In the 13th century, another Franciscan monk stands out - John Duns Scotus, one of the most prominent philosophers of the 13th century. John Duns Scotus, like Roger Bacon, came from Great Britain, from Scotland. Born in 1266 in the county of Roxburgh in Scotland. In 1281 he became a monk of a Franciscan monastery in the south of Scotland, and in 1291 he was ordained a priest. Throughout this time he studied at Paris and Oxford universities, in 1301 he taught as a bachelor at the University of Paris, then he was recalled to Cologne, where he died on November 8, 1308. Nickname - "thin doctor".

He wrote extremely many works in his short life, he is one of the most prolific scholastics. His work “Oxford Labor” stands out, which is a commentary on the works of Peter Lombard. In addition to the Oxford Work, John Duns Scotus has Miscellaneous Questions, On the First Beginning of All Things, and Subtle Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Perhaps the title of this work was the reason for the nickname "thin doctor".

The main opponent of John Duns Scotus, like Roger Bacon, was Thomas Aquinas. Unlike Roger Bacon, John Duns Scotus had many supporters and students, so that along with Thomism in the 14th century, another direction in scholasticism began to develop - scotism. The contradiction between John Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas begins from the very beginning, from the moment of comparing philosophy and religion. John Duns Scotus himself did not consider himself a philosopher, in general, philosophy and religion have not only different methods, according to John Duns Scotus, but also different subjects, this is the mistake of Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, philosophy has the human mind as its tool, and it is corrupted by human sin, which again was not understood by Thomas Aquinas, who believed that the human mind had not changed since the time before the fall. Therefore, one should not reason about God, but believe in Him and see Him through the grace given by Him.

Thomas Aquinas believed that since there are two kinds of knowledge, theological and scientific knowledge, there are two truths. John Duns Scotus says that if there are two truths about the same subject, then it is logical to assume that one of these truths is less perfect and simply not needed. Therefore, either we must discard one of the areas of knowledge, or assume that these areas of knowledge have different subjects.

John Duns Scotus chooses the second option and argues that the subject of theology is God, and the subject of philosophy is being. Only God Himself has knowledge of God, so our knowledge can only be based on what God Himself tells us. Therefore, theology is based on revelation, while philosophy cannot know God.

One might think that John Duns Scotus here belittles human rational abilities, although he himself claims that, on the contrary, he elevates the mind, since God descends to the weak human mind, giving him grace, and if God descends to the mind, then this is a value in the eyes of God.

What is being according to Scott? This is one of the most difficult categories of his philosophy, although John Duns Scotus did not consider himself a philosopher, and if he heard such a mention of himself, he would certainly be offended. Nevertheless, there are a lot of philosophical thoughts in his works, and, on almost all issues, John Duns Scotus argues as one of the greatest philosophers. Being, according to Scott, is that which exists everywhere. Therefore, we cannot find being, the knowledge of the material world sees only single things, but we know that all things, while existing, have something in common, that is, being. Things, as John Duns Scotus says, are synonymous in this respect with each other.

Being is the same everywhere - both in things and in God, however, in God, being has an infinite character, and due to the infinity of being, reason cannot say anything about God. And the very concept of infinite being is used by a person by analogy with our being, considering this concept the most perfect of all the concepts of reason, which could somehow bring a person closer to God. The concept of infinity in John Duns Scotus is an essential concept that gives us knowledge about God. If in Thomas Aquinas the main characteristic of God is the identity in Him of essence and existence, then John Duns Scotus objects, believing that essence is identical to existence in all objects, this is not what separates objects from God. Separates God from our world His infinity. God is infinite, so he is simple. John Duns Scotus proves this by saying that God cannot be a part of another whole, since He is infinite, and on the other hand, He cannot consist of other parts, for if these parts are finite, then the whole will be finite, and God is infinite. And if these parts are infinite, then we recall the previous argument that the infinite cannot be part of the whole. Therefore God, being infinite, is simple.

Other characteristics of God follow from the infinity of God. In particular, we can say about God that in God the violation of formal identity and difference is possible. If we can say about our material world that a thing is identical to itself and different from another, then in infinite being such a difference disappears. Therefore, we can speak of God as a Trinity and a Unit at the same time. Thanks to His infinite essence, we can speak of Him as Wisdom, Being, Love, and at the same time not violate His unity, His simplicity, His identity. Therefore, on the one hand, we can understand that in God wisdom does not coincide with justice, but since His wisdom and His justice are infinite, we can ultimately say that they also enter into divine simplicity and therefore coincide. All attributes known to us in God are both different and identical to each other.

A separate moment of the relationship between God and the world. According to the Platonic tradition, more accepted in the Franciscan order, John Duns Scotus shares the opinion that there are certain ideas in God. However, here, too, John Duns Scotus departs from the position of Augustine and believes that ideas as such do not exist either outside of God or in the mind of God - ideas as certain entities. Ideas cannot exist outside of God, because this would contradict the creation of the world, and in God they cannot exist, because this would violate the principle of God's simplicity. Ideas exist in God only as His thoughts, but not as separate formations.

As the thoughts of God, ideas are not created, but they do not create either. They are nothing but the thoughts of God, and their existence is therefore relative and dependent on the divine will. These ideas operate in relation to the world insofar as God Himself acts, insofar as God thinks. Therefore, ideas as such are no different from the thought of God.

Thomas Aquinas argued, speaking of God, that God cannot do much, since His will cannot contradict his own knowledge. Almost the same thing is said by John Duns Scotus, although researchers often reproach that John Duns Scotus puts the divine will in the first place. John Duns Scotus really says that the will dominates knowledge, but nevertheless he says that God can do everything, but He does not do what Thomas Aquinas enumerates: does not violate identity, the principle of logic, because God does not want this.

As we remember, the will of God, the mind of God, justice, etc. in God they coincide, but this divine voluntarism is not such voluntarism, just the will of God and His mind are one and the same. John Duns Scotus emphasizes one point in this aspect, arguing with Thomas Aquinas, and mainly with the Averroists, that knowledge has no power over God, there is nothing above God.

Speaking of the relationship between God and the world, of course, one cannot bypass the problem of matter. Since our world itself is material, the problem of cognition of matter, the existence of matter as a separate material principle, matter and form, and other problems arise. Thomas Aquinas argued that matter is the opposite of form and is one of the two components that make up the body. The body is made up of matter and form. John Duns Scotus objects and says that it is incorrect and incorrect to speak of matter simply as the opposite of form. If we are talking about matter, then this already means that matter has some existence of its own, therefore matter also has its own essence. Otherwise, it is meaningless to say that a thing consists of matter and form.

Matter exists - and exists as some entity. And if we say that God created matter, then God created matter, having some of His idea, the thought of matter, which once again confirms the possibility of the existence of matter independently without a form.

Such matter without a form can exist, it can even be known by itself, without a form, but, alas, it cannot be known by a person. Man cognizes only forms and therefore matter in cognition is not given to him. Matter, as indicated in the book of Genesis, is created before form, therefore, for John Duns Scotus, matter even has some priority over form, because it exists before form, arose before. And if it exists earlier, and if matter can exist separately, then the principle of individuation, i.e. that which gives an individual character to things, matter cannot possess.

Here John Duns Scotus faces a huge difficulty. Just like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, he argues that there can be no knowledge about the individual, knowledge is only about the general. But, on the other hand, denying the existence of ideas, denying that a thing consists of matter and form, John Duns Scotus also loses the support that came from Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, with the help of which one can assert the cognizability of the material world.

Therefore, a difficulty arises: on the one hand, knowledge exists, and on the other hand, knowledge is possible only about the general, but the general does not exist, only the individual exists. Aristotle had the same difficulty, and Aristotle himself hesitated just as much whether to give priority to reason or our feelings. Giving priority to reason, Aristotle inevitably returned to Platonism; giving priority to feelings, Aristotle inevitably had to become a materialist. Both are equally undesirable, which is why there were hesitation.

In John Duns Scotus we see another solution to the principle of individuation and the problem of cognition. If knowledge exists, and knowledge about the individual cannot exist, and yet only the individual exists, then this shows the extranatural, inhuman, supernatural character of our knowledge.

John Duns Scotus also decides the principle of individuality in his own way, calling this principle a certain word invented by him, in Latin it sounds like haecceitas, which in Russian is translated as “thisness”. Every thing is "this". Thisness that comes from God and gives the principle of individuation to things, making each thing what it is, unique. Therefore, according to John Duns Scotus, there is only God and the real world in all its diversity, everything else is just our abstractions, our conjectures and, possibly, our delusions. Therefore, John Duns Scotus in this position, remaining generally an adherent of the Franciscan order and a supporter of Augustinian philosophy, takes a nominalist position.

Speaking of matter, John Duns Scotus, following Aristotle, distinguishes several types of matter. First, there is a certain universal and primary substance that exists without form and underlies everything that exists. This matter is the subject of metaphysics and was given the name "first-first matter" by John Duns Scotus. In addition to the first-first matter, there is also a second-first matter. This is a qualitatively defined matter, of which the objects of the material world consist. This second-first matter is the subject of natural philosophy, i.e. natural sciences. And the third-first matter is the material from which a person makes the things around him, it is the subject of mechanics.

By virtue of His infinity, God is a free being, for nothing can limit or restrain God. Man is another free being. In his actions, a person is guided not by his knowledge, but by his will, for freedom is the essence of man. Man is free, but he obeys the divine will and acts according to the laws established by God. One does not contradict the other, just as Gilson gives an example, explaining the philosophy of John Duns Scotus, when a person jumps into the abyss and during his fall does not repent of his deed, but continues his fall with the consciousness of his rightness, it turns out that, on the one hand, a person acts according to the law of universal gravitation, and on the other hand, this fall continues to be free. Thus, laws do not force his will, do not cancel his freedom, and freedom and law operate in parallel. In the same way, man acts freely in a world governed by divine law.

A person in the world to whom God has given moral laws acts just as freely. These moral laws, the principles of morality, a person freely observes or does not observe. And even their observance does not violate his freedom, therefore, a person, being moral, remains free.

A person cannot understand the initial divine thoughts, therefore a person does not know what God proceeded from when he established certain moral postulates. Therefore, good for a person is what God created, created and thought. In this case, the creation and thoughts of God are beyond any evaluation. From the fact that God is infinite, a number of other consequences of the philosophy of John Duns Scotus follow. In God, His nature, His will, His freedom, His necessity, His love coincide. All these positions, although different, nevertheless constitute a simple divine essence. Therefore, God, being a Trinity, has in His essence love, and this love is the relationship of God the Father and God the Son begotten by Him.

The birth of the Holy Spirit is an act of will and at the same time a necessity. God cannot help but give birth to the Holy Spirit, because He cannot help but love the Holy Spirit, which is why He creates. Therefore, the first free act of God is always an act of His love. Therefore, in understanding God, John Duns Scotus proceeds not from reason, as Thomas Aquinas did, but from the will of God. And since the first act of God is love, then love is much more important for understanding God for John Duns Scotus, and that's exactly what John Duns Scotus writes, and our Christian philosopher considered, referring to the Apostle Paul.

Therefore, John Duns Scotus did not consider himself a philosopher, since the main goal of man is the salvation and knowledge of God, and the knowledge of God is possible only in an act of love for God, and by no means in the knowledge of God. Therefore, John Duns Scotus in every possible way denied philosophy and opposed himself to the intellectualism of philosophers. Philosophers, according to John Duns Scotus, are always by necessity determinists and intellectualists and therefore cannot know God, especially since the subject of philosophy is different.

The last and most original representative of the golden age of medieval scholasticism and in some respects a harbinger of a different worldview. Got a nickname doctor subtilis("Doctor thin").

He taught theology at Oxford and Paris. According to his philosophical views, he was a pure indeterminist and recognized the primacy of the will over the mind both in man and in God; attached great importance to individuality, individual freedom, which sharply differed from the Dominican Thomas Aquinas, an advocate of authority to the detriment of private will. Considered a follower of the ideas of William de La Mare.

Information about the life of D. Scott is half legendary.

Born, most likely in the city of Duns (in southern Scotland), according to other assumptions - in Northumberland or Ireland; indication of the year of birth. fluctuate between 1260 and 1274.

It is known for sure that he taught theology at Oxford, and then in Paris. Here he defended his doctoral dissertation, in which he defended (against the Dominicans-Thomists) the original purity of St. Virgo (Immaculata Conceptio). According to legend, a miracle happened in this dispute in favor of D. Scott: a marble statue of the Virgin nodded her head approvingly. It is historically reliable that the Parisian faculty recognized the arguments of D. Scott so convincing that at the same time it decided to require from now on from all those seeking an academic degree, an oath confession of faith in the Immaculate Conception (five and a half centuries before the proclamation of this dogma by Pope Pius IX). Summoned to Cologne on ecclesiastical matters, D. Scott died there of apoplexy, believed to be in 1308.

According to legend, D. Scott seemed extremely stupid in his early youth, and only after one mysterious vision did he begin to reveal his rich spiritual powers. In addition to theology and philosophy, he acquired extensive knowledge in linguistics, mathematics, optics and astrology.

As far as the general limits of the scholastic worldview allowed, D. Scott was an empiricist and individualist, firm in religious and practical principles and a skeptic of purely speculative truths (in which one can see one of the first manifestations of the British national character). He did not possess, and did not consider it possible to possess, a coherent and comprehensive system of theological and philosophical knowledge, in which particular truths would be derived a priori from the general principles of reason. From the point of view of D. Scott, everything real is known only empirically, through its action, tormented by the cognizer. External things act on us in sensory perception, and our knowledge of the reality of its content depends on the object, and not on the subject. But on the other hand, it cannot depend entirely on the object, because in this case, the simple perception of the object or its presence in our consciousness would already constitute perfect knowledge, while in fact we see that the perfection of knowledge is achieved only by the efforts of the mind, turned on the subject. Our mind is not a bearer of ready-made ideas or a passive tabula rasa; it is the potency of conceivable forms (species intelligibiles), by means of which it transforms individual data of sense perception into general knowledge.

That which is thus known or conceived by the mind in things, supersensible data, has no real existence apart from individual things; but it is also not only our subjective thought, but expresses the formal properties or differences inherent in objects. Since differences in themselves, without a discriminating mind, are unthinkable, the objective existence of these formal properties in things, independent of our mind, is possible only insofar as they are initially distinguished by another mind, namely the divine mind. How in actual (actual) cognition the formal properties of things (not exhausted by single phenomena) coincide with the corresponding formal ideas of our mind, and where is the guarantee of such a coincidence - to this question about the essence of cognition and the criterion of truth in D. Scott, as in others scholastics, no answer.

Sharper than other scholastics, distinguishing faith from knowledge, D. Scott resolutely denied the subordinate relationship of sciences to theology. Theology, according to D. Scott, is not a speculative or theoretical science; it is not an invention to avoid ignorance; with its vast volume, it could contain much more knowledge than it now contains; but its task is not this, but that, by means of frequent repetition of the same practical truths, to induce listeners to fulfill the prescribed. Theology is the healing of the spirit (medicina mentis): it is based on faith, which has as its direct object not the nature of the Divine, but the will of God. Faith as an abiding state, as well as the very acts of faith and, finally, the “seeing” that follows faith, are states and acts not speculative, but practical. Theoretical knowledge of the Deity we have only to the extent necessary for our spiritual well-being; at the same time, the Divinity is known to us empirically through the testing of His actions, partly in the physical world, partly in historical revelation. We cannot understand God, but only perceive in His actions. Accordingly, D. Scott rejected the a priori ontological proof of the existence of God, allowing only the cosmological and teleological.

Considering the world and the life of the world in their positive and negative properties, the mind cognizes the Divine as the perfect root cause, expediently acting, but we can have only a vague knowledge of God's own individual reality. The internal definitions of the deity (trinity, etc.), reported in the Christian dogma, cannot be deduced or proved by reason; they also do not have the character of self-evident truths, but are accepted only by virtue of the authority of the one who communicates them. However, these data of revelation, being communicated to man from above, then become the subject of rational thinking, extracting from them a systematic knowledge of divine things. On this basis, D. Scott indulges in speculations about the objects of faith, initially inaccessible to reason.

Although God in himself is an absolutely simple being (simpliciter simplex), inexpressible in any concept, and therefore His attributes or perfections cannot have a special reality in Him, however, they differ formally. The first such difference is reason and will. The rationality of God is evident from His perfect causality, that is, from the universal order or connection of the universe; His will is proved by the accident of single phenomena. For if these phenomena in their reality are not only consequences of a general rational order, but have their own causality independent of it, which, however, is subordinate to God as the first cause, then. consequently, the first cause itself, in addition to its rational action, has another, arbitrary, or exists as will. But as an absolute being, or perfect in itself, God cannot have reason and will only in relation to another, created being. In Himself there are two eternal internal processiones: rational and volitional - knowledge and love; the first is the divine Word or the Son, the second is the Holy Spirit, and the one principle of both is God the Father. All things are in the mind of God as ideas, that is, from the side of their knowability, or as objects of knowledge; but such being is not real or perfect, because according to D. Scott ideality is less than reality. In order to produce real reality, the ideas of the mind (divine) must be accompanied by the free will of God, which is the final cause of all being, which does not allow further research.

D. Scott's philosophical metaphysics is characterized by his views on matter and his understanding of individual being (principium individuationis). D. Scott understands universality negatively - not as the fullness of all definitions, but, on the contrary, as their absence: the most general being for him is the most indefinite, empty; as such he recognizes matter in itself (materia prima). He does not share either Plato's view, according to which matter is non-existent (to mh on), nor Aristotle's view, according to which it is only potential being (to dunmei on): according to D. Scott, matter actually stands out from nothing and is a real limit creations. Everything that exists (except God) is composed of matter and form. The existence of matter or its reality is independent of the form, which determines only the quality of material existence. The various subdivisions of matter, distinguished by D. Scott, express only the various degrees of certainty that matter receives from its combination with form; she herself is everywhere and always the same. Thus, the concept of matter in D. Scott coincides with the concept of universal substance, a single real substratum of all things. It is not surprising, therefore, that, contrary to all scholastic authorities, D. Scott attributed materiality to human souls and angels. The following argument is quite remarkable: the more perfect a form is, the more effective (relevant) it is, and the more relevant it is, the stronger it is embedded in matter and more firmly unites it with itself. The forms of an angel and a rational soul, however, are the most perfect and most actual, and, consequently, they completely unite matter with themselves, and therefore do not undergo quantitative disintegration, since they have the property of a unifying force.

John Duns Scotus was one of the greatest Franciscan theologians. He founded a doctrine called "Scotism", which is a special form of scholasticism. Duns was a philosopher and logician known as "Doctor Subtilis" - this nickname was awarded to him for his skillful, unobtrusive mixing of different worldviews and philosophical currents in one teaching. Unlike other prominent thinkers of the Middle Ages, including William of Ockham and Thomas Aquinas, Scotus adhered to moderate voluntarism. Many of his ideas had a significant impact on the philosophy and theology of the future, and arguments for the existence of God are being studied by students of religions at the present time.

A life

No one knows for sure when John Duns Scot was born, but historians are sure that he owes his last name to the city of Duns, located near the Scottish border with England. Like many compatriots, the philosopher received the nickname "Cattle", meaning "Scot". He was ordained to the priesthood on March 17, 1291. Considering that the local priest ordained a group of others towards the end of 1290, it can be assumed that Duns Scotus was born in the first quarter of 1266 and became a churchman as soon as he reached the legal age. In his youth, the future philosopher and theologian joined the Franciscans, who sent him to Oxford around 1288. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the thinker was still at Oxford, since between 1300 and 1301 he took part in the famous theological discussion - as soon as he finished reading the course of lectures on the "Sentences". However, he was not accepted to Oxford as a permanent teacher, as the local rector sent a promising figure to a prestigious one where he lectured on the Maxims for the second time.

Duns Scotus, whose philosophy has made an invaluable contribution to world culture, could not finish his studies in Paris because of the ongoing confrontation between Pope Boniface VIII and the French king Philip the Just. In June 1301, emissaries of the king interrogated every Franciscan in the French convention, separating royalists from papists. Those who supported the Vatican were asked to leave France within three days. Duns Scotus was a representative of the papists and therefore he was forced to leave the country, but the philosopher returned to Paris in the autumn of 1304, when Boniface died, and the new Pope Benedict XI took his place, who managed to find a common language with the king. It is not known for certain where Duns spent several years of forced exile; historians suggest that he returned to teach at Oxford. For some time, the famous figure lived and lectured in Cambridge, but the time frame for this period cannot be specified.

Scott completed his studies in Paris and received the status of master (head of the college) around the beginning of 1305. Over the next couple of years he held an extensive discussion on scholastic questions. The order then sent him to the Franciscan House of Learning in Cologne, where Duns lectured on scholasticism. In 1308 the philosopher died; November 8 is officially considered the date of his death.

The subject of metaphysics

The doctrine of the philosopher and theologian is inseparable from the beliefs and worldviews that dominated during the period of his life. The Middle Ages determines the views that John Duns Scotus propagated. The philosophy that briefly describes his vision of the divine principle, as well as the teachings of the Islamic thinkers Avicenna and Ibn Rushd, is largely based on various provisions of the Aristotelian work Metaphysics. The main concepts in this vein are "being", "God" and "matter". Avicenna and Ibn Rushd, who had an unprecedented impact on the development of Christian scholastic philosophy, have diametrically opposed views in this regard. Thus, Avicenna denies the assumption that God is the subject of metaphysics in view of the fact that no science can prove and affirm the existence of its own subject; at the same time, metaphysics is capable of demonstrating the existence of God. According to Avicenna, this science studies the essence of the being. Man is related in a certain way to God, matter and events, and this relation makes it possible to study the science of being, which would include in its subject matter God and separate substances, as well as matter and actions. Ibn Rushd ends up only partially agreeing with Avicenna, confirming that the study of being by metaphysics implies its study of various substances and, in particular, individual substances and God. Considering that physics, and not the nobler science of metaphysics, determines the existence of God, one can not prove the fact that the subject of metaphysics is God. John Duns Scotus, whose philosophy largely follows the path of knowledge of Avicenna, supports the idea that metaphysics studies beings, the highest of which, no doubt, is God; he is the only perfect being on whom all others depend. That is why God occupies the most important place in the system of metaphysics, which also includes the doctrine of transcendentals, reflecting the Aristotelian scheme of categories. Transcendentals are a being, the own qualities of a being ("single", "correct", "correct" - these are transcendental concepts, since they coexist with substance and denote one of the definitions of substance) and everything that is included in relative opposites ("final " and "infinite", "necessary" and "conditional"). However, Duns Scotus emphasized that any real substance that falls under the term "being" can be considered the subject of the science of metaphysics.

Universals

Medieval philosophers base all their writings on ontological systems of classification - in particular, those described in Aristotle's "Categories" - to demonstrate the key relationships between created beings and to provide man with scientific knowledge about them. So, for example, the personalities Socrates and Plato belong to the species of human beings, which, in turn, belong to the genus of animals. Donkeys also belong to the genus of animals, but the difference in the form of the ability to think rationally distinguishes a person from other animals. The genus "animals" together with other groups of the corresponding order (for example, the genus "plants") belongs to the category of substances. These truths are not disputed by anyone. However, the listed genera and species remain a debatable issue. Do they exist in extramental reality or are they just concepts generated by the human mind? Do genera and species consist of individual beings, or should they be regarded as independent, relative terms? John Duns Scotus, whose philosophy is based on his personal idea of ​​common natures, pays much attention to these scholastic questions. In particular, he claims that such general natures as "humanity" and "animalism" really exist (although their being is "less significant" than the being of individuals) and that they are common both in themselves and in reality.

Unique Theory

It is difficult to categorically accept the ideas that guided John Duns Scotus; quotations preserved in primary sources and abstracts demonstrate that certain aspects of reality (for example, genera and species) in his view have less than quantitative unity. Accordingly, the philosopher offers a whole set of arguments in favor of the conclusion that not all real unities are quantitative unities. In his strongest arguments he emphasizes that if the situation were just the opposite, then the whole real variety would be a number variety. However, any two quantitatively different things differ from each other equally. The result is that Socrates is as different from Plato as he is different from a geometric figure. In such a case, the human intellect is unable to detect anything in common between Socrates and Plato. It turns out that when applying the universal concept of "human being" to two personalities, a person uses a simple fiction of his own mind. These absurd conclusions demonstrate that quantitative diversity is not the only one, but since it is also the greatest, it means that there is some less than quantitative diversity and a corresponding less than quantitative unity.

Another argument is that in the absence of an intelligence capable of cognitive thinking, the flames of a fire will still produce new flames. The formative fire and the generated flame will have a real unity of form - such a unity that proves that this case is an example of unambiguous causation. The two types of flame thus have an intellect-dependent common nature with a unity less than quantitative.

The problem of indifference

These problems are carefully studied by late scholasticism. Duns Scotus believed that common natures in themselves are not individuals, independent units, since their own unity is less than quantitative. At the same time, general natures are not universals either. Following Aristotle's assertions, Scotus agrees that the universal defines one out of many and refers to many. As a medieval thinker understands this idea, the universal F must be so indifferent that it can relate to all individual F in such a way that the universal and each of its individual elements are identical. In simple words, the universal F determines each individual F equally well. Scot agrees that in this sense no general nature can be a universal, even if it is characterized by a certain kind of indifference: a general nature cannot have the same properties with another general nature belonging to a separate type of beings and substances. All late scholasticism gradually comes to similar conclusions; Duns Scotus, William of Occam and other thinkers are trying to subject being to a rational classification.

The role of intelligence

Although Scotus is the first to speak of the distinction between universals and general natures, he draws inspiration from Avicenna's famous saying that a horse is just a horse. As Duns understands this statement, general natures are indifferent to individuality or universality. Although they cannot, in fact, exist without individualization or universalization, the common natures themselves are neither one nor the other. Following this logic, Duns Scot characterizes universality and individuality as random features of a common nature, which means that they need to be substantiated. All late scholasticism is distinguished by similar ideas; Duns Scotus, William of Occam and some other philosophers and theologians give a key role to the human mind. It is the intellect that causes the general nature to be a universal, forcing it to belong to such a classification, and it turns out that quantitatively one concept can become a statement that characterizes many individuals.

Existence of God

Although God is not the subject of metaphysics, he is nevertheless the goal of this science; metaphysics seeks to prove its existence and supernatural nature. Scott offers several versions of evidence for the existence of a higher mind; all these works are similar in terms of the nature of the narrative, structure and strategy. Duns Scotus created the most complex justification for the existence of God in all of scholastic philosophy. Its arguments unfold in four stages:

• There is a first cause, a superior being, a first result.
• Only one nature is first in all these three cases.
• The nature that is first in any of the cases presented is infinite.
• There is only one infinite being.

To justify the first claim, he makes a non-modal root cause argument:

• A creature X is created.

In this way:

• X is created by some other being Y.
• Either Y is the original cause, or some third being created it.
• The series of created creators cannot continue indefinitely.

This means that the series ends at the root cause - an uncreated being that is capable of producing regardless of other factors.

In terms of modality

Duns Scotus, whose biography consists only of periods of apprenticeship and teaching, in these arguments in no way deviates from the main principles of the scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages. He also offers a modal version of his argument:

• It is possible that there is an absolutely first powerful causal force.
• If a being A cannot be descended from another being, then if A exists, it is independent.
• The absolutely first powerful causal force cannot come from another being.
• This means that the absolutely first powerful causal force is independent.

If the absolute root cause does not exist, then there is no real possibility of its existence. After all, if it is truly the first, it is impossible that it should depend on any other cause. Since there is a real possibility of its existence, it means that it exists by itself.

Doctrine of unambiguity

The contribution of Duns Scotus to world philosophy is invaluable. As soon as the scientist begins to indicate in his writings that the subject of metaphysics is the being as such, he continues the thought, arguing that the concept of being must unambiguously refer to everything that is studied by metaphysics. If this statement is true only in relation to a certain group of objects, the subject lacks the unity necessary for the possibility of studying this subject by a separate science. According to Duns, analogy is just a form of equivalence. If the concept of being determines the diverse objects of metaphysics only by analogy, then science cannot be considered as one.

Duns Scot offers two conditions for recognizing a phenomenon as unambiguous:

• confirmation and denial of the same fact in relation to a single subject form a contradiction;
• the concept of a given phenomenon can serve as a middle term for a syllogism.

For example, one can say without contradiction that Karen was on the jury of her own free will (because she would rather go to court than pay a fine) and against her own will at the same time (because she felt compelled on an emotional level). In this case, there is no contradiction, since the concept of "one's own will" is equivalent. Conversely, the syllogism "Inanimate objects cannot think. Some scanners think for a very long time before producing a result. Thus, some scanners are animate objects" leads to an absurd conclusion, since the concept of "think" is used in it interchangeably. Moreover, in the traditional sense of the word, the term is used only in the first sentence; in the second phrase it has a figurative meaning.

Ethics

The concept of the absolute power of God is the beginning of positivism, penetrating into all aspects of culture. John Duns Scotus believed that theology should explain controversial issues in religious texts; he explored new approaches to Bible study based on the primacy of divine will. An example is the idea of ​​meritoriousness: the moral and ethical principles and actions of a person are considered as worthy or unworthy of reward from God. Scott's ideas served as a justification for the new doctrine of predestination.

The philosopher is often associated with the principles of voluntarism - the tendency to emphasize the importance of divine will and human freedom in all theoretical matters.

Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception

As far as theology is concerned, Duns' most significant achievement is considered to be his defense of the Virgin Mary. In the Middle Ages, numerous theological disputes were devoted to this topic. According to the general opinion, Mary could have been a virgin at the conception of Christ, but the researchers of biblical texts did not understand how to solve the following problem: only after the death of the Savior did the stigma of original sin come off her.

The great philosophers and theologians of the Western countries were divided into several groups, discussing this issue. Even Thomas Aquinas is believed to have denied the legitimacy of the doctrine, although some Thomists are not prepared to accept this claim. Duns Scotus, in turn, made the following argument: Mary needed redemption, like all people, but through the goodness of the crucifixion of Christ, taken into account before the relevant events occurred, the stigma of original sin disappeared from her.

This argument is given in the papal declaration of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. The Pope recommended reading the theology of Duns Scotus to modern students.

John Duns Scott (lat. Johannes Dunsius Scotus John Duns Scotus, fr. Jean Duns Scot)
(1270–1308)

Duns Scott (Johannes Dunsius Scotus by nickname Doctor subtilis, also Dr. Marianus ) - the last and most original representative of the golden age of medieval scholasticism and in some respects a harbinger of a different worldview; genus, in all likelihood, in the city of Duns (in southern Scotland), according to other assumptions - in Northumberland or Ireland; indications of the year of birth fluctuate between 1260 and 1274. Information about the life of D. Scott is half legendary. There is no doubt that he taught theology with great success at Oxford and later in Paris. Here, in 1305, he defended his doctoral dissertation, in which he defended (against the Thomist Dominicans) the original purity of the Rev. Virgo (Immaculata Conceptio). According to legend, a miracle happened in this dispute in favor of D. Scott: a marble statue of the Virgin nodded her head approvingly. It is historically reliable that the Parisian faculty recognized the arguments of D. Scott so convincing that at the same time it decided to demand from all those seeking an academic degree an oath confession of faith in the Immaculate Conception (five and a half centuries before the proclamation of this dogma by Pope Pius IX). Summoned to Cologne on church affairs, D. Scott died there from an apoplexy, as is believed, in 1308. - According to legend, D. Scott seemed extremely stupid in his early youth and only after one mysterious vision began to reveal his rich spiritual powers. In addition to theology and philosophy, he acquired extensive knowledge in linguistics, mathematics, optics and astrology. In his short life he wrote a great deal; the complete collection of his works (Wadding edition, Lyon, 1639) contains 12 folio volumes. His main Op. - Commentaries on Aristotle, Porphyry, and especially on Peter Lombard. - What Thomas Aquinas was for the Dominicans (a privileged teacher of the order), D. Scott became the same for the Franciscans; it is believed, therefore, that he himself was one of the monks of St. Francis, but this has not been proven; the essential opposition of his teaching to Thomism sufficiently explains the commitment of the Franciscans to it. As far as the general limits of the scholastic worldview allowed, D. Scott was an empiricist and individualist, firm in religious and practical principles and a skeptic of purely speculative truths (which can be seen as one of the first manifestations of the British national character). He did not possess, and did not consider it possible to possess, a coherent and comprehensive system of theological and philosophical knowledge, in which particular truths would be deduced a priori from the general principles of reason. From the point of view of D. Scott, everything real is known only empirically, through its action, experienced by the cognizer. External things act on us in sensory perception, and our knowledge of the reality of its content depends on the object, and not on the subject; but on the other hand, it cannot entirely depend on the object, because in this case, the simple perception of the object or its presence in our consciousness would already constitute perfect knowledge, while in fact we see that the perfection of knowledge is achieved only by the efforts of the mind directed to subject. Our mind is not a bearer of ready-made ideas or a passive tabula rasa; it is the potency of conceivable forms (species intelligibiles), by means of which it transforms individual data of sense perception into general knowledge. That which is thus known or conceived by the mind in things beyond sense-data has no real being separate from single things; but it is also not only our subjective thought, but expresses the formal properties or differences; and since differences in themselves, without a discriminating mind, are unthinkable, it means that the objective existence of these formal properties in things, independent of our mind, is possible only insofar as they are initially distinguished by another mind, namely, the divine mind. How, in actual (actual) cognition, the formal properties of things (not exhausted by single phenomena) coincide with the corresponding formal ideas of our mind, and where is the guarantee of such a coincidence - we do not find this question about the essence of cognition and the criterion of truth in D. Scott, as well as at other scholastics, an intelligible answer. Sharper than other scholastics, distinguishing faith from knowledge, D. Scot resolutely denied the subordinate relationship of sciences to theology. Theology, according to D. Scott, is not a speculative or theoretical science; it was not invented to avoid ignorance; with its vast volume, it could contain much more knowledge than it now contains; but its task is not this, but rather, by means of frequent repetition of the same practical truths, to induce hearers to the fulfillment of the prescribed. Theology is the healing of the spirit (medicina mentis); it is based on faith, which has as its direct object not the nature of divinity, but the will of God. Faith as an abiding state, as well as the very acts of faith, and, finally, the "seeing" following faith, are states and acts not speculative, but practical. Theoretical knowledge of the Deity we have only to the extent necessary for our spiritual well-being; while the Deity is known to us empirically through the experience of His actions, partly in the physical world, partly in historical revelation. We cannot understand God, but only perceive in His actions. Accordingly, D. Scott rejected the a priori ontological proof of the existence of God, allowing only the cosmological and teleological. Considering the world and the life of the world in their positive and negative properties, the mind cognizes the Divine as the perfect root cause, expediently acting, but we can have only a vague knowledge of God's own individual reality. The internal definitions of the deity (trinity, etc.), reported in the Christian doctrine, cannot be deduced or proved by reason; they also do not have the character of self-evident truths, but are accepted only by virtue of the authority of the one who communicates them. However, these data of revelation, being communicated to man from above, then become the subject of rational thinking, extracting from them a systematic knowledge of divine things. On this basis, D. Scott indulges in speculations about the objects of faith, initially inaccessible to reason. Although God in himself is an absolutely simple being (simpliciter simplex), not expressible in any concept and, therefore, His attributes or perfections cannot have a special reality in Him, however, they differ formally. The first such difference is between reason and will. The rationality of God is evident from His perfect causality, that is, from the universal order or connection of the universe; His will is proved by the accident of single phenomena. For if these phenomena in their reality are not only the consequences of a general rational order, but have their own causality independent of it, which, however, is subordinate to God as the first cause, then, consequently, the first cause itself, in addition to its rational effect, also has another, arbitrary , or exists as will. But as an absolute being, or perfect in itself, God cannot have reason and will only in relation to another, created being. In Himself there are two eternal internal processiones: rational and volitional - knowledge and love; the first is the divine Word, or the Son, the second is the Holy Spirit, and the one principle of both is God the Father. All things are in the mind of God as ideas, that is, from the side of their knowability, or as objects of knowledge; but such being is not real or perfect, because, according to D. Scott, ideality less reality. In order to produce real reality, the ideas of the mind (divine) must be accompanied by the free will of God, which is the final cause of all being, which does not allow further research.

D. Scott's philosophical metaphysics is characterized by his views on matter and his understanding of individual being (principium individuationis). D. Scott understands universality negatively - not as the fullness of all definitions, but, on the contrary, as their absence: the most general being for him is the most indefinite, empty; as such he recognizes matter in itself (materia prima). He does not share either the Platonic view, according to which matter is nonexistent (τό μή όν), or Aristotelian, according to which it is only potential being (τό δυνάμει όν): according to D. Scotus, matter actually stands out from nothing and is the actual limit of creation. Everything that exists (except God) is composed of matter and form. The existence of matter or its reality is independent of the form, which determines only the quality of material existence. The various subdivisions of matter, distinguished by D. Scott, express only the various degrees of certainty that matter receives from its combination with form; in itself it is everywhere and always the same. Thus, the concept of matter in D. Scott coincides with the concept of a universal substance, a single real substratum of all things. It is therefore not surprising that, contrary to all scholastic authorities, D. Scott attributed materiality to human souls and angels. The following argument is very remarkable: the more perfect a form is, the more effective (actual) it is, and the more relevant it is, the more it penetrates into matter and more firmly unites it with itself; but the forms of the angel and the rational soul are the most perfect and most actual, and, consequently, they completely unite matter with themselves, and therefore do not undergo quantitative disintegration, since they have the property of a uniting force.

Assuming a single indefinite matter or substance as the basis of everything that exists in the world and understanding perfection as a form that completely mastered matter and determined it, D. Scot imagined the universe as a gradual ascent from the general to the individual, from the merged to the separate, from the indefinite to the definite, from imperfect to perfect. Involuntarily connecting scholastic concepts with ancient images of northern mythology, he compares the universe with a huge tree, whose root is the first matter, the trunk is the visible substance, the branches are physical bodies, the leaves are organisms, the flowers are human souls, and the fruits are angels. D. Scott was the first of the philosophers of the Christian world to adopt a genetic point of view in cosmology, clearly and decisively expressing that idea of ​​gradual development (from bottom to top), which in all its one-sidedness was developed in our day by his compatriot Herbert Spencer. The conception of the universe as an independent whole developing out of itself is a philosopher. the merit of D. Scott, although he failed to connect this idea with the basic truths of theology, in which he sincerely believed. What is the actual relation of the forms of natural being to the corresponding ideas of the divine mind? And further: if the ideas of the divine mind become real things through the addition of acts of the divine will to them, and on the other hand, the basis of all real being in the world is the universal substance, or the first matter, then the question is: what is the relationship between these two principles? any reality? Satisfactory in the philosophical sense of the solution of both these questions, we do not find D. Scott. Identifying the universal with the indefinite in its materia prima and seeing in it the lowest level, the minimum of being, D. Scot naturally recognized the positive pole of being, the maximum of reality, behind the existence of a single, or individual, as representing the highest degree of certainty. Contrary to most of his predecessors and contemporaries in philosophy, D. Scot understood individuality not as something that comes (accidens) to the essence, but as something essential, in itself (entitas). A set of properties that characterize Socrates and answer the question of what Socrates is - the so-called. among the Scholastics quidditas, - does not yet constitute the individual being of Socrates, as this person, because this whole set of conceivable properties could belong to several subjects and, therefore, is not a real individuality this subject, the real Socrates. This latter is not something qualitatively definable, it cannot be stated as something, but only indicated as this. This ineffable individual essence is neither matter nor form nor the composite of both, but the ultimate reality of every being (ultima realitas entis). D. Scott's students invented the name haecceitas for his principium individuationis, as opposed to quidditas.

In the anthropology of D. Scott, the following provisions are especially remarkable: a person is the most perfect combination of the most perfect form with the most perfect matter. Souls are created by direct acts of the will of God. The immortality of the soul cannot be proved by reason and is accepted only by faith. The soul does not really differ from its powers and abilities; they are not the accidentia of the soul substance, but the soul itself in certain states and actions or in a certain relation to something. Among well-known thinkers, not only of the Middle Ages, but of all times, D. Scott is the only one who quite resolutely and clearly recognized free will, with the exception of any determinism [Of the lesser-known scholastics, the predecessor of his indeterminism was William of Auvergne († in 1249) , which owns the definition: voluntas sui juris suaeque potestatis est.]. Will is a cause that can determine itself. By virtue of its self-determination, the will is the sufficient or complete cause of every act of itself. Therefore, it is not subject to any coercion on the part of the object. No objective good necessitates the consent of the will, but the will freely (from itself) agrees to this or that good and thus can freely agree to a lesser as well as a greater good. Our will is not only the real cause of our actions, but also the only cause of our desires. If the will in this case wanted one or the other, then there is no other reason for this than the fact that the will is the will, as for what heat warms, there is no other reason than that heat is heat. Remarkable in its impeccable accuracy is the following short formula of the “refined doctor”: nothing but the will itself is the complete (or whole) cause of volition in the will (nihil aliud a voluntate est causa totalis volitionis in voluntate). The doctrine of the primacy (primacy) of the will over the mind is closely connected with the doctrine of free will. The will is a self-determining and self-lawful force, it may want or not want, and this depends on itself, while the mind is determined to its action (thinking and cognition) with threefold necessity: 1) its own nature, by virtue of which it is only the ability to think and it is not in his power to think or not to think; 2) the data of sensory perception, which determine the initial content of thinking, and 3) acts of the will, drawing the attention of the mind to one or another object and thereby determining the further content and nature of thinking. According to this, D. Scott distinguishes the first understanding, or thinking, determined by the nature of the mind and the initial objective data (intellectio s. cogitatio prima), and the second, determined by the will (i. s. c. secunda). The act of the mind must be in the power of the will, so that it can turn the mind away from one thinkable and turn it to another, for otherwise the mind would remain forever with one knowledge of the object originally given to it. The mind (in "first thinking") only offers the will possible combinations of ideas, from which the will itself chooses what it wants and transmits it to the mind for real and distinct cognition. Thus, if the mind is the cause of desire, then only the cause official concerning the will (causa subserviens voluntati). D. Scott tries to justify all his psychological reasoning empirically, referring to inner experience as the highest authority. “That this is so,” he says, “is clear from certain experience, as everyone can experience in himself.”

Recognition of the primacy of the will over the mind significantly predetermines and ethical doctrine D. Scott. The basis of morality (as well as religion) is our desire for happiness. This desire is satisfied not in the theoretical but in the practical realm of the spirit. The ultimate goal of the moral life, or the supreme good (summum bonum), is not contemplation absolute truth or God, as Thomas believed with the majority of scholastics, but in the well-known affect of the will, precisely in perfect love for God, which really unites us with Him. The norm of morality is the only will of God, which prescribes to us the laws of activity, both natural and religiously positive. Righteousness consists in keeping these laws; sin is a functional violation of righteousness, and not some essential perversion of our soul. Nothing, except God, has its own dignity, but receives a positive or negative meaning solely from the will of God, which D. Scott understands as unconditional arbitrariness. God wants something not because it is good, but on the contrary, it is good only because God wants it; every law is just only insofar as it is accepted by the divine will. It depended solely on the will of God to make the incarnation and death of Christ the condition of our salvation; we could be saved in other ways. In his Christology, D. Scott, with all his desire to be orthodox, involuntarily inclines towards the Nestorian and Adoptian views: according to his idea, Christ, born as perfect human Rev. The virgin (who, therefore, according to D. Scott, despite her immaculate conception, was not in the proper sense of the Mother of God), achieves perfect union with the divine Logos and becomes the Son of God. Only D. Scott's skeptical reservations about the impotence of reason in matters of faith did not allow him to become a formal heretic. However, with regard to faith, he admits doubt, denying only the doubt that overcomes.

D. Scott's teaching has positive merits that raise it above the general level of medieval scholasticism. These include: his reasonable empiricism, which does not allow deriving concrete reality from general principles; his disagreement with the scholastic motto: philosophia theologiae ancilla; his more real understanding of substance in general and of spiritual beings in particular; his presentation of the world as an immanently developing whole, the recognition of independence and unconditional significance for individual being, and finally, his conviction, more faithful to the spirit of Christ than to the spirit of Aristotle, that true life is not reduced to the thinking of the mind and that love is higher than contemplation. But all these important virtues cannot atone for the fundamental sin of the Scottish system - its unconditional voluntarism, which leads the "refined doctor" to absurd conclusions and entangles his philosophy into hopeless contradictions. It is clear, in fact, that the unconditional self-causality of the human will is incompatible with the same causality of the will of God; that moral indifference and unconditional arbitrariness, attributed to God, contradict the concept of a deity as the supreme Reason and perfect Love; finally, that the principle of pure arbitrariness, both on the part of man and on the part of God, completely destroys any concept of an expedient world order and of the genetic natural development of the universe. D. Scott's students: Johannes a Landuno (who brought the opinions of his teacher closer to the ideas of Averroes), Franciscus de Mayronis (dr. illuminatus, or magister acutus abstractionum), Antonius Andreae (doctor dulcifluus), Johannes Bassolius, Walter Burlacus (doctor planus et perspicuus) , Nicolaus de Lyra, Petrus de Aquila (doctor ornatissimus). These writers did not add anything significant to the teachings of D. Scott.

Literature. Numerous biographies of D. Scott (Matthaeus Veglensis, Wadding, Ferchi, Guzman, Janssen, Colganus) belong to the 17th century. and do not matter reliable sources. On the teachings of D. Scott: Albergoni, "Resolutio doctrinae Scoticae" (1643); Hieron. de Fortino, "Summa theologica ex Scoti operibus"; Johann. de Rada, "Controversiae theol. inter Thom. et Sc." (Ven., 1599); Bonaventura Baro, "J. D. S. defensus" (1664); Ferrari, "Philosophia rationibus J. D. S." (Ven., 1746). In the latest literature, only K. Werner, “J. D.S." (Vienna, 1881), and Pluzanski, "Essai sur la philosophie de Duns Scot" (Par., 1867).

Vladimir Solovyov// Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron vol. 11, p. 240–244. SPb., 1893

Duns Scott John (Joannes Duns Scotus) (c. 1266, Duns, Scotland - November 8, 1308, Cologne) - Franciscan theologian, philosopher, the largest representative of the medieval conceptualism , "the thinnest doctor" (doctor subtilis). He taught at Oxford, Paris, Cologne. The main works are commentaries on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard: the Oxford commentary, known as Ordinatio (in other editions - Commentaria Oxoniensia, Opus Oxoniense), and the Parisian - Reportata Parisiensia. Remaining faithful to the tradition of Augustinianism, Duns Scotus at the same time reforms it. He was the first of the Franciscan theologians to renounce Augustine's teaching about the need for special divine illumination to achieve true knowledge, admitting, following Aristotle, firstly, that the human mind has the ability to acquire reliable knowledge about things that exist, and secondly, that any knowledge in the final account is based on the data of sensory perception. Although the ultimate goal of knowledge is the comprehension of divine being, however, a direct contemplation of the infinite being of God is not available to a person in his current state. He knows about the divine being only what he can infer, starting from the contemplation of created things. But it is not things as such, not the essences of finite things that are the own object of the human intellect: if the ability of intellect were initially limited to the realm of material things, the knowledge of God would become impossible. In sensually perceived things, the mind singles out, along with the characteristics that are characteristic only of finite things, which are fixed in Aristotelian categories, transcendentals - aspects of reality that transcend the world of material things, since they can take place outside of it. This is, first of all, being, as well as the attributes of being, either coinciding in scope with the concept of being: one, true, good, or “disjunctive attributes” such as “infinite or finite”, “necessary or accidental”, “to be a cause or causally conditioned” and etc., dividing the sphere of being as a whole into two subregions. It is being, according to Duns Scotus, that is the own object of the human intellect, since it is unambiguous, that is, in the same sense, is applicable to both the Creator and creatures, and therefore, although a person abstracts it from consideration of material things, it also leads to the knowledge of God, i.e., to the realization of the striving inherent in human nature from the very beginning. Being as such is the subject of philosophy, infinite being is theology, and the finite being of material things is physics.

Like Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus in his evidence relies on the Aristotelian doctrine of causes. The proofs of the existence of God for both begin with the statement of the fact that there is something random in the world that may or may not exist. Since the existence of random things is not necessary, it is derivative, that is, due to the First Cause, which has the necessary existence, Thomas concludes. Duns Scotus considers his argument insufficient: it is impossible, starting from the accidental, to come to conclusions that have the status of necessary truths. In order for the above reasoning to acquire evidentiary force, one should begin with the necessary premises. This can be done, because in any random fact there is something non-random, an essential characteristic that cannot be absent from what is random, namely, that it is possible. The assertion of the possibility of actually existing finite things is necessary. The actual existence of that which has only a possible existence necessarily presupposes the existence of a more perfect (necessary) existence, since a possible existence becomes actual if it is conditioned by that to which existence is inherent by its very nature. God, while possessing the necessary being, is at the same time the source of all possibilities. Since the possibilities of all finite things and events coexist in God, he is infinite. Really exist, according to Duns Scotus, only individuals; forms and essences (“whatnesses” of things) also exist, but not really, but as objects of the Divine intellect. These entities are "nature" which in themselves are neither general nor particular, but precede the existence of both the general and the particular. If the nature of the horse, argues Duns Scotus, were singular, there would be only one horse, if it were universal, there would be no individual horses, since it is impossible to deduce from the general that they are the own object of human intellect: if the ability of intellect was initially limited to the area material things, the knowledge of God would become impossible. In sensually perceived things, the mind singles out, along with the characteristics inherent only in finite things, which are fixed in Aristotelian categories, transcendentals - aspects of reality that surpass the world of material things, since they can take place outside of it. This is, first of all, being, as well as the attributes of being, either coinciding in scope with the concept of being: one, true, good, or “disjunctive attributes” such as “infinite or finite”, “necessary or accidental”, “to be a cause or causally conditioned” and T. dividing the sphere of being as a whole into two sub-areas. It is being, according to Duns Scotus, that is the own object of the human intellect, since it is unambiguous, that is, in the same sense, is applicable to both the Creator and creatures, and therefore, although a person abstracts it from consideration of material things, it also leads to the knowledge of God, i.e., to the realization of the striving inherent in human nature from the very beginning. Being as such is the subject of philosophy, infinite being is theology, and the finite being of material things is physics. Like Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus in his evidence relies on the Aristotelian doctrine of causes. The proofs of the existence of God for both begin with the statement of the fact that there is something random in the world that may or may not exist. Since the existence of random things is not necessary, it is derivative, that is, due to the First Cause, which has the necessary existence, Thomas concludes. Duns Scotus considers his argument insufficient: it is impossible, starting from the accidental, to come to conclusions that have the status of necessary truths. In order for the above reasoning to acquire evidentiary force, one should begin with the necessary premises. This can be done, because in any random fact there is something non-random, an essential characteristic that cannot be absent from what is random, namely, that it is possible. The assertion of the possibility of actually existing finite things is necessary. The actual existence of that which has only a possible existence necessarily presupposes the existence of a more perfect (necessary) existence, since a possible existence becomes actual if it is conditioned by that to which existence is inherent by its very nature. God, while possessing the necessary being, is at the same time the source of all possibilities. Since the possibilities of all finite things and events coexist in God, he is infinite.

Really exist, according to Duns Scotus, only individuals; forms and essences (“whatnesses” of things) also exist, but not really, but as objects of the Divine intellect. These entities are "nature" which in themselves are neither general nor particular, but precede the existence of both the general and the particular. If the nature of the horse, Duns Scot argues, were single, there would be only one horse, if it were universal, there would be no separate horses, since the individual cannot be derived from the general, and vice versa, from the individual - the general. The existence of individual things is possible due to the addition to the essence-nature of a special individualizing feature - "thisness".

Matter cannot serve as the beginning of individualization and differentiation of concrete things from each other, since it itself is indefinite and indistinguishable. The individual is characterized by a unity more perfect than the unity of the species (general nature), because it excludes division into parts. The transition from the unity of species to the unity of the individual presupposes the addition of some inner perfection. "Thisness", being added to the view, as it were, compresses it; species (general nature) loses its divisibility due to “thisness”. In conjunction with "thisness", the general nature ceases to be common to all individuals and turns into a characteristic of this particular individual. The addition of "thisness" means a change in the mode of existence of the species: it receives a real existence.

Interpreting the act of creation as a transition from the reduced existence of universals as objects of divine thinking to the real existence of individuals, Duns Scotus for the first time, in line with the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical tradition, gives the individual the status of a fundamental ontological unit. An individual, according to the teachings of Duns Scotus, has a higher existential perfection than the perfection of a specific or generic essence. The affirmation of the value of the individual led to the affirmation of the value of the human person, which corresponded to the spirit of the Christian doctrine. This was precisely the main meaning of the doctrine of "thisness".

To solve one of the important and most difficult problems of scholastic theology and philosophy: how is the presence of non-identical attributes of God - goodness, omnipotence, foresight, etc. - compatible with the assertion of the absolute simplicity and unity of God, i.e. with the absence of any plurality, Duns Scotus introduces the concept of formal difference. Objects are formally different if they correspond to different (non-identical) concepts, but at the same time they are not only mental objects, that is, if their difference is due to the thing itself. In contrast to really different objects that exist separately from each other in the form of different things, the formal difference of objects does not imply their real existence: they are different without being different things (actually existing substances). Therefore, the formal distinction of the Divine attributes does not contradict the real unity of the Divine substance. The concept of formal difference is used by Duns Scotus when considering also the problem of the difference between Persons in the Trinity and for distinguishing will and reason as abilities of the soul.

The theory of knowledge of Duns Scotus is characterized by a sharp opposition between intuitive and abstract knowledge. The object of intuitive knowledge is the individual, perceived as existing, the object of the abstract is “whatness”, or the essence of a thing. Only intuitive knowledge makes it possible to directly come into contact with something that exists, that is, with being. The human intellect, although naturally endowed with the capacity for intuitive cognition, in its present state is limited primarily to the realm of abstract cognition. Grasping the general nature inherent in individuals of the same species, the intellect abstracts it from individuals, turning it into a universal (general concept). Directly, without resorting to the help of intelligible species, the intellect can contact what really exists only in one case: by knowing the acts performed by itself. Knowledge about these acts, expressed in statements like “I doubt this and that”, “I think about this”, is absolutely reliable. The participation of the intellect (along with the sense organs) in the cognition of things in the external world ensures the achievement of reliable knowledge already at the stage of sensory perception.

Having contrasted, following Avicenna (Ibn Sina), the necessary existence of God with the random existence of finite things, Duns Scotus had to explain how these types of being are interconnected. He could not agree with Avicenna that the world of finite things emanate from necessary being with necessity: God, according to Christian doctrine, creates the world freely; in the act of creation he is not compelled by any necessity. In his conception of creation, Duns Scotus proceeds from the same premise as other scholastics: God, before giving existence to things, has perfect knowledge of their essence. But if the ideas of things are rooted in the divine essence itself, as his predecessors believed, then, Duns Scotus points out, the divine intellect in the act of cognition would be determined by the pre-existent essences of things. In reality, the divine intellect is primary in relation to the essences of things, since, knowing them, it simultaneously produces them. Therefore, the necessity inherent in the essences of things - each essence is characterized by a certain set of signs, and these signs must necessarily be present in it - is not an external necessity with which divine knowledge must conform; necessity is not a property of entities in themselves, but is communicated to them in the act of cognition and testifies to the perfection of the divine mind.

God creates not only the essence of things, but also really existing things. The existence of things is accidental, not necessarily inherent in them, since the only reason for their existence is the will (desire) of God: “It acts randomly in relation to any object, so that it can desire the opposite of it. This is true not only when the will is considered ... simply as the will that precedes its act, but also when it is considered in the act of volition itself” (Op. Oxon., I, d. 39, q. unica, n. 22). This explains the radical contingency of created things. In the act of creation, God assigned to each thing its nature: fire - the ability to heat, air - to be lighter than earth, etc. But since the divine will cannot be bound by any separate object, it is quite possible for fire to be cold and etc., but for the whole universe to be governed by other laws. The free will of God, however, is not pure arbitrariness. The perfection of the divine will is that it can only act in accordance with the divine intellect. Therefore, as Duns Scotus states, "God desires in the highest degree of intelligence." He desires essences as they should be, and chooses compatible essences among those that must come into existence in the act of creation. God is incapable of willing the meaningless. He is an infinitely wise architect who knows his own creation in every detail. The existence and non-existence of random things depends entirely on the free will of God, but when God wills and creates, He always creates wisely and purposefully. The assertion of the superiority of the will over the intellect is a hallmark of the ethics of Duns Scotus. He does not deny the fact that a person must know the object, desire it, but why, he asks, is this object chosen as the object of knowledge? Because we want to know it. The will governs the intellect, directing it to the knowledge of this or that object. Duns Scotus does not agree with Thomas Aquinas that the will necessarily aspires to the Highest Good, and if the human intellect were able to discern the Good in itself, our will would immediately cling to it and thereby achieve the most perfect freedom. Will, objects Duns Scotus, is the only ability that is not determined by anything - neither by its object, nor by the natural inclinations of a person. For Duns Scotus, the main assumption from which his predecessors proceeded when formulating their ethical doctrines is unacceptable, namely, that the basis of all moral virtues is the natural desire of every thing to achieve the degree of perfection that it can achieve, having its own form. Love for God and for one's neighbor in such doctrines turns out to be the result of a more fundamental human desire to achieve one's own perfection. Based on the distinction introduced by Anselm of Canterbury between the natural inclination of a person to act for his own benefit and the desire for justice, Duns Scotus interprets free will as freedom from necessity, forcing a person to seek, first of all, his own good; freedom is expressed in the ability to love goodness for the sake of goodness itself, in the ability to selflessly love God and other people.

Op.: Opera omnia, ed. L. Vives, 26 vol. P., 1891-95; Opera omnia, ed. With Balic etc. Vatican, 1950; God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, ed. and transi. F. Alluntis and A. Wolter, 1975.

Lit.: Gilson E. Jean Duns Scot: Introduction à ses positions fondamentales. P., 1952; Messner R. Schauendes und begriffliches Erkennen nach Duns Scotus. Freiburg im B., 1942; Bettoni E. L "ascesa a Dio in Duns Scotus. Mil., 1943; Grajewski M. The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus. Wash., 1944; Wolter A. The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. NY, 1946 Vier P. C Evidence and its Function according to John Duns Scotus N. Y, 1951 Owens J Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics Mediaeval Studies 19 (1957) Hoeres W Stadter E. Psychologie und Metaphysik der menschlichen Freiheit Die ideengeschichtliche Entwicklung zwischen Bonaventura und Duns Scotus Münch 1971.

G. A. Smirnov(New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 vols. / Institute of Philosophy RAS,
National general-scientific fund. T. I. M., 2010. S. 701–703)

TEXTS

Blessed John Duns Scot. Treatise on the beginning / Translation, introductory article and comments by A. V. Appolonov. M., 2001 // ΕΙΝΑΙ: Problems of Philosophy and Theology. Volume 1, No. 1/2 (1/2). 2012

Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below

Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.

Posted on http:// www. allbest. en/

Philosophy of John Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus (Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus), (1265-1308) is an English Franciscan, the last and most original representative of the golden age of medieval scholasticism and in some respects a harbinger of a different worldview.

He taught theology at Oxford and Paris. According to philosophical views, he was a pure indeterminist and recognized the primacy of the will over the mind both in man and in God; attached great importance to individuality, individual freedom, which sharply differed from the Dominican Thomas Aquinas, an advocate of authority to the detriment of private will.

The distribution of philosophy over the centuries is done solely for the purpose of convenience and habit. In fact, philosophy has its own internal calendar, but setting its own dates is in itself a research task and not an easy one, especially since philosophy's own calendar must somehow be correlated with the usual calendar. We will not solve this problem, we will not even set it for ourselves, we will simply note that the calendar of philosophy does not completely coincide with the generally accepted historical one. Yes, we also note, we can’t resist that the golden age of scholasticism, which is usually dated to the 13th century, actually begins with Albert the Great, from 20 years. 13th century and ends around the middle of the 14th century - the death of Ockham. The discrepancy between calendars is, in general, a very common thing, and we have met more than once and will still meet with this situation.

The most ripe fruits of scholasticism grew on its tree at the very end of the 13th and the first half of the 14th century, at the same time, forces capable of destroying scholasticism ripened on other branches of this tree. They were just biding their time, and their hour came a little later.

The time will come to talk about these forces, but for now we will try the most ripe fruits of scholasticism, already a little touched by corruption and decay.

One of the most notable and famous scholastics of the 14th century is John Duns Scotus, a Scot by nationality who lived only about 40 years or a little more. But he is considered almost a Franciscan opponent of Thomas Aquinas. The opponent, however, said too strongly. Indeed, there was a difference of opinion between the more romantically and mystically inclined Franciscans and the strict and dogmatic Dominicans. But this difference is not so significant, the difference in the interpretation of some dogmas, the struggle of both for influence and power in the Catholic Church is much more noticeable. We remember that in the Middle Ages it was customary to mark outstanding philosophers and theologians with some title: angelic doctor, universal doctor, etc. So Duns Scott got the name "thin doctor" for his love of complex logical exercises, which, it seems, he joined during his years of study at Oxford and Paris. His connection with the Franciscans was almost related - the uncle of the future theologian and philosopher was the vicar general of Scotland, that is, the head of the Scottish branch of the order. In early youth, they say, John gave the impression of a dumb (to put it mildly) guy, but again they say that he had a vision, after which he began to surprise everyone with his success in the sciences. After defending his dissertation in Paris, Duns Scot began a teaching career, which, however, lasted only two years. The defense of his dissertation was also accompanied by mysterious events: the topic of his dissertation was the original purity of the Virgin Mary. In general, there are disputes in theology about this dogma: whether Mary was conceived immaculately or was born in the usual way, but original sin did not pass to her, and besides, she was a virgin who gave birth to Christ. Catholics accepted the dogma of original purity only in the 19th century, but Duns Scotus insisted on the purity of Mary as early as the beginning of the 14th century, 500 years earlier. So, there is a legend that during the defense of the dissertation, the statue of the Virgin nodded approvingly to the dissertation student. So it was or not, but something else is known for certain. The Faculty of Theology of Paris not only awarded a degree to the applicant, but also decreed that all who sought a degree in that faculty should swear to it. that Mary is immaculate from the very beginning (and this, we remind ourselves once again, more than 500 years before the official adoption of this dogma).

The teaching career of Duns Scotus, as we have already said, did not last long. In 1307 or 1308 he was summoned to Cologne on some ecclesiastical business and died there suddenly of a stroke.

The most striking event in the life of Duns Scotus was his participation in the dispute between Pope Boniface VIII and the French King Philip IV the Handsome of the Capetian family (Well, male beauty is a moot point, but in some images King Philip looks quite impressive). Yes, and the chroniclers describe the king as a man who possessed exquisite beauty, a sharp mind, an iron will and extraordinary dispassion. Pope Boniface was also a remarkable man, at least in his ambitions. He was the last pope who insisted on the supremacy of the pope in matters not only ecclesiastical, but also political.

Initially, Pope Boniface was completely delighted with the king, paying tribute to his piety and intelligence. But the "romance" of the papacy and the French crown did not last long. The military claims of the ambitious Philip demanded expenses, the king introduced a new tax "on war", which he extended to the clergy. Thus, Philip IV emphasized that from now on the previously required consent of Rome to the taxation of the clergy and church lands was canceled. Pope Boniface VIII, in a special bull "Clericis laicos", sharply opposed the measures of Philip IV, forbade the taxation of the clergy without the permission of the curia, canceled all the concessions made by his predecessors in this matter and threatened with ecclesiastical punishment those who would collect or pay taxes not authorized by the pope. In response, the king forbade the export of gold, silver and all kinds of jewelry abroad from France, and Boniface lost the opportunity to receive funds from France.

Boniface had to look for new sources of income, and he found them: he introduced the jubilee years of the Christian church, starting from 1300. It was assumed that anniversaries would be celebrated every hundred years, but then the dates were reduced. The pilgrims who flocked to Rome for jubilees did not come there empty-handed. and if we consider that among the pilgrims there were many crusaders who wanted to be cleansed of sins, then it is clear that the papal treasury did not remain in the loser.

But Philip continued to annoy the pope. Information came to Rome that Philip imposes heavy taxes on the clergy and generally behaves as if there is no pope in the world. "The disputes continued, having received a theological shade appropriate to the time. In the next message of the pope, the unconditional priority of papal authority over royal power was proved. In a quarrel, the pope did not he cared about diplomatic expressions. The king was compared to a street boy who should be flogged with vines, the French were called dogs. Philip had to endure, especially since he had just been defeated by the English, but the ambitious monarch did not tolerate long. Philip accused Boniface of usurping papal power, declared him a monster, a criminal and a heretic. The pope in response excommunicated the king from the church, and the king sent his ambassador to Rome, where he incited several people to drive the pope from the throne. Morals were simple, the guards did not work well, so the conspirators broke into the papal palace, began to insult and scold a man who was no longer a young man, threatened that they would put him in chains and forced to abdicate. Papa was in the hands of the conspirators for three days, from the humiliations he had endured, he fell into a disorder of consciousness and died. This was in 1303. Then a separate story of Philip the Handsome begins, connected with the Knights Templar, but this is not our story yet. As for the popes, the famous "Avignon captivity" of the papal throne began a little later. Yes, it should also be noted that Dante Alighieri, who placed Boniface a in hell, was a fierce opponent of Pope Boniface. god knowledge being philosopher

So, in the dispute of kings (the English king also participated in the dispute, but not so actively) with the pope, Duns Scotus was, of course, on the side of the pope. For this reason, he was not only persecuted in France, but his position was unenviable. Due to the fact that he supported the pope, he was forced to leave Paris in the middle of the school year, after the death of Boniface he returned to Paris, but then new complications with royal power awaited him. Not many events in the life of a 40-year-old philosopher happened, there is nothing special to talk about. Much more significant is his spiritual history of his ideas, his philosophy.

After Scott's death, his disciples began to publish his writings and created an unimaginable confusion. They simply - simply took lecture notes, introduced into the main text what Scott himself crossed out, and also attributed to Scott several forged works that existed until the middle of the twentieth century as belonging to the British philosopher. A more or less reliable collection of Scott's works was published in the 1950s. In Russian in 2001, some of the works of Duns Scott were published with a foreword by a very good specialist in the history of Medieval philosophy - Gennady Mayorov. The collection contains "rational theology", "God-revealed theology", "Epistemology and metaphysics", "The doctrine of man and society". Dunsian comments on the fourth book of the master of maxims have also been translated. Apparently, these are comments on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard.

So, it's time to start presenting the ideas of Duns Scotus. We will begin with epistemological problems, with how Scotus imagines the process of cognition. He seems to be in solidarity with Aristotle in that. that our knowledge has its source as sensations, and the mind is the ability to organize sensations, but the mind does not have its own content - it is an instrument. He has to reject the idea of ​​his fellow Franciscans about divine illumination, about that. that God puts his ideas into the human mind. But what exactly are the ideas? Our ideas in the process of cognition change - what ideas does God put in us? Or is he constantly investing? But is it then possible to speak of man's own cognitive efforts? Rejecting the idea of ​​illumination, Duns Scotus encroaches, one might say, on the sacred: on the recognized theory of Augustine the Blessed. This is already too much, and he does not directly criticize Augustine. The arrows of his criticism are directed against the Augustinian Henry of Ghent, whom he accuses of misunderstanding Augustine. Indeed, there are grounds for such accusations. if we recall that the doctrine of divine illumination by Augustine is not entirely clear: either God puts understanding into the human soul to comprehend the eternal divine truths, or any and any - Augustine can be understood in different ways in this case. In addition, Henry of Ghent worries Duns Scotus very little, he needs him to state his understanding of the knowledge of truth in the traditional polemical manner for the Middle Ages. Eternal truths, from the point of view of Scotus, are logically analytical judgments, and the mind does not need any kind of illumination in order to "reach them." Let us remind ourselves that such judgments are recognized as analytical, the predicate of which does not contain anything new in comparison with the subject and does not require the involvement of additional information. For example: A bachelor is an unmarried person, a Predator is a carnivorous creature. The whole is greater than its part. Etc. If the area of ​​knowledge operates with eternal truths or refers to them, then the subject of eternal truths is God, therefore, these truths themselves cannot add anything new to knowledge. What is illumination or "illumination" for? What to illuminate? Everything can be understood without any "insights", everything is initially contained in the divine mind, that is, in the divine word proclaimed to people in the Holy Scriptures. The subject is understandable. But this is what is the object of eternal truths, that is, what they are about - these eternal truths. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus diverge here. For Duns Scotus there is an ontological difference between philosophy and theology. The subject of theology is God as such. The subject of philosophy is being as such. Therefore, philosophy cannot talk about God, it simply does not reach him, but it can reach the understanding of being as such, which is what philosophy (metaphysics) does.

As an Aristotelian, Thomas is interested in the existence of beings, that is, the existence of real things. Dunsa Scotus is not interested in the existence of things. he is interested in the being of beings as such, that is, as concepts. In this regard, Duns Scotus can be considered Hegel's predecessor in the Science of Logic, where Hegel explores the existence of the spirit not in the sense of the existence of the spirit (this is what the Phenomenology of the Spirit is devoted to, but in the sense of the spirit's own logic. If we establish the existent, then we can explore its signs and properties (also logical). The attributes of beings are as follows. The first group - the one, true and good - is, as we would say, the total characteristics of beings. The second group - separating attributes. They are divided into pairs: finite-infinite; necessary-random. Duns argues that any concrete being can be either one or the other, but not the third or the fourth.Despite, however, the prohibition within metaphysics to talk about God, Duns Scotus does not pass over this issue in silence. It is clear the question of God for metaphysics is quite traditional, especially since, according to Scott, the best philosopher is the one who, in addition to philosophical occupation, also deals with theology. Al Avicenna. Yes, and Duns Scotus himself was still more a theologian than a "pure" philosopher, thinking about the world as if there is no God and never was.

How can one interpret the existence of God in the author's scheme. The concept of God, according to Scot, should be derived from the premise of being (about being) - exactly as it will be later with Hegel. If we assume that the existent is the object of the human mind in its entirety, then there are no obstacles to the knowledge of God. The only thing that can interfere and this hindrance is tragic - the human mind is burdened with sensuality, it is in the captivity of sensuality and there is no way to escape from this captivity. Hence the notion that God is unknowable. Of course, it is unknowable for the mind, aimed at studying the material world, at sensory knowledge. This program is not suitable for knowing God, you need to download a new one. The essence of the new program is also clear. If we want to UNDERSTAND what God is, then we must use CONCEPTS. That is, to begin with, it would be nice to understand what is at stake. We must have an understanding of God. Christians talk a lot about God, attributing to him different properties, but these are separate properties, only one single concept is necessary, but precise and definite. By analogy - there is no need to describe the properties of some objects, you just need to name them exactly. And that's all. With God, however, the situation is not so simple, although Scott offers a concept that, in his opinion, is adequate to God. This is the concept of an actual infinite being. Why is this concept? Nothing can be called God. which would be less than the actual infinite being. But is there such a being? The proof of the existence of such a being is presented by Duns Scotus with a sophisticated logic of inference and may seem simply boring to a modern person, therefore we will not dwell on them. Moreover, this proof (it is stated in the comments to the "Sentences") is complex, confusing, contains a long series of arguments and can be traced with great difficulty. The funniest part is at the end of this proof. After spending a lot of words on proving God as an actually infinite being, Scott unexpectedly concludes that the Christian concept of God must be a matter of faith. Why does such a strange passage appear from the point of view of a rationally thinking logician. Scott remembers very simply. That God is not only an infinite being, an infinite being, he is also just and merciful. And this, says Scott, no philosopher can prove, because there are no such logical arguments. This is beyond pure logic. This must be accepted - then you are a Christian. Or not to accept - then you are a pagan or a heretic.

Passing from God to man, it can be noted that according to Scotus, the philosopher can prove that the human organism has a form, and this form is a rational and even rational soul. But this is not a special substance, as "that damned Averroes" thought, but did not understand what it was actually about. Scott followed Aristotle, who also considered the rational soul as a form that organizes the life of the body. The philosopher can prove the formality of the soul, but not its immortality, the philosopher does not have enough arguments. Therefore, the immortality of the soul cannot be the subject of philosophical (rational) consideration, it is the subject of faith. He simply does not find suitable arguments for such a proof in the history of philosophy.

A person has a property on which Duns Scotus resolutely insists - this is freedom. At the same time, it is interesting that he did not consider the mind to be free, the mind is limited by truth. If the mind reaches the truth, it does not need to be free, it is subject to the true law or regulation. Only the will can be free, it has no boundaries, the will can be suppressed, it can be subdued, but only externally. It is possible that the correlation of will and reason in human life will not cause much enthusiasm today, but this problem can be reformulated differently: what is more important for a person - the mind or the volitional and emotional side. It is amazing, but the purely rationalist and logician Scott prefers the second - the emotional and volitional sphere of human life. This is connected with the concept of love, which Scott, as a true Christian, puts above reason.

Reason, he believes, pagan philosophers. In particular, Aristotle preferred love. This is understandable, how could they know true Christian love. It's not the case for a Christian - for him love is above everything and - therefore - reason. By love, he understands love for the good, and love is disinterested. It is clear that selfless love for the good is love for God, it is the measure of all love. The idea of ​​selfless love for God-good obedience to him defines the ethics of Scotus. It hardly makes sense to develop this ethics, it is not very attractive to modern man, besides, its main idea is devoted to the question of why God must be loved and not hated, Duns seeks and finds evidence of this in logic.

In general, Scott's attempt to create a systematic philosophy, somewhat alternative to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, cannot be called completely finished, but it seems that the Franciscans were not embarrassed. For them, the main thing was to have a philosopher ("their own"), who would be comparable to the great Thomas. They found such a philosopher in Duns Scotus. Indeed, the followers of Duns Scotus were predominantly theologians. Their names are not mentioned almost in the history of philosophy, they fall under the category of theology, and the topics discussed by students and followers still belong to theology: the uniqueness of God, the omnipresence of his secret presence in all things, the immortality of the soul, etc. Pupils are often repelled from the same source as Scott himself, from the Sentences of Peter Lombard. You can name Landolfo Caracciolo, Hugo from Castro Novo, Francesco from March. The success of Duns Scotus in his time is evidence that Thomas Aquinas was not the undisputed and sole authority among theologians, at least in his time. His doctrine was officially adopted by the Dominican order, he also took up its defense, interpretation, propaganda, but this does not mean that it was free from criticism, this does not mean that there were no other very large schools within theology and theological scholasticism.

Duns Scot tried and quite successfully to create an alternative doctrine. It is possible that this work would have succeeded him even better, if not for such an early death. Just something 42 years. The real ideological opponent of Duns Scott was not Thomas, about whom the stubborn Scot broke more than one critical spear. The real opponent was a supporter of the so-called. natural theology (the forerunner of natural philosophy) William of Ockham, in whose writings the end of scholasticism as a spent intellectual resource is already visible. This is evident in Duns Scotus, but the smell of smoldering scholasticism is masked by refined logic and theology. Infused with love for God. William of Ockham is the forerunner of another strategic line in the subsequent philosophy, which was destined for a long life and unconditional primacy until the middle of the 19th century. Ockham marks the dawn of scientific philosophy.

Hosted on Allbest.ru

Similar Documents

The life path of Thomas Aquinas, his doctrine of being, the doctrine of man and his soul. The main features of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. Theory of knowledge and ethics of a medieval philosopher. Five Proofs for the Existence of God. Politics and the emergence of new ways of understanding the world.

abstract, added 06/06/2010


Aristotle's views on the "goals" of man and his soul. Reasoning of the philosopher about the ways of knowledge. The connection between the happiness of the individual and the well-being of society. Hierarchy of the goals of human existence according to Aristotle. The relevance of the ideas of the philosopher in the modern world.

control work, added 09/25/2012


Problems of medieval philosophy. The main principles of religious and philosophical thinking: theocentrism, soteriologism, revelation of God. Ideas of Plato, Neoplatonists, Aristotle. Philosophy of John Scotus Eriugena. Dialectics, metaphysics and formal logic.

abstract, added 10/24/2014


Bifurcated unity, dialectics and metaprinciples of being in the scientific knowledge of modern society. Characteristics of the problems of rationality. Principles of the trinity of being and organizational relativity of being. Features of understanding the unity of the universe.

test, added 07/25/2013


The theory of knowledge is the most important section of metaphysics as a philosophical doctrine of the fundamental principles of existence. Development of the problems of direct, mystical-intuitive knowledge in the Catholic and Orthodox theological thought of the Middle Ages. Functions of the theory of knowledge.

abstract, added 03/30/2009


The main periods and ideas of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Evidence for the existence of God in the "pre-Kantian" period. Analysis of the philosophical works of Kant, critical approaches to the classical proofs of the existence of God. The theory of the existence of God in the philosophy of I. Kant

abstract, added 05/09/2017


The experience of paradoxical ethics in the work of the Russian philosopher, a representative of existentialism N. Berdyaev "On the purpose of man": the origin of good and evil, the worldview of man; comparison of the views of V. Rozanov and N. Fedorov on the issue of knowing the truth of being.

essay, added 12/13/2012


The topic of teaching at universities is relevant now and was no less relevant in the days of the German philosopher and thinker Friedrich Hegel. Biography of Hegel and his philosophy. The idea of ​​being and the state, which had a religious connotation in the works of the philosopher.

abstract, added 02/03/2009


Brief biographical information about the Philosopher. The main provisions of the philosophical concept: understanding of being; epistemological position; social philosophy; understanding of the essence of man. Evaluation of the concept of the philosopher in question.

abstract, added 11/29/2003


Philosophy in search of fundamental structures of human existence. The place of myth in the system of fundamental structures of human being, which determine the structure of his life. Features of the process of mythologization of public consciousness in modern Russian society.