The collapse of the "collective security" policy

The Moscow trials and the purge in the ranks of the Red Army convinced both the Germans and the French and the British that the Soviet Union was going through a serious internal crisis (generally poorly understood), which for some time deprives it of the opportunity to play a decisive role in the international arena. Presenting his plans for Austria and Czechoslovakia to the General Staff on September 5, 1937, Hitler categorically rejected any possibility of a military reaction to this by the Soviet Union in view of the chaos reigning in the country caused by the purge of military and political personnel. According to the German charge d'affaires in Paris, the French government also expressed serious doubts about the strength of the Soviet regime and the combat capability of the Red Army. “The military and political circles of France,” he wrote at the beginning of 1938, “are increasingly asking the question of the usefulness of such an ally and the credibility of him.” While the French leadership became increasingly convinced that by signing an agreement with the USSR, it, in the words of P. Haxott, "acquired nothing", the passivity of the West in the face of German aggression further increased the distrust of the Soviet Union in relation to European democracies.

On March 17, 1938, the Soviet government proposed convening an international conference to consider "practical measures against the development of aggression and the danger of a new world slaughter." This proposal was rejected by London as inherently "increasing the tendency to form blocs and undermining the prospects for establishing peace in Europe." Having met such an attitude, the Soviet Union began to seek rapprochement with Germany and in March 1938 signed new economic agreements with it, while recalling the USSR ambassador to Germany, J. Surits, a Jew and therefore objectionable to the Nazis. Hitler made the following statement to the new ambassador, A. Mirekalov, on July 4: "I am pleased to read the declaration setting out the principles by which you will be guided in your efforts to establish normal relations between Germany and the Soviet Union."

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany, the Soviet Union parted with the last illusions about the effectiveness of the policy of collective security. In addition, France and Great Britain, whose governments Litvinov tried in vain to convince that the USSR was able to fulfill its obligations, expressed strong doubts about the combat capability of the Red Army, devastated by the purges, and did not see how Soviet troops could participate in the hostilities from -for the refusal of Poland and Romania to let them pass through their territories. The Soviet Union, of course, would have taken part in an international conference, but it was not even invited to sign the Munich Agreements on September 30, 1938. The non-aggression pact concluded by J. Bonnet and I. Ribbentrop on December 6, 1938 in Paris between France and Germany was regarded in Moscow as a step that, to one degree or another, untied Hitler's hands in the East.

By the end of 1938, the foreign policy position of the USSR seemed more fragile than ever, and the feared threat of creating a united "imperialist front" was quite real. In November 1936, this threat became concrete after the signing of the "anti-Comintern pact" by Germany and Japan, which was later joined by Italy and Spain. In such a situation, the Soviet leadership decided to go for reconciliation with Chiang Kai-shek and convince the Chinese Communists of the need to create a united front with the nationalists to fight against Japanese aggression. In August 1937, the USSR and China signed a non-aggression pact. In the summer of 1938, hostilities began between Japan and the Soviet Union. Fierce battles took place in August 1938 in Eastern Siberia near Lake Khasan, and then in Mongolia, where ground and air battles that lasted several months in the Khalkhin Gol region ended in victory. Soviet troops commanded by G. Stern and G. Zhukov.

On September 15, 1939, an armistice was signed. In the face of the threat of capitalist encirclement, the Soviet Union decided to move closer to Germany without abandoning negotiations with the Western democracies.

With the coming to power in Germany (1933) of the Nazi government headed by A. Hitler, the rapprochement of the Soviet Union with England and the USA began. The USSR proposed to create a system of collective security in Europe, but due to the opposition of Germany, England and most of the Eastern European countries, it was not possible to create such a system. The reasons were as follows: mutual distrust of the USSR and European powers.

Soviet Union. There was a duality in the foreign policy of the Soviet leadership: on the one hand, a course towards the peaceful coexistence of countries with different state systems, on the other hand, a course towards supporting the world revolution, which was secretly carried out through the structures of the Comintern (communist international), absolutely controlled by Stalin and his entourage.

Western countries. Agreeing with the arguments of Soviet diplomacy about the need for collective security, at the same time, they looked for the hidden intentions of Stalin and the Comintern in the foreign policy of the USSR to export communist ideology to them.

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Genoa Conference
By the early 1920s, Soviet Russia was in international isolation. The Soviet government sought to normalize relations with the rest of the world in order to obtain loans and establish farms.

Munich agreement
France, England and the USA could not cope with the aggressive aspirations of fascist Germany and hatched plans to provoke a war between the USSR and Germany. For this purpose, Munich was concluded in 1938

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
In August 1939, negotiations between England, France and the Soviet Union on collective security took place in Moscow, but they were sluggish and ended in vain, all responsibility for their failure lies with

After the end of the First World War, the League of Nations was formed - the first World Organization, whose goals included the preservation of peace and the development of international cooperation. Formally, it was founded on January 10, 1920 and ceased to exist on April 18, 1946 with the formation of the UN. The Charter of the League of Nations, worked out by a special commission created at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920, and included in the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919. and other peace treaties that ended the First World War was originally signed with 44 states, including 31 states that took part in the war on the side of the Entente or joined it and 13 states that remained neutral during the war.

Unfortunately, the contradictions of the Treaty of Versailles were reflected in his offspring. The League of Nations failed to become a universal security organization. The great powers occupied a dominant position in it and used it to their advantage. Even then there was a double standard. If an offense was committed by a small state, the League threatened it with all punishments. If the offense was committed by a "great power", such as Italy or Japan, the League turned a blind eye to it. Decisions on important issues required unanimity. This meant that the decisions could not actually take place.

Under cover of the League of Nations in the early 1920s. the division of the former colonies of Germany and some possessions of Turkey between the victorious states was carried out in the form of distribution of mandates. Mandatory territories formally had a different status of subordination, in essence being colonies. Great Britain received Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, part of Cameroon, part of Togo and Tanganyika, France - Syria and Lebanon, part of Cameroon and part of Togo, Belgium - Ruanda-Urundi, South Africa (South Africa) - South-West Africa. The Pacific islands and territories were divided among themselves by Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

Russia (USSR) did not join the League of Nations. The defeated states - Germany (adopted into the League in 1926), Austria and Turkey - were not allowed there for a long time. The most interesting thing is that the United States, which invented it, did not enter the League of Nations: supporters of the isolationist policy thwarted the ratification (approval) of the decision on the League of Nations in Congress - they were not going to bind themselves to this international organization in resolving European and world conflicts. The center of the "new world" seemed to be Europe, whose countries were supposed to ensure peace and security in the world - without the USSR, without the USA. But that was hardly possible. Dissatisfaction with the Versailles system was widespread, among the most offended, in addition to Germany, Japan and Turkey counted themselves. At the beginning of its existence, the League of Nations was one of the centers for organizing the struggle against the Soviet state. For example, under the guise of the Rhine Pact (Locarno Accords of 1925), Great Britain and France planned to create an anti-Soviet bloc with the participation of Germany, for which they did not secure the eastern German borders with any guarantees. The USSR fought against attempts by the League of Nations to interfere in its internal affairs, and also actively participated in conferences and meetings on disarmament held under the auspices of the League of Nations, making proposals aimed at a real solution to this international problem.

The crisis of the League of Nations occurred in the 1930s, and its peak - in the middle of the pre-war decade, when one after another followed the failures of the League, which was unable to cope with the challenges of that era.

The beginning was the aggression of Japan (the founding state of the League) against China, which seized in 1931. Manchuria, where in 1932. the puppet state of Manchukuo was created, to which the League was able to oppose only the "paper conclusion" of its special commission. Japan frankly ignored this conclusion, and in March 1933. left the League. Germany, which had been a permanent member of the Council of the League since 1926, followed in October of the same year. Then there was the takeover by Italy (also a founding member of the League) of the member state of the League of Ethiopia in 1935-1936, which the League of Nations could not prevent. Following Japan and Germany in December 1937. Italy left the League of Nations. Further, the situation developed like an avalanche: violation in 1936. Germany of the Treaty of Versailles and Locarno (the entry of troops into the Rhine demilitarized zone), the aggression of Germany and Italy against Republican Spain in the same 1936, the new aggression of Japan against China in 1937, the Anschluss of Austria in 1938, the dismemberment and capture of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939 .. After that, "quantity" for the League of Nations turned into "quality". The process of the death of the organization has become irreversible.

On the part of the USSR, active attempts were made to create a system of collective security in Europe. While the USSR was not a member of the League of Nations, he could not trust the objectivity of this organization in the event of a conflict between the USSR and any other country. Therefore, the Soviet Union proposed to a number of European states to conclude non-aggression pacts with the aim of "strengthening the cause of peace and relations between countries" in the conditions of "the deep world crisis now being experienced." Not all countries accepted such proposals for concluding a non-aggression pact and peaceful settlement of conflicts (among the countries that accepted this proposal were Germany, France, Finland, Turkey, the Baltic states, Romania, Persia and Afghanistan). The treaties were identical and guaranteed the mutual inviolability of the borders and territories of both states; an obligation not to participate in any treaties, agreements and conventions that are clearly hostile to the other party, etc.

Evidence of the strengthening of the international prestige of the USSR was its adoption in the fall of 1934. to the League of Nations, at the same time negotiations began on the conclusion of a multilateral regional agreement on mutual assistance ("Eastern Pact"), in which the USSR participated. The refusal of Germany and Poland to participate in this agreement, the unconstructive policy of Great Britain led to the termination of negotiations. Then the Soviet Union signed in 1935. a tripartite mutual assistance treaty with France and Czechoslovakia, which provided for the provision of military assistance to one of the parties in the event of an attack, but on the condition that this assistance would be provided by the other two parties. Subsequently, when Germany in March 1939. captured Czechoslovakia, and France agreed with this, the USSR offered to provide assistance unilaterally, but the government of Czechoslovakia refused to accept it.

The USSR also put forward the idea of ​​concluding a Pacific Collective Security Pact with the participation of China, the USA, Britain and other countries. But this initiative was not supported by Western partners.

Germany was in an unrestricted arms race in preparation for war. In 1935, it proclaimed a universal conscription. In 1935 between Berlin and London, negotiations began on the conclusion of an Anglo-German alliance, the purpose of which was, according to Hitler, "freedom of action for England on the seas and in overseas countries, freedom of action for Germany on the continent and in expansion to the East." An Anglo-German naval agreement was soon signed allowing for an increase in the German navy. In March 1936, German troops occupied the Rhine demilitarized zone, violating the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The Nazis rushed to power in France, Austria, Greece, in the Baltic states. In Spain, after the victory in the elections of the Popular Front in February 1936, the right-wing forces, led by General Franco, revolted. Germany and Italy actively helped the rebels. At the same time, most European states adhered to a policy of non-intervention in Spanish events, since the victory of either side weakened their own positions.

At first, the Soviet Union agreed with this policy and tried to stop the intervention of Italy and Germany in this conflict, but, convinced of the inefficiency of this activity, it began to provide significant economic, political military assistance to the Republicans, including sending regular troops under the guise of volunteers. In addition to Soviet volunteers, international brigades formed by the Comintern from anti-fascists from 54 countries fought on the side of the republican government. However, the forces were still unequal. After the withdrawal of international units from Spain, the republican government fell.

In 1936-1937. the Anti-Comintern Pact, or the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, was formed. In March 1938 Germany carried out the Anschluss (accession) of Austria. There was a real threat of breaking the balance of power in Europe and a world war. European diplomacy did not oppose this. She pursued a policy of appeasing the aggressor, i.e. tried, through concessions to Germany, to turn it into a reliable partner in international affairs, also sought to use Germany as a counterbalance to the foreign policy of the USSR, hoping that Germany's predatory aspirations would be directed to the East. The policy of appeasement culminated in the agreement in Munich (September 1938), which was attended by the heads of the governments of Germany, Italy, England and France. The most significant result of this meeting was the decision to annex the Sudetenland - an industrialized region of Czechoslovakia - to Germany. This was the maximum possible concession from England and France to Germany, but it only whetted Hitler's appetites. After the Western countries not only refused to help Czechoslovakia, but also forced it to refuse military assistance to the USSR, March 15, 1939. Germany took over the rest of Czechoslovakia. At the end of March, as a result of a conspiracy organized by the imperialists, the Spanish Republic fell. On April 7, fascist Italy occupied Albania. The governments of the Western powers essentially resigned themselves to new conquests. On February 27, England and France, and on April 1, the United States also recognized the Franco regime. By and large, diplomats accredited to the Axis countries were unanimous - a trip to the East was not far off. There was even a reason that Hitler would apparently choose to open hostilities: the "joining" of Soviet Ukraine to Transcarpathian Ukraine. However, Hitler handed over the Transcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary, which caused considerable confusion among the "Munichians". The eastern campaign, obviously, was postponed. In England and France, dissatisfaction was growing even in the ruling circles, who were seriously concerned about the threat to the national security of both countries. Under pressure from the public, on March 31, 1939, England and France granted guarantees of "independence" to Poland, and then to Romania. On April 15, F. Roosevelt sent a message to Hitler, asking him to assure that Germany would not attack its neighbors for 10 years. However, Danzig was omitted from the list of the latter, and its annexation to Germany became the reason for the anti-Polish campaign in Germany.

In the spring of 1939 In connection with the sharp escalation of the aggressive actions of the fascist states, the USSR turned to England and France with specific proposals for concluding an agreement on mutual assistance, including a military convention in the event of aggression in Europe. The Soviet government believed that in order to create a real barrier of peace-loving states against the further deployment of aggression in Europe, at least three conditions were necessary:

1) the conclusion between Britain, France and the USSR of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression;

2) the guarantee of security by these three great powers to the states of Central and Eastern Europe under the threat of aggression, including here also Latvia, Estonia, Finland;

3) the conclusion of a specific agreement between Britain, France and the USSR on the forms and amounts of assistance provided to each other and to the guaranteed states, without which (without such an agreement) mutual assistance pacts run the risk of hanging in the air, as the experience with Czechoslovakia showed.

June 2, 1939 The USSR handed over to the governments of England and France a draft treaty that took into account all the proposals put forward during the negotiations.

The British and French proposals did not provide for guarantees from Estonia, Latvia and Finland, at the same time they demanded guarantees of assistance from the USSR in relation to Poland, Romania, Belgium, Greece and Turkey, then raised the question of extending the guarantees of the three powers to Holland and Switzerland. The stubborn unwillingness of the British and French governments to include the Baltic countries in the general system of collective security in Europe had a very definite meaning - to leave open the gates from the northwest for the invasion of Nazi Germany into the territory of the Soviet Union. Intensive preparations were made for the use of Finland for the war against the USSR. At the expense of England, France, Sweden, the USA and Germany, military construction was carried out on the Karelian Isthmus under the guidance of the largest specialists of these countries. The Finnish government actively cooperated with Germany.

Great Britain was in parallel negotiating with Germany and Japan. July 18, and then again on July 21, 1939. conversations between Chamberlain Wilson's confidant and Hitler's emissary Wohltat, an official for special assignments in Goering's department, took place. Wilson proposed to conclude an Anglo-German non-aggression pact and sign a declaration of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. On July 20, at the initiative of Wilson, Wohltath met with the Minister of Overseas Trade of England, Hudson, who expressed the opinion that “... there are still three large areas in the world in which Germany and England could find wide opportunities for applying their forces, namely: English Empire, China and Russia".

On July 29, during a meeting of representatives of the Labor Party of England with the adviser of the German Embassy in London, proposals were considered for concluding an "agreement on the delimitation of spheres of interest" between England and Germany.

In July 1939 in Tokyo, an agreement was signed under which England recognized Japanese seizures in China and pledged not to hinder Japanese aggression there. It was the "Far Eastern Munich", according to which China was assigned the same role as a victim of aggression in Asia as Czechoslovakia was in Europe. The agreement was signed at the height of the armed conflict unleashed by Japan against the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic near the Khalkhin Gol River.

July 25, 1939 The British government finally accepted the Soviet proposal to begin negotiations on an Anglo-French-Soviet military agreement. On July 26, the French Foreign Minister announced that a French delegation would leave for Moscow.

To conduct military negotiations, the Soviet government appointed a delegation headed by the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Voroshilov. The members of the delegation were Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Shaposhnikov, People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov, Chief of the Air Force of the Red Army Loktionov and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Smorodinov.

The British delegation included Admiral Drax, Marshal of the British Air Force Barnet and Major General Haywood. The delegation was instructed to "negotiate very slowly." The American embassy in London reported to the US State Department on August 8 that the British military mission "has been instructed to do everything possible to ensure that the negotiations continue until October 1."

The head of the British delegation, Drax, declared that he "had no written authority" and that he was "authorized only to negotiate, not to sign a pact (convention)."

The French military delegation included a member of the Supreme Military Council of France, General Doumenc, the commander of the 3rd Air Division, General Valen, a professor at the Vuillaume Naval School, and others. The French delegation had the authority only to negotiate, but not to sign any agreement.

To the question of the head of the Soviet military mission: "Do the missions of England and France have corresponding military plans?" - Drax replied that when he came to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet government, he "expected that the project would be proposed by the Soviet mission."

The cardinal issue of the negotiations was the question of the passage of Soviet troops through Polish territory, "in order to directly contact the enemy if he attacks Poland", or "through Romanian territory, if the aggressor attacks Romania." These issues were not resolved during the negotiations, since the Polish government, even in the face of immediate danger from Germany, did not change the anti-Soviet course of its foreign policy. As early as May 11, 1939, the Polish ambassador in Moscow declared that Poland did not consider it possible to conclude a mutual assistance pact with the USSR. During negotiations in Moscow on August 20, Polish Foreign Minister J. Beck sent a telegram to his ambassador in France: “Poland is not bound by any military treaties with the Soviets, and the Polish government is not going to conclude such an agreement.”

In Paris, however, anxiety was growing in connection with the growing German aggressiveness.

war europe security fascism

French diplomacy, balancing between the old policy of appeasement and the fear of German aggression, behaved inconsistently during the negotiations, but on August 21 the French government authorized its representatives to sign the tripartite military convention. At the same time, the representatives of France in Warsaw tried to influence the Polish government, agree to the passage of Soviet troops through Polish territory in the event of a war with the aggressor (meaning Germany) and include this agreement in the text of the convention. But the negotiations stalled because of the position of the British government, which did not give its delegation the authority to sign a military convention. “The British Government,” said the statement approved at the meeting of the Defense Committee of England on August 2, 1939. instructions to the delegation at the Moscow talks - does not want to be drawn into any definite obligation that could tie our hands under any circumstances. Therefore, in relation to a military agreement, one should strive to limit oneself to as general formulations as possible ... not to negotiate on the issue of the defense of the Baltic states.

Poland and Romania also did not give consent to the passage of Soviet troops through Polish and Romanian territories in order to participate in hostilities against Germany.

In August 1939, the Soviet government received information that the German army was being brought to combat readiness and concentrated near the Polish border. It became known that in the period from 25 to 28 August, military operations of Germany against Poland may begin. Therefore, the Soviet Union had to think about an alternative way out.

Germany was interested in a non-aggression pact with the USSR, as it wanted the USSR to remain neutral after its attack on Poland. According to the documents, it is known that the decision to attack Poland was made when there was no talk of a non-aggression pact. In June, when the Soviet-Anglo-French negotiations were in full swing, Hitler says that the attack will take place regardless of whether an agreement is concluded between England, France and the USSR, that the German-Polish conflict will be resolved as planned in Berlin .

Analysis secret correspondence between the German embassy in Moscow and Berlin in June-August 1939. suggests that the Soviet government was cautious about Germany's proposal to conclude a treaty. This is how the German embassy and ambassador assesses the first stage of diplomatic probing in May-June: “We did everything possible, but we cannot drag Molotov and Mikoyan into the Brandenburg Gate.” On July 30, Hitler instructs: "Given the behavior of the Russians, to abandon further actions in Moscow." Later, after a meeting with Molotov, held on August 3 by telegraph from Berlin, Ambassador von Schulenburg reports: "My general impression is that the Soviet government has now decided to conclude an agreement with France - England, if they fulfill all its wishes."

On August 15, Ribbentrop announces through his ambassador in Moscow that he is ready to "make a short trip to Moscow in order to lay the foundation for clarifying German-Soviet relations." But the Soviet leadership replies: "Such a trip will require appropriate preparation."

On August 18, a new order to the ambassador: to seek agreement on an "urgent visit", bearing in mind that "the start of a German-Polish conflict is also possible in the near future ...". The next day, in response, the German ambassador was handed a Soviet draft non-aggression pact, and with regard to Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow, it was said that it would become possible after the announcement of the signing of the economic agreement, and if this announcement was made today or tomorrow, then the minister could arrive August 26-27.

On August 19, a Soviet-German loan agreement was signed in Berlin. The Soviet Union was given a loan of 200 million German marks for the purchase of industrial products in Germany, including military materials. The signing of this treaty gave a certain guarantee that Germany was not going to attack the USSR in the near future.

On August 20, Berlin fully reveals its cards. In a telegram to Stalin, Hitler announces: Germany "from now on has decided to secure the interests of the Reich by all means" in the conflict with Poland. He proposes to receive Ribbentrop "on Tuesday, August 22, but at the latest on Wednesday, August 23." The visit "should last at most two days, a longer period, taking into account the international situation, is impossible." It was clear that the German war machine was already on and an attack on Poland could happen any day now.

On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed for a period of ten years.

The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol that demarcated the spheres of influence of the parties in Eastern Europe: “Agreement was reached as follows:

1. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be the line separating the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania's interest in the Vilna region is recognized by both sides.

2. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR will be delimited approximately along the lines of the Narew, Vistula and San rivers.

The question of whether it is desirable in the interests of the parties to preserve the independence of the Polish state, about the boundaries of such a state, will be finally decided only by the course of future political events.

Regarding South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side indicated its interest in Bessarabia. The German side has clearly stated its complete political disinterest in these territories.

Thus, the sphere of influence of the USSR included Finland, Estonia, Latvia and the eastern territories of the Polish state - Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well as Bessarabia, forcibly torn away from the Soviet Republic after the First World War.

It can, of course, be argued that the conclusion of a secret protocol with Germany drew the Soviet state into the imperialist redistribution of the world as an ally of Hitler, but one cannot help but notice the formation of a bloc of aggressive states on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the signing of the Munich Agreement, tacit and often active encouragement of the aggressor with side of the Western powers. This protocol can be understood in the context of that time. A clash between the Soviet Union and Germany was inevitable. Stalin believed that in the name of final victory in a future war, it would be better if this clash took place on lines 200-300 kilometers away from the former borders of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet-German non-aggression pact cannot be regarded as an isolated phenomenon, as bare fact in isolation from the events that were then taking place in the world. The treaty was concluded when fascist aggression was already hanging over the European states. The economic and political plans of the aggressor were supported by the very influential forces of England, France, and also the United States. These were circles that hoped to deal with the Soviet Union with Hitler's hands.

But not only in Moscow thought so. Here is an excerpt from a conversation between the Soviet plenipotentiary in London Maisky and Churchill at the end of October 1939, already in the conditions of the outbreak of World War II.

“From the point of view of correctly understood interests of England, the fact that the whole East and South-East of Europe are outside the zone of war,” Churchill said, “is not negative, but positive. For the most part, Britain has no reason to object to the actions of the USSR in the Baltics. Of course, some of the sentimental figures may shed a tear about the Russian protectorate over Estonia or Latvia, but this cannot be taken seriously ... ". “Churchill,” reports Maisky, “understands that the USSR should be the master on the eastern coast of the Baltic world, and is very glad that the Baltic countries are included in our, and not in the German state system. This is historically normal and at the same time reduces the possible "living space" for Hitler. Churchill at the same time sweepingly drew along the line of the Soviet-German demarcation and declared: "Germany must not be allowed further than this line."

Churchill later wrote of the treaty:

“It is impossible to say who he inspired more disgust - Hitler or Stalin. Both realized that this could only be a temporary measure dictated by circumstances. The antagonism between the two empires and systems was deadly. Stalin no doubt thought that Hitler would be a less dangerous enemy for Russia after a year of war against the Western powers. Hitler followed his "one by one" method. The fact that such an agreement was possible marks the full extent of the failure of British and French policy and diplomacy in a few years.

In favor of the Soviets, it must be said that it was vital for the Soviet Union to move as far to the West as possible the starting positions of the German armies so that the Russians would have time to gather forces from all over their colossal empire. The catastrophes that their armies suffered in 1914, when they rushed to the offensive against the Germans, were imprinted in the minds of the Russians with red-hot iron, had not yet completed their mobilization. And now their borders were much further east than during the first war. They needed to occupy the Baltic states and most of Poland by force or deceit before they were attacked. If their policy was coldly calculating, then it was also at that moment in high degree realistic."

The agreements reached in August 1939 put a limit on the spread of fascist expansion in Eastern Europe, and therefore they can be regarded as directed not against, but in defense of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

At present, the opinions of researchers on the issue of concluding a Soviet-German non-aggression pact drastically differ, but are based, as a rule, on political likes and dislikes, and not on an objective analysis of the facts.

The conclusion of such an agreement allowed the USSR to get away from the danger of being drawn into a war on two fronts and made it possible to win some time to develop and strengthen the country's defense.

September 1, 1939 Nazi Germany attacked Poland. The allies of the latter - England and France - declared war on Germany. The Second World War. Attempts to create a system of collective security and prevent war have failed.

1.Introduction……………………………………………………………………2

2. Prerequisites for the “collective security” policy……………..2

3. The development of “collective security” in the mid-30s…….4

4. The failure of the “collective security” policy…………………….9

5.Conclusion……………………………………………………………..12

6. Literature………...……………………………………………………… 13

Introduction.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the international situation changed significantly. The deep world economic crisis that began in 1929 caused serious internal political changes in all capitalist countries. In some (England, France, etc.), he brought to power forces that sought to carry out broad internal transformations of a democratic nature. In others (Germany, Italy), the crisis contributed to the formation of anti-democratic (fascist) regimes that used social demagoguery in domestic politics at the same time as unleashing political terror, forcing chauvinism and militarism. It was these regimes that became the instigators of new military conflicts (especially after A. Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933).

Hotbeds of international tension began to form at a rapid pace. One developed in Europe because of the aggressiveness of fascist Germany and Italy. The second in the Far East because of the hegemonic claims of the Japanese militarists.

Taking into account these factors, in 1933 the Soviet government defined new tasks for its foreign policy: refusal to participate in international conflicts, especially those of a military nature; recognition of the possibility of cooperation with democratic Western countries to contain the aggressive aspirations of Germany and Japan (policy of "appeasement"); struggle for the creation of a system of collective security in Europe and the Far East.

Prerequisites for a “collective security” policy

The normalization of relations between the Soviet state and European countries began in the early 1920s. The first agreement was the Soviet-British trade agreement of March 16, 1921. Soon a Soviet-German temporary trade agreement was signed. Similar agreements were soon concluded with Norway, Austria, and Italy. Denmark and Czechoslovakia. In 1922 Genoa hosted the International Economic and Financial Conference, which was attended by 29 countries. Questions about disarmament raised by the Soviet delegation were rejected by other delegations. The position of the Western powers included demands to pay the debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments, return nationalized property to foreigners, and provide foreigners with the opportunity to engage in trade and economic activities in the Soviet country with the rights they had in other countries. They did not come to an agreement. It was decided to refer the disputed issues for consideration to a conference of experts in The Hague. The conference in The Hague ended inconclusively. Participation in the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1922, which discussed issues of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, also demonstrated the incompatibility of the positions of Soviet Russia and Western countries. Bilateral relations developed more effectively for the USSR. During the Genoa Conference in Rapallo, a bilateral Soviet-German treaty was signed (1922). Its signing was regarded as an attempt to disrupt the Versailles international system that began to take shape in post-war Europe. In October 1925, a trade agreement with Germany and a consular convention were signed; in 1926, the USSR and Germany signed a non-aggression and neutrality pact. Soviet-British relations developed more complicated. For a long time the relationship was very tense. A manifestation of this was Curzon's memorandum containing a number of ultimatum demands: an end to subversive activities in Iran and Afghanistan, an end to religious persecution in the USSR, and others. Fearing an escalation of tension, the Soviet government agreed to meet a number of demands. The conflict between Moscow and London was finally settled in 1923. After that, in January 1924, the USSR was officially recognized by Great Britain. In August of the same year, the General Treaty and the Treaty on Trade and Navigation were signed. The aggravation of diplomatic relations took place in 1926 during the strike of the British miners, when the Soviet leadership provided assistance to the strikers through the trade unions. In 1927, diplomatic relations between the countries were severed. Diplomatic relations with other countries were more stable. Established and maintained diplomatic relations with Italy, Norway, Austria, Sweden, Greece, Denmark and France. Only relations with the USA have not been established.

At this time, the USSR was pursuing a more active policy towards Asian countries. After the end of the civil war, it strengthened peaceful relations with the states located on the southern borders of the country - with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey. By the end of the 1920s, the influence of the USSR on the world stage increased. The period of the late 20s - mid-30s was characterized by a relatively stable situation on the western borders of the USSR; the situation on the eastern borders was different. The conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929, the Japanese aggression in Manchuria and Shanghai in 1931-32, which escalated into a war between Japan and China. Relations between China and the USSR were restored by 1932, relations with London resumed in 1929. Relations between the USSR and the USA during this period were unstable. Diplomatic relations with the United States were established in 1933, after Roosevelt came to the White House.

Since the mid-1930s, Moscow has actively supported the ideas of creating collective security systems in Europe and the Far East, which were supposed to lead to an alliance with democratic countries and to the isolation of Germany and Japan. In 1934 The USSR was accepted into the League of Nations - an international organization, the predecessor of the UN.

The development of "collective security" in the mid-30s.

The development of international relations in the 1930s took place in a difficult situation. The capitalist world was shaken by the economic crisis of 1929–1932. The crisis led to an aggravation of internal contradictions and intensified the economic and political rivalry between the big imperialist powers. The coming to power of the Nazis had a significance far beyond the national framework and had a strong influence on the change in the entire political climate on the European continent. The aggressive militaristic essence of the fascist regimes, their fierce anti-Bolshevik and anti-Soviet propaganda began to exert an ever-increasing influence on the development of the foreign policy of the European states. The threat to the victorious countries of the First World War increased, and at the same time, the hopes of London and Paris to use the Nazi regime as a "bastion" against Bolshevism strengthened.

The policy of the Soviet government was aimed at ensuring the security of the USSR and preventing war. The state and party leadership of the USSR believed that the capitalist encirclement, hostile to socialism, would inevitably undertake military actions against the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, it became clear that the most likely opponents in the war would be Germany, Italy, and Japan. In the Soviet Union, a course was taken for the intensive development of military industries and the strengthening of the country's defense capability.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership considered it necessary to strengthen the country's international position by expanding ties with non-aggressive capitalist states and to create a system of collective resistance to aggression on a contractual basis. The relations of the Soviet Union with the capitalist countries were characterized by deep mutual distrust and suspicion. There was a well-founded fear in the USSR about the possibility of forming a single anti-Soviet bloc of imperialist states. It was no secret to the Soviet leadership that the German slogan "Drang nach Osten" met with a very favorable attitude in Paris and London, that the aggression of the fascist states could be directed against the USSR.

The policy of the Soviet Union, in turn, caused mistrust on the part of the Western powers. The thesis of the CPSU(b) about the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and the victory of the socialist revolution on a global scale was interpreted in the West as a program of Soviet expansionism. The support of the Soviet Union for the revolutionary movements was regarded by the right-wing leaders of the bourgeoisie as a manifestation of the "revolutionary messianism of the Soviets." The victories of the Popular Fronts in Spain and France in 1936 frightened the bourgeoisie of Western Europe, who hastened to attribute the successes of the left forces to the "intrigues of Moscow." The course of the Soviet leadership to increase the military potential of the USSR was used by anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda to spread the myth of the "Soviet military threat". Many political leaders The West, considering Nazi Germany as a "bastion against Bolshevism", justified in this way the policy of "appeasement" of the aggressor, which actually encouraged the plans of the most reactionary forces of imperialism directed against the USSR.

In 1935 the Soviet Union already had diplomatic relations with 36 countries of the world, including all the leading capitalist powers. The Soviet government concluded friendship treaties with Turkey and Yemen, an agreement on guarantees and neutrality with Iran, non-aggression treaties with Latvia, Estonia, Poland, France, Italy and Afghanistan. In 1936, a protocol on mutual assistance was signed between the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic. The expansion of the Soviet Union's ties with other states increased the possibilities for the active influence of Soviet policy on the development of international relations.

The attitude of the Soviet state towards the League of Nations did not remain unchanged. In the first years of the existence of Soviet power, this international organization, created after the end of the First World War, took up anti-Soviet positions, uniting the imperialist powers in the struggle against Soviet Russia. However, the international environment was changing. The Soviet state turned into a power, the existence of which had to be reckoned with by all countries of the world. Japan's aggression in China, the growth of fascist Germany's military preparations, and the withdrawal of these states from the League of Nations created a direct military threat in Europe and Asia. Under these conditions, the participation of the USSR in an international organization whose charter provided for counteracting aggression became desirable for many member countries of the League of Nations. France took the initiative in inviting the USSR to the League of Nations.

The decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of December 20, 1933 included a clause on the possibility, under certain conditions, of the USSR joining the League of Nations. The Soviet leadership did not overestimate the effectiveness of the activities of the League of Nations, but considered it possible to participate in the collective actions of this international organization against the military threat from the most aggressive forces of imperialism.

On September 15, 1934, having received an invitation on behalf of 30 member countries of the League of Nations to join this organization, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR sent a letter to the chairman of the XV Assembly of the League of Nations stating that the Soviet government accepted the invitation as an expression of the desire of the majority of the members of the League of Nations to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Union is ready to become a member of the League of Nations and to assume the observance of international obligations arising from the Charter of the League. The Soviet government officially declared that it was not responsible for the decisions taken by the League of Nations prior to the entry of the USSR. In addition, the USSR expressed its disagreement with the system of mandates adopted by the League of Nations, which was in fact a form of colonial rule, and also expressed regret over the absence of obligations of racial equality in Article 22 of the Charter. The head of the Soviet delegation to the XV Assembly of the League of Nations, in his speech on September 18, stressed that the Soviet Union was entering the international organization as a state of a new socio-political system, preserving its inherent features.

In the opinion of the Soviet government, the effectiveness of collective measures to counter aggression could be ensured only if the international community agreed to determine the real danger, if an international legal basis was created to establish the very fact of aggression. Therefore, even earlier, at the Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Arms in February 1933, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft declaration on the definition of aggression. The Soviet Union proposed to give the most complete definition of aggression, i.e. to fix various activities attacking side, which may entail political, economic and military sanctions of the world or regional community within the framework of collective security in the name of maintaining peace.

The declaration proposed by the Soviet Union on the definition of aggression was a new phenomenon in international law and received a wide response in world public opinion and in the ruling circles of many states. In July 1933, the USSR signed a convention on the definition of aggression with 10 states: Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Lithuania. In January 1934, Finland joined the convention. However, the leading capitalist countries - the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan - did not sign the convention, thereby weakening the foundations for creating collective security. Developing the concept of collective security, Soviet diplomacy proposed supplementing the mechanism for ensuring peace, along with the activities of the League of Nations, with a system of regional pacts. In a conversation with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Barthou in Geneva on May 18, 1934, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov spoke about a system of multilateral pacts that were supposed to cover the states of those regions where the threat of war and aggression was brewing. The Soviet People's Commissar considered it expedient to form "three vicious circle"- Eastern European, Pacific and Mediterranean, which could be formed as a result of regional agreements on mutual assistance against aggression with the participation of states interested in maintaining peace in these areas. According to the Soviet government, the regional pacts were to have a close connection with the League of Nations and create a more flexible and more effective mechanism for countering aggression.

The failure of the "collective security" policy

The Western powers pursued a policy of concessions to fascist Germany, hoping to create from it a reliable counterbalance against the USSR and direct its aggression to the east. This policy culminated in the Munich Agreement (September 1938) between Germany, Italy, Britain and France. It legally formalized the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Feeling its strength, Germany in 1930 occupied the whole of Czechoslovakia.

In the Far East, Japan, having captured most of China, approached the Soviet borders. In the summer of 1938, an armed conflict took place on the territory of the USSR in the area of ​​Lake Khasan. The Japanese grouping was thrown back. In May 1939 Japanese troops invaded Mongolia. Parts of the Red Army under the command of G.K. Kukov defeated them in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol River.

At the beginning of 1939, the last attempt was made to create a system of collective security between Britain, France and the Soviet Union. However, Western states did not believe in the potential ability of the USSR to resist fascist aggression. Therefore, the negotiations were dragged out by them in every possible way. In addition, Poland categorically refused to guarantee the passage of Soviet troops through its territory to repel the alleged fascist aggression. At the same time, Great Britain established secret contacts with Germany in order to reach an agreement on a wide range of political problems (including the neutralization of the USSR in the international arena).

The Soviet government knew that the German army was already in full readiness to attack Poland. Realizing the inevitability of war and its unpreparedness for it, it sharply changed its foreign policy orientation and went towards rapprochement with Germany. On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded in Moscow, which immediately entered into force and was designed for 10 years (Ribbentrop Molotov Pact). It was accompanied by a secret protocol on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. The interests of the Soviet Union were recognized by Germany in the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia, Finland) and Bessarabia.

September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland. Poland's allies Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September. However, they did not provide real military assistance to the Polish government, which ensured A. Hitler a quick victory. The second world war began.

In the new international conditions, the leadership of the USSR began to implement the Soviet-German agreements of August 1939 on September 17, after the defeat of the Polish army by the Germans and the fall of the Polish government. The Red Army entered Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. On September 28, the Soviet-German Treaty "On Friendship and Border" was concluded, which secured these lands as part of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the USSR insisted on concluding agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, gaining the right to deploy its troops on their territory. In these republics, in the presence of Soviet troops, legislative elections were held, in which the communist forces won. In 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became part of the USSR.

In November 1939, the USSR began a war with Finland in the hope of quickly defeating it and creating a pro-communist government in it. There was also a military-strategic need to ensure the security of Leningrad by moving the Soviet-Finnish border away from it in the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus. Military operations were accompanied by huge losses on the part of the Red Army. They showed her poor preparedness. The stubborn resistance of the Finnish army was ensured by the deeply echeloned defensive "Mannerheim Line". Western states provided Finland with political support. The USSR, under the pretext of its aggression, was expelled from the League of Nations. At the cost of enormous efforts, the resistance of the Finnish armed forces was broken. In March 1940, the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed, according to which the USSR received the entire Karelian Isthmus.

In the summer of 1940, as a result of political pressure, Romania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union.

As a result, significant territories with a population of 14 million people were included in the USSR. The border of the country moved in the west in different places to a distance of 300 to 600 km. The foreign policy agreements of 1939 helped to delay the German attack on the Soviet Union by almost two years.

The Soviet leadership made an agreement with fascist Germany, whose ideology and policy it had previously condemned. Such a turn could be carried out in the conditions of the state system, all the internal means of propaganda of which were aimed at justifying the actions of the government and forming a new attitude of Soviet society towards the Nazi regime.

If the Non-Aggression Pact, signed in August 1939, was to a certain extent a forced step for the USSR, then the secret protocol, the Treaty of Friendship and the Border, and other foreign policy actions of the Stalinist government carried out on the eve of the war did not take into account the interests of different states and peoples of Eastern Europe

Conclusion

A valuable contribution to the practice of international relations was the Soviet proposals on disarmament, on the definition of aggression, and the creation of regional pacts of mutual assistance. Soviet diplomacy gained experience in the League of Nations and became a permanent and active participant in the most important international forums. The undoubted success of Soviet foreign policy was the conclusion of mutual assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia.

The main reason for the failure of the collective security policy was that Soviet diplomacy failed to overcome the hostility of the ruling circles of the West to Soviet state. The ideological confrontation between socialism and capitalism hindered the development of interstate relations, anti-Sovietism and anti-communism became the basis that led to the Munich agreement. In 1938–1939 crisis phenomena in the relations between the USSR and the leading capitalist countries were growing, and the tendency towards the political isolation of the USSR was intensifying.

The development of international relations was negatively influenced by the inconsistent and contradictory policies of Washington, London and Paris, which failed to overcome mutual rivalry and develop a common position towards aggressive states. It should also be taken into account that the USSR acted in the international arena without loyal and reliable allies. The unfavorable development of international relations was largely influenced by the miscalculations and mistakes of the Soviet political leadership.

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