radars of 1944 matched the level of the American and British ones in 1941 and were clear evidence of the technical backwardness of Japan.

Besides "Yamato" and "Musashi" carried a set of hydrophones, in general, useless for battleships. At the end of the war, they were equipped with radio detectors and infrared devices. These devices were developed based on German technology.

In general, the electronic equipment of Japanese ships was backward, which was especially manifested in battles, which often took place in conditions of limited visibility or at night. This fact can be explained rather by an underestimation of the role of electronic equipment, since if desired, the ships could be equipped with very sophisticated German radars.

Crew and habitability

When commissioned, the Yamato's crew consisted of 2,200 people, including 150 officers, but in reality it was much larger from the very beginning. "Musashi" went out to participate in the battle for the Philippines, having on board 2,400 people, the crew of "Yamato" in its last voyage exceeded 3,000. This increase was caused, first of all, by the increase in anti-aircraft artillery personnel.

As for living conditions, the Yamato seemed to be a model of comfort for the Japanese sailors who were not spoiled. Indeed, compared to earlier battleships, it had 3.23 meters of living space per crew member, while its predecessors had between 2.23 and 2.63 meters. The battleship seemed even more comfortable against the background of heavy cruisers (1.3³ - 1.5³ meters) and even more so destroyers (1³ meters). It is no coincidence that "Yamato" and "Musashi" were nicknamed "hotels" in the Japanese navy - they even had large vats for bathing the crew.

However, in comparison with European and especially American standards, the Yamato's habitability was completely unsatisfactory. The cockpits were cramped, the aisles narrow, and the galleys and plumbing were primitive. The Japanese designers considered the amenities for the crew as something tertiary, believing that the sailors of the Imperial Navy will endure any difficulties.

Fighting career in 1942-1944

"Yamato"- laid down on November 4, 1937, launched on August 8, 1939, entered service in December 1941

Although the Yamato officially entered service on December 16, 1941, the ship was declared combat-ready only on May 27, 1942. As the flagship of the United Fleet, he formally participated in the battle of Midway Atoll on June 4-6, 1942, but actually did not have any collisions with the enemy, since he was 300 miles behind the Japanese aircraft carriers.

On May 28, 1942, Yamato relocated to Truk Island, where she spent about a year, serving as the floating headquarters of the United Fleet. On December 25, 1943, the Yamato, located north of Truk Island, was hit by a torpedo (charge weight 270 kg) from the American submarine Skate ( Skate), took about 3000 tons of water into the hole. The combat capability of the ship was seriously damaged due to the flooding of the cellar of the aft tower of the main battery. In January - April 1944, the Yamato underwent repairs and modernization in Kure.

In June 1944, the Yamato took part in the battle in the Philippine Sea, and the formation, which also included Musashi and a number of other heavy ships, acted in front of their aircraft carriers. On June 19, the Yamato opened fire for the first time in a combat situation, but later it turned out that the battleship had fired at its own aircraft, fortunately, ineffectively.

Musashi- laid down on March 29, 1938, launched on November 1, 1940, entered service in August 1942.

Until the end of 1942, "Musashi" underwent tests, additional equipment and combat training in Japanese waters. On January 22, 1943, he arrived at Truk and became the new flagship of the United Fleet. In May 1943, he was included in the compound intended to disrupt the Aleutian landing operation of the US fleet, but the Japanese delayed the deployment of their forces, and the operation had to be canceled. On March 29, 1943, the Musashi left Truka Bay, evading an attack by American carrier-based aircraft, but at sea the US submarine Tunney was attacked ( Tunny) and got hit by a torpedo in the bow. 3000 tons of water were taken, the losses amounted to 18 people. Repairs were carried out in Kure until the end of April. June 19-23 "Musashi" in place with "Yamato" participated in the battle in the Philippine Sea, but did not achieve any results.

The Japanese command saved their battleships for the proposed general engagement with the American fleet. In reality, the war in the Pacific Ocean turned into a series of small but grueling skirmishes, in which the forces of the Japanese fleet melted away while the strongest battleships defended themselves away from active combat zones. As a result, the Imperial Navy developed a skeptical attitude towards these ships, which is well illustrated by a popular saying among sailors:

There are three largest and most useless things in the world - the Egyptian pyramids, the Great Wall of China and the battleship Yamato

"Yamato" and "Musashi" in the battle for the Philippines

In October 1944, the Japanese super battleships were finally thrown into serious battle. The Americans began landing in the Philippines and, if successful, the operation could destroy the Japanese defensive perimeter and cut off Japan from the main sources of raw materials and oil. The rate was too high, and the Japanese command decided to conduct a general engagement. The "Se-Go" (Victory) plan drawn up by him was an outstanding achievement of the operational art. Since the aircraft carrier forces of the Imperial Navy had fallen into decay by that time, the main role was assigned to large artillery ships.

The northern group, which included the few surviving aircraft carriers, was to act as a decoy for Task Force 38, the main strike force of the American fleet. The main attack on the landing ships was to be inflicted by the 1st commando unit of Vice Admiral Kurita. It consisted of 5 battleships, including the Yamato and Musashi, 10 heavy and 2 light cruisers, and 15 destroyers. The compound was supposed to cross the San Bernandino Strait at night and in the morning to attack landing ships off Leyte Island. He was supported by the smaller 2nd sabotage unit of Vice Admiral Nishimura, which followed the Surigao Strait.

Fight in the Sibuyan Sea

On October 22, the 1st sabotage formation went to sea and the very next day was attacked by American submarines, which sank two heavy cruisers. On the morning of October 24, when the Kurita formation was in the Sibuyan Sea, massive attacks by American carrier-based aircraft began. By coincidence, the main strikes of the Americans were aimed at Musashi. During the first three hours, the battleship received at least three torpedo hits and a number of bombs. The roll was corrected by counter-flooding, but the ship had already received too much water, had a large trim on the bow and was gradually losing speed. After 15 hours, the battleship was again subjected to powerful attacks by torpedo bombers and dive bombers and received many torpedo and bomb hits. Although the attacks ended after 16 hours, the flooding of the battleship's interior was out of control. Vice-Admiral Kurita, seeing the desperate situation of the Musashi, ordered him to throw himself ashore. But the order could not be fulfilled - at 19.36 the battleship capsized and sank. In total, Musashi received hits from 11-19 torpedoes and 10-17 bombs. 1,023 crew members died, including its commander Rear Admiral Inoguchi, who chose to die along with his ship. The losses of the Americans amounted to 18 of the 259 aircraft involved in the attacks.

Despite the loss of the Musashi, the Kurita unit remained fully operational, since the rest of the battleships did not receive serious damage. However, Kurita hesitated and even turned back. However, the Northern Group of Vice Admiral Ozawa fulfilled its role of decoy - the main forces of the 38th Task Force rushed at it, leaving the northern straits unguarded. The American commander overestimated the achievements of his pilots, who reported on the sinking of many Japanese battleships, and decided that the 1st commando unit posed no danger. Kurita, meanwhile, received a direct order from the commander-in-chief of the United Fleet - "The unit must attack with faith in divine providence!" and moved forward.

Fight in Leyte Gulf

The formation unimpeded at night crossed the unguarded San Bernadino Strait at high speed and entered Leyte Gulf. Around 6.45 the Japanese discovered American ships. This was the northern group of the US 7th Fleet, which included 6 escort aircraft carriers, 3 destroyers and 4 destroyer escorts. On "Yamato", which became the flagship of the Japanese formation, the enemy was mistaken for one of the high-speed aircraft carrier groups and believed that it included cruisers. Nevertheless, the Japanese entered the battle. "Yamato" for the first time in his career opened fire on a surface enemy at 6.58 from a distance of 27 km. The first volleys fell on the White Plains aircraft carrier ( White plains) and the gunners believed they had hit.

In the future, the battle was reduced to the pursuit of the slow-moving enemy by the Japanese, who responded with attacks from aircraft and destroyers. Over the next three hours, Japanese ships fired at numerous targets and considered several American aircraft carriers and cruisers sunk. Shooting was hampered by occasional rainstorms and smoke screens enemy. As a result of the large difference in speed (up to 10 knots), the Japanese formation stretched out and Kurita lost control of the battle. At 10.20 the 1st commando unit withdrew from the battle and turned on the opposite course, although the path to Leyte Gulf, where the American transports had gathered, was open.

It was the only battle in history when battleships and cruisers held sights on aircraft carriers, and they responded by raising their planes into the air. The Japanese missed their chance, losing the final battle with a score of 1: 3 (one aircraft carrier had to pay with the loss of three heavy cruisers). Such a result, despite all its illogicality (too much was determined by the confusion of the Japanese admiral), became quite symbolic - the planes armed with bombs and torpedoes turned out to be stronger than the most powerful artillery.

The last trip "Yamato"

The last trip "Yamato". Scheme.

Explosion "Yamato".

"Yamato" returned to its native shores only on November 22, 1944 and was immediately delivered for repair and modernization, which turned out to be the last for him and ended in January 1945. Meanwhile, the war moved to the shores of Japan. On April 1, 1945, American troops landed in Okinawa. Since the island's garrison had no chance of repelling the landing, the Japanese command made the main bet on suicidal methods of struggle. The fleet also did not stand aside, proposing to use the Yamato to attack enemy landing craft despite the enemy's air and sea domination.

On the morning of April 6, 1945, a compound consisting of Yamato, 1 light cruiser and 8 destroyers went to sea to participate in Operation Ten-itichi-go (Heaven-1). The task was set before the formation - "the attack of the enemy fleet and supply ships and their destruction." In case of difficulties in returning to base, "Yamato" was ordered to throw himself on a sandbank off the coast of Okinawa and support army units with artillery fire. It was also assumed that this raid would divert the enemy's carrier-based aircraft and facilitate the massive kamikaze attacks scheduled for April 7 on the landing craft of the American fleet off the coast of Okinawa. The plan was suicidal from the start.

The Japanese compound was discovered by the enemy in the early morning of April 7. Starting from noon, the Yamato and her escort were heavily attacked by American carrier-based aircraft (227 vehicles in total). Two hours later, the battleship, having received up to 10 torpedo hits and 13 aerial bomb hits, went out of order. At 2:23 pm local time, the bow cellar of the main caliber artillery exploded, after which the Yamato sank. Only 269 people were saved, 3061 crew members were killed. The losses of the Americans amounted to 10 aircraft and 12 pilots.

Project evaluation

Preparing for the war for domination over the Pacific Ocean, the Japanese clearly imagined that it was impossible to compete even with the United States alone in the number of ships, especially such as battleships. The Americans, with a huge manufacturing advantage, could always build significantly more of them. As a result, a course for quality superiority was set, and it was within the framework of this concept that battleships of the Yamato class were ordered.

The criterion for assessing the superiority was the largest battleship that can pass through the Panama Canal. That is, the task was to build an artillery ship superior to any possible American response to it in the same class of ships. It must be admitted that the task was not fully resolved. In terms of the aggregate artillery power and protection, the Yamato significantly surpassed the latest American battleships of the Iowa class and, to an even greater extent, the battleships of European countries. However, it was inferior (in the limitations of the Panama Canal) to the battleships of the "Montana" type being built at this time. Only the decline in the importance of battleships, during the Pacific campaign, did not give the Japanese battleships worthy opponents (battleships of the "Montana" were not completed). And the advantage over the “Iowa” was not so great, given their great speed and numerical advantage, to speak of the full achievement of their goals. However, history has decreed that the Japanese giants went down in history as the largest and most powerful artillery ships in history.

... The rapprochement with Yamato was deadly to any opponent, including LK Iowa, South Dakota and Richelieu, not to mention Bismarck. It is even difficult to imagine what damage the ships would have received before reaching a distance of 14-16 km. ...

However, it should be emphasized that it would be incorrect to consider the dueling situation of the Yamato - an American battleship. The Japanese built super-powerful ships because they could not compete in the number of battleships. During the war years, Japan commissioned 2 new battleships, the USA - 10, and here the balance of forces looks obvious.

Of course, the project was not devoid of flaws. These, first of all, included not quite well-designed anti-torpedo protection. As for the shortcomings of Japanese radars and anti-aircraft systems, the general technological lag behind the United States and the underestimation of these means in particular (radars were not imported from Germany, for example) already affected. Fire control systems, a ballistic computer, are the highest engineering ideas of their time. The main caliber guns were the most long-range and powerful, but with a very low resource and a shell that was not much heavier than that of American opponents.

Each weapon is as good as it is used. In this regard, the Japanese admirals have nothing to brag about. All the decisive battles of the first half of the war took place without the participation of Yamato and Musashi. The Japanese command did not even use the opportunity to intimidate the enemy with the characteristics of the ships. As a result, the super battleships were thrown into battle in situations where their strengths were unclaimed. Speaking about the death of battleships, it makes no sense to talk about the lack of survivability or weakness of anti-aircraft weapons. Under such attacks, no ship would have survived, and how long they managed to hold out under the hail of blows does credit to their builders.

Was it a mistake to build Yamato-class battleships? Perhaps they should have been even larger (no matter how paradoxical it sounds in relation to the already largest battleships in history), with a large number (and possibly a large caliber of main battery guns), with better anti-mine and anti-aircraft protection in order to compensate for the maximum size quantitative and qualitative indicators. There is no doubt that Japan would have received a much greater effect by investing the money spent on battleships in aircraft carriers and aviation. However, given the gap in the military-industrial potential of Japan and its opponents, we have to admit that any other decision would not have led the Japanese to their goals either. The mistake was the very decision of Japan to start a war.

Battleships of this type marked the peak and at the same time a dead end in the development of battleships. The role of the main strike force at sea passed to aircraft carriers

Ship commanders

"Yamato":

12/16/1941 - 12/17/1942 - Captain I rank (from 05/01/1942 - Rear Admiral) Gihati Takayanagi.

12/17/1942 - 09/07/1943 - Captain I rank (from 05/01/1943 - Rear Admiral) Chiaki Matsuda.

09/07/1943 - 01/25/1944 - Captain I rank (from 01/05/1944 - Rear Admiral) Takedji Ono.

01/25/1944 - 11/25/1944 - Captain I rank (from 10/15/1944 - Rear Admiral) Nobuei Morisita.

11/25/1944 - 04/07/1945 - Captain I rank (posthumous vice admiral) Kosaku Ariga.

Musashi:

08/05/1942 - 06/09/1943 - Captain I rank (from 11/01/1942 - Rear Admiral) Kaworu Arima.

06/09/1943 - 12/07/1943 - Captain I rank (from 11/01/1943 - Rear Admiral) Keizo Komura.

12/07/1943 - 08/12/1944 - Captain I rank (from 05/01/1944 - Rear Admiral) Bundzi Asakura.

08/12/1944 - 10/24/1944 - Captain I rank (from 1.5.1943 - Rear Admiral) Toshihiro Inoguchi.

Notes (edit)

All data are as of December 1941.
The transcription of Japanese names is given according to the reference book by Apalkov Yu.V.
V. L. Kofman Japanese battleships of World War II. Yamato and Musashi. P. 12.
Smith P. Ch. Sunset of the Lord of the Seas. - M .: AST, 2003, p. 94.
Named after a province in the south of Honshu Island, Nara Prefecture. The word is also used as a poetic name for Japan. Cm.: Apalkov Yu.V. P. 112.
Named after the province in the east of Honshu Island, Kamagawa and Saitama Prefecture. Cm.: Apalkov Yu.V. P. 113
V. L. Kofman Japanese battleships of World War II. Yamato and Musashi. P. 14.
The mass of the gun is 227 tons, the mass of the 510 mm armor-piercing projectile is 2000 kg. Campbell j... Naval weapons of World War Two. - London, Conway Maritime Press, 2002, p. 179.
Ibid, p. twenty.
This steel was also the main material in the construction of American and British battleships.
V. L. Kofman Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi. P. 33.
Perhaps, otherwise, "Musashi" could have been saved. Ibid, p. 34.
V. L. Kofman Japanese battleships of World War II. Yamato and Musashi. S. 38. It should be added that such a high assessment of the quality of British armor is not confirmed by A. Raven and D. Roberts. Cm: Raven A., Roberts D. Battleships of the British Royal Navy of the types "King George V", "Lion", "Vanguard". SPb., 1997, p. 10.
Battleship of the Vanguard class. Armor protection.
In fact, the belt could be pierced by the guns of the Iowa-class battleships. See: Kofman, p. 37.
After the war, during field tests, the armored plates for the Shinano captured by the Americans were pierced by 406-mm shells. Kofman, S. 41.
Balakin S.A., Dashyan. A.V. and others. Battleships of the Second World War. P. 239.
With the American approach to the design of ammunition, a 460-mm projectile would weigh about 1780 kg. See: V. L. Kofman. Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi. P. 48.
Trinitroanisole, TNT equivalent 1.06.
For comparison, the detonator of the American Mk8 armor-piercing projectile had a deceleration of 0.033 s. The armament of Iowa-class battleships
http://www.wunderwaffe.narod.ru/WeaponBook/Jap_Cr_2/25.htm
V. L. Kofman Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi. P. 56.
Ibid, p. 51.
Ibid, p. 62.
Ibid, p. 64.
Hygiene procedures on the overwhelming majority of Japanese ships were limited to pouring water on the upper deck.
In terms of habitability, the Yamato was inferior to Soviet ships. See for example: http://www.wunderwaffe.narod.ru/Magazine/MK/2003_01/03.htm
V. L. Kofman Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi. P.79.
Nimitz C., Porter E. War at sea (1939-1945). - Smolensk, Rusich, 1999.
Balakin S.A., Dashyan. A. V. and others. Battleships of the Second World War. P. 231.
V. L. Kofman Japanese battleships of World War II. Yamato and Musashi. From 101.
Sherman F. War in the Pacific. Aircraft carriers in battle. - M .; SPb: AST, Terra Fantastica, 1999.S. 177.
Kofman V.L. Japanese battleships of the Second World War. Yamato and Musashi. P. 106.
http://www.wunderwaffe.narod.ru/WeaponBook/Jap_Cr_2/25.htm
Finally, the reasons for the death of "Yamato" were established in 1985. international expedition discovered and examined the wreckage of the battleship.
Balakin S.A., Dashyan. A.V. and others. Battleships of the Second World War. P. 254.

Literature

Apalkov Yu.V. Combat ships of the Japanese fleet: Battleships and aircraft carriers. - SPb .: Didactics, 1997.
Balakin S.A., Dashyan. A.V. and others. Battleships of the Second World War. - M .: Collection, Yauza, EKSMO, 2005.
V. L. Kofman Japanese battleships of World War II. Yamato and Musashi. - M .: Collection, Yauza, EKSMO, 2006.

Links in culture

en: Space battleship Yamato (anime) (eng.)
en: Yamato (film) (eng.)

Links

Berezhnykh O.A. Battleship "Yamato"
Pechukonis N.N. Battleship "Yamato"
The world's largest model of the battleship Yamato. Museum in Japan. 64 photos.
Inright J."Shinano" - the sinking of the Japanese secret supercarrier - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1991. - ISBN 5-203-00584-2

: class "Nelson" (1927) type "King George V" (1940) type "Lion" * Vanguard (1946) | : Scharnhorst class (1938) class "Bismarck" (1940) type "H" * type "P" * | : type "Littorio" (1940) | : pr. 1047 * | the USSR : type "Soviet Union" * type "Kronstadt" * type "Stalingrad" * | USA : type "North Carolina" (1941) class "South Dakota" (1942) class "Iowa" (1943) class "Alaska" (1944) type "Montana" * | : type "Dunkirk" (1937) type "Richelieu" (1940) | : type "Yamato" (1941)