About Lightning War (Blickrig Plan) Briefly

• Japanese blitzkrieg

A brief definition of the concept of a blitzkrieg plan is lightning war . AT modern world blitzkrieg is a strategy in which large tank formations act autonomously. Deep behind enemy lines, tank units break through. There is no battle for fortified positions. The main ones are the control center and supply lines. If they are destroyed, the enemy will be left without control and supply. Thus, it loses its combat capability.

Germany used this method ("Molnienosnaya vojjna") of waging war in the First World War. The most famous use of Blitzkrieg as a military tactic is seen in the context of World War II. And again the plan of lightning war did not give the desired results.

The failure of the Blitzkrieg in World War II

The outbreak of World War II showed that the Blitzkrieg plan was Germany's military strategy. European states surrendered to the Nazis one by one. After the declaration of war on the USSR, the German leadership was sure that Soviet Union succumb to them quickly enough, namely in two weeks. Of course, they understood that the Russian people would not submit so easily, but they were sure that they would be able to deal with the Union quickly enough with the help of their plan. Why was the blitzkrieg plan ineffective when applied to the Soviet Union? There are many answers. It is worth briefly understanding the reasons for the collapse of the blitzkrieg in World War II.

Having entered the territory of the USSR, the German army sent its troops straight inland. The tank troops could not move as fast as the German command would like, due to the slow advance of the infantry. The infantry was given the task of eliminating the remnants of Soviet forces in the west.
So why did the blitzkrieg succeed? Of course, the huge territory of the USSR could be considered the cause, but, by no means, this was not the reason. The distance between Berlin and Moscow could be compared with what the German invaders had already passed in Europe, capturing a number of countries.
And back to the tanks and infantry. The soldiers were exhausted by the constant movement on foot and on horseback. The infantry did not keep up with the tank troops. The front expanded, which complicated the advance. Roads, or rather their absence, also played a role.

Very soon, logistics problems began to arise in the German army. There were hardly enough vehicles and modern weapons for half of the divisions. I had to use weapons recaptured from the enemy and their own transport, which was simply abandoned. Since the Blitzkrieg plan is a lightning war, and in the USSR, the German troops had to face difficulties, and it took longer than planned. The soldiers began to experience a shortage of simple essentials.

It is worth noting that the German army was slowed down not only by Russian off-road. Stalin was preparing for war as a possible prospect. Therefore, in the border areas there was a place for the deployment of Soviet soldiers. The purges and repressions in the 1930s led to the weakening of the officer corps of the Red Army. That is why the concept was developed for enhanced defense of the front line. This explained the heavy losses at the initial stage of the war. Since the USSR was a prosperous country with a large population, the army had no problems with either material or human resources.

Although the German army was moving east, as required by their concept, this was not enough to reach Moscow on time. In numerical terms, the Germans were also inferior. It soon became clear that it would not be possible to capture both Kyiv and Moscow at the same time. So tank troops began to fight for Kyiv. The German infantry began to retreat.

The end of September urged the German command to make a decision: to attack Moscow at a rapid pace or start preparing for winter. The decision was made in favor of Moscow. Again, the soldiers were exhausted by a many-kilometer throw. The weather took its toll, and the mud slowed down any forward movement of the Nazi troops. With the onset of winter Soviet troops went on the counteroffensive. Again, the unsuccessful "Blitzkrieg" could be attributed to weather conditions or the numerical superiority of the enemy. But it was the overconfidence of the German leadership. Having captured a number of European countries, they were sure of their lightning victory on the territory of the USSR. In addition, the lightning-fast capture of European countries became possible thanks to luck. Breaking through the Ardennes was a very risky move, but after its successful completion, propaganda about a lightning victory did its job.

Germany at that time was not ready for war. Her resources were limited. The unfinished war with England also made its contribution, and not so little was left before the victory over it.
The Nazi command remembered the victories in the First World War. Arrogance and arrogance played into the hands of the Soviet army, as they were not considered a strong and worthy opponent.
The German army, hoping for good luck in the blitzkrieg, came to the territory of the Soviet Union unprepared for winter. They were not prepared for the fact that they would stay for a long time, to conduct military operations. As a result, the plan to quickly conquer Moscow turned into a shortage of equipment, food and banal socks.

Blitzkrieg as a military tactic in the ancient world

Rome already had the ability to defeat its opponents in a war of attrition. A protracted war was the best solution for fighting with an adequate enemy. But, in aggressive wars, a bet was made on blitzkrieg. Even the "barbarian" states of that time understood this. In defensive terms, the border fortresses were surrounded by walls to disrupt the enemy blitzkrieg.
There are many examples in history in which the aggressors both won and lost with the help of blitzkrieg.
The Scythians in the wars used all their military power in one battle. They departed from the classical understanding of warfare and instead of the "main battle", the population skillfully mobilized at a rapid pace. Thus, they used blitzkrieg to defend against the aggressor.
Reasons that can disrupt the blitzkrieg
Any tactic of warfare is not perfect. There are factors hindering military plans. Therefore, choosing one or another strategy, you need to weigh all the factors. Let's try to explain using the example of the failure of the blitzkrieg in the Second World War on the territory of the USSR.

The first factor is the location. On a specific example of the Second World War, you can see that the German troops simply confused the Russian impassability and the vastness of the territory. If the territory is hilly, swampy or wooded, then heavy tanks in close combat with infantry noticeably lose. Of course, the mountains of the Ardennes did not prevent the victory over France. But this is mere luck, rather than an axiom. In addition, one should not rely only on natural conditions, because if France had left a more powerful military fortification in that area, and not a light defensive system, then the victory of the German army would not have been so obvious. Weather conditions can also slow down the enemy's blitzkrieg plan.

Air superiority is also an integral part of Blitzkrieg's success. Again, the example of World War II shows that the success of the invaders in Europe, in part, depended on the inability of the Allies to deploy for defense in the air. One of the main reasons was the lack of air combat tactics in the current situation. When trying to destroy the German pontoon bridges, everything turned into the defeat of the French aviation, and the safety of the bridges. On the territory of the USSR, the Germans faced the vastness of the territory and, accordingly, the dispersal of the army. As a result, allied aviation made it impossible for German troops to move during daylight hours. Initially, it was planned to attack in bad weather in order to exclude air interference, however, it was not expected that bad weather would slow down the advance of their own troops.

Despite the effectiveness of rapid campaigns against Poland and France, mobile operations could not succeed in the following years. Such a strategy must take into account that the enemy can retreat in order to regroup forces, and only then strike. The German command did not think about it, so the army was cut off from the supply of fuel, ammunition and food.

Japanese blitzkrieg

In 1941, the Japanese government decided to secretly increase its military training. They planned to wait until they needed to start hostilities in the Far East and Siberia to strengthen their own borders.
The strategic idea of ​​the Japanese.

The strategy consisted in a series of successive strikes by the Japanese army against the Red Army in the areas of Primorye, Amur and Transbaikalia. As a result, the Red Army had to capitulate. The plan also included the capture of the most important strategic objects: military, industrial, food bases and communications.
. In the first hours of the offensive, it was planned to defeat the Air Force of the Soviet Union, by surprise.
. The entire operation to advance to Lake Baikal was calculated for six months.

The first stage of the plan came into effect, namely, the mobilization of the Kwantung Army began, and its increase by 2 divisions. For the whole world, Japan held training camps. The population was warned that in no case should a send-off be arranged, and the term "mobilization" was replaced by the term "extraordinary formations".

By the end of July, Japanese troops began to concentrate near the borders with the Soviet Union. However, such large-scale gatherings were difficult to disguise as exercises. It was reported to Berlin that a little less than a million people were called up and to the territory of Northern China, people who spoke Russian were sent.
The result of the planned lightning attack was the complete surrender of Japan and the defeat of the Kwantung Army.

When a modern Russian person hears the words "blitzkrieg", "blitzkrieg", the first thing that comes to mind is the Great Patriotic War and Hitler's failed plans to instantly conquer the Soviet Union. However, this tactic was not used by Germany for the first time. At the beginning of the war, the German General A. Schlieffen, who was later called the blitzkrieg theorist, developed a plan for the "lightning" crushing of enemy forces. History has shown that the plan was unsuccessful, but it is worth talking about the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan in more detail.

World War I: causes, participants, goals

Before analyzing what are the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan, one should first analyze the prerequisites for the outbreak of hostilities. The conflict was caused by the contradictions between the geopolitical interests of two political blocs: the Entente, which included Great Britain, France and Russian empire, and the Triple Alliance, the participants of which were Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy, and later (since 1915) and Turkey. There was a need to redistribute the colonies, markets and spheres of influence.

The Balkans became a special zone of political tension in Europe, where many Slavic peoples, and the European great powers often took advantage of the many contradictions between them. The reason for the war was the assassination of the heir of the Emperor of Austria-Hungary Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, in response to which Serbia received an ultimatum from Austria-Hungary, the terms of which practically deprived it of sovereignty. Despite Serbia's willingness to cooperate, on July 15 (July 28, New Style), 1914, Austria-Hungary launched a war against Serbia. Russia agreed to side with Serbia, which led to Germany's declaration of war on Russia and France. The last member of the Entente - England - entered the conflict on 4 August.

General Schlieffen's plan

The idea of ​​the plan, in essence, was to devote all forces to victory in the only decisive battle, to which the war would boil down. The enemy (French) army was planned to be surrounded from the right flank and destroyed, which would undoubtedly lead to the surrender of France. It was planned to strike the main blow in the only tactically convenient way - through the territory of Belgium. On the Eastern (Russian) front, it was supposed to leave a small barrier, counting on the slow mobilization of Russian troops.

Such a strategy seemed well thought out, albeit risky. But what are the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan?

Moltke's changes

The high command, fearing the failure of the blitzkrieg plans, considered the Schlieffen plan too risky. Under pressure from dissatisfied military leaders, some changes were made to it. The author of the modifications, Chief of the German General Staff H. I. L. von Moltke, proposed to strengthen the left wing of the army to the detriment of the attacking grouping on the right flank. In addition, additional forces were sent to the Eastern Front.

Reasons for making changes to the original plan

1. The German command was afraid to radically strengthen the right wing of the army, which was responsible for encircling the French. With a significant weakening of the forces of the left wing, combined with an active offensive by the enemy, the entire rear of the Germans was threatened.

2. Resistance of influential industrialists over the possible surrender of the Alsace-Lorraine region into the hands of the enemy.

3. The economic interests of the Prussian nobility (Junkers) made it necessary to divert a rather large group of troops to the defense of East Prussia.

4. The transport capabilities of Germany did not allow supplying the right wing of the army to the extent that Schlieffen assumed.

Campaign of 1914

In Europe, there was a war on the Western (France and Belgium) and Eastern (against Russia) fronts. Actions on Eastern Front called the East Prussian operation. In its course, two Russian armies coming to the aid of allied France invaded East Prussia and defeated the Germans in the Gumbinnen-Goldap battle. In order to prevent the Russians from striking at Berlin, the German troops had to transfer part of the troops to East Prussia from the right wing of the Western Front, which ultimately became one of the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg. We note, however, that on the Eastern Front this transfer brought success to the German troops - two Russian armies were surrounded, and about 100 thousand soldiers were captured.

On the Western Front, the timely assistance of Russia, which pulled the German troops back on itself, allowed the French to put up serious resistance and prevent the German blockade of Paris. The bloody battles on the banks of the Marne (September 3-10), in which approximately 2 million people participated on both sides, showed that the First World War from lightning passed into a protracted one.

Campaign of 1914: Summing up

By the end of the year, the advantage was on the side of the Entente. The troops of the Triple Alliance were defeated in most of the battlefields.

In November 1914, Japan occupied the German port of Jiaozhou in the Far East, as well as the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands. The rest of the Pacific passed into the hands of the British. In Africa at that time, hostilities were still going on, but it was clear that these colonies were lost for Germany.

The fighting in 1914 showed that Schlieffen's plan for a quick victory did not live up to the expectations of the German command. What reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan have become apparent by this point will be discussed below. A war of attrition began.

As a result of hostilities, by the end of 1914, the German military command moved the main military operations to the east - in order to withdraw Russia from the war. Thus, by the beginning of 1915, Eastern Europe became the main theater of military operations.

Reasons for the failure of the German blitzkrieg plan

So, as mentioned above, by the beginning of 1915 the war had entered a protracted stage. Finally, consider what are the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan.

To begin with, we note that the German command tritely underestimated the strength of the Russian army (and the Entente as a whole) and its readiness for mobilization. In addition, following the lead of the industrial bourgeoisie and the nobility, the German army often made decisions that were not always tactically correct. Some researchers in this regard argue that it was Schlieffen's original plan, despite its riskiness, that had a chance of success. However, as mentioned above, the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan, which were mainly the unpreparedness of the German army for a long war, as well as the dispersion of forces in connection with the demands of the Prussian junkers and industrialists, are largely due to the changes made to the plan by Moltke, or, as they often referred to as "Moltke's errors".

Most military historians are inclined to think that if the plan of the Chief of the German General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen had been implemented, the First World War could have gone completely to the scenario. But back in 1906, the German strategist was removed from his post and his followers were afraid to implement Schlieffen's idea.

Lightning war plan

At the beginning of the last century, Germany began planning for a major war. This was due to the fact that France, defeated several decades earlier, was clearly hatching plans for military revenge. The German leadership was not particularly afraid of the French threat. But in the east, Russia, which was an ally of the Third Republic, was gaining economic and military power. For Germany, there was a real danger of a war on two fronts. Well aware of this, Kaiser Wilhelm ordered von Schlieffen to develop a plan for a victorious war under these conditions.

And Schlieffen, in a fairly short time, created such a plan. According to his idea, Germany was to start the first war against France, concentrating 90% of all its armed forces in this direction. Moreover, this war was supposed to be lightning fast. Only 39 days were allotted for the capture of Paris. For the final victory - 42.

It was assumed that Russia would not be able to mobilize in such a short time. German troops, after the victory over France, will be transferred to the border with Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm approved the plan, saying at the same time the famous phrase: "We will have lunch in Paris, and we will have dinner in St. Petersburg."

Failure of the Schlieffen plan

Helmut von Moltke, who replaced Schlieffen with the Chief of the German General Staff, took the Schlieffen plan without much enthusiasm, considering it too risky. And for this reason, he subjected him to a thorough processing. In particular, he refused to concentrate on western front the main forces of the German army and, for reasons of precaution, sent a significant part of the troops to the east.

But Schlieffen planned to cover the French army from the flanks and completely encircle it. But due to the transfer of significant forces to the east, the German group of troops on the western front simply did not have enough available funds for this. As a result, the French troops not only were not surrounded, but also managed to launch a powerful counterattack.

The calculation of the slowness of the Russian army in terms of protracted mobilization also did not justify itself. The invasion of Russian troops into East Prussia literally stunned the German command. Germany found itself in the grip of two fronts.

German imperialism began preparations for an armed attack on the Soviet Union long before it was carried out. The political plan of aggression had long matured in the minds of the fascist leaders, who relentlessly and consistently strove to expand Germany's "living space" and had managed to enslave many European states by that time. And here's how it happened.

Plans for a "German Empire in the East"

The task of forcibly seizing the European part of the USSR in order to form a German empire in continental Europe, Hitler put forward as early as 1927 in his book Mein Kampf, which openly called for a campaign to the East, an attack on the Soviet Union. “If today we are talking about new lands and territories in Europe,” he wrote, “we turn our gaze primarily to Russia.” At the same time, the long-standing claims of Kaiser Germany on the territory of its eastern neighbors were flavored with ardent anti-communism and racist ideology, such as the fact that "destiny itself points its finger at Bolshevik Russia." “The new living space in the East,” declared the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, “opens up a field of activity that has never been larger and more tempting in German history.” To implement Hitler's long-cherished plans for the formation of a German empire in the East by military defeat of the USSR, the "all-destroying" Wehrmacht was created - the most powerful army in the entire capitalist world, generously equipped with the latest military equipment for that time.

Already in the mid-30s, as can be judged from archival materials, as well as official diaries and memoirs of Wehrmacht figures, the political and military leadership of Germany in resolving issues of internal and foreign policy proceeded from option "A", which meant an armed invasion of the USSR.

Those who planned the policy of aggression and determined the solution of the political and economic problems connected with it, naturally experienced a great need for intelligence information. The role of intelligence in the process of strategic planning and decision-making at the state level has grown tremendously. All services of "total espionage" were ordered to speed up the collection of information about the Red Army and the Soviet defense industry in every possible way, to check the data obtained earlier. They were called upon to start creating all the necessary prerequisites for reconnaissance support for the main directions of the future eastern campaign.

The dominant role in this belonged to the Abwehr, who was primarily interested in the strategic military capabilities of our country. Through intelligence channels, the state of defense of the border areas was carefully ascertained, as well as the deployment of military-industrial enterprises, airfields, power plants, transport hubs, railway stations, sea and river ports, bridges, arsenals and warehouses, which, with the outbreak of hostilities, were to become objects of bombing and sabotage .

Since the second half of the 1930s, the Soviet Union has been declared the main opponent of the secret services of fascist Germany. Even the attack on Poland, and then the military campaign in Northern Europe, did not weaken the intelligence interest in our country and did not in the least affect the activity of the Nazi secret services, which continued to be quite high.

Despite the fact that on August 23, 1939, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed, and at the end of September of the same year, the Friendship and Border Treaty between the USSR and Germany was concluded, Hitler considered the military defeat to be his most important task, as before. a socialist state, the conquest of a new "living space" for the Germans up to the Urals.

With the capture of Poland in 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union become neighbors. The presence of a common land border and the fact that the German and our armies were face to face, naturally, made it easier for the Abwehr and the SD to carry out reconnaissance operations against the USSR, allowing them to work by the “close method”. On the side of the Nazi secret services, there was also the undoubted advantage that during the two years of hostilities in Western Europe that preceded the attack on the Soviet Union, they completely fit into the military adventures of the leaders of the Third Reich, accumulated considerable experience in subversive actions in foreign territories, created cadres of professional intelligence officers of the "new school" finally adapted their organizations and tactics of action to wartime conditions. To a certain extent, the expansion of the SD’s capabilities to work against the USSR was also facilitated by the fact that, with the occupation of Poland, the Nazis managed to seize part of the archives of Polish intelligence. At the disposal of Schellenberg, who accompanied Himmler, who ensured the safety of Hitler during his trip to Warsaw, was an extensive card file of the Polish intelligence network abroad, including those located in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. Measures were taken to establish the whereabouts of the agents and redirect them to actions in the interests of Nazi Germany.

“From the beginning of the Polish campaign,” writes G. Buchheit, “the Soviet Union fell into the orbit of close attention of the Abwehr. Prior to this, the USSR was more of a political factor, and everything that was connected with it or the communist movement as a whole was considered the competence of the SD. After the capture of Poland, military intelligence, despite the strict border control by the Russians and the language barrier, managed to achieve certain results.

Previously, intelligence operations against the Soviet Union, associated with undercover penetration into the country, were carried out, according to former leaders of the Abwehr, "irregularly, from time to time, when a real opportunity opened up for this", not associated with great risk and definitely promising success. According to P. Leverkün, it was extremely rare for German military intelligence to send their proxies and secret agents from Germany to the USSR at that time. It was much easier to cross the Polish border.

By the end of the 1930s, the main areas of activity of the Abwehr were clearly outlined, which became an important component of the military machine of Nazi Germany, the starting point for espionage and sabotage operations against the USSR. He was given the task of quickly refreshing the available information about the progress of arming the Red Army and the measures taken by the command to deploy troops in the event of a military threat, about the deployment of headquarters and large formations. Since the difficulties of collecting this kind of information were aggravated, as the Abwehr claimed, by the severe frosts that prevailed in the USSR in the winter of 1939/40, at first German military intelligence was practically unable to find out, at least approximately, the number of Red Army units and their deployment before only on the territory of Belarus, which was considered by the Wehrmacht command as the main theater of future military operations, where, as the Nazis were sure, they would be able to defeat and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops.

But the untwisted intelligence mechanism was gaining momentum. According to the testimony of former representatives of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command, in a relatively short period of time - from the end of the Polish campaign to June 1940 - the Abwehr managed, using its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, to update some information about the combat capability of the Red Army. Part of the information obtained concerned military-industrial facilities and economic centers of the USSR, the increased interest in which was caused by the need to create favorable conditions for solving the problem of the second stage of hostilities, when the war was supposed to Nazi elite, from the phase of the destruction of the Red Army to move into the phase of the economic suppression of the country. Even before the winter of 1941, this assumed the capture during the pursuit of the remnants of the retreating Red Army, or at least the destruction of the main vital industrial and economic centers (Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass, the oil regions of the North Caucasus), necessary to recreate the defeated armed forces. However, according to eyewitness accounts, Admiral Canaris was able to provide only limited and sometimes inaccurate information, because “Abwehr agents were invariably neutralized in the SSSL. According to the confessions of the leaders of the Abwehr, the representations of German military intelligence in Krakow, Ljubljana and Koenigsberg, with all their efforts, “failed to penetrate deep into Russia.”

The sharp increase in intelligence activity against the Soviet Union dates back to the moment of the capitulation of France, when, in the opinion of the top Nazi leadership, the rear of the future war was reliably provided and Germany had at its disposal enough material and human resources to continue hostilities. After all, as you know, after the end of the war with France, Germany was not weakened in military and economic terms. Its armed forces retained their combat readiness, and the military industry, which had the opportunity to put the economic potential of 12 captured states of Europe at its service, worked at full capacity. But the matter is not only and not so much in the capitulation of France. In essence, all the criminal acts of aggression by Hitlerite Germany before June 22, 1941, connected with the forcible subjugation of other countries to its domination, were nothing more than a preparatory stage for an armed attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler wanted to ensure for his troops the most advantageous strategic positions that would allow him to confidently and without great risk begin the fight against the Soviet country. To do this, he annexed Austria, dismembered Czechoslovakia, attacked Poland, then tried to disable France in order to provide himself with a reliable rear. In a word, Hitler decided to take advantage of the favorable outcome of the war in the West and, without making a long pause, suddenly move the already wound up war machine, accustomed to easy victories for two years, towards the Soviet Union, in order, as the Nazis hoped, to achieve decisive success in a short campaign. The content of Hitler's conversation with Keitel and Jodl immediately after the end of the French campaign of 1940 is known, in which he stated: “Now we have shown what we are capable of. Believe me, a campaign against Russia will be a simple child's game in comparison with this.

Hitler's generals, guided by the instructions of the Fuhrer, given at a secret meeting on November 23, 1939, began to develop appropriate strategic plans.

In the summer of 1940 and at the beginning of 1941, preparations for armed aggression against the USSR acquired a particularly wide scope, becoming complex in the full sense of the word. It covered the economic, diplomatic and ideological spheres, and especially the military and intelligence ones.

This is understandable: the Soviet Union was the main obstacle for German imperialism on the way to extending its unlimited domination to other countries and peoples. Hitler understood that the guarantee of establishing dominion over Europe, which he aspired to, depended decisively on the outcome of the German-Soviet war.

A complete picture of the planning and preparation of aggression against the USSR was revealed later, when the materials of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, memoirs of political and military figures, heads of intelligence services, as well as documents from secret archives were published.

German blitz plan

As already mentioned, according to the instructions of the leader of the Nazi Party, Hitler and his accomplices, armed aggression against the USSR was to be a special “war for living space in the East”, during which they did not even think to reckon with the civilian population. In this aggressive war, stakes were openly placed on the physical extermination of the majority Soviet people. The criminal intentions of the German imperialists in relation to the Soviet people were recorded in the so-called "master plan" "Ost", the author of which was the main imperial security department.

In May 1940, the plan, which grew with each new discussion with additional ideas and details, was presented to Hitler “as the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht” and approved by him as a directive that obliged the German command to prevent the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops during military operations and achieve complete depletion of the military and military-industrial potential of the USSR. Thus, the question of unleashing armed aggression against the Soviet Union had already been resolved by that time in the highest spheres of the Nazi Party and the generals of the Wehrmacht and moved into the field of practical preparations for the invasion, in which essential role was called to play intelligence.

A clearly smoothed mechanism for planning military operations and working out specific options for their conduct was again launched in July 1940. In accordance with Hitler's order, and taking into account the guidelines developed by the RSHA, as well as intelligence information provided by the Abwehr and the SD, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal Brauchitsch, undertook the final polishing of a detailed strategic and tactical plan for attacking the Soviet Union, which was being worked on in a situation the strictest secrecy. Subsequently, this plan, developed by the RSHA with the active participation of the central apparatus of the Abwehr and its groups at the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces, was subjected to scrupulous study and clarification at the highest military authorities. At the end of July 1940, Hitler gathered all his top generals at the Berghof. At this meeting, the goals of the war were clearly defined and the timing of the troops' march was determined. Summing up the results of this meeting, Hitler said: “Russia must be destroyed. Deadline - spring 1941. The operation will only make sense if we defeat the country with one blow. Thus, the aggression against the Soviet Union was planned and prepared as a lightning-fast military campaign, which, as Hitler emphasized, could be victoriously completed thanks to the factor of surprise.

In the same place, in Berghof, the Fuhrer's directive was brought to the leaders of the Abwehr and the SD: using undercover channels, to probe the possibility of obtaining the consent of Finland and Turkey to become Germany's allies. To encourage these countries to enter the war, Hitler was ready to cede some territories of the USSR to them "after the victorious conclusion of the campaign" in the East.

There is a lot of documentary evidence of how intensive the preparation of Nazi Germany for the war with the Soviet Union was. “At the end of September 1940,” said General Zukertor, who held an important post in the Wehrmacht, “I personally had the opportunity to make sure that preparations for an attack on the USSR were in full swing. I then visited the Chief of Staff of Army Group C, commanded by Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb. At the same time, by pure chance, a huge map fell into my field of vision with a plan for the deployment of German troops in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Soviet border and their attack on the Soviet Union. The location of the German units and the objectives of each offensive were indicated there.

No less weighty are the confessions made on this score by General Pickenbrock: “I must say that already from August - September 1940, the flow of reconnaissance tasks for the Abwehr in the Soviet Union began to noticeably increase from the side of the Foreign Armies Department of the General Staff ... These tasks, of course, were connected with the preparation of the war against Russia. The Wehrmacht Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorate, Pikenbrock argued, “already from September 6, 1940, with all its might, prepared an attack on the SSSL in all areas of espionage and subversion.

Evidence of the active participation of the Abwehr in the planning and preparation of armed aggression against the Soviet Union was also cited in the testimony of General Franz von Bentivenyi given by him at the Nuremberg trials. According to Bentivegni's testimony, in August 1940, Canaris warned him strictly confidentially that Hitler had begun to implement the plan of a campaign to the East, that the formations of German troops were gradually being secretly transferred from the west to the eastern borders and were deployed at the starting positions of the upcoming invasion of Russia. Informing about this, the head of the Abwehr proposed to immediately begin creating the prerequisites for the widespread deployment of intelligence work on the territory of the USSR, paying particular attention to the importance of collecting information that would allow predicting the possible pace of quantitative and qualitative build-up of the Red Army, as well as the actual timing of the reorientation and practical translation. Soviet industry to solve military problems.

General Pickenbrock testified at the same trial in Nuremberg that at the end of December 1940, together with Admiral Canaris, he was at the next report from Field Marshal Keitel in Brechsgaden. At the end of the report, the Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the Wehrmacht High Command, Colonel General Jodl, invited them to his office and announced that in the summer of 1941 Germany would start a war with Russia. A few days later, Canaris warned Pickenbrock that the attack on the USSR was scheduled for May 15th. In January 1941, Canaris, at a meeting of the heads of departments of the Abwehr, specified the date for the speech of the German troops.

In the archives where captured materials of Nazi Germany are stored, reports were found by the head of the Abwehr II department, General Lahousen, addressed personally to Canaris, from which it follows that this department, like other Abwehr units, was inextricably linked with the preparation of fascist aggression against our country.

The role of German intelligence in the Barbarossa plan

After a single point of view was developed on all the main issues of waging war against the USSR and the most important decisions were made in this regard, on December 18, 1940, Hitler signed the famous Directive No. 21 on the attack on the Soviet Union (Plan Barbarossa). Preparations for aggression were ordered to be completed by May 15, 1941. The directive was so secret that only nine copies were printed. Only a relatively small group of generals and officers of the high command and heads of intelligence agencies were privy to the secret strategic plans for the war. The directive contained an order for the German armed forces to be ready "even before the end of the war with England, to defeat Russia with a quick blow." Hitler was firmly convinced that he could crush the Soviet Union as a result of one fleeting operation.

The goal of the campaign was formulated as follows: "In the north, a quick exit to Moscow - the capture of the capital in political and economic terms is of decisive importance." “The capture of this city,” the Barbarossa plan emphasized, “means a decisive success both from a political and economic point of view, not to mention the fact that the Russians in this case will lose the most important railway junction.” The Nazis hoped that with the fall of Moscow they would be able to paralyze the functioning of the apparatus of state power, deprive it of the possibility of restoring the defeated armed forces and, thus, the fate of the bloody battle would be decided - the Soviet Union would capitulate to Germany, and the war would quickly end.

Alfred Rosenberg, the chief ideologue of the Nazi Party and the newly appointed "Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories," wrote of the finale of the war: in order to secure the possibility of freely administering German world politics and guarantee the danger of the Reich ... Therefore, a war with the aim of creating an indivisible Russia is excluded. The task of Germany, said the head of the Nazi punitive apparatus Reichsführer SS Himmler, "is not only the division of Russia into small states, but also the expansion of the German sphere of influence far beyond the Urals."

Following Directive No. 21 and in pursuance of it, detailed instructions were issued to the "total espionage" services, which were charged with the duty, first of all, to maximize the collection of intelligence data about the USSR. Their main interest was concentrated around finding out the production capacities of the defense industry for the deployment of military production and the development of new, advanced models of military equipment and the timing of their adoption. They were also given the task of ensuring the planting of “strongholds” on Soviet territory along the path of the upcoming advance of the German troops by bringing their agents into the country by the time of the attack on the Soviet Union.

In the winter and spring of 1941, preparations for the invasion reached a climax. By this time, all the main links of the military and intelligence departments of fascist Germany were involved in it. Brauchitsch and Halder held continuous meetings. The commanders-in-chief of the army groups, their chiefs of staff, and the leaders of the Abwehr were invited here every now and then. Representatives of the Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian armies visited one after another. The headquarters coordinated and refined plans for military operations. On February 20, 1941, a discussion of the operational plans of the army groups took place at the General Staff of the Ground Forces, which were found to be quite acceptable. General Halder wrote that day in his official diary: "Our joint discussion was crowned with the best results."

In the headquarters of army groups in February - March 1941, numerous exercises and military maneuvers took place, at which possible options actions of troops and the order of organization of their supply. Big war game with the participation of the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, General Halder, the commanders and chiefs of staff of the armies, was held at the headquarters of Army Group A (South) in Saint-Germain near Paris; the actions of Guderian's tank group were played separately. After completion, the plans of army groups and individual armies were reported to Hitler on March 17, 1941. "The attack on Russia," said the Fuhrer, considering these plans, "will begin as soon as our concentration and deployment is over. It will take about a week ... It will be a massive offensive of the highest class. Perhaps the most powerful of all that history has ever known. The case with Napoleon will not be repeated ... "

Exercising unremitting control over the planning of offensive operations of army groups and armies, the General Staff constantly demanded that the Abwehr provide information on the quantitative and qualitative indicators characterizing the Armed Forces of the USSR, on the state of the Soviet economy, the transport system, investments in defense industries, the composition and equipment of military equipment groupings of the Red Army on the western borders, the nature of the fortifications in the border districts. The aerial photographic reconnaissance department of the Air Force headquarters systematically surveyed the border regions of the USSR. However, despite the efforts made by Admiral Canaris and the head of the department of the Foreign Armies of the East, Colonel Kinzel, to activate the German intelligence network abroad, they failed to ensure the flow of accurate and reliable information to the extent that would suit the General Staff. In the diary of General Halder, there are often notes indicating the lack of clarity in the overall picture of the deployment of Soviet troops, the lack of reliable information about the fortifications, etc. General Blumentritt, who was then close to the Wehrmacht high command, complained that in preparation for During the war, it was very difficult to form any accurate picture of Soviet Russia and its armed forces.

The role of German intelligence in ensuring the surprise attack on the USSR

As in the development of the infamous Barbarossa plan, so in its implementation, the German General Staff and the services of "total espionage" relentlessly followed Hitler's "fundamental concept". The Fuhrer expressed the essence of this concept before the invasion of the territory of the USSR in the following words: “One single blow must destroy the enemy. Air raids, unheard of in their massiveness, sabotage, terror, acts of sabotage, assassination attempts, assassinations of leaders, crushing attacks on all weak points of the enemy defense suddenly in one and the same second ... I will stop at nothing. No so-called international law will not prevent me from taking advantage of the advantage that is given to me.

Thus, the main orientation of the Nazi elite in preparing for the war against the USSR included an indispensable requirement that the blow be delivered in conditions of strategic surprise, which would put the Soviet troops in a critical situation.

It was supposed in a relatively short time to pull up from the west and concentrate along the entire border of the USSR almost five million strong army with a huge number of tanks, guns, vehicles and other latest military equipment. The General Staff, in accordance with Hitler's directive, already on July 6, 1940, began an intensive transfer of troops and equipment from west to east.

The statistics that later became known showed that if on July 21, 1940 there were 15 divisions in Poland and East Prussia, then by October 7 there were already 30 of them, and a week later, that is, on October 15, General Halder wrote in his service diary: “Now we have 40, and soon there will be 100 divisions on the Russian border.” From January 1941, the scale of the transfer increased dramatically, and in March-April, echelons with German troops and equipment went to the Soviet borders in a continuous stream. Since May, the Wehrmacht command began to send up to 100 echelons per day to the eastern borders according to the military schedule. Only from France to Poland it was necessary to redeploy several armies numbering about 500 thousand people. By mid-June, the deployment of the German invasion army was practically over. Fascist Germany, which had been preparing for a long time to strike at the Soviet Union, by this moment had concentrated enormous armed forces near the western borders, which had taken their starting positions for the attack. In total, they included 190 fully equipped divisions (together with satellites), 3,500 tanks, 4,000 aircraft, 50,000 guns and mortars. On the territory of Poland, the construction of roads and bridges began, warehouses were erected, supplies were prepared, the communications system and air defense were improved.

In order to be able to attack the Soviet Union suddenly, it was important to do everything covertly, in deep secrecy, and for this, as planned, resort to the use of a whole range of tricks and methods of disguise inherent in the aggressor. A strictly limited circle of people was privy to the plans for an attack on the USSR, carefully guarded by the Nazi counterintelligence. By a special directive, Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht headquarters and the leaders of the secret services, primarily the Abwehr and the SD, to provide cover for the German advance to the east and, as far as possible, make it invisible. In pursuance of this directive, the headquarters of the operational leadership, back in early September 1940, issued a document with the following content, addressed to the leadership of the Abwehr:

"Supreme Command Headquarters of the Fuhrer 6. 9. 1940

Headquarters of operational management 7 copies.

Department of Defense of the country, copy. No. 4

No. 33264/40 Top secret

For command only

In the coming weeks, the concentration of troops in the east will increase significantly. By the end of October, it is necessary to achieve the position indicated on the attached map. The regroupings at (the borders of) Russia should by no means give the impression that we are preparing an offensive to the east. At the same time, Russia must understand that there are strong and combat-ready German troops in the General Government, in the eastern provinces and in the protectorate, and draw the conclusion from this that we are ready at any moment with sufficiently powerful forces to defend our interests in the Balkans in the event of a Russian intervention.

In the work of our own intelligence, as well as in possible responses to Russian requests, one should be guided by the following basic fundamental provisions.

1. Mask, if possible, the total number of German troops in the east by spreading rumors and news about the supposedly intensive replacement of military formations taking place in this area. Movements of troops should be justified by their transfer to training camps, reorganization, etc.

2. To create the impression that the main direction in our movements falls on the southern regions of the General Government, on the protectorate and Austria, and that the concentration of troops in the north is relatively small.

3. Overestimate the level and assessment of the state of armament of formations, especially tank divisions.

4. Distribute appropriately selected information to create the impression that after the end of the western campaign, air defense in the east direction has become much more effective and that the anti-aircraft defense of all important objects is being strengthened by captured French equipment.

5. Work to improve the network of highways and railways and airfields to explain the need for the development of the newly conquered eastern regions, referring to the fact that they are conducted at a normal pace and pursue mainly economic goals.

To what extent individual authentic data, for example, on the numbering of regiments, the number of garrisons, etc., can be transferred to the Abwehr for use in counterintelligence purposes, the main command of the ground forces decides.

For the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Yodl."

Hitler's directive, dated January 31, 1941, emphasized that the advance of concentrated troops to the border should take place at the last moment and be unexpected for the enemy. As in all previous military operations of Nazi Germany, this was done with the aim of taking the victim of aggression by surprise, depriving her of the opportunity to prepare to repel the attack.

The highly experienced Admiral Cana-ris, who knew all the moves and exits, all the springs and levers of the Nazi government apparatus, directed and coordinated the actions of various departments of the Reich to ensure secrecy and operational-strategic camouflage of the prepared armed aggression. It was the head of the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the Wehrmacht, turned into the main center of disinformation, who was instructed to comprehensively think over and resolve the issue of the distribution mechanism false information about the forces and means that should be used in order to hide the scale of the transfer of troops to the borders of the USSR, to mislead public opinion both inside Germany and abroad, and thus divert attention from the criminal intentions of the Nazi elite.

As the International Military Tribunal later established, the Nazi elite considered ensuring the surprise of an armed attack on the Soviet Union as an indispensable condition for the rapid defeat of the Red Army directly on the western borders. Naturally, this area of ​​activity of the Abwehr became one of the most important on the eve of the outbreak of war.

A group of professionals from the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the Wehrmacht, in accordance with the order of the Supreme High Command of August 26, 1940, entrusting the Abwehr with the task of "carefully disguising the concentration and deployment of German troops on the German-Soviet border", based on the experience already gained, proposed a set of practical measures for disinformation . Since these measures affected many aspects of the life of the Reich, they were considered and approved by Hitler himself.

First of all, it was considered necessary to maintain the appearance of good neighborly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. All political actions carried out at that time to put together an anti-Soviet military bloc had to be kept in the strictest secrecy. In a decision taken at a meeting with Hitler on February 3, 1941, it was expressly stated that agreements with neighboring states participating in the operation could not be concluded as long as there was any need for disguise. German representatives in negotiations with the allies of aggression were forbidden to touch on the details of the Barbarossa plan. A limited number of people were involved in the preliminary activities for the implementation of this plan. At the same time, the protection of the borders with the USSR was strengthened. All residents suspected of sympathizing with the Soviet country were evicted from the German border strip. Counterintelligence work was widely deployed in the places of concentration of German troops. In Germany itself and in the countries occupied by it, all those who could potentially threaten the secrecy of military preparations by their actions were taken under the control of counterintelligence agencies. A special government order of April 2, 1940 categorically prohibited all types of communication with countries declared hostile to Nazi Germany. Movement between the Reich and the territory occupied by German troops was limited. A special permit was required for permanent or temporary exit from these territories to Germany and back. A number of regulations were issued aimed at tightening the passport regime, the conditions for the stay of foreigners in Germany, etc.

The coordinated and methodical implementation of these measures was intended to confuse people and, thus, set Soviet intelligence on the wrong track, making it difficult to "figure out the intention of the Germans to attack." Curious generalizing evidence on this subject is given in the memoirs of V. Schellenberg. “The hour of the great general offensive,” he wrote. - became noticeably closer. A lot of effort was required to mask our action against Russia. Particularly threatened places had to be protected from spies - marshalling yards and border crossings. In addition, it was necessary to block the information channels of the enemy; we only used them to spread misinformation, such as the transfer of troops and supplies to the west to prepare for the renewed Operation Sea Lion. How much the Soviets believed in this disinformation can be judged by the fact that as early as June 21, the Russian infantry battalions stationed in the Brest-Litovsk citadel were engaged in drill training to the music.

Hitler's secret directive on disinformation of the USSR

On February 15, 1941, Hitler issues a new top-secret "Directive on Disinformation", obliging the main headquarters of the German armed forces and the Abwehr to take additional measures to strengthen the camouflage of preparations for Operation Barbarossa in order to avoid revealing them to Soviet intelligence.

Justifying in this directive the significance of the disinformation campaign for delivering a surprise strike with powerful strategic reserves, Hitler indicated that it would go through two closely related stages.

At the first stage (approximately from February 15 to April 16, 1941), the main content of the campaign was to be a set of disinformation measures aimed at convincing Soviet intelligence that the regrouping of German forces was not connected with their concentration in the eastern part of the country, but represents the usual systematic "exchange" of troops. Everything was supposed to look like some formations were being withdrawn to the east for rest and study, and fresh troops stationed there were being pulled up with guns and equipment to the west in connection with the upcoming Operation Marita (invasion of Yugoslavia). To solve the problems of this stage, the main headquarters of the Wehrmacht was instructed, in particular, to determine how long the expected transportation of military units by rail could be given out as a normal exchange of troops in the area.

At the second stage (from April 1941 to the moment of the invasion of German troops into the territory of the USSR), the strategic deployment of the armed forces was to be portrayed as a disinformation maneuver, supposedly undertaken in order to lull the British vigilance, divert their attention from the ongoing preparations for the invasion of the British Isles . At this stage, the Abwehr had to decide how and using what channels to promote the false information to Soviet intelligence that the German navy and air force, which had recently refrained from participating in hostilities, were accumulating forces before a large-scale decisive attack on England. For this, as the former deputy head of the Abwehr II, Colonel Stolze, testified, “it was planned to transfer a significant part of the German navy to ports on the French and German coasts of the North Sea, as well as the concentration of air formations on French airfields.” Immediately before the attack on the Soviet Union, it was supposed to start moving German ships towards England in order to create the appearance of the beginning of an operation to land on the British Isles. All this, taken together, should have confirmed the main thesis that in 1941 the main goal of the Nazi command was the defeat of England. Such actions as the adaptation of schools, theaters, institutions on the northwestern and northern coasts of France to accommodate troops and hospitals, the creation of naval bases in the ports of Palis and Bordeaux, and the eviction of residents of the cities of the northern coast of France were also calculated to mislead Soviet intelligence.

At the same time, the “Disinformation Directive” prescribed: “Despite the significant decrease in activity in the implementation of Operation Sea Lion, everything possible must be done to ensure that the conviction grows in one’s own troops that preparations for a landing in England are continuing, although the troops intended for this withdrawn to a certain point in the rear. It was also important, the directive stressed, to keep as long as possible misleading about the actual intentions even those troops selected for participation in hostilities directly on the Eastern Front.

At the beginning of May 1941, in Krampnitz, near Potsdam, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the Wehrmacht, General Warlimont, a special meeting was held to consider the extent to which the impending attack on the USSR was camouflaged and what should be done to enhance its effectiveness at the final stage. prepared aggression. This representative meeting was attended by senior officers of the headquarters of the operational leadership, the head of the Wehrmacht department, Colonel Rudolf, the leaders of the Abwehr Lahousen and Stolze, high-ranking officials from the command of the branches of the armed forces.

In a program of disinformation measures designed to create the desired overall picture, special place took action, with the help of which Hitler managed to mislead the top Soviet leadership. As it became known, at the beginning of 1941, when, despite the precautions taken, the flow of signals emanating from various sources about the concentration of large formations of German troops in Poland increased especially strongly, J.V. Stalin, concerned about this, addressed a personal message to Hitler, in which he wrote that it seemed that Germany was going to fight against the Soviet Union. In response, Hitler sent a letter to I. V. Stalin, also of a personal nature and, as he emphasized in the text, "confidential." Hitler did not deny that large military formations were indeed concentrated in Poland. But at the same time, he argued, being sure that this revelation of his would not go further than Stalin, that the concentration of German troops on Polish territory pursued other goals and was in no way directed against the Soviet country. And in general, he intends to strictly observe the concluded non-aggression pact, in which he vouches for his honor as head of state. In a “confidential” letter to Stalin, Hitler found an argument that, as Marshal G.K. Zhukov later said, Stalin apparently believed: the Fuhrer wrote that the territory of Western and Central Germany “is subjected to powerful British bombardments and is clearly visible from the air. Therefore, he was forced to withdraw large contingents of troops to the East ... ". And he did it as if with the aim of being able to covertly rearm and reorganize them there, in Poland, before a decisive attack on England.

In a word, everything was done to strengthen the Soviet leadership in the opinion that the concentration of large German troops on the German-Soviet border was just a diversionary maneuver in connection with the measures under the Sea Lion plan and that before the defeat of England, at least until the middle 1942, Hitler will not be able to turn troops to the east. And, as we now know, the Nazis quite succeeded in this and cost our army and people dearly. As a result of the enormous blow planned by Hitler, which turned out to be completely unexpected for the Soviet leadership, only 1200 aircraft were destroyed on the very first day of the war, with the vast majority at the airfields. This blow could not but cause a certain nervous shock in our troops.

So, although the general meaning of the campaign was to disorientate public opinion and hide preparations for an armed attack behind the “smoke screen” created, the main camouflage actions developed in two directions.

The first was aimed at impressing the people and the army of their own country that Germany was really seriously preparing for a landing on the coast of the British Isles and generally intended to start a "big war" against England. (True, back in July 1940 and later, Hitler repeatedly expressed the idea among his close associates that the landing operation was a very risky undertaking and that it could be resorted to only if no other ways were found to crush England.) Moreover, although in practice Hitler abandoned this idea long ago, it continued to be used quite widely as a means of disinformation. And, as it later became known, not without success: the reality of the landing plans was believed both in Germany itself and abroad.

The second direction, as will be seen from the further presentation, contained a whole range of measures related to the dissemination of false information about the threat to the security of the Reich allegedly emanating from the Soviet Union.

Acceptance of Germany with preventive war

History convinces us that every aggressor government strives at all costs to misinform the world community, to create the appearance that it is being forced into direct military action by circumstances - the interests of self-defense. It is perhaps difficult to find a case when any state would openly and frankly admit that it decided on unprovoked aggression, on unleashing a war for the sake of conquering foreign territories. A feature of Hitler's military strategy was, first of all, that an armed attack on other countries was carried out without a declaration of war, but with the active use of provocations organized by intelligence, started with the sole purpose of obtaining a pretext for aggression. After all, the Hitlerite government claimed that the conflict with Poland was provoked by it, and the reason for the war, the Nazis declared a ridiculous desire "to prevent the encirclement of Germany." Along with the action we have described in Gliwice, the Nazis were preparing another similar provocation at the same time. As it turned out during the investigation into the case of a terrorist agent detained in Warsaw, sent by the SD, several scouts entered Poland from Germany in the second half of August 1939 with the task of killing peasants from the German national minority so that Berlin could blame the Poles for this .

To justify the capture by the Nazi troops in April 1940 of Denmark and Norway, the most clumsy version you can think of was launched: they tried to present this outright aggression as a "measure of protection" of these countries from the invasion of the British. At the same time, the Abwehr and the SD, whose actions were based on the same patented method of the German attack, were offered in no case to give grounds for concluding that Germany was striving to create strongholds here for its future military operations.

“We will continue to tell the whole world,” Hitler declared, “that we were forced to capture a certain area in order to ensure order and security.” And in subsequent years, the Nazi leaders justified their aggressive policy in a similar way. It was exactly the same during the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. Acting on a Hitler-approved disinformation program, Canaris launches a deliberate campaign to spread false rumors about an allegedly growing threat to the security of the Reich from the Soviet Union, whose armed forces are "ready to launch a preemptive strike against Germany." As if “it was precisely the military preparations of the USSR that confronted Hitler with the need to take measures to strengthen the defense in the East, forced him to resort to a“ radical response to the impending danger.

Since the disinformation campaign was of the utmost importance, everything connected with it was constantly in the center of attention of Hitler himself and the Wehrmacht High Command. The mass media, diplomatic correspondence, as well as the agent network of Nazi intelligence abroad were widely used to spread the necessary rumors. The disinformation worked out in the bowels of the Abwehr was supplied to German military missions in neutral countries and the military attachés of these countries in Berlin. The headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht specifically instructed the Abwehr to mislead the Soviet military attache in Berlin in order to divert his attention from the movements of German troops near the border of the Soviet Union.

The actions of the Nazi “total espionage” services were limited to “supporting” with concrete facts and making public the version of the preventive nature of the attack on the USSR, thereby contributing to the solution of the main task set by Hitler: to shift the responsibility for the bloody conflict to the Soviet government. For example, in the "weekly review" very popular at that time in Germany (weekly newsreels. - F. S.) employees of the propaganda department of the Wehrmacht invariably showed footage showing Soviet troops and the equipment of the Red Army. The Nazis made no secret of the fact that this measure was calculated to give the impression "how great is the danger coming from the East." Declaring that “today there are 150 Russian divisions on our border” and that “Moscow, by deploying its forces, violated the provisions of the friendship treaty by committing a“ vile betrayal ”, the Nazis, in confirmation, staged the statements of“ Soviet officers ”about the allegedly undertaken training“ planned Soviet offensive.

Summing up some of the results of the disinformation campaign that was widely launched on the eve and during the invasion, in which, along with the Abwehr Active participation also received the main imperial security department, the chief of the latter, Heydrich, reported on July 7, 1941: “According to reports, the idea is successfully spreading everywhere that some kind of“ threat ”for the Reich came from the Soviet Union and that the Fuhrer again struck at the right time.

Now it is known for certain that the intense disorientation, combined with the secrecy of the transfer and concentration of troops, allowed the German command to achieve tangible results in ensuring the surprise of the invasion of the territory of the USSR and thereby guarantee itself obvious advantages in the initial period of the war.

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that the top leaders of the Nazi regime, who did not take into account international legal norms and even showed complete disregard for them, resorted to various methods of masking their expansionist plans with the help of the Abwehr and the SD, did everything in order to shift responsibility for unleashing war on others. The explanation for this should, obviously, be sought primarily in the fact that although war at that time was considered a legitimate means of implementing politics, however, in world public consciousness, only a defensive war was recognized as justified. Aggressive war was outlawed by international law.

The second, no less significant circumstance, noted by Western authors so far, is that the leaders of the Third Reich were aware of the danger that the recognition of the aggressive nature of their own aspirations would adversely affect the morale of the soldiers of the Wehrmacht and allies. Was it possible to reveal to the world, to one's own people, that we are talking about the physical extermination of millions of people, the seizure of foreign lands and wealth. On the day of the sudden attack on our country, Hitler, as the Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, in the order-appeal "To the soldiers of the Eastern Front", who entered the war against the Soviet Union, inspired that the USSR pursued an aggressive policy and now Germany was forced to take retaliatory actions. “The main thing is,” Hitler told his accomplices on July 16, 1941, “not to tell the whole world about our goals. It's not needed. It is important that we ourselves know what we want.”

Information about the German attack on the USSR

It is now reliably known that the task that the political leadership of the Reich set for Nazi intelligence - to hide from the outside world the preparations of Nazi Germany to attack the Soviet Union - she failed to solve.

Soviet state security organs, border troops, military intelligence not only correctly assessed the military-strategic plans of Hitlerism, but also at the right time turned out to be aware of the concentration of Nazi troops on the western border, quite accurately determined the expected dates for the start of hostilities. Since the summer of 1940, they regularly provided the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government with information on the course of Nazi Germany's military preparations against the USSR. It is enough to refer at least to firmly established facts and authentic documents kept in the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Committee of State Security and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.

Let's look at them chronologically. Back in the middle of 1940, the property of Soviet foreign policy intelligence became information that the German Ministry of Railways, on the instructions of the Wehrmacht General Staff, was engaged in calculating the throughput and finding out other possibilities of railways in connection with the upcoming transfer of troops from the Western to the Eastern theater of military operations that was being prepared.

On August 9, 1940, it became known that “underground structures and artillery fortifications are being built on the coast of the Baltic Sea from Stettin and Swinemünde to Memel. Fortifications are built in the forests and are well camouflaged. In the port of Swinemünde, new berths equipped with the latest technology have been built, access roads and berths are hidden under water in concreted channels. Moorings for ships with a large draft are being built in the Memel Canal. At night, in Memel, German troops are drawn up to the Lithuanian border. German officers and soldiers and Germans living in Memel study Russian and practice Russian colloquial speech ... ".

In October 1940, on the basis of materials received from Soviet intelligence agents "Sergeant" and "Corsican" (German anti-fascists who worked in the General Staff of the Air Force and the German Ministry of Economy), the authorities were informed about the military preparations of Germany. “...“ Corsican ”... - indicated in this message, - in a conversation with an officer of the headquarters of the high command, I learned that at the beginning of next year Germany would start a war against the Soviet Union ... The purpose of the war is to seize part of the European territory of the USSR from Leningrad to the Black Sea from the Soviet Union and the creation on this territory of a state entirely dependent on Germany ... An officer of the headquarters of the supreme command (department of military attaches), the son of the former minister of colonies ... told our source ... (a former Russian prince, connected with the military German and Russian circles) that, according to information, received by him at the headquarters of the high command, in about six months Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union.

On November 6, the state security organs of the USSR presented a generalized certificate of Germany's military preparations as of October 15, 1940. The certificate, in particular, stated that in total over 85 divisions were concentrated against the Soviet Union, that is, more than one third of the ground forces of the German army. Characteristically, it was emphasized in the certificate, that the bulk of infantry formations (up to 6 divisions) and all tank and motorized divisions are located in a dense grouping in the border zone with the USSR. In addition, 12-13 divisions (including two tank divisions) in Austria, 5-6 infantry divisions in the Czech Republic and Moravia and 6-8 infantry divisions in Norway.

On December 25, 1940, the military attache at the Soviet embassy in Berlin received an anonymous letter about the impending attack by fascist Germany on the USSR, outlining the plan of military operations. As subsequent events showed, this plan was close to reality.

At the same time, Soviet intelligence informed the government of the essential details of the "Plan Barbarossa", the proposed deployment of German military forces near the Soviet western borders. The information, simultaneously sent to the General Staff of the USSR, said: “Germany's action against the Soviet Union has been finally decided and will follow soon. The operational plan of the offensive provides for a lightning strike on Ukraine and further advance to the east ... "

Information about the preparation of the Germans for the war against the USSR

In February 1941, Soviet intelligence became aware of Hitler's intention to postpone the invasion of the British Isles until the end of the military campaign in the east. A few days later, information was obtained about a confidential meeting between the Romanian military fascist dictator Antonescu and a prominent German official Bering, during which the details of Romania's participation in anti-Soviet aggression were discussed.

Then, in February 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sent a message received from Berlin from the "Corsican" that "the military economic department of the German statistical office received an order from the high command to draw up maps of the location of industrial enterprises of the USSR by regions » . The maps were supposed to serve as an orientation when choosing objects of aerial bombardment and sabotage operations.

At the beginning of March 1941, a Soviet intelligence agent in Berlin, through an official of the committee on the four-year plan, obtained information that a group of committee workers had been given the task to urgently draw up calculations of the stocks of raw materials and food that Germany could receive as a result of the occupation of the European part of the USSR. The same source said that the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Halder, was counting on unconditional success and lightning-fast occupation by the German troops of the Soviet Union and, above all, Ukraine, where, according to Halder, the good condition of the railways and highways would contribute to the success of the operation. Halder also considers the occupation of Baku and its oil fields to be an easy task, which the Germans supposedly will be able to quickly restore after the destruction from hostilities. According to Halder, the Red Army will not be able to provide adequate resistance to the lightning-fast offensive of the German troops and the Russians will not even have time to destroy the reserves. On March 6, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of Defense were informed about the materials presented.

On March 11, 1941, the data received by our counterintelligence from the British embassy in Moscow were brought to the attention of the authorities. According to these data, “On March 6, the British Ambassador Cripps called a press conference, which was attended by British and American correspondents Chollerton, Lovell, Cassidy, Duranty, Shapiro and Magidov. Warning those present that his information was confidential and not to be used for publication, Cripps made the following statement: “…Soviet-German relations are definitely deteriorating…Soviet-German war is inevitable. Many reliable diplomatic sources from Berlin report that Germany is planning an attack on the Soviet Union this year, probably in the summer. There is a group in the German General Staff advocating an immediate attack on the USSR. Until now, Hitler has been trying to avoid a war on two fronts, but if he is convinced that he cannot make a successful invasion of England, then he will attack the USSR, since in this case he will have only one front ...

Answering questions, Cripps stated that the German General Staff was convinced that Germany was able to capture the Ukraine and the Caucasus, up to Baku, in two to three weeks.

On March 22, 1941, Soviet intelligence reported to the government about Hitler's secret order to suspend the fulfillment of orders from the USSR.

On March 24, 1941, the Soviet state security authorities received from Berlin and submitted to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a message with the following content: THE USSR. Plans are being drawn up to bombard the most important objects of the Soviet Union. First of all, it is supposed to bombard communication bridges in order to prevent the supply of reserves. A plan was developed for the bombing of Leningrad, Vyborg and Kyiv. The aviation headquarters regularly receives photographs of Soviet cities and other objects, in particular the city of Kyiv ...

There is an opinion among the officers of the aviation headquarters that the military action against the USSR is allegedly timed for the end of April or the beginning of May. These dates are associated with the intention of the Germans to keep the harvest for themselves, hoping that the Soviet troops, during the retreat, will not be able to set fire to more green bread.

By March 25, 1941, data were collected on the transfer of 120 German divisions to the Soviet border area.

On March 26, 1941, the Soviet state security agencies intercepted a cipher telegram from the Turkish ambassador to the USSR, Haydar Aktay, to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, which reported: “Judging by the noteworthy report that the Swedish envoy in Berlin sent to his government and a copy of which I managed to get ... the Germans believe that the action against Russia has become an urgent need. This explains the significant strengthening of the German troops located on the Russian border. It has been finally established that over the past 2-3 weeks a significant concentration of troops has been carried out on the Russian border. Swedish engineers working in the vicinity of Warsaw personally stated that German motorized units were sent in large numbers to the Russian border every night. The political circles of Berlin believe that the attack on Russia will be carried out by ground forces, and on England - by large air formations and a submarine fleet; they even say that three army groups are being prepared for this task: the Warsaw group under the command of Marshal von Bock, the Königsberg group under the command of Marshal von Runstedt, the Krakow group under the command of Marshal von Leeb. In order to ensure a quick victory over the Soviet armies, a lightning offensive plan from the three above-mentioned points will be applied. The target of this offensive will be Ukraine; it is also possible that it will spread to the Ural Mountains.

In informing you of the above information, which is trustworthy, as well as other information that has recently been circulating here that the Germans are preparing to attack Russia, I ask you to keep it secret.

In April 1941, the agent "Starshina" reported from Berlin: "In the event of a war with the USSR, the German aviation headquarters scheduled a number of points on Soviet territory for bombing the first stage in order to disrupt the supply of reserves from east to west and disrupt supply routes going from south to north ... Military operations against the USSR are supposed to begin with the bombing of these points with the active participation of dive bombers.

In addition, Soviet airfields located along the western border of the USSR should be bombed first of all.

The Germans consider the ground service of aviation to be a weak point in the defense of the USSR and therefore hope to immediately disorganize its operations by intensive bombardment of airfields.

On April 10, 1941, the Soviet government was also sent an intelligence report on the content of Hitler's conversation with the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, Paul, from which it followed that Hitler decided to start military operations against the USSR at the end of June 1941. On the same days through the channels military intelligence received a message from Richard Sorge, who documented the intentions of fascist Germany and the specific timing of its attack on the USSR.

At the beginning of May 1941, from the foreign agents of the Soviet military intelligence, it became known about the inspection of parts of the German troops located on the territory of the General Government and in East Prussia, and reconnaissance in the border zone by the highest ranks of the army. On May 5-7, Hitler, Goering and Raeder were present at the maneuvers of the German fleet in the Baltic Sea near Gdynia. In mid-May, Hitler arrived in Warsaw, accompanied by six senior officers of the German army, and on May 22 began inspecting troops in East Prussia.

On June 6, 1941, the state security organs of the USSR reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks intelligence data on the concentration of a four-million German army on the western border of the Soviet Union, and a few days later that a group of German troops stationed in East Prussia received an order to occupy by June 12 starting positions for the attack on the USSR.

On June 11, 1941, a Soviet intelligence officer, who was among the employees of the German embassy in Moscow, announced Berlin's secret order to prepare embassy personnel for evacuation within seven days and immediately begin destroying archival documents.

In mid-June 1941, with reference to information received from a reliable source working at the headquarters of the German aviation, the state security organs of the USSR informed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that “all German military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR were completely completed and the strike can be expected at any time...

The objects of German air raids will primarily be: the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing individual parts for aircraft (electrical equipment, ball bearings, tires), as well as car repair shops ...

... Hungary will take an active part in the hostilities on the side of Germany. Part of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, is already on Hungarian airfields.

... Important German aircraft repair shops are located: in Königsberg, Gdynia, Graudenz, Breslau, Marienburg. Milic aircraft engine workshops in Poland, in Warsaw - Ochachi and especially important ones - in Heiligenkeil ... ". A source working in the German Ministry of Economy reports that the appointment of the heads of the military economic departments of the "future districts" of the occupied territory of the USSR has been made. The Ministry of Economy says that at a meeting of business executives destined for the "occupied" territory of the USSR, Rosenberg also spoke, who stated that "the concept of the Soviet Union should be erased from geographical map» .

A week before the outbreak of the armed conflict, through the channels of Soviet intelligence, a sample of a phrase book distributed to German soldiers was received, the content of which betrayed the real aspirations of the leaders of the Reich. It contained, for example, such phrases: “Russ, give up”, “Who is the chairman of the collective farm? ..”, etc.

As can be seen from the above documents and facts, from the middle of 1940 to June 22, 1941, the Chekist authorities and military intelligence received through their channels extensive and reliable information about the upcoming aggression, in particular about the accumulation of strategic reserves for a surprise strike, and timely reported to the Central Committee about this. VKP(b) and the Soviet government. But it so happened that the information received through intelligence channels, as well as warnings coming from other sources, including from Churchill, did not inspire confidence in the political leadership of the country, and the biased position of I.V. Stalin prevented him from giving the current situation a correct assessment . which, as you know, predetermined the heavy losses of the Soviet people in the initial period of the war.