Organizational structure and place of attack aviation in the Red Army Air Force
In the interwar period, the organizational structure of aviation units was continuously developed, the composition of the Red Army Air Force and the place of various branches of aviation in it were specified.
By the mid-20s, in the process of transferring the air fleet to a peaceful position, aviation units were enlarged. The aviation squadrons that existed before the military reform of 1924 were consolidated into squadrons of three squadrons. The aviation squadron became the main military unit of the Soviet Air Force, remaining it until the end of the 1930s. It consisted of 18 aircraft and 367 personnel. The aviation squadron was subordinate to the head of the Air Force of the military district and was the main organizational and tactical unit in the Red Army Air Force (KA).
The military aviation received a new name in accordance with the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 15, 1924, when the Workers 'and Peasants' Air Fleet (RKKVF) was transformed into the Air Force of the Red Army, and the Main Directorate of the Air Fleet into the Directorate of the Air Force.
A year later, it was decided to create five assault aviation squadrons of 27-30 aircraft, which marked the beginning of the organizational formation in the Soviet Union of attack aviation, designed to destroy small and mobile ground targets from low altitudes. The formation of these squadrons began in 1926, which should be considered the year the Soviet attack aviation was created.
In the same 1926, a decree of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR saw the light, all aviation units located in the same garrison were organizationally united into an aviation brigade. However, this step did not pursue far-reaching goals - simply the creation of brigades facilitated the tasks of providing. At the same time, a regrouping of aviation forces took place - in the garrison they collected parts of the same tribal affiliation. All this made it possible to reduce the range of spare parts, more accurately determine the required dimensions of consumables and fuel. Subsequently, this led to the implementation of the idea of creating homogeneous bomber, fighter and ground attack aviation brigades.
At that time, the aviation brigade consisted of a headquarters, three squadrons, units and support units. The states and property sheets of the brigades were established, in accordance with which it was planned to have 50 aircraft in the bomber and attack aviation brigade, and 100 in the fighter brigade. one per military district), separate training detachments intended for the retraining of pilots who had long breaks in flight work, and training grounds. Thus, the brigade became a full-fledged operational-tactical unit of the Red Army Air Force.
In the autumn of 1926, in accordance with the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a new organization of rear services was introduced in the Air Force. Logistic units were withdrawn from aviation squadrons and detachments, and on their basis larger formations were created - air fleets intended for the logistics of flight units. The air fleets were entrusted with the tasks of supplying aviation units and formations with all types of allowances, repairing aviation property, preparing, maintaining and protecting airfields. The aviation fleet, as an independent combat unit, included technical and economic services, an airfield, a training ground, a weather station, a workshop, garages, means of communication and air defense, and other services and units. Depending on the volume of work on maintenance of combat aviation units, the fleets were divided into three categories. Aircraft fleets of the second category were supposed to be involved in providing attack aviation.
With the increase in the capacity of the aviation industry and the improvement of the aircraft fleet of combat aviation, the ratio of aviation branches in the Air Force gradually changed.
The difficulties associated with the restoration of the country's economy, the budget deficit and other factors, both objective and subjective, made their own adjustments to the process of organizational building. Thus, the planned prospects for the creation of homogeneous aviation formations had to be postponed to the second half of the 1930s. In 1931, out of 13 aviation brigades available in the Air Force, 9 were mixed, consisting of squadrons of various branches of aviation (fighter, bomber, reconnaissance and ground attack).
The practice of organizing combat training in mixed aviation brigades made it possible to identify a number of strengths and weaknesses in formations of this type. This experience in military organizational development came in handy later, in the formation of mixed formations in the air armies of the fronts in the summer of 1942, when attack aviation forces were still not enough to create homogeneous formations of attack aircraft.
The growth of the combat strength of attack aviation was carried out through the formation of new units and an increase in the regular number of combat aircraft in aviation units and formations. Headquarters were created in the attack aviation squadrons, to which all special services (weapons, aerial photography, communications and air navigation) were subordinate. At the same time, the transport capabilities of the aviation rear were strengthened in order to ensure the combat activity of aviation in isolation from railway and waterways. It should be noted that the needs of the aviation rear in vehicles, despite the efforts made, far exceeded the available capabilities. This shortcoming remained relevant in the 1940s.
In 1933, the Red Army Air Force had 77 aviation brigades, including 24 heavy bombers, 14 fighters, and 10 ground attack brigades.
Even during the development and implementation of the military reform of 1924-1925 in the Soviet Union, a course was taken to build a three-service structure of the armed forces. By the beginning of the 1930s, the necessary prerequisites for the implementation of these plans were created; on March 23, 1932, at a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the provisions developed by a commission composed of prominent military figures - A.N. Egorova, Ya.I. Alksnis and A.Ya. Lapin. Based on the results of the discussion, a resolution “On the Fundamentals of the Organization of the Red Army Air Force” was adopted, which indicated that the changes that had taken place in the Air Force were transferring them from auxiliary weapons, which they had essentially occupied until now, to the role of an independent branch of the military. The same resolution determined the division of the Air Force in accordance with the strategic and operational-tactical designation into tactical, operational and strategic aviation. At the same time, it was supposed to be divided by affiliation into military, army and front, regardless of the type of aviation. Moreover, only heavy bomber aircraft were considered as a means of the High Command.
Not everything was certain with the types of aviation, especially bomber, which was divided into long-range or short-range, heavy, medium or light. In the documents of that time there are also references to cruising aviation. The struggle of opinions gave rise to frequent clarifications and changes in the composition, organizational structure and subordination of the Air Force.
An important step in organizational building was taken in 1938. At that time, based on the experience of hostilities in Spain and China, aviation regiments began to form as aviation units. The bomber aviation regiment consisted of five squadrons, which in the new structure became units of 12 aircraft. The regiment of fighter and attack aviation consisted of four aviation squadrons of 15 aircraft each. In the bomber squadron there were four, and in the fighter and attack aircraft - five aviation units. The links of all branches of aviation were three-plane composition.
The new structure significantly strengthened the aviation unit and its subunits, and increased their ability to carry out combat missions. With such an organizational structure, aviation units entered the war, retaining it until August 1941.
On January 1, 1941, the Red Army Air Force had 249 aviation regiments of various types of aviation, by June 1, another 17 air regiments were formed.
If we talk about the number of aircraft in the combat units of the Red Army, then on January 1, 1940 it was:
The aviation units of all branches of aviation were consolidated into aviation formations. Created in July 1940 new type formations - aviation division. The first aviation divisions were reorganized from aviation brigades; subsequently, the formation of many new formations was simultaneously begun. If in 1930 the Air Force consisted of 17 brigades, then by June 1941 there were 79 aviation divisions and 5 aviation brigades.
Moreover, two types of air divisions were created: mixed - for manning the air forces of the armies and homogeneous (fighter or bomber) - in the front-line aviation groups and the DBA of the High Command.
The formations of long-range bomber aviation of the High Command accounted for 13.5%, the Air Force of the military districts (front-line aviation group) - 40.5%, and the Air Force of the armies (army aviation) - 43.7%. Separate units of military aviation, which were part of the rifle corps, accounted for 2.3% of the entire Red Army Air Force.
At the same time, parts of attack aviation were not reduced to homogeneous formations. Assault aviation regiments, one by one, were part of a mixed aviation division, along with a bomber and two fighter aviation regiments. There were no attack aviation units in the front-line aviation group, as well as in the formations of central subordination.
This situation has developed not only because the ground attack aircraft fleet was the smallest, but also based on the purpose of the ground attack aircraft. He was a "battlefield aircraft", and, therefore, his place was in the "tactical" aviation operating over the battlefield. In a number of documents, army aviation is called tactical, front-line group - operational, and subordinate to the High Command - strategic aviation.
During limited-scale hostilities on the Karelian Isthmus harsh winter In 1939/40, Soviet pilots had to deal with weak Finnish aviation. After the end of the war, in the final report to the Main Military Council of the Red Army dated March 19, 1940, the head of the Red Army Air Force Ya.I. Smushkevich wrote: "The necessity of the division of the Air Force into army aviation, specially designed for interaction with ground forces, and operational, acting in the interests of aviation in war, has been proved with complete certainty." Further, the head of the Air Force points out: "The army aviation should include reconnaissance aircraft, short-range bombers and some fighters, that is, those types of aviation that are most adapted to interact with ground forces."
However, the attempted division of the front's aviation subsequently exacerbated the difficult situation in which it found itself during the war. But in itself the idea of assigning part of the forces to combined arms armies in order to achieve close tactical interaction with the troops deserves close attention. At the same time, of course, the dispersion of attack aviation forces by separate regiments (one regiment per army) was unacceptable.
On the eve of the war, the organizational structure of the aviation rear, designed to provide for all branches of aviation, changed. By the end of the 1930s, when the air fleets could no longer cope with the ever-increasingly complex tasks that confronted them, they were reorganized into air bases, each of which was attached to one aviation unit. As part of an aviation division, the air base could provide 8-10 aviation squadrons of 15-aircraft fighter and attack aircraft, located at 8-10 airfields.
Combat practice, especially the experience of the war with Finland in 1939-1940, has shown that such a structure significantly reduces the maneuverability of both the flying and rear units.
To eliminate this shortcoming, in accordance with the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, from April 1941, parts of the aviation rear - the air base - began to be withdrawn from the aviation formations. The aviation rear began to be organized on a territorial basis. In the military districts, air base areas (RAB) began to be created, which, being aviation rear formations, mastered the territory assigned to them in terms of aerodrome and organized the logistics of aviation units and formations of any affiliation and type of aviation.
The RAB included air bases, and the latter included airfield service battalions (BAO) at the rate of one battalion per regiment and one base per division. In addition to air bases, the air base area included an airfield engineering battalion and a mobile railway aviation workshop.
To the beginning of the Great Patriotic War this reorganization was not completed.
With the outbreak of World War II in Europe, the rate of deployment of the Red Army Air Force increased sharply. By the end of 1941, it was planned to create 106 air regiments equipped with new technology, deploy 25 divisional directorates. Almost all divisional directorates in the summer of 1941 were in the process of formation and were understaffed.
The plan for 1941 provided for the re-equipment of all 96 fighter regiments, 62 of 79 bomber regiments, 8 out of 10 reconnaissance and 11 existing assault aviation regiments with new aviation equipment. By June 22, it was possible to re-equip only 8 fighter and 1 bomber aviation regiments, which was about 5% of the plan.
From the book Military Aspects of Soviet Cosmonautics author Tarasenko MaximCHAPTER 2 Organizational structure of the Soviet cosmonautics. Soviet cosmonautics had no equal in the world in terms of the secrecy of all its aspects, but, perhaps, its organizational structure remained its most vague aspect. Meanwhile, organizational decisions reflect
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From the book I fought in a fighter [Those who took the first blow, 1941-1942] author Drabkin Artem VladimirovichOrganizational structure of the UPA In order to more clearly guide the troops, the UPA was divided according to the territorial principle into four main territorial administrations - the General Military Districts (GVO). Each of these GVOs, in turn, was divided into military districts
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From the book US War in Afghanistan. In the graveyard of empires author Jones Seth J.REGULATIONS ON AWARDS AND PRIZES FOR THE PERSONNEL OF THE RED ARMY AIR FORCES, LONG-TERM AVIATION, fighter aircraft of the air defense, the Air Force of the Navy for combat activity and the preservation of materiel I. Fighter aviation1. Pilots
From the book Fighters - take off! authorStructure Maintenance fighter aviation regiments of the Red Army Air Force The chief engineer of the regiment, who reported directly to the commander of the regiment, was responsible for the material support of the regiment, as well as for the technical training of the flight personnel.
From the book Greek mercenaries. "Dogs of war" of ancient Hellas author Herbert William ParkThe organizational structure of the units for the protection of the leaders of the Soviet
From the book Spy Number One author Sokolov Gennady EvgenievichOrganizational structure of al-Qaeda After the elimination of the Taliban regime, al-Qaeda gradually turned into a decentralized non-linear network based in Pakistan. Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman divided the group into four categories or series.
From the book History of the military district system in Russia. 1862–1918 author Kovalevsky Nikolay FedorovichORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE In organizational terms, the Red Army Air Force, including fighter units, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, radically differed from the state that was inherent in military aviation in the mid-30s, when
From the book The Birth of Soviet Attack Aviation [The History of the Creation of "Flying Tanks", 1926–1941] author Zhirokhov Mikhail Alexandrovich3. The organizational structure of the "ten thousand" 10 (initially 13) thousand, as we have seen, did not have a clear organization. The troops were commanded by various leaders who initially assembled them. Having entered the general army, these leaders kept apart from the subordinate troops.
From the book Weapons of Victory and the NKVD. Constructors in the grip of repression author Pomogaybo Alexander Albertovich From the author's book1 The composition, organizational structure and functioning of the military district system in the conditions of a major war The long-awaited pan-European crisis became a reality in the summer of 1914. On June 28, Serbian nationalists killed the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke
From the author's bookManagement of assault aviation units In the prewar years, quite a lot of attention was paid to the issues of training command personnel for the Red Army Air Force, as well as problems related to the management of aviation on the ground and in the air. This aspect was reflected in a number of
From the author's bookInteraction of assault aviation with other branches of aviation and ground forces Views on the organization of command and control of assault aviation units are closely intertwined with the provisions relating to the organization of interaction between attack aviation and other branches of aviation and
From the author's bookTHE CREATOR OF AVAILABLE AVIATION When I first started writing this book, I made a list of the names of the people I wanted to write about. At the end of the chapter, I crossed out the corresponding surname, and the list was reduced. But working with books sometimes gave me new surnames, and I added
Photos with airplanes. I took the captions and legends for the photographs from there.
Aviation technicians of the Leningrad Front of the 1st mine-torpedo regiment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet preparing a bomber for the next flight. 1941
Aviation technicians of the Leningrad Front of the 1st mine-torpedo regiment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet preparing a bomber for the next flight. 1941
Location: Leningrad region
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Muscovites on Sverdlov Square inspect a German plane shot down over the capital. 1941
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Muscovites on Sverdlov Square inspect a German plane shot down over the capital. 1941
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Air unit commander Korolev (left) congratulates Captain Savkin on the excellent performance of the combat mission. 1942
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Air unit commander Korolev (left) congratulates Captain Savkin on the excellent performance of the combat mission. 1942
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The soldiers are advancing on the copse occupied by the Germans. In the foreground - the wreckage of a downed German aircraft. 1943
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The soldiers are advancing on the copse occupied by the Germans. In the foreground - the wreckage of a downed German aircraft. 1943
Location: Leningrad Front
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Assembly of combat aircraft in the shop of one of the defense plants. 1942
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Assembly of combat aircraft in the shop of one of the defense plants. 1942
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Professor Predchetensky A.M. inspects combat vehicles collected at the expense of the workers of the Ivanovo region. October 7, 1944
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Professor Predchetensky A.M. inspects combat vehicles collected at the expense of the workers of the Ivanovo region. October 7, 1944
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Appearance of the shop N-sky aviation plant. 1943
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Appearance of the shop N-sky aviation plant. 1943
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Interior view of the aircraft assembly shop at an aircraft factory. March 1943
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Interior view of the aircraft assembly shop at an aircraft factory. March 1943
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Suspension of test bombs to the aircraft at the aircraft building, Order of Lenin Plant No. 18 named after. Voroshilov. 1942
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Suspension of test bombs to the aircraft at the aircraft building, Order of Lenin Plant No. 18 named after. Voroshilov. 1942
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A participant in the All-Union Socialist Competition, a student of a vocational school, Komsomol member A. Fedchenkova, finishing the armored glass of the pilot's cockpit. 1942
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A participant in the All-Union Socialist Competition, a student of a vocational school, Komsomol member A. Fedchenkova, finishing the armored glass of the pilot's cockpit. 1942
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Aerologist-sounder of the Tbilisi airport Krasnikova E. at the instruments after a high-altitude flight. February 02, 1945
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Aerologist-sounder of Tbilisi airport Krasnikova E.U. instruments after high-altitude flight. February 02, 1945
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R.L. Carmen in a group at the plane on one of the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. 1941
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One of the aircraft of the squadron, built at the expense of the staff of the State Academic Maly Theater of the USSR, at the airfield before being sent to the front. June 1944
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One of the aircraft of the squadron, built at the expense of the staff of the State Academic Maly Theater of the USSR, at the airfield before being sent to the front. June 1944
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Artists of the State Jazz Orchestra conducted by L. Utyosov inspect the fighter "Merry Fellows", purchased at the expense of the musical group. 1944
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Artists of the State Jazz Orchestra conducted by L. Utyosov inspect the fighter "Merry Fellows", purchased at the expense of the musical group. 1944
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Honored Artist of the RSFSR L.O. Utyosov speaks at a rally on the occasion of the transfer of aircraft built with funds from the State Jazz Orchestra to representatives of the Red Army command. 1944
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Honored Artist of the RSFSR L.O. Utyosov speaks at a rally on the occasion of the transfer of aircraft built with funds from the State Jazz Orchestra to representatives of the Red Army command. 1944
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Fighter squadron "Gorky worker", built at the expense of the workers of the Gorky region, at the airport. 1944
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Fighter squadron "Gorky worker", built at the expense of the workers of the Gorky region, at the airport. 1944
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Fighter Yak-9, built at the expense of the collective farmer F.P. Golovaty. 1944
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Fighter Yak-9, built at the expense of the collective farmer F.P. Golovaty. 1944
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F.P. Golovaty and Guard Major B.I. Eremin near the 2nd aircraft, purchased at the personal expense of F.P. Golovaty and handed over to the Soviet pilot. June 1944
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F.P. Golovaty and Guard Major B.I. Eremin near the 2nd aircraft, purchased at the personal expense of F.P. Golovaty and handed over to the Soviet pilot. June 1944
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Guard Major B.N. Eremin in the cockpit of an aircraft built at the expense of F.P. Golovaty. January 1943
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Guard Major B.N. Eremin in the cockpit of an aircraft built at the expense of F.P. Golovaty. January 1943
Location: Stalingrad Front
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Komsomol members of the Yaroslavl region at the airport hand over to Soviet pilots a squadron of aircraft built with funds raised by the youth of the region. 1942
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Komsomol members of the Yaroslavl region at the airport hand over to Soviet pilots a squadron of aircraft built with funds raised by the youth of the region. 1942
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Member of the agricultural artel "Krasny Luch" A.M. Sarskov and Hero Soviet Union, Major F.N. Orlov near the plane, built on the personal savings of A.M. Sarskov. July 10, 1944
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Member of the agricultural artel "Krasny Luch" A.M. Sarskov and Hero of the Soviet Union, Major F.N. Orlov near the plane, built on the personal savings of A.M. Sarskov. July 10, 1944
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Guard Lieutenant I.S. Pashayev near the plane, built at the expense of the workers of Kiev. September 13, 1944
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Guard Lieutenant I.S. Pashayev near the plane, built at the expense of the workers of Kiev. September 13, 1944
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Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Aviation V.I. Shevchenko thanks the representative of the collective farmers of the Ivanovo region E.P. Limonov for the planes built at the expense of the working people of the region. October 10, 1944
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Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Aviation V.I. Shevchenko thanks the representative of the collective farmers of the Ivanovo region E.P. Limonov for the planes built at the expense of the working people of the region. October 10, 1944
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Attack aviation pilot G. Parshin thanks Evgenia Petrovna and Praskovya Vasilievna Barinov for the plane built with their personal savings. June 3, 1944
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Attack aviation pilot G. Parshin thanks Evgenia Petrovna and Praskovya Vasilievna Barinov for the plane built with their personal savings. June 3, 1944
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A squadron of aircraft "Chapaevtsy", built at the expense of the workers of the city of Chapaevsk, and transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front, at the airfield. September 12, 1944
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A squadron of aircraft "Chapaevtsy", built at the expense of the workers of the city of Chapaevsk, and transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front, at the airfield. September 12, 1944
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Aircraft squadron "Moscow", built at the expense of the workers of the Kiev region of Moscow, at the airport. October 16, 1944
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Aircraft squadron "Moscow", built at the expense of the workers of the Kiev region of Moscow, at the airport. October 16, 1944
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A squadron of fighters built with funds raised by the Komsomol members of Novosibirsk. 1942
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A squadron of fighters built with funds raised by the Komsomol members of Novosibirsk. 1942
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A squadron of fighters built with funds raised by the youth of the Khabarovsk Territory. 1942
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A squadron of fighters built with funds raised by the youth of the Khabarovsk Territory. 1942
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Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Ryazanov, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev and Colonel General S.K. Goryunov inspect aircraft built at the expense of the workers of the city of Znamensk. 1944
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Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Ryazanov, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev and Colonel General S.K. Goryunov inspect aircraft built at the expense of the workers of the city of Znamensk. 1944
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Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain I.N. Kozhedub in the cockpit of an aircraft built at the expense of the collective farmer V.V. Konev. June 1944
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Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain I.N. Kozhedub in the cockpit of an aircraft built at the expense of the collective farmer V.V. Konev. June 1944
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Collective farmer of the agricultural artel “Gudok” K.S. Shumkova is talking with Guard Lieutenant Colonel N.G. Sobolev, who received the Krasnoyarsk Komsomolets aircraft, built with her personal savings. 1943
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Collective farmer of the agricultural artel “Gudok” K.S. Shumkova is talking with Guard Lieutenant Colonel N.G. Sobolev, who received the Krasnoyarsk Komsomolets aircraft, built with her personal savings. 1943
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Loading ammunition on transport aircraft to be sent to the front. March 1943
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Loading ammunition on transport aircraft to be sent to the front. March 1943
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Loading ammunition at the airport. 1944
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Loading ammunition at the airport. 1944
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Fighter pilots N.F. Murashov, A.G. Shirmanov and technician N.P. Starostin for the release of the Combat Leaflet. July 1941
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Fighter pilots N.F. Murashov, A.G. Shirmanov and technician N.P. Starostin for the release of the Combat Leaflet. July 1941
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Junior Sergeant A.V. Smirnov, senior sergeant G.M. Ter-Abramov and military commissar S.I. Yakovlev load leaflets on the plane. 1942
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Junior Sergeant A.V. Smirnov, senior sergeant G.M. Ter-Abramov and military commissar S.I. Yakovlev load leaflets on the plane. 1942
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Air Force Commander Cherno navy ON THE. Ostryakov (left), Commissar of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet, Brigadier Commissar N.V. Kuzenko and the head of the flight inspection, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel N.A. Naumov (right) at the airport near the plane. 1942
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Commander of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet N.A. Ostryakov (left), Commissar of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet, Brigadier Commissar N.V. Kuzenko and the head of the flight inspection, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel N.A. Naumov (right) at the airport near the plane. 1942
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Captain I.I. Saprykin (left) assigns a combat mission to a fighter unit at the Kherson Mayak airfield. 1942
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Captain I.I. Saprykin (left) assigns a combat mission to a fighter unit at the Kherson Mayak airfield. 1942
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Fighter pilot, captain Balashov V.I. tells combat friends about his experience in air combat. August 1942
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Fighter pilot, captain Balashov V.I. tells combat friends about his experience in air combat. August 1942
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Captain V.I. Balashov, commander of the squadron squadron, explains the course of combat flight to the navigator of the torpedo bomber Nikolai Samoilovich Umansky. 1943
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Captain I.E. Korzunov near the damaged aircraft. In the background, the main aircraft of the Soviet long-range aviation - DB3F (IL-4). 1941
Captain I.E. Korzunov near the damaged aircraft. In the background, the main aircraft of the Soviet long-range aviation - DB3F (IL-4). 1941
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German fighter jet Messerschmidt making an emergency landing. 1942
German fighter jet Messerschmidt making an emergency landing. 1942
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An American aircraft in service with one of the flying units of the Northern Navy. 1942
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An American aircraft in service with one of the flying units of the Northern Navy. 1942
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Naval aviation bombers at the airport. October 1942
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Naval aviation bombers at the airport. October 1942
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Suspension of a torpedo on a torpedo bomber at the airfield of a mine-torpedo regiment. 1943
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Suspension of a torpedo on a torpedo bomber at the airfield of a mine-torpedo regiment. 1943
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Return from a combat flight to the naval reconnaissance seaplane base. June 1943
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Return from a combat flight to the naval reconnaissance seaplane base. June 1943
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Hurricane fighters at the field airfield of one of the air units. 1942
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Hurricane fighters at the field airfield of one of the air units. 1942
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The commander of the torpedo bomber aircraft of the Air Force of the Northern Fleet, which sank four transports and one enemy patrol ship, Guards Captain Bolashev V.P. talking with crew members: navigator, guard captain Nikolai Samoilovich Umansky, gunner, sergeant Emelianenko V.A. and gunner-radio operator Biryukov M.M. - at the plane. 1943
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The commander of the torpedo bomber aircraft of the Air Force of the Northern Fleet, which sank four transports and one enemy patrol ship, Guards Captain Bolashev V.P. talking with crew members: navigator, guard captain Nikolai Samoilovich Umansky, gunner, sergeant Emelianenko V.A. and gunner-radio operator Biryukov M.M. - at the plane. 1943
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Soviet fighter pilot Maksimovich V.P. learns to drive an English Hurricane fighter
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Soviet fighter pilot Maksimovich V.P. learns to drive an English Hurricane fighter
under the leadership of the English pilot Votsevis Paul. 1941
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English fighter pilot Sergeant Howe, who fought on the Northern Front,
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English fighter pilot Sergeant Howe, who fought on the Northern Front,
awarded the Order of Lenin, at his plane. 1941
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Captain Druzenkov P.I. introduces a group of pilots "Fighting France"
(Squadron "Normandie-Neman") with the route of the upcoming combat flight. 1942
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French pilots of the military unit of the Fighting France "Normandie" leave the airfield after completing a combat mission. 1943
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French pilots of the military unit of the Fighting France "Normandie" leave the airfield after completing a combat mission. 1943
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Major A.F. Matisov. talks with the pilots of the Fighting France "Normandy", operating as part of the air force of the Red Army. 1943
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Major A.F. Matisov. talks with the pilots of the Fighting France "Normandy", operating as part of the air force of the Red Army. 1943
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The group of aces "Normandie" of the Fighting France is developing a plan for the next flight. 1945
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The group of aces "Normandie" of the Fighting France is developing a plan for the next flight. 1945
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The crew of the American "flying fortress" bomber, upon returning from a combat mission, talks with Soviet pilots. 1944
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The crew of the American "flying fortress" bomber, upon returning from a combat mission, talks with Soviet pilots. 1944
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Senior Lieutenant N.I. Dobrovolsky (left) and captain A.G. Machnev - order-bearing pilots of the assault aviation unit, who distinguished themselves in battles in the Oryol direction at the field airfield near the aircraft. 1943
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Senior Lieutenant N.I. Dobrovolsky (left) and captain A.G. Machnev - order-bearing pilots of the assault aviation unit, who distinguished themselves in battles in the Oryol direction at the field airfield near the aircraft. 1943
SAOO, unit ridge 9763
Location: Oryol-Kursk direction
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Soviet attack aircraft in the sky near Berlin. 1945
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Soviet attack aircraft in the sky near Berlin. 1945
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One of ten gliders captured by the Yugoslav partisans at one of the German airfields near Belgrade. 1944
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One of ten gliders captured by the Yugoslav partisans at one of the German airfields near Belgrade. 1944
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A rally at one of the airfields near Berlin before the departure of the Victory Banner to Moscow for the Victory Parade. 1945
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A rally at one of the airfields near Berlin before the departure of the Victory Banner to Moscow for the Victory Parade. 1945
Location: 1st Belorussian Front
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Warriors carry the Banner of Victory across the Central Moscow airfield on the day it arrives in Moscow from Berlin. June 20, 1945
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Warriors carry the Banner of Victory across the Central Moscow airfield on the day it arrives in Moscow from Berlin. June 20, 1945
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The crew of flight commander M. Khazov before departure at the airport. 1945
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The crew of flight commander M. Khazov before departure at the airport. 1945
Location: 2nd Far Eastern Front
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Female calculation of "hearers". 1945
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Female calculation of "hearers". 1945
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Military photojournalist V. Rudny with the crew of the aircraft "Catalina". Shooting year unknown
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Military photojournalist V. Rudny with the crew of the aircraft "Catalina". Shooting year unknown
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The history of Soviet military aviation began in 1918. The USSR Air Force was formed simultaneously with the new land army. In 1918-1924. they were called the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet, in 1924-1946. - Air Force of the Red Army. And only after that the usual name of the USSR Air Force appeared, which remained until the collapse of the Soviet state.
origins
The first concern of the Bolsheviks after they came to power was the armed struggle against the "whites". Civil war and unprecedented bloodshed could not do without the accelerated construction of a strong army, navy and air force. At that time, aircraft were still curiosities; their mass operation began somewhat later. Russian empire left as a legacy of Soviet power a single division, consisting of models called "Ilya Muromets". These S-22s became the basis of the future USSR Air Force.
In 1918, there were 38 squadrons in the air force, and in 1920 - already 83. About 350 aircraft were involved in the Civil War fronts. The leadership of the then RSFSR did everything to preserve and exaggerate the tsarist aeronautical heritage. The first Soviet commander-in-chief of aviation was Konstantin Akashev, who held this position in 1919-1921.
Symbolism
In 1924, the future flag of the USSR Air Force was adopted (at first it was considered the airfield flag of all aviation formations and detachments). The background of the cloth was the sun. In the middle was a red star, inside it - a hammer and sickle. At the same time, other recognizable symbols appeared: silver soaring wings and propeller blades.
As the flag of the USSR Air Force, the cloth was approved in 1967. The image has become extremely popular. They did not forget about him even after the collapse of the USSR. In this regard, already in 2004, the Air Force received a similar flag. Russian Federation. The differences are insignificant: the red star, the hammer and sickle disappeared, an anti-aircraft gun appeared.
Development in the 1920s and 1930s
The military leaders of the period of the Civil War had to organize the future armed forces of the USSR in conditions of chaos and confusion. Only after the defeat of the "white" movement and the creation of an integral statehood did it become possible to begin a normal reorganization of aviation. In 1924, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet was renamed the Air Force of the Red Army. There was a new Air Force Directorate.
Bomber aviation was reorganized into a separate unit, within which the most advanced heavy bomber and light bomber squadrons at that time were formed. In the 1930s, the number of fighters increased significantly, while the proportion of reconnaissance aircraft, on the contrary, decreased. The first multi-purpose aircraft appeared (such as the R-6, designed by Andrey Tupolev). These machines could equally effectively perform the functions of bombers, torpedo bombers and long-range escort fighters.
In 1932, the armed forces of the USSR were replenished with a new type of airborne troops. The Airborne Forces had their own transport and reconnaissance equipment. Three years later, contrary to the tradition established during the Civil War, new military ranks were introduced. Now pilots in the Air Force automatically became officers. Everyone left the walls of their native schools and flight schools with the rank of junior lieutenant.
By 1933, new models of the "I" series (from I-2 to I-5) entered service with the USSR Air Force. These were biplane fighters designed by Dmitry Grigorovich. During the first fifteen years of its existence, the Soviet military aviation fleet was replenished by 2.5 times. The share of imported cars decreased to a few percent.
Air Force holiday
In the same 1933 (according to the decision of the Council of People's Commissars) the day of the USSR Air Force was established. August 18 was chosen as a holiday date in the Council of People's Commissars. Officially, the day was timed to coincide with the end of the annual summer combat training. By tradition, the holiday began to be combined with various competitions and competitions in aerobatics, tactical and fire training, etc.
The USSR Air Force Day was used to popularize civil and military aviation among the Soviet proletarian masses. Representatives of industry, Osoaviakhim and the Civil Air Fleet took part in the celebrations on the occasion of the significant date. The center of the annual holiday was the Mikhail Frunze Central Airfield in Moscow.
Already the first events attracted the attention of not only professionals and residents of the capital, but also numerous guests of the city, as well as official representatives of foreign states. The holiday could not do without the participation of Joseph Stalin, members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the government.
Change again
In 1939, the USSR Air Force experienced another reformatting. Their former brigade organization was replaced by a more modern divisional and regimental one. Carrying out the reform, the Soviet military leadership wanted to achieve an increase in the efficiency of aviation. After the transformation in the Air Force, a new main tactical unit appeared - the regiment (it included 5 squadrons, which in total ranged from 40 to 60 aircraft).
On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the share of attack and bomber aircraft was 51% of the entire fleet. Also, the composition of the USSR Air Force included fighter and reconnaissance formations. There were 18 schools operating on the territory of the country, within the walls of which new personnel were trained for the Soviet military aviation. Teaching methods were gradually modernized. Although at first the solvency of Soviet cadres (pilots, navigators, technicians, etc.) lagged behind the corresponding indicator in the capitalist countries, year after year this gap became less and less significant.
Spanish experience
For the first time after a long break, USSR Air Force aircraft were tested in a combat situation during civil war in Spain, which began in 1936. The Soviet Union supported the friendly "left" government that fought the nationalists. Not only military equipment, but also volunteer pilots went from the USSR to Spain. I-16s showed themselves best of all, they managed to show themselves much more efficiently than the Luftwaffe aircraft did.
The experience gained by Soviet pilots in Spain proved to be invaluable. Many lessons were learned not only by shooters, but also by aerial reconnaissance. The specialists who returned from Spain quickly advanced in their careers; by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, many of them became colonels and generals. In time, the campaign abroad coincided with the unleashing of the great Stalinist purges in the army. The repression also affected aviation. The NKVD got rid of many people who had fought with the "whites".
The Great Patriotic War
The conflicts of the 1930s showed that the USSR Air Force was in no way inferior to the European ones. However, World War, and an unprecedented arms race unfolded in the Old World. The I-153 and I-15, which had proven themselves in Spain, had already become obsolete by the time the German attack on the USSR. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War generally turned into a disaster for Soviet aviation. The enemy forces invaded the territory of the country unexpectedly, due to this suddenness they gained a serious advantage. Soviet airfields near the western borders were subjected to devastating bombardments. In the first hours of the war, a huge number of new aircraft were destroyed, which did not have time to leave their hangars (according to various estimates, there were about 2 thousand of them).
The evacuated Soviet industry had to solve several problems at once. Firstly, the USSR Air Force needed a quick replenishment of losses, without which it was impossible to imagine an equal fight. Secondly, throughout the war, designers continued to make detailed changes to new machines, thus responding to the technical challenges of the enemy.
Most of all, in those terrible four years, Il-2 attack aircraft and Yak-1 fighters were produced. These two models together accounted for about half of the domestic aircraft fleet. The success of the Yak was due to the fact that this aircraft proved to be a convenient platform for numerous modifications and improvements. The original model, which appeared in 1940, has been modified many times. Soviet designers did everything to ensure that the Yaks did not lag behind the German Messerschmitts in their development (this is how the Yak-3 and Yak-9 appeared).
By the middle of the war, parity was established in the air, and a little later, Soviet aircraft began to outperform enemy aircraft. Other famous bombers were also created, including the Tu-2 and Pe-2. The red star (the sign of the USSR / Air Force drawn on the fuselage) became for the German pilots a symbol of danger and the approaching heavy battle.
Fighting the Luftwaffe
During the Great Patriotic War, not only the park was transformed, but also the organizational structure of the Air Force. In the spring of 1942, long-range aviation appeared. This formation, subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, played a crucial role throughout the remaining war years. Together with him, air armies began to form. These formations included all front-line aviation.
A significant amount of resources was invested in the development of repair infrastructure. New workshops were supposed to quickly repair and return damaged aircraft to combat. The Soviet field repair network became one of the most efficient among all such systems that arose during the Second World War.
The key air battles for the USSR were air clashes during the battle for Moscow, Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge. Indicative figures: in 1941, about 400 aircraft took part in the battles, in 1943 this figure grew to several thousand, by the end of the war, about 7,500 aircraft were concentrated in the Berlin sky. The fleet has grown at an ever-increasing pace. In total, during the war, the forces of industry of the USSR produced about 17 thousand aircraft, and 44 thousand pilots were trained in flight schools (27 thousand died). Legends of the Great Patriotic War were Ivan Kozhedub (he won 62 victories) and Alexander Pokryshkin (he scored 59 victories).
New challenges
In 1946, shortly after the end of the war with the Third Reich, the Air Force of the Red Army was renamed the Air Force of the USSR. Structural and organizational changes have affected not only aviation, but the entire defense sector. Although the Second World War ended, the world continued to be in a tense state. A new confrontation began - this time between the Soviet Union and the United States.
In 1953, the Ministry of Defense of the USSR was created. The country's military-industrial complex continued to expand. New types of military equipment appeared, and aviation changed. An arms race began between the USSR and the USA. All further development of the Air Force was subject to a single logic - to catch up and overtake America. The design bureaus of Sukhoi (Su), Mikoyan and Gurevich (MiG) entered their most productive period of activity.
The advent of jet aviation
The first epoch-making post-war novelty was the jet aircraft tested in 1946. It replaced the old outdated piston technology. The first Soviet were the MiG-9 and Yak-15. They managed to overcome the speed mark of 900 kilometers per hour, that is, their performance was one and a half times higher than that of the previous generation models.
For several years, the experience accumulated by Soviet aviation during the Great Patriotic War was generalized. Key problems and pain points of domestic aircraft were identified. The process of modernization of equipment has begun to improve its comfort, ergonomics and safety. Every little thing (the pilot's flight jacket, the smallest device on the control panel) gradually took on modern forms. For better shooting accuracy, aircraft began to install advanced radar systems.
Airspace security has become the responsibility of the new air defense forces. The appearance of air defense led to the division of the territory of the USSR into several sectors, depending on the proximity to the state border. Aviation continued to be classified according to the same scheme (long-range and front-line). In the same 1946, the airborne troops, formerly part of the Air Force, were separated into an independent formation.
faster than sound
At the turn of the 1940-1950s, the improved Soviet jet aviation began to develop the most inaccessible regions of the country: the Far North and Chukotka. Long-distance flights were made because of another consideration. The military leadership of the USSR was preparing the military-industrial complex for a possible conflict with the United States, located on the other side of the world. For the same purpose, the Tu-95, a long-range strategic bomber, was designed. Another turning point in the development of the Soviet Air Force was the introduction of nuclear weapons. The introduction of new technologies today is best judged by the expositions located, including in the "aircraft capital of Russia" Zhukovsky. Even such things as the suit of the USSR Air Force and other equipment of Soviet pilots clearly demonstrate the evolution of this defense industry.
Another milestone in the history of Soviet military aviation was left behind when in 1950 the MiG-17 was able to exceed the speed of sound. The record was set by the famous test pilot Ivan Ivashchenko. Soon the obsolete attack aircraft was disbanded. In the meantime, new air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles have appeared in service with the Air Force.
In the late 1960s, third-generation models (for example, MiG-25 fighters) were designed. These machines could already fly at three times the speed of sound. MiG modifications in the form of high-altitude reconnaissance and interceptor fighters were launched into serial production. These aircraft have significantly improved takeoff and landing characteristics. In addition, the novelties were distinguished by multi-mode operation.
In 1974, the first vertical takeoff and landing (Yak-38) were designed. The inventory and equipment of the pilots changed. The flight jacket became more comfortable and helped to feel comfortable even in conditions of extreme overloads at ultra-high speeds.
fourth generation
The latest Soviet aircraft were stationed on the territory of the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Aviation did not take part in any conflicts for a long time, but demonstrated its capabilities in large-scale exercises, such as Dnepr, Berezina, Dvina, etc.
In the 1980s, fourth-generation Soviet aircraft appeared. These models (Su-27, MiG-29, MiG-31, Tu-160) differed by an order of magnitude improved maneuverability. Some of them are still in service with the Air Force of the Russian Federation.
The latest technology at that time revealed its potential in the Afghan war, which flared in 1979-1989. Soviet bombers had to operate under conditions of strict secrecy and constant anti-aircraft fire from the ground. During the Afghan campaign, about a million sorties were made (with the loss of about 300 helicopters and 100 aircraft). In 1986, the development of military projects began. The most important contribution to these undertakings was made by the Sukhoi Design Bureau. However, due to the deteriorating economic and political situation, work was suspended and projects were frozen.
Last chord
Perestroika was marked by several important processes. First, relations between the USSR and the USA have finally improved. cold war ended, and now the Kremlin did not have a strategic adversary, in the race with which it was necessary to constantly increase its own military-industrial complex. Secondly, the leaders of the two superpowers signed several landmark documents, according to which joint disarmament was launched.
In the late 1980s, withdrawal began Soviet troops not only from Afghanistan, but also from the countries of the already socialist camp. Exceptional in scale was the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the GDR, where its powerful advanced grouping was located. Hundreds of planes went home. Most remained in the RSFSR, some were transported to Belarus or Ukraine.
In 1991, it became clear that the USSR could no longer exist in its former monolithic form. The division of the country into a dozen independent states led to the division of the formerly common army. This fate did not escape aviation. Russia received about 2/3 of the personnel and 40% of the equipment of the Soviet Air Force. The rest of the inheritance went to 11 more union republics (the Baltic states did not take part in the partition).
Baranov Mikhail Dmitrievich (10/21/1921 - 01/17/1943)
Hero of the Soviet Union, deputy squadron commander of the 183rd Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 289th Fighter Aviation Division of the 8th Air Army of the Southwestern Front, senior lieutenant.
Member of the Great Patriotic War since June 1941. Fought on the Southern Front. By October 1941, he personally destroyed 5 enemy aircraft. On November 5 and 6, he was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner, and on November 8 he shot down He-111 and Me-109 in an air battle. In February 1942 he was appointed deputy squadron commander.
By June 1942, Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Baranov made 176 sorties, personally shot down 20 enemy aircraft and destroyed 6 during ground attack on airfields.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 578) was awarded to Mikhail Baranov on August 12, 1942.
On August 6, 1942, Mikhail Baranov flew out on alert as part of a group of Yak-1 fighters to intercept enemy Ju-87 bombers marching towards the city of Kotelnikovo under the cover of Messerschmitt Bf.109F fighters. The forces were unequal, but the Soviet pilots entered the battle. Baranov shot down two Messerschmitts and one Yu-87, but during the battle he ran out of ammunition. After that, Baranov shot down another Me-109, hitting it with a wing on the tail. Then he met with another German fighter on a collision course, rammed him, but his plane was badly damaged and crashed. Baranov landed by parachute and soon returned to his regiment.
During the landing, he injured his leg and spine. The medical board suspended him from flying, but he continued to fly. Soon he was appointed navigator of the regiment, and then transferred to the 9th Guards Odessa Fighter Aviation Regiment. Due to untreated wounds, he often fell ill. In one of the flights in mid-November 1942, a cramp cramped his leg. He was sent to a rest home. There he got worse and was admitted to the hospital.
He returned to the regiment on January 15, 1943 with a medical report: "Subject to outpatient treatment in part, temporarily not allowed to fly." On January 17, he obtained permission to take to the air. On the first flight, one of the instruments failed. Then Baranov took off on another plane. During the performance of aerobatics, the plane suddenly rolled over, rolled over on its back and in this position fell to the ground and exploded. The pilot died.
He was buried in the city of Kotelnikovo, Volgograd region. After the war, he was reburied in Volgograd on Mamaev Kurgan. In less than a year of fighting, he made 285 sorties, in 85 air battles he personally shot down 31 enemy aircraft and 28 as part of a group, destroyed 6 aircraft at airfields.
Awarded the Order of Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red Banner.
chart 1.
Chart 1
Notes:
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RKKA AIR FORCE ON THE EVE OF THE WAR
Grigory GERASIMOV
More than half a century separates us from the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, but disputes still do not stop why the Red Army Air Force suffered a severe defeat in 1941?
Soviet historiography saw one of the main reasons in the presence of an insignificant amount of modern equipment in the Air Force fleet. At the same time, most studies say nothing about the significant quantitative superiority of the Red Army Air Force over the enemy in June 1941, and in fact, on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, the Red Army aviation had 15,986 combat aircraft, while the entire German aviation fleet consisted of 10,000 aircraft. There were 4,000 combat aircraft directly in the troops operating against the USSR.
Why, then, did it happen that aviation, to which the military-political leadership of the country paid so much attention, at a decisive moment turned out to be unable to solve the tasks of protecting the air borders of the Motherland? The answer to this question can be given by analyzing the development of the Air Force in the 20s - early 40s.
The experience of the war has shown that for this it is necessary to study the quantitative and qualitative indicators characterizing aviation in the period under study.
Archival and published documents contain data on the aircraft fleet in the interwar period. The use of the method of expert assessments makes it possible to give a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessment of aviation for individual years of the interwar period.
Expert assessments include the determination of the conformity of the models of military equipment in service with the requirements of modern combat, i.e. the extent to which these types of aircraft could effectively conduct combat operations, resist air defense systems, and perform combat missions in accordance with their intended purpose. Then they were superimposed on the number of aircraft in service in the second half of the 1920s-1941. The calculation results are presented in graphical form on chart 1.
By 1941, the basis of the bomber aviation of the Red Army Air Force was still made up of obsolete SB-2 and TB-3
The chart clearly shows a number of trends:
First, the constant and steady quantitative growth of aviation technology. There were 515 combat aircraft in the Air Force units in 1925, 3649 in 1933, 6349 in 1938, and 15986 in June 1941;
Secondly, until 1940 the number of modern aircraft in the fleet of the Red Army was growing, and only in 1941 their number decreased, and significantly - from 4324 to 2577. By the beginning of the war, the number of aircraft that fully met the requirements of modern combat operations had decreased to the level of 1937 ;
Thirdly, the number of obsolete aircraft in the combat units of the Air Force was constantly growing. This growth becomes especially rapid in the prewar years: 1938 - 3737, 1939 - 8368, June 1941 - 13409;
Fourth, since the late 1920s the share of modern aircraft was steadily falling: 1928 - 95%, 1932 - 85%, 1937 - 53%, 1940 - 34%, June 1941 - 16%.
The reasons for these trends lay in the field of doctrinal views and the military-technical policy of the Soviet state and the production and technical capabilities of the country's economy.
Aviation was the branch of the armed forces, and then the branch of the armed forces, to which the country's top military-political leadership paid constant and unflagging attention. This was due, first of all, to the significant role that the air force was to play in a future war.
The first Soviet people's commissars for military and naval affairs invariably emphasized great importance aviation for future victories. L.D. Trotsky, in an article dedicated to the sixth anniversary of the Red Army, wrote: "If the most difficult task of the first three years was the creation of a revolutionary cavalry, now aviation issues occupy a central place in military development ...". M.V. Frunze also believed that "any state that does not have a powerful, well-organized and trained air fleet will inevitably be doomed to defeat."
At the same time, it is important to note that the top military-political leadership did not accept the theory of the Italian General Douai, according to which aviation was assigned a decisive role in achieving victory in modern warfare, and a course was taken for the harmonious development of all branches of service and types of armed forces.
A milestone decision that drew a line under the disputes about the role of aviation in the structure of the Armed Forces and the prospects for its further development was the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the state of defense of the USSR" dated July 15, 1929, which set the task of bringing the quality of aviation "to the level of advanced bourgeois countries". Guided by this decision, the Council of Labor and Defense, two days later, ordered the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR to clarify the five-year plan for military development, basing it on the requirement to be stronger than the enemy in three types of weapons, namely, in the air fleet, artillery and tanks.
On June 13, 1930, at a joint meeting of the STO and RVS of the USSR, an updated plan for the construction of the Red Army for the first five-year period was approved. It envisaged, in particular, the transformation of the Air Force into a powerful branch of the armed forces, solving independent operational tasks and ensuring close interaction with other branches of the military, the accelerated construction of heavy bombers, the rearmament of fighter aircraft, the creation of high-quality aircraft and engines, and the conquest of the stratosphere.
Thus, by the beginning of the 1930s, the contours of the future Air Force were clearly defined.
Further changes in views on the future of the air force were largely associated with the name of M.N. Tukhachevsky. In 1930, being the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, he submitted a report on the reorganization of the Armed Forces to the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs K.E. Voroshilov. As Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Biryuzov noted in the preface to selected works of Tukhachevsky, his proposals "not only were not appreciated and supported by Voroshilov and Stalin, but were also met with hostility. In Stalin's conclusion, to which Voroshilov fully joined, it was stated that the adoption this program would lead to the liquidation of socialist construction. What caused the anger of the top party and military leaders?
M.N. Tukhachevsky were to create a powerful, technically equipped army. In the early 30s. it was planned to have: 260 rifle and cavalry divisions, 50 ARGC divisions and 225 PRGC battalions, 40 thousand aircraft, 50 thousand tanks in service. A decade later, having created a powerful industrial base, straining all the forces of the people, spending most of the budget on preparing for war, the USSR managed to create only half of the military-technical potential that M.N. Tukhachevsky proposed. JV Stalin had every reason to call this program the system of "red militarism".
At the same time, a significant increase in the country's military-technical potential during the first five-year plan gave rise to Stalin's hopes for creating a powerful, technically equipped army. Tukhachevsky's plans now seemed not so unrealizable, and their author was again returned to the military Olympus. Now as Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy and Chief of Armaments of the Red Army.
Since 1933 M.N. Tukhachevsky puts K.E. Voroshilov, the question of increasing the size of the Air Force fleet. In one of his memos, he writes: "A general assessment of the possible development of the Air Force of our enemies indicates the need for our country to have 15,000 active aircraft - this reinforcement cannot be stretched out, but carried out in 1934 - 1935." He was supported by G.K. Ordzhonikidze, who guaranteed that the industry would do everything in its power. At the report, Voroshilov imposed a resolution: "America" I do not see. All the same abstract "projects" on 11/23/1933.
Not finding support from the people's commissar, M.N. Tukhachevsky tried to find assistance from the most authoritative military figures of the Red Army and found it in the person of I.P. Uborevich. In a joint note to the People's Commissariat of Defense, they, based on the experience of exercises and maneuvers that have shown the enormous combat capabilities of modern aviation, demand an urgent build-up of the Air Force:
"Modern aviation can disrupt rail transport for a long time, destroy ammunition depots, disrupt the mobilization and concentration of troops. The side that will not be ready to defeat the enemy's air bases, to disorganize its rail transport by systematic air attacks, to disrupt its mobilization and concentration by numerous airborne assaults, to the destruction of its fuel and ammunition depots, ... she herself runs the risk of being defeated. Proceeding from this, Tukhachevsky and Uborevich believed that the main decisive link in the development of the Red Army in the coming years should be an increase in the number of aircraft to 15 thousand active aircraft in 1934-1935.
Against what enemy did Tukhachevsky need 15 thousand combat aircraft? In the operational plans of the mid-30s. the most likely adversary was Poland, which in case of war could be supported by Germany. Both of these states, according to Tukhachevsky's calculations, could field 2,600 aircraft at that time. Definitely, in order to destroy them, fifteen thousand aircraft are too many. Maybe they were needed in order to ensure the guaranteed security of the country in the event of any large-scale war?
Yes, they gave such a guarantee. But what would have happened if the war had not started in the mid-1930s. or did it start later, when this entire aviation armada was morally obsolete? Then the army was in for a disaster. And this catastrophe happened in 1941. It was planned by the untimely deployment of the largest air force in the world in the mid-1930s, when there was no real threat of war to the Soviet Union. All European countries had insignificant air forces. In 1934, potential aggressors, including Germany, Japan and Italy, had relatively small air fleets - 620, 2050, 931 combat aircraft, respectively. Other European states: France, England also did not contain large air forces, but had an industrial base for their deployment, they constantly carried out research and development in order to start mass production of modern aircraft in case of war.
Is it possible to lay all the blame for the untimely deployment of numerous Air Forces only on M.N. Tukhachevsky and I.P. who supported him. Uborevich, I.A. Khalepsky? No. They were only executors of the will of I.V. Stalin, who appointed them to high positions, since they were able to talentedly, sincerely and conscientiously pursue a policy of massive technical equipment of the Red Army. The fact that this was Stalin's principled policy is also evidenced by the fact that it did not undergo significant changes after the destruction in 1937-1938. the people who carried it out.
K.E. Voroshilov was against these people and against such an implementation of the military-technical policy. He was a supporter of more moderate and, apparently, realistic solutions, but Stalin did not reckon with him. Voroshilov himself, in order not to lose his post, preferred to remain silent, reconcile and work with people whose views he did not share.
How cost-effective was the military-technical policy of that time? Diagram 2 provides an answer to this question. It shows that the cost of purchasing aircraft was incomparably greater than the cost of combat training, the acquisition of prototype weapons and equipment for the Air Force, and even the cost of all R&D in the estimate of the Red Army. For example, if in 1930 84 million rubles were allocated for the purchase of aircraft equipment, then only 252 thousand rubles for combat training of the Air Force, 2 million for orders for experimental weapons and equipment, and 11 million rubles for all R&D conducted by the Red Army . In 1935, these figures were respectively - 756, 5.7, 8.6 and 43 million rubles. In 1940, 7.7 billion rubles were spent on aircraft equipment, 16 million rubles on combat training of the Air Force, and 414 million rubles on R&D through the Red Army. In the same year, all spending on education in the USSR amounted to 2 billion rubles, on science - 0.3 billion rubles.
An analysis of expenditures on the purchase of equipment, combat training of the Air Force, R&D shows that huge funds were spent on the production and maintenance of a huge fleet of aircraft in combat readiness, most of which were already obsolete in the prewar period. At the same time, disproportionately little money was spent on the creation of new types of equipment and combat training.
The redistribution of finances in favor of the creation of promising aircraft and better training of pilots would have a greater effect than the maintenance of the world's largest armada of obsolete aircraft.
Another important set of circumstances that led to the fact that the Air Force approached the beginning of the war with the worst indicators of the quality of the aircraft fleet were technical reasons. They were determined by the state and possibilities of the economy, the level of developmental developments and the ability of the industry to master them.
Modern bombers - Pe-2 and Pe-8 by 1941 had just begun to enter combat units and in fact had not yet been mastered by personnel
Chart 1 clearly indicates that the Air Fleet of the Red Army possessed the most modern fleet of vehicles in the 20s. This is explained by the fact that the rate of improvement of combat aircraft after the end of the First World War was not as fast as during the war years or in the thirties. The basis of the fleet of most European countries was the aircraft of the First World War. The same aircraft were in service with the Red Air Fleet.
In the early 20s. even modern aircraft were in the most miserable technical condition. On November 7, 1921, M.V. Frunze wrote about the Air Fleet: “We don’t have one, because you can’t seriously consider the fleet of those several hundred vehicles that are known among our pilots as “coffins”. Only the exceptional valor and courage of our aircrew make it possible to use them."
In the abstracts of the report to the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the chief Air Force USSR A.P. Rozengolts dated May 9, 1924 determined the main conditions for the development of the Air Fleet in the USSR: the organization of aircraft and aircraft design industries within the country, the preparation of ground equipment and aviation personnel, the development of aviation sciences and design work.
For the first time, the issue of organizing the aviation industry was discussed by the country's top military leadership in September 1924, and in October of the same year a 3-year aircraft manufacturing program was developed. Unfortunately, the Main Directorate of the Military Industry (GUVP), which was supposed to carry out the implementation of the program, did not have the proper production base and capabilities for this, therefore, already at the beginning of next year, when discussing the results of the implementation of the production program, the Revolutionary Military Council stated its significant underfulfillment. 41 combat aircraft and 132 training aircraft were delivered instead of 254 and 144 respectively. 70 motors were delivered instead of 200. A resolution was adopted obliging the GUVP to deliver all aircraft and motors in accordance with the order.
Due to the weakness of the domestic aviation industry in the early twenties, the military leadership, represented by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, was forced to turn to the purchase of aircraft equipment abroad and the concession construction of aircraft. Foreign partners with whom negotiations were underway on the organization of the construction of aircraft and engines were the German firms "Junker", "Fokker", "WWII".
Cooperation with the Junkers firm, which undertook to create a modern all-metal aircraft at a plant in Moscow, received the greatest development. In reality, the company was able to make only 100 aircraft, which were inferior in quality to foreign counterparts. At the same time, the work of Junkers was of great importance for the development of the Soviet aircraft industry. In particular, in a note sent by K.E. Voroshilov and F.E. Dzerzhinsky to the Politburo of the Central Committee, it was noted: “We have extracted all the drawings and data, both about the aircraft under construction in Fili, and about the organization of production. We put this material in the basis for the organization of its own production of metal aircraft".
In 1927-1928. managed to establish a mass production of aircraft, but, as was emphasized in the decision of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the quantitative expansion of production was not accompanied by a qualitative improvement in aircraft and engines. In this regard, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR believed that aviation should be fully provided with high-quality domestic products. At a meeting in 1928, the Revolutionary Military Council stated: "The level of technology, the degree of security and the state of aviation, except for fighter aviation, is considered satisfactory, and fighter aviation is threatening." The way out was found in the urgent purchase of 100 fighters abroad, followed by the organization of mass production under license of the most modern foreign fighter.
BB-22 Yakovlev - outdated before he was cured of "childhood diseases"
The struggle for the independence of the domestic aircraft industry from abroad continued until the beginning of the 30s, in connection with which, at the end of 1930, the Revolutionary Military Council determined a detailed list of measures necessary to ensure the production in the USSR of all units and parts for aircraft and aircraft engines.
Questions of production of engines, armament of aircraft remained open. In the Decree of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR "On the state of aviation armament" adopted in January 1929, it was recognized that the situation with the armament of the Air Force had made very little progress. This was especially true of machine guns and the production of aerial bombs.
An important milestone in the provision of aviation with military equipment and weapons was the adoption in January 1929 of the system of the air fleet of the Red Army and a five-year plan for pilot construction. The main attention was paid to the creation of a powerful bomber and fighter aircraft. The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks / "On the state of defense of the USSR" adopted on July 15, 1929 stated: "... the most important task for the coming years in the construction of red aviation is to bring its quality to the level of advanced bourgeois countries as soon as possible, and by all means should be planted, cultivated and develop their own, Soviet scientific and design forces, especially in engine building". The presence by this time of a relatively well-established aviation industry ensured the fulfillment of supply plans.
In 1933, in the report of the head of the Air Force of the Red Army, an assessment was made of the technical equipment of the air fleet: "Our air fleet, being the most powerful in the world, lags behind the air forces of the advanced capitalist countries in terms of the quality of its materiel, and is inferior even to Poland and Japan in terms of fighter aviation."
The 30s, especially their second half, were the "golden age" of military aviation, when development accelerated incredibly. Moral obsolescence of equipment occurred sometimes in 3-4 years, sometimes in a year! For example, the Su-2 and Yak-2 (Yak-4) were not considered modern aircraft in 1941, although their production was carried out for no more than a year or two. The I-153 "Chaika" fighter was really obsolete, which was put into series in 1939 and continued to be produced in small quantities in 1941.
The Soviet Union was really late with the development of combat aircraft, which are considered to be "modern" at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The Germans had a serial Bf 109 in 1936, the British had the Hurricane and Spitfire in 1937. Our main fighters (Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3) were put into production only in 1940 ., since the hopes for earlier machines (I-180) did not materialize. In reality, mass production of modern aircraft was launched only in 1941. A significant role in this was also played by the saturation of the Air Force with obsolete, but still quite technically sound aircraft, which prevented the rearmament and repression of design personnel.
An analysis of the state of aviation technology shows that the most important reason that hindered the creation of modern aviation in the USSR was the lack of high-quality domestic engines that corresponded to the world level. This was especially evident in the late 1930s and early 1940s. On the eve of the war we had:
- in-line V-shaped M-105 with a power of 1100 hp (reproduction of the French "Hispano-Suiey" with forcing), due to the need for refinement, it entered the supply only in the second half of 1940, and actually became brought up no earlier than mid-1941. By this time, the Germans considered the standard Dfl09F fighter with an engine DB 601N with a power of about 1350 hp, which gave the enemy a noticeable advantage, since with approximately the same mass of fighters, the power load on the Germans became less.
- in-line V-shaped AM-35A designed by Mikulin, with a power of 1350 hp, the only motor of a completely domestic design. It was distinguished by a very large mass - 850 kg, while English and German engines of similar power weighed no more than 700 kg. This, along with weak armament and excessive altitude, was the reason for the relatively small success of the MiG-3.
- double-row star-shaped M-88B (reproduction of the French "Mistral-Major" with forcing and a two-speed supercharger) with a capacity of 1100 hp. In reality, this engine was put into production in 1941, and therefore at the first stage it was distinguished by low reliability, which was especially bad for long-range bomber aviation, since failures over enemy territory threatened with an emergency landing and loss of equipment and crew. According to its data, it belonged to an outdated generation of motors. Modern "stars" in the early 40s. reached the power level of 1500-1700 hp
- single-row star-shaped engines M-62 and M-63 (reproduction of the American "Wrights") with a power of 1000-1100 hp, obsolete, although they had good specific characteristics, but were not applicable to modern fighters (they were equipped with I-16 and I-153), during the war years they were used on transport vehicles, for example, on Li-2.
- the only truly advanced engine that was in service in 1941 was the Shvetsovsky M-82 with a power of 1700 hp, created based on the "motives" of French engines. It was mass-produced, but in 1941 it was not installed on any production aircraft, except for a small batch of Su-2. Due to the fact that the M-82 was a new design, it had a lot of shortcomings, including significant ones. . It was possible to finish the engine only by 1943 with the creation of the M-82FN modification.
Thus, an important reason for the backwardness of Soviet military aviation, which manifested itself in the late 30s, was the delay in the development of a new generation of engines. It was laid down by the very logic of the development of a new generation of engines, associated at that time mainly with the reproduction of imported American and French engines, which at the time of purchase were no longer quite modern, and taking into account the time for mastering, fine-tuning, etc., they caused a qualitative lag from other countries, especially from the Germans and the British.
If you look even deeper, then the backlog of the USSR was, as it were, echeloned along several levels: aircraft (1st level); motors (2nd level); technologies (3rd level); machine tool building (4th level); education and culture of production (5th level), etc.
The military-political leadership of the country clearly saw the need to invest in problems of the 1st level, and this led to the creation of many aviation design bureaus. Level 2 problems were largely recognized. Much has been done to develop education. Less attention was paid to cultivating a culture of production – apparently much longer periods are needed to develop it. Technologies at that time were almost completely borrowed, which was due to the weakness of fundamental science, the lack of scientists. The machine tool industry developed at a rapid pace, but the machines were primitive, there was a lack of precise, high-performance equipment, which led to the fact that entire aircraft factories, for example, Kazan No. 124, had to be equipped with American equipment.
As historical experience shows, real, long-term, and not instantaneous, from the last forces, success is ensured by levels of 3, 4, 5 orders. Conditions for their development in the 30s. did not exist in the USSR.
Creation in 1943-1944. fighters that seriously competed with the German ones, and, in particular, the Yak-3 and La-7, became possible due to successes in the field of aerodynamics, the maximum reduction in the mass of our machines, including due to weapons and fuel reserves, as well as squeezing out of our motors, the latest "juices". Thanks to this, our M-105PF2 and ASh-82FN engines approached the German ones in terms of specific characteristics, but still inferior to them in absolute terms. The DB 605 on the Bf 109G had a power of 1650 hp, while the M-105PF2 on the Yak-3 had only 1280, but the Soviet aircraft was 500-600 kg lighter. The BMW 801J engine, which was installed on the FW 190A-9, was about 150 hp. more powerful than our ASh-82FN, but the La-7 was again somewhat lighter than the German aircraft,
The analysis of the technical condition of the Red Army Air Force testifies to the presence of a number of objective and subjective reasons that led to a decrease in the share of modern combat aircraft in the country's air fleet in the prewar period.
Modern aircraft on the eve of the war were "raw" machines, and this is confirmed by an analysis of the technical condition of the Air Force fleet in the 30s - early. 40s
Chart 2 shows the following trends:
– General increase in the share of serviceable aviation equipment;
– Increasing the share of serviceable obsolete aircraft;
- Decrease, immediately before the war, in the share of serviceable modern military equipment.
Strange and incomprehensible, at first glance, is the decline in the proportion of serviceable modern aircraft. This happened only once in the history of domestic aviation in the interwar period, and it is clear that this event is not accidental. These aircraft were created in a hurry, their fine-tuning was carried out directly by the troops, so among them the proportion of faulty aircraft exceeds that of obsolete military equipment. Of course, one must also take into account the fact that the obsolete equipment was produced only 1-3 years ago and was only morally obsolete, but still its technical condition was better than that of new aircraft that had just left the factory.
Dry figures characterizing the technical state of the army's combat effectiveness are filled with living content only when they are compared with similar indicators of a specific enemy with whom real combat actions will have to be carried out. Unfortunately, there are no complete data on the qualitative state of German aviation. But you can make an approximate comparative analysis based on the available figures.
Soviet aviation included 16% modern types combat aircraft, the Iraqi Air Force had about the same number during the operation "Desert Storm" by the multinational forces, and could not resist the enemy. Why did the Soviet Air Force continue to fight under approximately similar conditions and eventually won air supremacy?
First of all, thanks to the huge stock of aviation equipment and its economic potential. The group of German troops that attacked the USSR included 4,000 combat aircraft. They were opposed by 7469 aircraft in the Western theater of operations and 2311 as part of the AGK aviation, in which there were 2061 aircraft of modern types, which accounted for 51% of the total number of German aircraft, but if we take into account all modern machines of the Red Army Air Force, then this figure will grow to 64%, and this may already indicate, if not the equality of forces, then at least the comparable quantitative and qualitative potential of the air forces of both sides.
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the success of combat operations in the air depended not only on the performance characteristics of the aircraft, but also on the level of preparedness of the pilots. Of course, it is one thing to try to fight on some I-5 against a Bf 109F-2, and quite another to fight a competent pilot on an I-16 type 24 of 1940 release against a Bf 109E, especially in a group. And the war gave examples of this kind. For example, twice Hero of the Soviet Union B.F. It was on the I-16 that Safonov made 224 sorties, in which he personally shot down 30 enemy aircraft and 3 in group battles. This suggests that success largely depended on the tactics of combat use, which we, in 1941, as a whole, were, of course, worse worked out than the Germans, especially for modern types of aircraft.
The degree of development of "donkeys" at the beginning of the war was much higher than the MiGs, not to mention the LaGGs and Yaks, which were considered to be in trial operation and did not pass state tests. It is likely that, from the point of view of combat effectiveness, the 2065 I-16s available in the Western theater posed a much greater threat to the Germans than the 845 "modern" MiGs.
The main reasons for having a large number aircraft of obsolete designs and an insignificant share of modern aircraft in the air fleet of the Red Army Air Force at the beginning of the war were: an inefficient, costly military-technical policy aimed at creating the largest air force in the world without taking into account the real military threat; creation and introduction into mass production of weapons models doomed to rapid obsolescence; and the delay on this basis with the creation of modern types of aviation in the prewar period.
3 Combat and strength of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War 11941 - 1945 - Sat. Art. No. 1.M., IVI. 1994; History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T.Z. M. Military Publishing. 1974. S.327-328
4 Calculated according to: RGVA f.4, on. 14, d.2678, l.204; d.2396; f.31811, op.2. d.602, l. 14; e.bb4 l.3; f.29, op.46, file 271 l.3; f.29, op.26, e, 1, l.65; d.42, l.84; Combat and strength of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War / 1941 -1945 - Sat. Art. No. l.M., 1994.
5 RGVA, f.4, op. 14, d.30, l.20.
6 Frunze M.V. Sobr. op. T.Z. M., 1929. P.158.
7 History of the Second World War 1939 -1945. T.I. M., 1973. P.258.
8 M.N. Tukhachevsky. Selected works. M., 1964. S. 12.
9 RGVA, f.33987, op.3, l 155, l.57.
10 Biryuzov S. Preface II M.N. Tukhachevsky. Selected works. T.I. M., 1964. S. 12.
11 RGVA, f.22987, op.3, d.400, l, 112.
13 M.N. Tukhachevsky. Selected works. T.1. M., 1964. S. 13.
15 RGVA, f.22987, op.Z, d.400, l. 178.
16 History of domestic artillery. T.Sh. Book 8. p.201
17 Compiled according to: RGVA, f.51, op.2, d.54, l.74; 448, l.5, 527, l.544.
18 RGVA, f.51, op.2, d.54, l.74; d.448, l.5, d.527, l.544; The national economy of the USSR for 70 years. M., 1987. P.632.
19 Frunze M.V. Selected works. M., 1957. T.2. P.25.
20 RGVA, f. 4, op 7., d. 6, l. 461.
21 According to the explanatory note to the pian, it is based “on the gradual development in accordance with the normal pace of development of human and material resources. The total amount of operating aircraft is increased by 33% from the figure of the previous year. For comparison: the annual increase in operating aircraft in the United States is 8%, England -10%, France -15%, Romania -18%. Nevertheless, the report of the chief of the UVVS of the Red Army stated that the three-year plan for the development of the Air Force for 1925-1928 adopted by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. is the minimum to ensure the air defense of the USSR. RGVA, f.4, op.1, d. 61, l.538; f.33987, op.Z, d.210, l. 10.
22 RGVA, f.4, op. 18, d.7, l.230; d.8, l. 10; d.9, l. 132.
23 Issues of cooperation with the "Junker" company were discussed at the meetings of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR 5 times, and with "Fokker" - 4 times. The issue of concluding an agreement on the provision of technical assistance by BMW in the production of engines was also discussed. Not all members of the Revolutionary Military Council were supporters of such cooperation. RGVA, f.4, on. 18, d.7, l. 128,182,219,230,238; d.8, l. 15.16; d.9, l.232,224;d. And, l.268. See also: Mishanov S.A., Zakharov V.V. Military cooperation between the USSR and Germany. M., 1991. pp.54-56.
24 Op. Quoted from: Mishanov S.A., Zakharov V.V. Military cooperation between the USSR and Germany. 1921 - 1933 Analysis of Western historiography. M., 1991. P.56.
25 RGVA, f.4, op. 18, d. 15, l.25.
26 RGVA, f.4, op.1, d.707, l.276.
27 RGVA, f.4, op.1, 0.707, l.276.
28 RGVA, f.4, op. 18, d, 19, sheet 418.
29 RGVA, f.4, op.2, d.484, l.9.
30 RGVA, f.4, op. 18, d. 19, l.2.
31 of the CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. M., 1981. P.259.
32 RGVA, f.33987, op.3, d.485, l.58.
33 Combat and strength of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War / 1941 -1945 Art. Sat. No. 1. M., 1994. S. 244-245.
34 Tulyak Heroes of the Soviet Union. Tula. 1967. S.335-336.
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