Current page: 18 (total book has 39 pages)

Khabalov. - In the gendarmerie police division, in the cavalry platoon. He reported that they threw hand grenades, firecrackers, with which the gendarmes were wounded ... I'm sorry: another incident happened in the morning. It must be said that according to the schedule that I reported on, military units were assigned to all factories, where - a company, where - a half company - to prevent the occurrence of disorder at the plant itself ... At the Pipe Plant, on Vasilyevsky Island - this is a state-owned artillery department factory, The workers went on strike in the morning. Moreover, as I was informed, this was done unfriendly: some workshops were on strike, others did not want to strike ... Second Lieutenant Iossa (I don’t answer for the surname, but it seems so), who commanded the company of the Finnish regiment that occupied this plant, brought it out armed; then one of the workers jumped up to him and began threatening him with his fist in front of his nose and showering him with curses. He pulled out a revolver and laid it down on the spot ... This had such an effect that the crowd instantly fled, and the riots ended. This incident with the shooting and killing of a worker took place in addition to the orders of the authorities, but simply because, when the revolver is loaded, such a case can always happen! to 8, - there was another incident on Nevsky Prospekt. The training team of the 9th reserve cavalry regiment, which dispersed the crowd on Nevsky all day and dispersed it in cavalry formation, without the use of weapons, returning, after such an attack, was attacked by the crowd at Gostiny Dvor, at the chapel. The attack took the form of several revolver shots from the crowd at the chapel, with one of these shots wounding a private in the head. Then the head of the team stopped her, hurried, and opened fire on the crowd: three were killed with this fire, and nine were wounded ... At first it was known that three were killed, then it turned out that more ... It was just about 9 hours ... I must say, that on that day I was in the mayor’s apartment all day, because the head of security and the lieutenant colonel in charge of the troops were right there

Pavlenkov.

And there were a lot of people there: there was a decent turmoil and tightness, because everyone was there, who asked for protection, who for information ... Calls were heard from the Minister of War and others. Again, I apologize if I'm not speaking consistently... It's hard to put it this way objectively...

Chairman. - Please continue…

Khabalov. “Then, at about nine o’clock, I received a telegram signed by His Imperial Majesty: “I order tomorrow to stop the unrest in the capital, which is unacceptable in the difficult time of the war with Germany and Austria. Nicholas."

Chairman. “Where is this telegram now, General?”

Khabalov. “I can’t tell you, because I handed it over to the chief of staff ... Maybe the chief of staff returned it to me, but I don’t remember ... I will report to you further. This telegram, how can I tell you? - to be frank and truthful: she had a butt on me ... How to stop tomorrow? It is said: "tomorrow" ... the sovereign orders to stop, at all costs ... What will I do? how do i stop? When they said: “give bread,” they gave bread and it was over. But when the inscription “Down with the autocracy” is on the flags, what kind of bread will soothe! But what to do? - The king ordered: it is necessary to shoot ... I was killed - positively killed! - Because I did not see that this last resort, which I will launch, would certainly lead to the desired result ... It must be said that every evening all the heads of the military guard sections gathered, reported what happened during the day, and then found out what to do for tomorrow ... And then by 10 o'clock the heads of the sections, the commanders of the reserve battalions were to gather to listen to orders for the next day.

Khabalov. - Quite right. Just an hour after receiving this telegram, they were supposed to assemble. When they gathered, I read them a telegram, so that this telegram was read out by me, and other members of the meeting saw it.

Chairman. - Have you now accurately conveyed the text of this telegram to us?

Khabalov. - I think - for sure ... Let me repeat once again: “I order tomorrow to stop the unrest in the capital, unacceptable during the difficult war with Germany and Austria. Nicholas."

Chairman. - Tell me, General, was this telegram transmitted by telegraph or by radio-telegraph?

Khabalov. - By telegraph; she was obviously on a direct line from Headquarters...

Chairman. “Do you know where the receiving apparatus of this direct wire was?”

Khabalov. - I think that he was at the main headquarters, because they brought it to me either from the main headquarters, or from the general headquarters ...

Chairman. “So there were receiving wires here and there?”

Khabalov. - There were direct wires from the naval headquarters and from the main department of the general staff. Obviously, a telegram was transmitted over a direct wire ...

Chairman. “So it wasn’t a radio telegram?”

Khabalov. - No no! It's printed on Yuze, and there are straight wires on Yuze...

Chairman. - Please continue…

Khabalov. - I then announced: “Gentlemen! the sovereign ordered the riots to be stopped tomorrow. This is the last resort, it must be used ... Therefore, if the crowd is small, if it is not aggressive, not with flags, then you are given a cavalry detachment in each sector - use the cavalry and disperse the crowd. Since the crowd is aggressive, with flags, then act according to the rules, i.e. warn with a triple signal, and after a triple signal, open fire ”... As proof of my state of nervousness, I’ll tell you this. This does not justify me at all, because, in my position, the nerves must be iron, and you never need to lose your head, therefore, this is not an apology, but only an explanation ... In the evening, the mayor turns to me and says that he finally came up with some kind of bread distribution project. I must say that on that day the Minister of the Interior Protopopov came to see me ...

Chairman. - 25th?

Khabalov. - Yes, maybe on the 25th, - he came several times ... Probably, it was on the 25th ... Probably, he arrived at the mayor's house, and then he said something like this: “There, the city, came up with some kind of project in charge of food, but this is the wrong organization, this is a revolutionary project ”... Although, he didn’t really say anything - what is it? I haven't seen this project before... So: the mayor calls and says that the project has been worked out. And I answer him: "You have invented some kind of illegal project that is completely inconsistent with the city's regulations: I cannot agree to this." He says, "What should I do with him?" "Do what you want!" - here is my answer, showing, it seems to me, that the man's head was not in order ... Then, that same evening, I was invited to a meeting of the Council of Ministers. I came to this meeting, it took place in the apartment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. There, in the beginning, I remember that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers… said something like that… God forbid! - one must remember ... It's hard to say: thoughts slipped in this meeting, rushed from one subject to another! ... At first there was a conversation about why two workers' deputies were arrested, who shortly before issued an appeal with an invitation to go on strike ...

Chairman. Was it the 25th or 26th?

Khabalov. - I'm sorry: it was on the 26th ... The meeting of the Council of Ministers began, I think, at 12 o'clock at night.

Chairman. - Monday or Sunday?

Khabalov. - On Sunday ... That night meeting, which I reported to you, took place on the very evening when I received the telegram.

Chairman. - So, the meeting of the Council of Ministers was on the night of the 25th to the 26th, that is. after the chiefs of the units gathered at your place and you gave the order ... Apparently, your memory does not fail you, since you immediately in your testimony, without yet telling about the events on Sunday, instinctively went on to present what happened in the Council of Ministers.

Khabalov. – The Council of Ministers was on the 25th. At this meeting ... I don’t know for sure: it seems that a break has already been announced for classes in the State Duma? ... It seems that a break has already been announced ... although I cannot report; whether it was announced, or was just about to be announced ...

Chairman. - Tell us briefly what happened at this meeting of the Council of Ministers? ...

Khabalov. - At this meeting, the following happened: there was a rather long speech by the Minister of Agriculture about whether this modern cabinet could get along with the State Duma and work with the State Duma ... He came to the conclusion that it was impossible to work, and that this composition of ministers could not work with State Duma; after all the speeches and debates on the food question, it turned out that, in essence, the majority of the State Duma, so to speak, considered the orders of the Minister of Agriculture expedient and was ready to approve them; but it could not approve them, because it would be in contradiction with itself! ... And therefore, no matter what expedient orders they make, the State Duma will still not work with them! ... And therefore, there is only one way out - the departure of everything ministries... Although he categorically did not say the latter, one could guess from the meaning... Then, Foreign Minister Pokrovsky spoke at a rather lengthy speech, who expressed the general opinion that it was necessary to get along with the State Duma, but it was impossible to work without the State Duma. And that, in essence, the demands of the State Duma are such that they must be acceptable and that those who are objectionable to the State Duma must leave. Then there was a speech by Krieger-Voinovsky, which also boiled down to the fact that the State Duma was not at all so revolutionary in mood, what in the speeches of this one - like him? - Rodichev - and someone else - there were very weighty considerations ... The second was, it seems, Nekrasov's speech - I don’t remember exactly ... According to Krieger-Voinovsky, the impression from these speeches was quite moderate ... The meaning of Krieger-Voinovsky’s speech was such that, if the State Duma does not like this composition, if it does not want to work with it, then this should be reported to the sovereign and asked to replace us with another composition ...

Chairman. - Then?

Khabalov. - Then, Protopopov reported at a rather lengthy ... But since, in essence, he reported on what was happening on the streets, and, in my opinion, did not report in detail, I asked permission to say what happened on the streets, and reported that what I reported to you, i.e. sequentially those events that took place on that day - namely: the incident on Znamenskaya Square, where the bailiff was killed, then the incidents on Nevsky. I then reported on the incident at the Pipe Factory... And now I don't remember whether I reported this telegram or not?... But I reported on what order I had given. In the end, several ministers - military, justice and agriculture - said that if this is already the case in the streets, that troops are being shot at, thrown at, etc., then force must be opposed to such disorders ...

Chairman. "General, what is it?" You don't remember this telegram, did you report it? Didn't it make sense for you not to report it?

Khabalov. “Of course it wasn't. I had full sense to report. But whether I reported it or not, I can't say...

Chairman. “But it must be assumed that they reported it?”

Khabalov. - I think I did. But at least take me under oath: I can’t say for sure - I don’t remember ...

Chairman. - You say: Protopopov gave a rather incomplete report on the events of the day. What was the conclusion in Protopopov's speech, what was his proposal?

Khabalov. “Again, I can’t report this to you ... But in a word, Protopopov stood here for the riots to be stopped by armed force ... in my opinion, that’s the point ...

Chairman. “Rittich and some other ministers have just spoken before him on the subject that the Duma and even its moderate circles—not Rodichev and Nekrasov, but others—are dissatisfied with the ministry and do not want to work with it. Of course, you know that this mainly concerned Protopopov. Can you tell us what Protopopov's attitude was towards such speeches by these ministers who spoke before him?

Khabalov. - I must tell you that Protopopov spoke several times ... When I arrived, he spoke first. Then the chairman of the Council of Ministers turned to him to tell him what was happening, and he told it all at length and, in my opinion, not in detail ... I expected, I confess, that Protopopov should have said: “I’m leaving "- I think so ... but I have not heard such a word.

Chairman. How long have you been at this meeting?

Khabalov. I think two hours...

Chairman. - To its end? – When did the other ministers begin to disperse?

Khabalov. - No, I left to the end: I saw, in fact, that I would be present at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, where they would talk about the resignation of the ministry. Why am I here? Meanwhile, it was three o'clock in the morning...

Chairman. - You stopped at Protopopov's speech and that after his speech you told what happened on the streets of Petrograd on Saturday.

Khabalov. - Yes. In response to my statement, the Minister of Agriculture said that he did not know and did not hear this, but what if they start shooting at the troops in the streets, and the crowd, which had hitherto been passive, goes over to aggressive actions, what remains? - It remains to suppress the disorder by force of arms ...

Chairman. - Was there anything else in the meeting of ministers that you would find it necessary to note?

Khabalov. - I said that the head of the security department, Globachev, was summoned to explain why these two members of the workers' deputies, who remained at large, were arrested ... that is. no: working group of the central military-industrial committee. Well, he reported that the police came to this meeting. The meeting turned out to be, in fact, public, because there were not members of the working group - there were only two of them, but in general - there were 50 people ... Since these two were already involved in the investigation under Article 102, among the rest of the group, then they, at the request of the judicial investigator, were arrested. Then, the rest were detained until their identity was ascertained.

Chairman. - Continue your story about the events that followed.

Khabalov. - On Sunday, the 26th, the troops set out and occupied, as usual, all the posts that rely on the schedule ... It turned out that they had to shoot at the crowd in different places. Volynians fired at the crowd on Znamenskaya Square. and Suvorov. Then, the Pavlovsky regiment fired on Nevsky near the Kazan Cathedral. Then, around 4 o’clock in the afternoon… But I can’t tell you, gentlemen, where and how much they shot… I must say, the situation here was desperate!… I had not made any orders about the distribution of bread. At about 4 o’clock I was informed that the 4th company of the Pavlovsky Life Guards Regiment, stationed in the buildings of the court and stable department and which, as it turned out later, consisted mainly of evacuees, and numbered up to 1,500 people - that she ran out into the street, shooting up, with some kind of shouting, and crowding on Konyushennaya Square, near the bridge, not far from the Church of the Resurrection of Christ ... Having asked the battalion commander by phone, I received information - but not from him, but from someone else - that this company requires so that they would take the rest to the barracks and not dare to shoot ... Moreover, it was indicated that the company itself fired at a platoon of mounted police guards. This last one seemed wrong to me. Why would they shoot at the horse-police guards? Then it turned out that this company really rebelled; she, in fact, did not go out: she was not called at all, - the training team and other companies were called. But this company was not called and was sitting in its barracks ... So this company is rebelling, demanding that others, the rest of the companies return to the barracks and not dare to shoot ... Then I ordered the battalion commander to take measures to exhort, put this company in the barracks, demand that its officers be by all means with the company, since, according to my information by telephone, there were two officers there, and there should be not two, but many more ...

I told the head of security, Colonel Pavlenkov, that he, for his part, take measures so that this does not grow, does not play out further ... In addition to the battalion commander and officers, he ordered more regimental priest so that he persuaded them, shamed them and took an oath of allegiance and that the company went to the barracks and handed over its rifles ... In the end, after admonishing the battalion commander and after admonishing the priest, this company returned to its barracks and handed over little rifles. But not all rifles: 21 rifles are gone! Consequently, apparently, the people with them also disappeared ... The Minister of War constantly demanded that I tell him by phone what was happening in the city. I reported on the phone. When it was reported in the evening about this company, he demanded that the field court be shot right away ... I confess, I consider it impossible not only to shoot, but even to subject a person to any punishment without asking him, even if by a simplified court, without condemning him ... and even more so to put to death! ... Therefore, I demanded the prosecutor of the Mende military district court in order to ask what to do with this company, which initially had 800 people: what to do? - "Undoubtedly, there must be an inquiry, and only after the inquiry, - a field court." - Well, then, - I say: - 800 people - this is a thing! - it’s unthinkable: you can’t interrogate it in a week ... I ordered my chief of staff, General Khlebnikov, or maybe Chizhevsky, to appoint a whole commission of inquiry: 5 people were appointed with a general at the head. In the meantime, I ordered that the regiment itself hand over the guilty to us in order to arrest them ... Initially, it was planned to arrest the entire battalion and imprison it here - in the Peter and Paul Fortress, so late in the evening I negotiated with Nikolaev: would there be such a room so that such a mass could be arrested. When it turned out that in reality there were not 800, but 1,500 people, it turned out to be physically impossible, because there is no such premises ... Well, then I ordered the arrest of at least the most important instigators, ordered them to be interrogated; there were 19 of them, and they were escorted to the fortress ...

Chairman. - Did the regiment itself issue them?

Khabalov. “They were issued by the regimental authorities themselves, undoubtedly by the authorities. Forgive me, I say: regiment, but there are no regiments here: there are reserve battalions here. They are so large in number that they exceed the peaceful composition of the regiment by three to four times ... So, in this company there were 1,500 people, and in the entire regiment in peacetime 1,770 people. And thus, this one company, in terms of the number of people, was almost equal to a peacetime regiment ... Therefore, those who were in the fortress were not at all the kind of people who would be shot tomorrow, but these were people subject to trial ... Then, will I shoot them or not, is the question; either until now I have not shot anyone; when it happened, he replaced it with hard labor for various terms ... Now this circumstance, this indignation of the company of the Pavlovsky regiment, it has already shown that the situation is unfavorable. The next day, the troops were to, again as before, occupy the same points ...

Chairman. - Sorry! You are moving on to Monday. But what, General, did you report the results to Headquarters?

Khabalov. - Yes, quite right: I informed the Headquarters. - I reported the following: “I can’t fulfill your Majesty’s command,” and that the riots continue, “But I can’t” ... At the district headquarters, if a telegram is needed, it should be.

Chairman. - I'm listening.

Khabalov. - In a word, I informed the Headquarters several times, and there are several reports at the district headquarters - there should be: there are prints of telegrams stored ... I informed the sovereign that I could not do anything. In response to this, the next day I received a notice that General Ivanov had been appointed to replace me ... So the next day I was not commander-in-chief of the district troops.

Sen. Ivanov. Was it the 26th?

Khabalov. - No, on the 27th.

Chairman. - Did you receive it again by the same telegraph?

Khabalov. - No, it was somewhat different: obviously received by the Minister of War, in the main department of the General Staff. And they gave it to me by phone ... I have to interrupt - because I need to tell the day ...

Chairman. - Quite right. I interrupted you with my question. So you began to describe the events in the morning, from Monday ...

Khabalov. - In the morning, since Monday, the following has been happening ... Let me go back a little: I must say that this unfortunate order to use the rifle in business was caused, among other things, by the fact that the cavalry was exhausted. She will disperse one crowd - another will gather! In a word, horses and unfed people were running around, and they were exhausted, exhausted ... So, I start in the morning. In the morning I am at my apartment ... God forbid, memory ...

Chairman. Are you tired, General? Maybe take a break? Or give me water?

Khabalov. – No, thank you. I don’t need water, I’m not nervous… But with all the desire to be truthful and consistently tell what happened, it’s hard to do: because these events are a cauldron!…

Chairman. Please, let's look into...

Khabalov. - In a word, on some occasion, in the morning ... ( Tries to remember. ) Yes, that's what it is! - At night - at night they also reported about the 2nd crew, naval, Baltic, - that, as if at night, he raises an uprising ... And what is there, I don’t know, some agitators ... In a word, they passed it on to me at night, but at night they couldn’t get through to me over the phone, and this was passed on to my chief of staff. Early in the morning, the mayor told me the same thing - early in the morning, perhaps at 7 or 6 o'clock (keep in mind that I arrived at 3 o'clock in the morning: that means I did not sleep at night). At night they called me that the 2nd fleet crew was worried that they would rise up, become, at the head of the rebels on strike - now I learned that measures had already been taken at night, a search had been carried out, it turned out that there was nothing of the kind - all these false information ... In general, there was a lot of false information both in the first days and during the riots: there was a whole bunch of false information! ... the command of this regiment refused to leave; that at first the message was that they had killed their head of the training team, and according to other sources, that he himself shot himself in front of the front when they refused to obey him ... Well, then I gave the battalion commander one thing: “Try - try not to went, did not flare up further! Return to the barracks and try to disarm: let them sit at home ”... He himself immediately went to the mayor’s house. It must be said that Colonel Pavlenkov suffers from angina pectoris (in general, all the officers who are here are sick, and all the healthy ones in the army: all the sick were evacuated here). And from the morning of that day, Colonel Pavlenkov was not able to come to the service. Therefore, I summoned his deputy, Colonel Mikhailichenko, of the Life Guards of the Moscow Regiment, to the city administration, and came myself. When I arrived there, according to the information received, it turned out that a company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, consisting of evacuees, was joining the Volynians, who were standing on the street and did not want to hand over their rifles; then, the same - part of the Lithuanians. And after that, further information that this armed crowd, with a crowd of factory workers and others who had joined, was moving along Kirochnaya, that it had destroyed the barracks of the gendarmerie division, and that, after that, it was also destroying the premises of the school of ensigns of the engineering troops ... Then I had to think about subdue this crowd. I formed a detachment consisting of 2 companies of Keksholm, 2 companies of Preobrazhenians, a company of His Majesty's riflemen, if I am not mistaken - in a word, those who can be removed from the immediate vicinity, from Nevsky ... They were attached, called by Colonel Mikhailichenko, a machine-gun company from Strelny, a squadron of dragoons of the 9th reserve regiment was attached ... And this detachment, consisting of 6 companies, 15 machine guns and one and a half squadrons, under the command of Colonel Kutepov, a heroic cavalier,

He was sent against the rebels with a demand that they put down their weapons, and if they don’t put down, then, of course, act against them in the most decisive way ... Then something impossible begins to happen that day! ... Namely: the detachment will move, - move with a brave officer , resolute. But he somehow left, and there are no results ... There must be one thing: if he acts decisively, then he would have to face this electrified crowd: organized troops had to break this crowd and drive this crowd into a corner to the Neva, to Tauride Garden... And here: neither yes nor no!... I am sending, there is no news... I am sending three patrols of Cossacks - from those Cossacks that I had. It must be said that, having sent this detachment, I was left without troops and it was necessary to assemble another detachment so that in the event of a further uprising, I would have something to oppose ... I send this detachment from three patrols. - I only receive information that Kutepov’s detachment reached only Kirochnaya, that they moved along Kirochnaya and Spasskaya, but that they can’t move further, reinforcements must be sent ... I receive news that the district court has been destroyed and set on fire ... Litvinov, fireman , informs by phone that he came with the fire brigade to put out the district court, but the crowd does not allow, and that he is not able to do this ... Then two companies were taken - I don’t remember which -, they were sent there to the district court to disperse this crowd or allow firefighters to put out the fire ... But again, these sent companies left, disappeared, and there is no news! Following then, a report from the Moscow regiment. The Moscow regiment was located in such a way that its part was located on Sampsonevsky Prospekt near the barracks - this part was supposed to prevent the crowd from gathering on Sampsonevsky Prospekt near the factories. And the other part, the 4th company with machine guns, was supposed to take Liteyny Bridge and Nizhegorodskaya Street, and here not let the crowd of workers into the Liteynaya part - from here, as well as from Liteynaya - here ... In a word, to keep in their hands, if possible , approach to the firearms depot ... Around noon, a report was received that the 4th company was suppressed by the crowd, that the officers who were trying to resist - some were killed, some were wounded, that, after that, colossal crowds were blocking Sampsonevsky Prospekt, that the rest of the companies were standing on the courtyard of the barracks, being powerless, obviously, to do something ... The situation was becoming critical! It became difficult to give anything in support: to whomever I turned to, they everywhere say that they have no free mouths, that they cannot give ... Only in the evening it became clear what the Semenovites, Izmailovites and huntsmen could give; but of them, in the end, only three companies of Izmailovites and 3 companies of rangers arrived. Here, - The Finnish regiment cannot give me ... Along with this ... Although I'm guilty: I don't know if this has any meaning ...

Chairman. - Please please! - it is very important.

Khabalov. - I repeat, along with this there are a number of demands: to give a company there for protection, to give here for protection ... To give the Chairman of the Council of Ministers a guard to protect him ... But, to be honest, I thought that this meant leaving 20 people: what is 20 people? - The guards will not give anything - exactly, but unless there will be extra bloodshed ... Where there is no guard - it is better! But in view of urgent requests, a company was sent, which was supposed to occupy Mokhovaya from two ends: from the Simeonovskaya side and from the Panteleymonovskaya side. Then, when it turned out...

Chairman. - And on the part of the Minister of Internal Affairs Protopopov was there a demand to send units to protect him?

Khabalov. – I don’t remember… No, I don’t think it was… probably not even. There were different requirements: for example, the Lithuanian Castle reported ...

Chairman. - And from the side of the former chairman of the Council of Ministers Stürmer?

Khabalov. - No, it wasn't either. Of the ministers, only Prince. Golitsyn demanded; and then there was a demand to send to the Mariinsky Palace, and in the evening guards were sent there. Then a company was sent to occupy the telephone exchange - she defended it there ... Guilty ( returns to original presentation), when it turned out in such a way that the Vyborg side was captured by the rebellious crowd, then the Foundry part, and that the rest of the city was relatively, relatively, prosperous, then I was supposed to collect - pull off a possible reserve, under the command of Colonel Preobrazhensky Regiment Prince. Argutinsky-Dolgorukov - at his Palace Square and then send it in this way: send part of it to support Kutepov, who, obviously, could not cope; and send the other part to the Petrograd Side, together with the Life Grenadiers and a company of the Moscow Regiment, and try to throw these rebels as far as possible to the north, to the sea ... For the situation was all the worse because the Powder Plants - explosives were located behind: God forbid! the explosion of one of these factories - and nothing would be left of Petrograd ... The situation was difficult. And the project of forming reserves turned out to be very difficult, because the arrived 3rd company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment was without cartridges, but it is impossible to get cartridges, because the striking crowd occupies the Vyborg side ... There is nowhere to get it! Then from the units (Pavlenkov was in charge of everything here, and I was present as a senior commander) - then they decided to get these cartridges from the units - from the 181st infantry regiment. But it turned out that the regiment, although it did not actually rebel, but, apparently, the commander could only do what to keep this regiment. And the commander of the Finnish Reserve Regiment, when asked to send a company, said that he had only two reliable companies in his regiment, and they only held back the regiment with their presence ... Then they tried to get cartridges from military schools, from Pavlovsk and Vladimir.

Chairman. - Monday night?

Khabalov. - In the night ... Actually, this is an uprising of soldiers and workers - it happened on Monday: that means - I'm talking about Monday ... Our attempt to get cartridges from there was unsuccessful, because we could not deliver them: if they had sent, the cartridges would have hit into the hands of the rebels - revolutionaries ... Seeing that I could not gather troops from here, that we had only a handful left - I turned by telephone to Kronstadt, to the local commandant, so that he would send an army, and if not an army, then at least cartridges ... But the commandant told me that he could not send it, because he also feared for the fortress. Thus, towards evening the situation became almost hopeless, in the sense of an attack. There was only one question left: about the defense of this detachment (the reserve stationed on Palace Square). The Minister of War, who arrived here, at the mayor’s house, informed me that General Ivanov had been appointed instead of me, that General Ivanov would arrive with troops so that I could hold out until Ivanov approached ... So, I had to cling to something ... I must say that the mood officers, in particular the Izmailovsky regiment, was not such that one could count on a particularly vigorous action: they expressed that it was necessary to enter into negotiations with Rodzianko ... the mayor's house. It was about 6 pm, on Monday, or at 5, so - at 5 or 6 pm ... In response, General Belyaev ordered the chief of the general staff, Zankevich, who was right there, to immediately take command of all the troops of Petrograd. And, therefore, I appeared, as it were, eliminated, although it was not directly told to me that I was removed from my post ... General Zankevich took command of all the troops that he actually had: one machine-gun company, two batteries without shells, because the battery had 8 shells in total; then, at that time, two companies of the Preobrazhensky Regiment were stationed at the Winter Palace - perhaps there were not many more - and then, on the same evening, the Pavlovsky Regiment came with music. He came himself, apparently at the instigation of his battalion commander ... Sorry, I forgot to say that on that day the Pavlovsky regiment was commanded not by a real battalion commander, because the unfortunate one was mortally wounded the day before ... According to one information (sorry: I'm jumping!), according to some information, he was wounded, as if by his own troops, not this information

Wrong; and according to others, he was wounded when he left the rebellious four companies, which he persuaded to return to the barracks: he went to those companies that were on Nevsky Prospekt near the Kazan Cathedral; here, on the Ekaterininsky Canal, a crowd stopped him, he tried to grab a revolver to shoot, but the revolver was snatched from him and three fingers were cut off with a blow of checkers, his head was cut off with another blow - in a word, he probably no longer lived ... In a word, Pavlovsky the regiment did not appear at my call, but perhaps at the call of Colonel Pavlenkov, because I considered this regiment unreliable, thought that it would be better if they remained in the barracks ... But this whole regiment came in the evening with music and stood on the square near Preobrazhensky Regiment. In the evening, Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich drove there (that is, to the mayor): he expressed displeasure that he had not been told anything about what was happening, and asked what to do with the guards crew, of which he was the commander ... To this I I reported to His Highness that the guards crew was not subordinate to me, that I had no right to dispose of them, and now - this is what is happening: I outlined the actions for him ... Grand Duke talked to me, then went to talk with the mayor Balk; the conversation, in fact, did not lead to any definite results ... In the end, he raised the question: what to do with his part? I say: “Your Highness, how is your unit? You vouch that she will act against the rebels - then you are welcome! here are our reserves, let them come here! ... If she does not act against the rebels and declares that she will not shoot against her own, then let them better stay in their barracks. The Grand Duke said that he did not vouch for how they would behave, but that he would send two companies of the training team, the most reliable ones. - And indeed he sent ... General Zankevich, who was once the commander of the Life Grenadier Regiment, received this appointment (commander of the troops of the Petrograd guard), went home, put on the uniform of the Life Grenadier Regiment and went to the reserve standing on Palace Square. After talking with the lower ranks, with the team, he made such a conviction that they could not be counted on. Thus, by the evening it turned out that all attempts to organize a reserve sufficient to disperse the crowd on the Vyborg side and open the way to the source of ammunition turned out to be futile: it was not possible to form a reserve to send to the cartridge factory ... Then the question went defense is about holding on! The initial assumption was to stay in the center of the city, near the Winter Palace, occupying the area along the Moika, from the Winter Bridge to the Winter Canal, inclusive. But with the allocation of a company to the telephone exchange, it turned out that our forces were not enough for this, and therefore it was decided to concentrate in some one building. General Zankevich strongly insisted on the Winter Palace. I suggested the Admiralty. The position of the Admiralty makes it possible to shell three streets: Voznesensky Prospekt, Gorokhovaya Prospekt, and Nevsky Prospekt, i.e. approaches from three stations. Then, by itself, this is a separate building in which it was possible to stay for some time: it was supposed to stay during the day ... At first, we moved into it. But gen. Zankevich strongly insisted that we should die near the Winter Palace, that we should occupy the palace and defend ourselves there, in it ... Then we moved to the Winter Palace. But to be honest, I didn’t go there particularly willingly: it was the Winter Palace that was undesirable—undesirable given the impression that it was the Winter Palace and that we would turn the Winter Palace into a fortress… When we moved to the Winter Palace, it turned out that of those units there: the Preobrazhensky regiment went to the barracks, the Pavlovsky regiment left even earlier, the guards crew also left even earlier - so there remained: three companies of the Izmailovsky regiment, one Jaeger, one Rifle, two batteries, a machine-gun company, and even part of the policemen and gendarmes on foot ... The part is very small: only one and a half, two thousand people, moreover, with a very small supply of cartridges! When we moved to the Winter Palace, the manager of the palace, General Komarov, turned to me with a request that we vacate the palace so that we would not occupy it ... I agreed with him, went with him and informed the gene. Zankevich, who again flatly refused, saying that in a moral sense, if the last faithful servants of the tsar die, then it is precisely protecting his palace ... After a while, quite by accident, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich arrived at the palace, who that day was in the city (I wanted to leave for Gatchina, but I could not leave and came to the palace). The Grand Duke also spoke out that it was better not to occupy the palace, and he asked both me and the Minister of War, both ...

By the seventh volume.

The seventh volume ends with the publication of testimonies and interrogations taken by the Extraordinary Investigative Commission of the Provisional Government in its general meetings. On October 11, 1917, the Commission completed its actions on a survey of the largest figures in the tsarist regime with an interrogation of the former Minister of War, General. D.S. Shuvaev, - 88th in a row. Our publication reproduces 87 interrogations and testimonies; one interrogation - Count V. N. Kokovtsov - dated September 11 (this is the second interrogation of Kokovtsov; the first dated August 25 was included in our publication) was not in our collection, and we, despite all efforts, could not find him.

For the first time, public figures appear before the reader with their answers and testimonies: a member of the State. Duma AI Shingarev, dwelling not only on the financial and budgetary policy of the State. Duma, but also giving interesting information about the military situation in Russia on the eve of the revolution and interesting characteristic A. D. Protopopova; A. R. Lednitsky, sketching in broad strokes an outline of the tsarist policy on the Polish question in connection with the intrigues of bourgeois representatives of Poland in the family of the Velepolsky brothers; and, finally, Chairman of the State Duma M. V. Rodzianko. The testimony of the latter is especially valuable, as is the first edition (dated as early as September 4, 1917) of his memoirs of the past. As you know, the second edition appeared during the civil war, and the third - after the end of the war in the "Archive of the Russian Revolution" by I.V. Gessen. As the meaning and significance of the Russian Revolution of 1917 changed in Rodzianko's memoirs, his views on the events preceding the revolution also evolved. In this regard, the interrogation of Rodzianko, placed in Volume VII, deserves attention for its freshness and unblunted perceptions.

The second group of testimonies comes from the tsarist ministers - VN Kokovtsov, Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; the “flying” Minister of the Interior (only for 2½ months in 1915) Prince N. B. Shcherbatov, and two Ministers of War A. A. Polivanov and D. S. Shuvaev. The most valuable and curious testimony was given by Kokovtsov about the circumstances of the assassination and death of Stolypin, which Kokovtsov witnessed, and even more remarkably about the circumstances of the staged dissolution of the 2nd Duma and how the entire council of Russian ministers was considering measures to hide the secret employee Shornikova, who skillfully played a provocative role in the arrest of the Social Democratic faction of the State. Duma. Of considerable interest is Shcherbatov's account of his ministry and the tsar's relationship to the administration of the state. The testimonies of the ministers of war are of a more specific nature, they relate to military affairs, although they give quite a few details to characterize the supreme bearer of power and at the same time the supreme commander in chief. The testimonies of prominent officials of the Ministry of Justice Chaplin and Lyadov characterize the policy of the leader of the Ministry, Shcheglovitov, in its most important moments.

There are two appendices to this volume:

1) a set of corrections, clarifications of errors noticed in all seven volumes of the publication (in essence, the reader should have introduced these corrections into the text of the book);

2) index of proper names.

Regarding the pointer it is necessary to say the following. According to the original plan, this index was supposed to be a separate volume, but for economic reasons it had to be included in the seventh volume and at the same time compress it by more than half. The main purpose of the index is to provide factual information about those medium and small figures of the tsarist regime, information about which is currently very difficult. It is easy, of course, to find information about Witte and Stolypin, but one has to dig through the mountains of reference official publications in order to extract details about the service, origin, education of countless officials, officers and generals, court officials, members of courts, prosecutors, officials of the police department, officers of a separate corps of gendarmes, priests and bishops, and other, ordinary servants of the tsarist regime, whose names are full of seven volumes of our publication. It seemed to us that the communication of factual information about these figures is not only necessary for the reader of our publication, but will also be useful for those involved in the study of the events that preceded the revolution, and for those who wish to bring, for one reason or another biographical information. We set as our main goal the communication of information about the life and activities of all these persons before the beginning of the revolution, although in some cases we could not refrain from running ahead of February 1917.

The need to shorten the text of the index caused some unevenness in the presentation, but we hope that neither the reader nor the researcher dealing with the era of the fall of the regime will complain about the material presented by us.

Interrogations and testimonies.

Testimony of A. I. Shingarev.

Content. Financial and budgetary commission of the State Duma. Questions of general policy. Meeting with Stolypin. Stolypin's gradual loss of power. Budget law. State income excluded from the jurisdiction of the Duma. Customs tariff. Income of the department of Empress Maria, cabinet, appanages and income from credit operations. Loan rescheduling. Spend area. Booked expenses. The right to spend money by the government. Military expenses. The fundamental dispute between the Minister of Finance Kokovtsov and Gosud. Duma on the costs of construction of private railways. roads. Constitutional ruble. Secret loan. Incomplete budgetary rights of the Duma. Collections of legal titles. Article 18 of the budget rules. New position on field management. Limited budgetary rights of the Duma. Disagreements between the Duma and the Council on the issue of painting. tax measures. Meeting of March 7, 1915. Shingarev's budgetary speeches. Preparing for the elections, asking for 1½ million for this item. More about the private meeting of the members of the Duma with the ministers. The process of members of the Social-Democratic faction of the State Duma. Works of the Naval Commission. Fears of the possibility of war. Naval program. General unpreparedness. Information from the front. Note on the situation at the front, filed by b. king. State of affairs in 1916. Characteristics of Protopopov. Protopopov's behavior abroad. Stockholm date.

Chairman. Andrei Ivanovich, we will not question you on any particular matter, but within the general limits that I will allow myself to state, perhaps you will not refuse to tell us everything you know. We are summing up the results of the rather complex work of twenty-seven investigators, and, as experience has shown, general interrogations help us in the sense of a full and clear awareness of the specific facts that come to us. Our main attention is focused on the era of recent years. We investigate in most detail the last year of the existence of the old regime, but we are also interested in the events of a somewhat earlier time. First of all, I would like you to give us a general outline of the policy of recent years, illustrating it with individual moments in the activities of various ministers. In addition, it is desirable that you share with us information about your work in the financial and naval commissions of the Duma. We are interested in the work of the Financial Commission partly in connection with the question of the abuse of Article 87 of legislation outside the Duma, and, in particular, with the question of the abuse of §§ 17 and 18 of the budget rules. Then, in view of your chairmanship of the Naval Commission, we would like to have a general brief outline of the military affairs of the last years, and perhaps months of the old regime. Our secretary has already spoken to you today, perhaps all this together will help you give us such a general story.

Shingarev. Actually, my work was not in the financial commission, but in the budgetary one. In our State Duma, the financial commission dealt with tax issues, and this was the name of the commission of the state council, where the budget and finances were concentrated. I worked almost exclusively in the budgetary commission, and very rarely visited the financial commission, even quite often I was not a member there. Allow me first of all to touch on the general political question, all the more so since I can give comparatively little evidence on it, since in the State Duma I did little to deal with the question of general policy, specializing almost exclusively in questions of budgetary, financial and economic, i.e., worked in the commissions of land and self-government. For three Dumas, from the second to the fourth, I almost never spoke on general political questions, and only in my budgetary speeches, every year since 1908, did I devote the end of my speeches to questions of general policy. I used to have such a scheme of speech that I first considered the legal side of the budget, its technical features, and then proceeded to analyze the abuses and mistakes of the government in the field of general policy. I think that there is something especially new here, except for you known facts, I will not say. From the moment of the 2nd Duma, I took part in political work in Petrograd, and even then it was quite clear that the implementation of existing laws concerning popular representation was not at all desirable for the existing government, that insofar as it was necessary to preserve the form, it was preserved, insofar as it was possible to take away the content from this form, it was taken away. In general political questions, this stage in the history and the end of the Second Duma is well known. Some break in the gradual development of the course of events was supposedly created during the period of the Third Duma by the appearance of Stolypin in power. Outwardly, in the speeches of my comrades in the Duma, the Octobrists and other persons who sympathized with Stolypin, this was expressed as follows. Stolypin made a coup in order to strengthen, at least in this form, popular representation. It was, so to speak, a parade phrase that explained why Stolypin dissolved the 2nd Duma, created an ugly, provocative trial of the Social Democrats, and then applied a whole series of measures. From the point of view of the defenders of the government at the time, all this was done in order to preserve popular representation in this truncated form. In the beginning, I met a large number of people who sincerely believed that this was the case. This explained the charm of Stolypin in their midst. He was seen as a defender of certain classes, but at the same time a defender of constitutional principles, insofar as they remained, survived after the act of June 3rd. However, as the 3rd Duma lived, the illusions, which perhaps existed in Stolypin himself, I do not know, dissipated to a sufficient degree both for him and for his admirers. I had very little contact with Stolypin. I've only been to him two or three times. For the first time during the period of the 2nd Duma, in 1907, when in our Voronezh province, in Zemlyansky district, they were sentenced to death penalty nine or ten peasants suspected of killing a local landowner. I then received a telegram from one of the defenders of these unfortunates, who told me that two of those awarded had confessed, while the rest denied their guilt, and so he asked for a review of this process.

Interrogation of A. I. Spiridovich

Content: The activities of Spiridovich as head of the palace guard. Spiridovich's works on the history of the revolutionary movement. question of provocation. Sources of Spiridovich's work on the history of the revolutionary movement. The attitude of the police department to the question of the use of secret employees who are members of revolutionary organizations. Police department instructions. Attitude to Dzhunkovsky's instructions. The case of Nikitenko, Naumov and others. Gerasimov and Ratimov. Spiridovich's arrival from Yalta at the call of Protopopov. The Stolypin murder case. About the ranks of political and "physical" protection. Spiridovich's meeting with Bogrov at Kulyabko's. Meetings of Spiridovich with Kurlov, Verigin and others regarding Bogrov's messages. A. T. Vasiliev. Protopopov. Voeikov. Court acquaintances of Spiridovich. Dislike of the former Empress Spiridovich. A special department of the palace commandant's administration. Spiridovich's relationship with Rasputin. Prince Andronikov and his relationship with Voeikov. Service in the palace guard, as a means of evading military service. The role of Spiridovich in promoting conscription evasion. Library of the palace guard. Spiridovich and A.N. Khvostov.

Chairman.- Are you Major General Spiridovich? What is your first and last name?

Spiridovich.- Alexander Ivanovich.

Chairman.- Before you were arrested, were you a mayor in Yalta?

Spiridovich.- Exactly.

Chairman.- How old are you?

Spiridovich.- Fourty four.

Chairman.- You began your service in the gendarme corps on December 31, 1899 and were in it until April 1905?

Spiridovich.- With the performance of duties. I served in the gendarme corps, and then was seconded to the commandant of the palace.

Chairman.- In the position of head of the security detachment?

Spiridovich.- Yes, subordinate to the palace commandant. Then, according to my uniform, I was only an officer of the gendarme corps or the head of the security detachment.

Chairman.- From 1903 to 1905 you were the head of security in Kyiv?

Spiridovich.- The head of the security department.

Chairman.- And when did you begin to manage the palace agents in Tsarskoye Selo?

Spiridovich.- Since January 1, 1906. The security agency is subordinate to the palace commandant. This is not an agency in the sense of informing and searching, this is a completely separate article. There is the so-called agent of the political police of the former regime, which is in charge of searches. I was in charge of such searches in Kyiv. Under the palace commandant, there was no such search. There was a detachment of physical protection.

Chairman.- What about security in the sense of awareness?

Spiridovich.- It wasn't.

Ivanov. Who was this part?

Spiridovich.- The palace commandant did not have a special body, the director of the police department and the head of the security department had to give him information.

Chairman.- And in Tsarskoye Selo there was no security department?

Spiridovich.- Not. Tsarskoye Selo was on the wanted list run by the Petrograd security department.

Chairman.- So, you are saying that, as the head of security, you were not engaged in political searches and did not have secret employees?

Spiridovich.- Certainly not.

Chairman.- How long did you continue to be in charge of security?

Spiridovich.- Until August 15, when I was appointed mayor of Yalta by order. The order took place on the 15th of August, and I left on the 18th of September.

Chairman.- So, you served in Tsarskoye from January 1, 1906 to August 16, 1916, that is, more than ten years?

Spiridovich.- Quite right.

Chairman.- Do you own a work on the history of the revolutionary movement? Who was your closest collaborator in compiling this story?

Spiridovich.- Nobody literally.

Chairman.- You alone wrote this?

Spiridovich.- One. I collected materials from the first years of service in the gendarme corps. While I served, I did not have time to write. When I served in Tsarskoye, I had a big library, which remained in cash in Yalta. All my work was preserved there - mainly in abstracts, in the scheme by which I worked, especially in the party of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. I didn't have any employees. This book was actually written by me during trips on the retinue train, and those who participated in these trips saw my work.

Chairman.- You say - especially in the party of the S.-R. And what about the Social-Democratic Party?

Spiridovich.- The history of the Social-Democratic Party. I have been writing for a long time.

Ivanov.- Do you have three parts?

Spiridovich.- Two issues: s.-d. and s.-r. The first one I wrote for three years.

Chairman.- What do you know about provocation, that is, about provocative methods in the protection of the political police Russian state. You understand provocation as "the complicity of officials of the detective agencies or their informants in revolutionary work with the aim of suppressing then that one with the greatest result for the authorities." So? I absolutely read it.

Spiridovich.- Quite right.

Chairman.- What do you know about the provocation?

Spiridovich.- The source of the provocation cannot be sought only in the malice of the gendarmerie officers or the officials of the palace police, who were in charge of this. Under the old regime, line officers were taught everything. If we go to Berezovsky's shop, we can find there instructions and drawings even on the issue of the size of the boot and footcloth and how to put on the footcloth. And there are instructions for that. No one taught gendarmerie officers how to carry out inquiries on political matters and how to conduct searches. This is the main cause of adverse events in this area - I have always said this. Anything is taught, but it is not taught.

Chairman.- Do you think that the reason for the provocation is the insufficient training of the officers of the gendarme department, who are replenishing the personnel of the security departments?

Spiridovich.- An officer leaves the ranks, goes to the corps of gendarmes, and completely new duties fall on him. This means: on the one hand, there is a malicious provocation, when the rank in charge of the search knows perfectly well what he is doing, and nevertheless does it; on the other hand, there is a provocation from ignorance, from inexperience. I share these two provocations.

Chairman.- And the provocation, determined by the property of the case itself?

Spiridovich.- Searches are such a delicate thing that if a person of bad morals conducts them, he will always cross this thin line.

Chairman.- What thin line? Obviously, some part of the investigative work seems acceptable to you, and then there is an easily crossed line, beyond which something unacceptable begins. So what, in your opinion, is unacceptable in political investigative work and what do you consider acceptable?

Spiridovich.- It is permissible only to know, but to know through a source that does not work itself. I do not recognize active revolutionary workers as informants. It is unacceptable.

Chairman.- Who do you call an active worker?

Spiridovich.- The one who really works in this or that revolutionary organization.

Chairman.- And who do you call an inactive worker?

Spiridovich.- Let me give you an example. A community has gathered in this room, the question of some kind of revolutionary enterprise is being decided. There are ten people in this room. The eleventh person brings tea. He does not belong to this circle, but he knows those who sit here and serves as an informer. This is just a waiter - a well-known rank in charge of political investigations.

Chairman.- And in practice, how many chiefs of the gendarme department and other authorities were satisfied with this way of informing? Was such a measure of information considered sufficient in the environment of political investigation?

Spiridovich.- I find it difficult to answer this question. To do this, you need to know each person well individually.

Chairman.- But you have been in contact with this area almost all your life, and therefore, from your own point of view, you can be an excellent informant about it. After all, you yourself said that a certain degree of external contact seems to you, for the purpose of information, quite sufficient.

Spiridovich.- I can say, for example, about the one who was in Kyiv after me ...

Chairman.- About whom exactly?

Spiridovich.- About General Yeremin.

Chairman.- Answer my question: how many of the people who worked under the old regime on the case of political investigation were satisfied with the method of informing that you consider acceptable, and with the result that this method gave? Or were the majority dissatisfied?

Spiridovich.- It seems to me that those who understood the service properly were satisfied.

Chairman.- And the majority were understanding or not understanding?

Spiridovich.- Mr. Chairman, the work of agents is so ticklish that to tell another how I conduct it is an unthinkable thing.

Chairman.- You evade the answer, because the question is put quite clearly. You say that information about the secret society is obtained through such people who bring a glass of tea to the meeting, and you more than brought a glass of tea - you spent almost your entire service around this Wednesday.

Spiridovich.- I understand the question and say that you need to know the work of everyone. I have to name this or that head of the security department by name and then say whether he was engaged in a provocation or not.

Chairman.- I'm asking about your general view.

Spiridovich.- I can not say that everyone was engaged in a provocation.

Chairman.- The question is, how many were satisfied with the way of informing about which we spoke, or did you observe this only as an exception?

Spiridovich. - It seems to me - no. And that's why. In my opinion, the majority wanted to know as much as possible, and, of course, I know more if my person is closer to the revolutionary organization. It all depends on what degree of intimacy I allow.

Chairman.- But what is your conclusion from your observations? Apparently, this question is somewhat difficult for you.

Ivanov.- So you compiled a work in which a lot of material is not only from your activities, but also from the activities of other people.

Spiridovich.- Allow me to report that when compiling my work, I have never been in a special department of the police department; never asked anyone a question.[*] I did not enter their hiding places.

Ivanov. On what basis did you draw your conclusions?

Spiridovich.- Based on party documents and police department data, but data that was turned into official memos.

Ivanov.- Received by you from your agents?

Chairman.- From the police department?

Spiridovich.- The department could give me statistics. Then the department for three years published something like its own newspaper - it is in the gendarme department, and then there are codes of inquiries. Here are the official documents that I used from the police department.

Ivanov.- And during your work as the head of the security department in Kyiv, were there cases when your agents crossed the line that the chairman asked you about?

Spiridovich.- Not.

Chairman.- There was not a single case? Were there only informers, were there no agents involved in the communities?

Spiridovich.- No, there were. I'm sorry, I just pointed out to you two sharply different possibilities in this direction.

Chairman. But you still haven't answered my question. What was the opinion of experts in this field: could there be a case of political investigation of the old regime using only informants who did not belong to parties?

Spiridovich.- To have informants or employees who are members of the organization - this was certainly allowed. The department approved it.

Chairman.- And the officers of the security department used this admission?

Spiridovich.- Undoubtedly.

Chairman.- And such cases of use, as informers, by persons who were members of the party, were predominant?

Spiridovich.- It was authorized.

Chairman.- What and by whom was it sanctioned?

Spiridovich.- The Police Department.

Chairman.- In what form was it sanctioned? How was it expressed?

Spiridovich.- Written, it seems to me, was not expressed. The entire instruction to the security departments was written after I left Kyiv. Then, after the departure of Lopukhin, in fact, this began to pass into the form of instructions from the police department. But none of the instructions caught me.

Chairman.- You did not take part in the preparation of such instructions?

Spiridovich.- Instructions for searches - no.

Chairman.- What are the instructions?

Spiridovich.- For protection.

Chairman.- To protect what?

Spiridovich.- Exclusively for the protection of the emperor. In the last two years, a commission has worked in the police department, which worked out the principle of protection, as such. A regulation was worked out, which was to include, as a whole, the following parts: the duties of the heads of departments (the part that I was in charge of), the duties of the general police, the duties of governors, the duties of the chiefs of search in a given city and the duties of the heads of the gendarmerie departments in each given city.

Chairman.- Did you participate in this commission?

Spiridovich.- Yes.

Chairman.- When did this commission start its work?

Spiridovich.- The work of the commission was interrupted.

Chairman.- Before it could be interrupted, it had to be started. When exactly, in which year did she start her work?

Spiridovich.- It must have started in 1912 and ended with the entry into office of General Dzhunkovsky, who stopped her work.

Chairman. Why did he stop it?

Spiridovich.- I do not have exact information on this issue. But of all the draft instructions that were developed in the commission, about 30 people worked, the work was distributed to different people according to their specialties, Dzhunkovsky approved only one instruction - the instruction of my detachment, that is, the physical protection of the sovereign when traveling. Only he approved it, and it is called "instruction of the mobile guard detachment during the trips of the sovereign." This instruction was in effect at the celebrations of 1913. What General Dzhunkovsky was guided by and whether he destroyed all other instructions, I do not know. Then the work stopped, and it seems already in 1915 or 1916 ...

Chairman.- And not in 1914?

Spiridovich.- It seems that under Beletsky, under the chairmanship of Vissarionov, she began to work. It was a big commission.

Chairman.- Was it at the time when Beletsky was the director?

Spiridovich.- No, he was a deputy minister. These are the last sessions of the commission.

Chairman.- What did this commission work out?

Spiridovich.- We had, it seems, only two meetings. I, as the head of the security detachment, was instructed by the chairman to present my work, my instructions. I later presented this instruction from Mogilev in an official letter to the chairman of the commission. Then I left for a new position in Yalta, and I have not been to any meeting of this commission.

Chairman.- Leave this commission. What do you know about the search instructions, that is, about the secret employees who, as you know, were in the police department?

Spiridovich.- I never had this instruction, because when I was in Kyiv, even under Lopukhin, it was not drawn up. It was compiled after I left Kyiv, and I left in April 1915.

Chairman.- Do you know that in this instruction the use of secret employees - members of criminal, from the point of view of the then law, revolutionary organizations - was the rule?

Spiridovich.- I don't know. I did not see these instructions, they were a big secret in the department even from the officers who came into contact with this issue. What I knew, I have already reported to you.

Chairman.- How do you explain that such an instruction was a secret even for officers who needed to be instructed?

Spiridovich.- As far as I know, the gendarme department gave it only to the officers who were in charge of the search.

Chairman.- These officers not only had to be aware, but they had to know this instruction by heart, because it contained the position in which they acted?

Spiridovich.- Yes.

Chairman.- For what purpose did you write the two mentioned books on the history of the revolution?

Spiridovich.- We fought against the revolutionary movement, but they did not know what they were fighting with. The officer entered the gendarme corps, not knowing ...

Chairman.- You already spoke about it. What school did you go through, that is, what kind of education did you receive?

Spiridovich.- I graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod Cadet Corps, then the Pavlovsk Military School, then went into service, stayed in the regiment for 6 years and transferred to the gendarme corps.

Chairman.- Did you offer the police department to buy the books you wrote from you? Did you get paid for them?

Spiridovich.- I worked completely independently.

Chairman.- That is, regardless of the police department and did not enter into any conditions with it?

Spiridovich.- When I finished the first book, since, by its very content, a private printing house could not print it, I printed it with the permission of the Comrade Minister at the printing house of the headquarters of the corps, and then asked for permission to sell it. The headquarters printing house also sold the first issue. Then I finished the second issue. Then Beletsky was a Deputy Minister. By the way, they compiled the so-called "Essays" of Colonel Rozhanov. When Beletsky found out that I had finished my work, he bought from me all the other copies of the S.-R.

Chairman.- Did they pay you?

Spiridovich.- Yes. This has been officially done.

Chairman.- How much did you pay?

Spiridovich.- I do not remember.

Chairman.- You stated that you were somewhat aloof from this matter when you arrived in Tsarskoye Selo. Now tell me, what do you know about the case of Fleet Lieutenant Nikitenko, Naumov and others?

Spiridovich.- In the autumn of 1906, maybe I will be somewhat confused in the dates, - please indicate to me, and I will get better ... In 1906, I was once invited by the palace commandant Trepov, and he told me: “Go, colonel, to the commander of the convoy and listen there statement of the Cossack Ratimov. I went to the apartment of Prince Trubetskoy, where Ratimov, in the presence of the commander of the hundred, reported on his acquaintance with a certain Naumov, who talked about putting an infernal machine under the table in Peterhof, in his office. Here, as far as I remember, is what Ratimov reported. Nothing more, it seems. Ratimov was told not to interrupt the acquaintance.

Chairman.- Who said it?

Spiridovich.- Me and others. They were bosses, I was not the boss. Then the sovereign went to the skerries, I also went to the skerries with my detachment, and I did not see Ratimov until the end of 1907. When we returned to Peterhof at the end of October, after moving to Tsarskoe Selo, Ratimov came to me and reported that Naumov had renewed his acquaintance. Here I no longer remember exactly what he told me, but certainly in his report he gave information that the case was about an attempt on the Emperor's life. I remember that at the same time I reported to the palace commandant that this should be transferred to the authority of the head of the security department, and I received an order to transfer the whole matter from hand to hand to General Gerasimov. How Gerasimov conducted the search, what information he gave, I did not know until the day of the trial, where I was called as a witness.

Chairman.- After your return with the former emperor to Tsarskoye Selo, did you see Ratimov only once or several times?

Spiridovich.- I do not remember. Maybe once, maybe twice.

Chairman. Did you see him alone or in the presence of someone else?

Spiridovich.- I do not remember. In my opinion, this should be the case anyway.

Chairman.- Maybe it was the commander of a hundred?

Spiridovich.- Yes.

Chairman.- Have you seen Ratimov together with Gerasimov?

Spiridovich.- Yes, when I handed it over to him.

Chairman.- Was it once or several times?

Spiridovich.- Once.

Chairman.- So, you saw Ratimov in the presence of Gerasimov only once?

Spiridovich.- Yes.

Chairman.- When information reached you that Naumov was giving proclamations to Ratimov, did you inform Gerasimov about this?

Spiridovich.- I do not remember. Allow me to remember. After all, in this case I was a complete stranger; all this was to be done by the commander of the hundred. For me, it was completely unexpected and unusual.

Chairman.- But this is not such a surprise that makes a person confused. You are entrusted with the protection of the sovereign emperor. You are even engaged in literary work, you know that the transmission of proclamations - especially in a military environment, by a person from the military, is a crime. Why, then, you, not an ordinary citizen and inhabitant, but a person specially assigned to the case, did not report anything to the authorities about this crime - for the initial arrest to be carried out?

Spiridovich.- I'm sorry, that's probably what was done.

Chairman.- So you think that Naumov was arrested?

Spiridovich.- Not.

Chairman. Why didn't you insist that this harmful person be arrested. After all, if he had been arrested, he might not have been hanged in a year, and with him two more people, and the others would not have gone to hard labor.

Spiridovich.- It was not part of my responsibilities. General Trepov was in charge of this. You don't deign to know what General Trepov was like. When I went in to ask him once about my duties, he treated me very coolly in the presence of everyone.

Chairman.- You are the head of the protection of the sovereign emperor, a whole army of fillers is subordinate to you. You have been informed that in Tsarskoe Selo a man has wound up, the son of the owner of a post office, who distributes proclamations in His Majesty's convoy - you, who carry this guard, do not insist on his arrest on the grounds that you have a strict boss and you do not dare to report him about the necessity of this arrest.

Spiridovich.- I don't say it, I don't remember it. Probably Gerasimov was told this. But I cannot verify that it was I who heard about these proclamations at the time. I humbly ask you to consider my testimony, which I then gave to the prosecutor during the inquest. After all, I am telling you now, several years after I spoke then at the trial. After all, this matter did not interest me at all then. Then Gerasimov went to Tsarskoye with a direct report.

Chairman.- I understand that in the presence of Prince Trubetskoy and the commander of the hundred, you listened to the story of the escort Ratimov that in Tsarskoye Selo, near the palace, Naumov gave him proclamations.

Spiridovich.- No, sorry, where he gave - I did not know.

Chairman.- Well, it doesn't matter where. But who is he, did they tell you?

Spiridovich.- Yes, - who, but not where.

Chairman.- The existence of a fact. Did you know the name of Naumov, whom Ratimov could always point to as a person handing out proclamations?

Spiridovich.- Everything was known to Gerasimov.

Chairman.- And you too?

Spiridovich.- I'm not searching.

Chairman.- What a search! A crime under Articles 129 and 130 has been committed - you know this very well. You should have arrested this man because you were in charge of the guards at Tsarskoye Selo.

Spiridovich.- But these duties are carried out by the escort.

Chairman.- Do you think that the duties of the escort are different from those of the head of security?

Spiridovich.- I want to prove all the time that our guards were physical guards, that my unit there was not undercover, as you please tell me, and had nothing to do with the case.

Chairman.- In this case, I am interested in a specific question - your attitude to the case of Naumov and Nikitenko. This case later received great publicity, received the name of preparations for regicide. Perhaps it is no secret to you that there was no preparation for regicide, however, it all ended with the hanging of three persons and the reference to hard labor of a number of others. You can look at things differently, but you know how it ended ... Tell me, please, this: did the snitches subordinate to you follow Ratimov and Naumov, their intercourse?

Spiridovich.- Not.

Chairman.- Well, let's leave it. Tell me, were you arrested in Petrograd?

Spiridovich.- Yes, in Petrograd.

Chairman.- On whose invitation did you come to Petrograd?

Spiridovich.- I was going to Petrograd since the end of the last 1916. I submitted all the documents, you deigned to receive them.

Chairman.- Yes I know. But on whose call did you come here?

Spiridovich.- I received permission, and then received a telegram from Minister Protopopov, with a link to the Rhine, so that I would come, that's why I came. My trip was mainly delayed by the search for a deputy for me. I would have arrived long ago, but I was waiting to be appointed a deputy. However, I received a telegram that the minister asked me to leave.

Chairman.- When did you arrive in Petrograd?

Chairman.- Did you provide evidence?

Spiridovich.- No, I was first summoned by the minister on Saturday, a week later, I think, on February 26th. Those. I arrived on Monday, and according to the agenda, I was summoned to the minister on Saturday.

Spiridovich.- Yes, on the 25th.

Chairman.- What conversation did you have with the minister? Give the content of this conversation in its essential part.

Spiridovich.- In a significant part of the conversation concerned the business on which I came. I briefly reported my case, the minister listened, invited Antsyferov, gave a brief resolution and asked for help so that I could carry out the whole thing.

Chairman.- What's the deal?

Spiridovich.- There were cases about the boundaries of the city administration.

Chairman.- Consequently, these are cases concerning the Yalta city authorities, and not the Petrograd events. Was there any talk about Petrograd?

Spiridovich.- No, it was not.

Chairman.- Did you come alone from Yalta or together with someone from the ranks of the local Crimean administration?

Spiridovich.- No, I am alone. I was accompanied by an assistant bailiff, Prince Tseretelli. He went to ask for a transfer, I did not know this, but in Petrograd, in the department of general affairs, I found out. The head of the department said to me: “Why don’t you make him an assistant?”

Chairman.- Did he also receive a telegram with a challenge from Protopopov?

Spiridovich.- I do not know this. No. He came to Yalta and asked for a vacation in Petrograd, not talking about the reasons.

Chairman.- What kind of relationship did you have with Rein? Why did Protopopov summon you with a reference to the Rhine?

Spiridovich.- It seems that in December, I may be confusing a month, but it is in my documents, Professor Pisemsky came to Yalta, right to me. I received a telegram - I do not remember from Rein or from Protopopov - to assist him ...

Chairman.- This is how your purely official relationship with the Rhine began?

Spiridovich.- Yes. I came. I decided that I needed to tell him everything. It was the first time I saw Rhine.

Chairman.- Tell me this: when Stolypin was killed in Kyiv, were you there?

Spiridovich.- Yes.

Chairman.- By the position of your chief of security of the person of the former emperor. You served earlier in Kyiv. Did you know the then head of the Kyiv security department, one of your successors in office, Kulyabko?

Spiridovich.- Kulyabko is married to my sister. We studied with him.

Chairman.- Is he alive, Kulyabko?

Spiridovich.- He is in the regiment, at the front. The whole war in the regiment.

Chairman.- What's his name?

Spiridovich.- Nikolai Nikolaevich.

Chairman.- Tell me in general terms, what meetings did you have with Kulyabko and Kurlov on the protection of the then tsar, and what, in particular, did you have to do with Bogrov and Bogrov's shot in this story that ended in the death of Stolypin?

Spiridovich.- Regarding the protection of the emperor, I did everything that was necessary according to the instructions.

Chairman.- But let's focus your attention on Bogrov, on your meetings with Kurlov and Kulyabko concerning Bogrov, and on everything that happened in the theater. Tell me in general terms, what did Bogrov tell you?

Spiridovich.- All this was indicated by me in detail during the investigation. Let me warn you that I can not remember everything and now I can confuse. Let me remind you once again that I was the head of security there, and not the head of the search. All my duties related to the adoption of security measures, to the distribution of guard outfits, to admission to places where outsiders visited - these were my duties. The distribution of seats in the theater, tickets to the theater - this did not concern me, it lay, on the one hand, with the local authorities, and then a special body was created - the ticket issuing bureau. It was the bureau that did the business.

Chairman.- Please tell us under what conditions did you make these trips? The tsar, for example, is going to Kyiv - are you going with a whole detachment?

Spiridovich. There is a whole printed manual on this.

Chairman.- Where can she be?

Spiridovich.- In the police department, it must be.

Chairman.- In what department, - do not remember?

Spiridovich.- In a special department, should be.

Chairman(referring to the secretary). - You'll have to ask for it.

Spiridovich.- Instructions for the protection of the sovereign emperor when leaving the places of state residence.

Chairman.- And how many people did you have in such detachments? Is it travel dependent?

Spiridovich.- Yes.

Chairman.- And how many fillers were there in your position who are watching?

Spiridovich.- Sorry, these are not fillers. This is very different in our conversations. Filer is a surveillance agent.

Chairman.- What do you call them?

Spiridovich.- It's called a guard, guard agent or junior guard, junior rank. I called them that. And fillers, these are specially agents of the security department.

Chairman.- How many such agents did you have?

Spiridovich.- I had 250 of them.

Chairman.- Is this when leaving for Kyiv?

Spiridovich.- They went out. They were added from a special team. In St. Petersburg there was a special team for the protection of ministers and persons who needed to be protected; from there they gave it when it was not enough. I had such a group. It was formed, divided into dozens, dozens were united into teams, officers were placed over the teams. A purely military organization was adopted.

Chairman.- Gendarmerie officers?

Spiridovich.- Yes sir.

Chairman.- What was the number of commanding officers?

Spiridovich.- It depended on the area to which they had to be sent; and also depending on how many people were in cash and what the topography required.

Chairman.- Let's leave now the outer part, it was determined. Let's touch on the inside - your dates with Kulyabko and Bogrov.

Spiridovich.- For several days I dined at Kulyabko's. Several people ate. During lunch, Kulyabko says: “Come into the office, listen, there I have one young man.” Dinner was over, I went with Kulyabko to the office, the young man was introduced to me. Who he was, I did not know, I saw him then for the first time. And this young man, as far as I remember, began to tell Kulyabko about a conspiracy of several people in my presence; pointed to the party of social revolutionaries, said that the party was plotting the assassination of Stolypin. Not a single word was said about the sovereign. This went on for several minutes. Kulyabko offered questions, but I don't remember whether I asked him a question or not. Verigin also came, it seems ...

Chairman.- Is Verigin alive or not?

Spiridovich.- Alive. He was then a police officer. When I left there, after listening to this, I asked him a few questions, and then, on this conversation, Senator Trusevich built a whole accusation of allowing Bogrov to enter the theater.

Chairman.- Why Kulyabko called you into the office?

Spiridovich.- Maybe he was worried.

Chairman. Why was he worried?

Spiridovich.- Maybe because it was a few days before the arrival of the sovereign and the very celebrations. I don't know why he called me.

Chairman.- Have you discussed the statement of the young man with Kulyabko?

Spiridovich.- Under Bogrov, I did not say anything to him.

Chairman.- But you discussed these issues with him?

Spiridovich.- There was nothing.

Chairman.- You emphasize - here, but it is important for me to know not where it was, but what it was.

Spiridovich.- Then, there must have been discussions, I don't remember. Bogrov had, some time later, something else to report. According to his stories, someone had to come, he had to tell which house they would come to. The issue of establishing surveillance did not interest me.

Chairman.- It is clear that Kulyabko is worried: he is the head of security, the tsar arrives, the ministers arrive, and the young man tells him that there is a suggestion to kill the minister. He naturally gets excited and invites you, his relative; under Bogrov, of course, you don’t say anything, you just listen to the story. But when did he leave? After all, what you just said is not vital. Life would not allow such a calm attitude to business.

Spiridovich.- Yes, but Bogrov talked about what would happen.

Chairman.- I understood it, and probably everyone would understand that your relative and head of security called you to consult with you.

Spiridovich.- Then, probably, it also was. But I want to dwell on one conversation with Bogrov.

Chairman.- What did Kulyabko tell you about Bogrov before he called you into the office?

Spiridovich.- I remember Kulyabko telling me that this person can be trusted, because he has been working with him for a long time and completely trusts him.

Chairman.- Bogrov was an informant for what part?

Spiridovich.- According to the party of social revolutionaries. But I remember he said that you can work with him quite calmly. It was Kulyabko's attestation...

Chairman.- You say that it was the day before the theatrical performance?

Spiridovich.- May be. I do not remember when it was, but in any case, before the arrival of the sovereign.

Chairman.- You say that you did not take any part in the development of the plan - what to do with this, did not take?

Spiridovich.- I do not remember. There were certainly conversations, because there was a friend of the Minister of Internal Affairs Kurlov with the ranks of the police department.

Chairman.- Obviously, there was a conversation with Kurlov and Verigin about this?

Spiridovich.- Verigin was a rank of the police department.

Chairman.- Who else came from the ranks of the police department?

Spiridovich.- There was Verigin, Senko-Popovsky.

Chairman.- Was your participation limited to this? Then you were in the theater and were present when Bogrov shot?

Spiridovich.- No, it's my fault. The day of the visit of the sovereign to the theater is approaching. At 6 o'clock in the morning I left for maneuvers with the former sovereign for 50 miles and returned at two o'clock. When I went to the common dining room, I heard there that the organization that Bogrov had warned about had arrived. I'm sorry, it was known to us, it seems, even in the morning.

Chairman.- On the morning of the performance?

Spiridovich.- On the day of the maneuvers. I was excited that the organization had arrived, and I had already outlined some plan for myself in the sense of transferring the outfit. When I left the maneuvers, I agreed with the palace commandant Dedulin where I would stand at the entrance to the city and what signal I would give - where to go to the sovereign. All this is in the evidence at the investigation. Standing in Saints,[*] I had to, depending on what I learned, wave in this way, and the chauffeur had to know where to go. The goal was not to carry the sovereign emperor along the streets lined with outfits.

Chairman.- Why?

Spiridovich.- Because, since we believed the head of the search that a terrorist organization had arrived, I could not be sure that it would operate against Stolypin, and I could not put the sovereign at risk.

Chairman.- So, you admitted the possibility that this organization would act against the former emperor?

Spiridovich.- There are documents for this. I agreed with the palace commandant that I would wave to him. When I returned and found Kurlov, I insisted that Kurlov inform the palace commandant on paper that the organization about which he had warned the palace commandant had already arrived, and although, according to the information of the Kyiv security department, it had identified the minister as the object of its actions , but one can be afraid of her speeches against the sovereign. This is the meaning of the paper that was sent to the commandant.

Chairman.- Why was it necessary to write such a paper?

Spiridovich.- To make the palace commandant feel that they should wake up.

Chairman.- Why paper? For this, word of mouth was sufficient.

Spiridovich.- Too much believed the seriousness of this. Anyway, it was done.

Chairman.- You wanted to relieve yourself of responsibility?

Spiridovich.- Responsibility was not removed from anyone.

Chairman.- What was done, in view of the seriousness of the situation, to arrest this organization?

Spiridovich.- I do not know this, because I was on the road all the time, I could not be interested in the search and observation of this organization at all.

Chairman.“But you can’t afford not to be interested in it.

Spiridovich.- I was very interested, but could not get into it.

Chairman.- But if you were interested in this, then what did you do to investigate your orders? You say that you directed the king along some other street, so your own orders depended on what you could find out about this organization.

Spiridovich.- I don't remember if I saw Kulyabko. Maybe when I arrived from the maneuvers, from the hippodrome, Kulyabko said that it was possible to allow the passage of the sovereign.

Chairman.- Did you participate in the drafting of the mentioned paper or did Kulyabko write it?

Spiridovich.- It was not Kulyabko who wrote it, Kurlov and I wrote it. Kulyabko was not here.

Chairman.- Still, you did not answer the main question. The state of affairs was as follows: in the morning an organization arrived, you are in charge of the protection of the tsar, you attached serious importance to this, assuming that the object of the planned assassination, Stolypin, could be replaced by another object - the tsar. What did you do to find out whether this organization was arrested or not?

Spiridovich.- Obviously, I asked Kulyabko and he must have answered me that this organization does not really exist. It was possible that this organization exists only in Bogrov's thoughts. He said that the organization had arrived, that they were all sitting in his room, and they could not be taken; someone will come in the evening and will transmit something.

Chairman.“But when they told you that the organization had arrived, that it was sitting in Bogrov’s room, that it didn’t come out, and therefore it couldn’t be taken, how didn’t it seem to you, an experienced guard, to be a woman’s fairy tales? After all, you know very well that in thousands of cases an organization was taken from the room where it was sitting, that if an organization does not go out into the street, then this is by no means an obstacle in the eyes of the guards to arresting it, because it is precisely they who are in the street. can scatter, but here it can be captured for sure.

Spiridovich.- Sorry, then I could not judge all this. I was physically on the street, I was doing my job and could not ...

Chairman.- In addition to the physical work, you had a mental one, which consisted in fulfilling your immediate task- who needs to be protected in Kyiv. You received information that this organization had arrived, how did you not find out whether this organization was arrested or not?

Spiridovich.- My work consisted in the physical protection of the sovereign on the street with the participation of the Deputy Minister of the Interior and the head of the security department with officials.

Chairman.- The protection of the king from the possibility of an attempt on his life - is it a matter of physical protection or some other?

Spiridovich.- All this work is divided into two types. The security department is in charge of one job, and I was not in charge of it. I don't remember now what I talked about with Kulyabko, but, in any case, I didn't have time to delve into it.

Chairman.- The chairmen of the Council of Ministers of Russia were not killed every day. It was, however, an exceptional case. You were very close to this case. You were probably very worried about the fate of your relative Kulyabko and for your own. How did all the circumstances of this case not cut into your memory? You must clearly remember how Bogrov, a few steps from the former emperor, killed Stolypin, and in doing so he could have killed the tsar.

Spiridovich.- I have not yet reached this point, I can describe the whole day to you in detail.

Chairman.- But you remember only one thing, that you wrote a paper to Dedulin.

Spiridovich.- Because in the morning everything was done without me. I later learned from conversations. The morning was interesting for all of them. From seven in the morning until two they had a meeting with Bogrov, a plan of action was worked out. All this was done without me.

Chairman.- Who had a date with Bogrov?

Spiridovich.- All this is in the most submissive report. But all this was without me, because I left at 7 o'clock, returned from the maneuvers at 2-3 and what happened during this time, I do not know.

Chairman.- But what have you been doing since two o'clock in the afternoon? You arrived, agreed with Kurlov and wrote a paper to Dedulin.

Spiridovich.- And immediately left for the hippodrome, where the sovereign was supposed to arrive. It looks like it was a hippodrome. Then we went to the Kyiv Lavra, where my outfits were also sent. I rushed about, I did not have enough attention to anything else. Maybe it was a mistake, but I was too calm about Kulyabka.

Chairman.- Did you know then the former vice-director or, perhaps, the head of a special department of the police department of that time, A. T. Vasiliev?

Spiridovich.- Yes.

Chairman.- What kind of relationship were you in?

Spiridovich.- I know him from the first years of service in Kyiv. He was a fellow prosecutor, and I was in contact with him as the head of the security department.

Chairman.- Did you have a good relationship?

Spiridovich.- We never visited each other, but the relationship was good.

Chairman.- Were there good relations in 1911-1912 too?

Spiridovich.- Yes.

Chairman.- What color is Kulyabka's hair - is he blond, brown-haired or brunette?

Spiridovich.- Now, perhaps, gray-haired.

Chairman.- And then what was he like?

Spiridovich.- Blond.

Chairman.- But not a very light blond. Isn't he red?

Spiridovich. - No. A little bit in the dark.

Chairman.- Have you changed your hair color? Weren't you brighter then?

Spiridovich.- Not.

Chairman.- Do your friends say about you that you are red?

Spiridovich.- Not. When I don't shave, you can say that I am red, but I always shave.

Chairman.- Did you shave in 1911?

Spiridovich.- Always shaved.

Chairman.- Did you know Protopopov before?

Spiridovich.- I saw him twice in my life.

Chairman.- When?

Spiridovich.- Last time, - as I already reported to you, and the first time - on the eve of departure for Yalta, on September 17 or 18, 1916. He introduced himself as a future minister. He was appointed that day.

Chairman.- And before that you had no meetings?

Spiridovich.- No, I saw him for the first time.

Chairman.- Do you firmly remember that when you arrived in Petrograd and saw Protopopov, you did not talk about current events?

Spiridovich.- Not.

Chairman.- You lived in Tsarskoye Selo. Whom of those around the yard did you know, whom did you meet?

Spiridovich.“I knew everyone, met everyone.

Chairman.- But most often?

Spiridovich.- I met with almost everyone.

Chairman.- Have you been to someone's house?

Spiridovich.- I visited the palace commandant Voeikov.

Chairman.- Were you on good terms with him?

Spiridovich.- He, as the boss, treated me well.

Chairman.- Were you in a subordinate-boss relationship or just on good terms?

Spiridovich. We didn't know each other at home.

Chairman.- Are you married with your first marriage?

Spiridovich.- Second.

Chairman. Since when have you been married to your current wife?

Spiridovich.- Since October 1915.

Chairman.- With whom did you know, except for Voeikov?

Spiridovich.- With Prince Orlov, with Drenteln, with Prince Tumanov, with all the persons who served the sovereign.

Chairman.- What about Vyrubova?

Spiridovich.- He was also familiar.

Chairman.- What kind of relationship did you have with the former empress?

Spiridovich.- None.

Chairman.- Have you been to Vyrubova in the presence of the former empress?

Spiridovich.- The former empress did not love me, as I was told.

Chairman. Why didn't she love you?

Spiridovich.- I find it difficult to answer. No one during my entire service could answer this for me.

Chairman.- But some dislike of her was felt by everyone?

Spiridovich.- Yes, it was felt. Perhaps she felt that she was being watched, that she was not being guarded, as she put it, but that they were spying on her.

Chairman.- And it was attributed to you?

Spiridovich.- Probably.

Chairman.- Did Voeikov protect you?

Spiridovich.- Hard to say.

Chairman.- Why?

Spiridovich.- Voeikov's personality is too vague to say what he said there. General Voeikov and all the palace commandants treated me well.

Chairman."But didn't this vague personality have some definite features?"

Spiridovich.- As a person, he is of enormous conceit. According to him, he is never wrong. If he listened to others, he only listened, or rather, only heard. But he had his own opinion on everything.

Chairman.- Why was Voeikov considered the center of German influence at court?

Spiridovich.- It seems to me that this came from his relationship with Fredericks, and Fredericks, according to the general public, was considered a German. I personally have never heard from General Voeikov anything in the sense of Germanophilia.

Chairman.- Of course, you did not hear, because after all there was a certain difference between him and you in terms of position. But in your hands were three hundred people who were scattered around Tsarskoye and who were watching everything, which means that you were a person who was knowledgeable about Tsarskoye Selo.

Spiridovich.- You are a little wrong in judging the service of the people subordinate to me - after all, they were in charge only of the line of passage. Meanwhile, many thought that they were watching everything Tsarsky. Perhaps this is where the former empress's dislike for me stems from.