Soldiers of the second defense 1942.
"Great Dead Adzhimushkay".
Dedicated.

The war broke into every Soviet family with the pain of uncertainty and danger hanging over our Motherland, a premonition of irreparable losses and suffering.
June 22, 1941 at 03:15 enemy aircraft raided the main base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol; Ishmael attacked. Even before the raid, on the orders of the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, the Military Council of the Fleet introduced operational readiness No. All personnel were on ships and in units. The calculation of the fascist German command for the night laying of mines by aircraft and the blocking of ships with subsequent destruction in the bases was thwarted.
In July - August 1941, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the troops of the southern front retreated to the east. The left-flank divisions of the 9th Army, cut off from the main forces of the front, were merged into the Primorsky Group of Forces, which was transformed on July 19 into the Primorsky Army (commanded by Lieutenant General G.P. Safronov). Under the blows of the enemy, the army retreated to Odessa.
The defense of Odessa lasted from August 5 to October 16; up to 80 thousand soldiers and commanders, 15 thousand inhabitants, about 500 guns, 14 tanks, 1158 vehicles, 163 tractors, 3.5 thousand horses, about 25 thousand tons of various cargoes were evacuated to the Crimea. The Odessa Defensive Line provided a preparatory stage and time in the defense of the Crimea, a successful evacuation supplemented the 51st Separate Army with combat experience and high morale of the Primorsky Army.
In the south of Ukraine, the German-Romanian troops, continuing the offensive, in mid-September 1941 reached the Chongar bridge and the Arabatskaya arrow. The enemy threw in the Crimean direction 7 infantry divisions of the 11th army and the Romanian corps (two brigades).
The complexity of the situation, the inconsistency of intelligence sources, served, in part, to disperse the 51st army (commanded by Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, then - Lieutenant General P.I. Batov) across the area of ​​the Crimean peninsula in order to counter probable enemy landings. The 51st Army was deployed in August 1941 from units of the 9th Separate Rifle Corps, previously stationed in the Crimea, and several divisions formed on mobilization. The new formations had weak weapons and did not have time to undergo sufficient combat training.
Already by June 26, the minesweeper T-412 on the approaches to the Kerch Strait, from Novorossiysk (the northwestern part of the Black Sea), had installed 250 mines. 15,000 Kerch residents were mobilized to the front.
July 15 - 5 rifle divisions from the 9th rifle corps and naval rifle divisions (51 armies and KVMB) took up defense on the Perekop-Sivash-Armyansk line.
July 20 - The Azov military flotilla is formed.
On August 1, in accordance with the report of Mironov to the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the selection of 200 partisans (by August 5 - 300 people), the following were formed on the Kerch Peninsula: the Mayak-Salyn group, headed by S.F. Leiko; Mariental - S.F. Mukhanov; Maryevskaya - G.I. Podoprigora. In the city of Kerch and adjacent settlements, the preparation of the population for P.V.O.
August 14 - The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief issued a Directive on the formation of the 51st army.
By September 1, the Kerch Naval Base was formed, which included: 3 divisions of ships for the protection of the water area and the 2nd group of ships for the protection of raids. During the 4th stage of the mobilization of Kerch residents in the 1st Crimean division (320 rifle division 51A), more than 15 thousand people left, 9 thousand people died, 4.5 thousand people were missing.
In accordance with the decision of the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated August 28, the enterprises of the city were transferred to a special mode of operation in wartime. The production of products necessary for the front has begun. The workers of Kerch are building and equipping two armored trains "Voykovets" and "Gornyak" for the front.
Stubborn fighting on the outskirts of the Crimea began on September 12, when the advanced units of the 11th German Army broke through to the Perekop Isthmus. Military sailors provided active assistance to the 51st Army in deterring superior enemy forces.
On September 17, the ships of the Azov Flotilla and the Black Sea Fleet helped units of the 51st Army to destroy enemy tanks that had broken through to the Arabat Spit.
On September 19, the Voroshilov cruiser fired at enemy positions in the Skadovsk, Khorly, Alekseyevka area.
On September 24, the troops of the 54th Army Corps of the 11th German Army (since September 17, commander Erich von Manstein), with the support of tanks and aircraft, launched an offensive against Perekop and Armyansk, and on September 26 broke into Armyansk. Under pressure from the enemy, the Soviet units were forced to retreat to the Ishun defensive positions. This line of defense was weakly fortified, but the Nazi troops, who suffered significant losses in the battles for Perekop, were unable to immediately capture it.
On October 13, Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov was appointed commander of the Azov military flotilla. Under Kerch, three gunboats "Don", "Rion", No. 4 were additionally allocated.
On October 18, troops of the 11th German army attacked the Ishun positions. The weakened units of the 51st army, in exhausting bloody battles, could not hold back the superior enemy forces. The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army transferred from Odessa began to arrive on the Crimean Isthmus, when the Nazis had already broken through the Ishun positions.
To closely coordinate the actions of the ground forces and the Black Sea Fleet, on October 22, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command created the command of the Crimean troops, headed by Vice Admiral G.I. Levchenko. Corps Commissar A.S. Nikolaev was appointed a member of the Military Council, and com. 51 of the Separate Army, Lieutenant General P.I. Batov.
On October 24, the command of the Crimean troops launched a counterattack in the Vorontsovka area. Fierce fighting continued for several days, but it was not possible to push the enemy back. Soviet troops began to retreat to the steppe regions of the Crimea, where there were no prepared defensive lines. The 51st army retreated with heavy fighting to the Kerch Peninsula. The Kerch Defensive Region was formed here, which included the forces of the 51st Army and the KVMB (Commander Rear Admiral P.N. Vasyunin).
A separate Primorsky army, under continuous blows from superior enemy forces, began to retreat to Sevastopol. But the shortest paths to the city were cut by the enemy. The main forces of the Separate Primorsky Army had to break through the mountains, Alushta and Yalta to Sevastopol. evacuation of equipment, raw materials, wounded; mobilized to the front... The toiling city fulfilled its duty to the end.
KMZ workers equipped the Voykovets armored train to the front, which crossed the factory gates on August 21. And already on August 24 - baptism of fire at Perekop. Since October 25, the commander of the armored train, Major S.P. Baranov. The bright and short fate of the armored train crew. On October 31, at the Shakul station, the Voykovets took its last battle. Part of the crew went out to connect with the Crimean partisans, the other - carried out the wounded commander and already in Sevastopol joined the ranks of the defenders of the fortress city.
October 27 - Kerch is bombed daily.
October 28 - based on the decision of the Military Council of the Crimean troops in the Republic - a state of siege is introduced in Kerch.
On November 1, KVMB was included in the KOR and operationally subordinated to Lieutenant General P.I. Batov by order of 51A.
From November 1 to November 3 Evpatoria, Saki, Simferopol were occupied by the enemy.
November 4 - three of the five gunboats based in Kerch were sunk by enemy aircraft.
By November 6, the Adzhimushkay partisan detachment named after Lenin was formed in Kerch (leaders: M.A. Mayorov, S.I. Cherkez, N.I. Bantysh) in the amount of 60 people.
On November 7, the Starokarantinsky detachment was formed. Stalin (leaders: A.V. Zyabrev, I.Z. Kotlo) - 41 people. Mayak-Salyn detachment (I.I. Shulga, D.K. Tkachenko, V.D. Kostyrkin). The Headquarters determined the main task of the fleet: the active defense of Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula with all its forces, pinning down the enemy in the Crimea, and repelling his attempts to break through to the Caucasus through the Taman Peninsula.
By November 8, 200,000 people had been evacuated through the strait to the North Caucasus and Taman.
On November 9, the line of defense passes through the settlement of Seven Kolodezey, the Turkish shaft and the settlement of Bagerovo.
Formation of the Adzhimushkay partisan detachment named after Lenin began in August. In an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy at night, weapons, ammunition, food were delivered to the catacombs by carts, water tanks were cemented ... The main functions of the organizer were assigned to the head of the military department of the committee, S.I. Cherkez. The detachment was formed from the workers of the district committee
VKP(b), plant them. Voikov and nearby fishing farms. The detachment left for the catacombs on November 2. The leadership of the detachment was entrusted to M.A. Mayorov, director of the Yenikalsky Rybzavod. Fight the enemy in the occupied city - 60 men and 5 women took the oath. The experience of the civil war was continued in the harsh years of the Patriotic War.
On November 10, 51A reached the outskirts of Kerch along with the 9th brigade of the KVMB, two regiments of the 302nd Rifle Division.
November 12 Representative of the Marshal Soviet Union G.I. Kulik decided to evacuate the 51st Army.
The partisans of the Starokarantinsky detachment took their first battle on November 13, attacking the headquarters of the German battalion.
Since November 14, the Germans have been hosting the city.
Until November 16, under the cover of focal resistance of scattered units, evacuation is carried out. The loading of the wounded soldiers on the last ships was carried out under artillery and mortar fire. Overloaded ships ran aground in the strait. At the tip of the Chushka spit, a seiner with evacuated medical workers, m/v Gornyak with ammunition, a tugboat Silin with the wounded and other vessels ran aground. The entire strait is littered with boats, rafts and floating objects with people and wounded soldiers. People and cargo were removed from emergency ships by boats and transported to the spit. And at night, the ships themselves were removed from the shoals. The paramilitary flotilla evacuated up to 50 thousand troops and about 400 guns.
On November 18, the Starokarantinsky detachment was surrounded. The battle with the enemy began underground. In the first sortie, commander A.V. Zyabrev (later - commander senior lieutenant A. Petropavlovsky) died.
November 21 Adzhimushkay took their first fight. In the fight against the partisans, the Nazis drive the civilian population out of the upper tiers of the quarries.
November 29 - the tragedy of the Bagerovsky moat (about 7 thousand civilians were shot).
December 1: Nazis do not spare even children - 245 schoolchildren are poisoned younger age, high school students were shot.
On December 8, the enemy falls asleep and bombards the exits of the Adzhimushkay quarries. The underground regional committee of Kerch proceeds to active actions (I.A. Kozlov, N.V. Skvortsov).
In mid-November 1941, our troops launched a counteroffensive near Tikhvin and Rastov-on-Don.
On December 5-6, a powerful counteroffensive near Moscow began, as a result of which the enemy was thrown back from the Soviet capital by 350-400 kilometers. This victory was the beginning of a radical turn in the course of World War II and the first major defeat of the Nazis in World War II. The Nazi command accelerated preparations for the invasion of the Caucasus from the Crimea. But the enemy was afraid to try to force the Kerch Strait without capturing Sevastopol.
On December 17, the Nazis, after artillery and aviation preparation, launched a second offensive against Sevastopol. The skillful use of reserves inside the SOR, the delivery of large reinforcements from the Caucasus, and the landing operation that began on the Kerch Peninsula played a big role in disrupting the new onslaught of the enemy.
The troops of the 51st and 44th armies of the Transcaucasian Front and the forces of the Black Sea Fleet were involved in the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, originally planned for December 21, by decision of the Headquarters. The purpose of the operation was: to prevent the enemy from breaking through to the Caucasus, breaking through the encirclement of Sevastopol; encirclement of the Kerch group and its destruction.
(The commander of the 42nd Army Corps, Hans von Sponeck, under the threat of encirclement, withdrew his units from the Kerch Peninsula without an order, for which he was removed from his post and put on trial. In January 1942 he was sentenced to death, later replaced by 6 years in prison . Shot 3 days after the assassination attempt on Hitler).
Theodosia was chosen as the main direction. From the composition of the 44th Army (Commander Major General A.N. Pervushin), 23 thousand people were allocated to the port of Feodosia and 3 thousand to the southern coast of the peninsula in the region of Mount Opuk. The ships of the Azov military flotilla (commander Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov) and the KVMB (commander Rear Admiral A.S. Frolov) were to land 13 thousand people from the 51st Army (commander Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov) on the northern and eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula.
In connection with the storming of Sevastopol by the enemy, the operation is postponed to December 25. Under Sevastopol, 345 SD and 79 MSBR are being transferred from the landing forces.
Great difficulties arose in connection with the stormy weather in the Sea of ​​Azov and in the Kerch Strait and the absence of special landing and landing craft here; the impossibility of using aviation to prepare bridgeheads for landing and during the landing period. Prepared for landing: 42 thousand people, 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 6 gunboats, 20 torpedo boats, 32 patrol boats, 10 minesweepers, 2 boats, 17 transports, 176 canoes, 77 boats, 58 launches, 17 oaks.
Of the five landing points (Ak-Monai area, Zyuk, Tarkhan, Khroni and Yenikale) the landing was carried out only in 2. On the afternoon of December 25, 15 warships and 115 small ships, having taken on board parts of the landing force in Temryuk and Kuchugury, due to the intensifying storm, could not reach Ak-Monai and, by decision of S.G. Gorshkov, landed at the Zyuk cape (1378 people, 3 tanks, 4 guns, 9 mortars) and m. Khroni (1452 people, 3 tanks, 4 guns). The landing was carried out in very difficult conditions and dragged on.
By the evening of December 26, the storm intensified to 6-7 points. An ice edge formed near the shore, preventing the approach of ships. The next day, the landing force was attacked by enemy aircraft.
At the same time, ships and vessels of the KVMB received landing forces in Taman and Komsomolsk and proceeded at night in storm conditions through the shallow Tuzla ravine, since enemy batteries installed on the coast of the Kerch Peninsula interfered with the Tuzla spit from the north. The buoys and milestones set out the day before along the planned route were partially torn off by the storm, and many ships ran aground at the passage.
On December 26, more than 1,600 people were landed near Kamysh-Burun, 55 people near the Old Quarantine, about 500 people north of Eltigen, and 19 people in Eltigen.
The subsequent landing echelons were delivered to the Kerch Peninsula on the night of December 28th.
As of December 31, the total number of landed troops of the 51st army with weapons and equipment was brought to 17383 people. In addition, on December 29, 2393 paratroopers were delivered to the bridgehead in the Kamysh-Burun area by a detachment of ships that had the task of landing them in the area of ​​Mount Opuk, but due to bad weather and mistakes made by his command, he could not do this.
On the night of December 29, a breakthrough of boats with an assault landing in the port of Feodosia ensured the landing of the first landing.
On December 30 and 31, landings continued in Feodosia (23,000 people, 133 guns and mortars, 34 tanks, 334 vehicles, 1,550 horses, about 1,000 tons of ammunition).
The goal of the Kerch-Feodosiya operation was partially achieved. But with the threat of encirclement, the Nazis hastily left Kerch.
By the end of December 31, a detachment of sailors was advancing on Koktebel. The troops of the 44th Army captured the Vladislavovka area, but the enemy managed to stop their advance. The troops of the 51st army failed to launch an offensive in the western direction - to Sudak, Simferopol, Dzhankoy.
On December 30, the strait was frozen over, which made it possible to speed up the transfer of units of the 51st army.
On December 30, Volodya Dubinin died while clearing the Starokarantinsky quarries.

From December 30 to January 1, the fascist German command concentrated the 46th and 73rd German infantry divisions and the Romanian mountain rifle corps west of Feodosia. The 132nd and 170th German infantry divisions were hastily pulled up from the Sevastopol area. Almost all enemy aircraft from the airfields of the Crimea was redirected for operations in the Kerch-Feodosiya direction.
By the end of January 2, the front line had stabilized. It passed from Kiet (on the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov) through Seit-Asan, Kulecha-Mosque and Karagoz to Koktebel (on the Black Sea coast).
On January 2, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the plan presented by the command of the Caucasian Front, which provides for: an offensive operation by the main forces of the front with a strike on Dzhankoy, Perekop, Chongar, and part of the forces on Simferopol, landing in the areas of Alushta, Yalta, Perekop and Yevpatoria in order to cut all routes withdrawal of the enemy from the Crimea, and then destroy it. The headquarters ordered the front commander to speed up the concentration of troops and the transition to a general offensive in every possible way.
From December 29, 1941 to May 13, 1942, the ship forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla transferred over 260 thousand people, 1596 guns, 629 tanks, 8128 vehicles, tractors and trailers to the ports of Kamysh-Burun and Kerch.
On January 5, a tactical assault force landed in Evpatoria as part of a marine battalion (commander captain-lieutenant G.K. Buzinov) and a unit of the intelligence department of the fleet headquarters (commander captain V.V. Topchiev).
The impossibility of landing due to weather conditions and strong opposition from the enemy of the second echelon on the night of January 6-7 made the fate of the fighters and commanders of the 1st echelon of the landing force short and tragic, remaining in our memory as an example of the courage and heroism of the Soviet Warrior.
(January 8, a reconnaissance group of 13 people perishes in the Evpatoria region - the commander of the battalion - commissioner U.A. Latyshev).
How I wanted to believe that the war was leaving the Kerch land and now we have to work, work tenfold strength in order to drive the enemy without stopping and respite ...
January 2 restored: railway Kamysh-Burun - Salyn (Chistopolye); city ​​water pump.
On January 3, the newspaper "Kerch worker" is published.
On January 6, 13,000 soldiers crossed from Taman along the ice crossing (built by the 132nd engineer battalion, commander Captain P.N. Nikonorov), 198 mortars, 229 machine guns, 14 wagons, 210 horses, 47 guns and 12 cars were transported.
By January 10, several city schools began to work, and by January 15, the governing bodies of the city of Kerch were basically staffed.
The fleet command failed to prepare and start the planned operation in time: the 11th German army, reinforced by two infantry divisions, went on the offensive, captured Feodosia and forced the Soviet units to withdraw to the Ak-Monai positions.
On January 28, the Crimean Front was formed as part of the 44th, 51st and 47th armies and the SOR; the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla were quickly subordinated to him (Commander Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, member V.S. Divisional Commissar F.A. Shamanin, Chief of Staff Major General F.I. Tolbukhin, representative of the Headquarters Commissar 1st Rank L .Z. Mekhlis).
All attempts by the troops of the Crimean Front to launch an offensive (February 13-27) ended in failure. By order of the Headquarters, the troops went over to a tough defense. The third period of the defense of Sevastopol began.
On February 7, the Kerch Komsomol members launched an initiative to raise funds for the construction of a tank column named after. Komsomol (collected more than 300 thousand rubles)
On February 10, navigation was opened in the port (headed by A.S. Polkovsky), in the Kamysh-Burun port (V.A. Zhuchenkov).
On February 20, 12 steam locomotives, 322 wagons, 70 kilometers of railway tracks were repaired. By February 27, 9271 people work at the enterprises of the city of Kerch. The arsenal of the Crimean Front was the plant named after. Voikov. A steam-powered tram line was put into operation.
February 28, school number 11 was renamed the school. Volodya Dubinin.
On March 4, a city defense committee was created (headed by N.A. Sirota, I.I. Antilogov, P.A. Khvatkov, A.S. Frolov).
On March 24, at the KMZ, under the leadership of T.I. Tikhonov, the workers of the plant built a separate light armored train No. 74. With the outbreak of war, the Kerch workers created three armored trains for the army - 1941 - Voykovets and Gornyak (Kamysh-Burun) and 1942 - No. 74 (Comm. Major P.S. Kononenko).
On April 1, bread shops are open in the city.
April 3 in the village of Bulganak, pos.im. Voykov open lunch kitchens and medical stations.
The fighting on the Crimean front turned into a protracted defensive one. An attempt to break through the enemy defenses in February, March and April led to minor successes, but they were not decisive.
On April 13, the Crimean Front, by order of the Headquarters, goes on the defensive and is reassigned to the North Caucasian direction. Under the leadership of Marshal S.M. Budyonny, an offensive is being prepared for May 20-25.
By May 1, the German command had developed a plan for the offensive "Hunting for bustards", and on May 7 began to implement it, intensifying raids on the front line, warehouses, airfields, concentrations of troops and equipment. In the eastern part of the Crimea, the enemy concentrated up to 8 divisions. The commander of the 11th army was reassigned to the 22nd tank division transferred from France, which played an important role with the start of the offensive on May 8, 1942, wedged into the defense in the zone of the Soviet 44th army.
May 10 - the communications of the troops are disorganized. Due to weather conditions - spring rains and mudslides, the withdrawal of the 47th Army (Commander General K.S. Kolganov) to the line of the Turkish Wall to organize a stable defense there was extremely difficult. But already on the night of May 9-10, the Nazis, having rushed forward to the Turkish Wall, captured 2 dominant heights on it with marks 108.3 and 109.3; airfields in the area of ​​​​the villages of Marfovka, Kenegez and Khadzhi-Bie (Storozhevoe) were captured.
On May 11, the command of the 47th and 51st armies withdraws the main units from the semi-encirclement along the roads along the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov. On this day, at 11.30, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov was killed (he was replaced by the chief of staff, Colonel G.I. Kotov). In the area of ​​the Ak-Monai Isthmus, part of the forces nevertheless turned out to be surrounded.
On May 12, 156 rifle divisions fought especially hard battles for heights 108.3 and 109.3.
On May 13, German troops broke through the defenses in the center of the Turkish Wall, where the highway to Kerch passed, and occupied the village of Sultanovka (Gornostaevka). The way to Kerch opened before the enemy. (1 line of defense: Cape Tarkhan - settlement Katerlez - Kerch-port; 2 line: height 95.1 - 133.3 - Adzhimushkay - Kolonka).
On May 14, on the outskirts of Kerch, north of the city, the head of the combat training department of the Crimean Front headquarters, Colonel P.M. Yagunov, was appointed to lead the defense of the site. With the wounding of the commander of the 1st Frontal Reserve Regiment, Major A.G. Golyadkin and Commissar Eliseev, the command of the regiment passes to Senior Lieutenant M.G. P.M. Yagunov is subordinate to about 4,000 people; together with 157 SD, they enter the first battle in the evening. At the same time, battles are being fought in the areas: Soldier's Slobidka, the city of Metridat, the Ak-Burnu metro station (KVMB, 156 SD, 72 KD - Colonel Commissar V.A. Martynov).
On May 16, the Nazis broke into the village of Adzhimushkay. Parts of the 44th Army (Colonel Kuropatenko, Lieutenant Colonel P.M. Tatarchevskiy) are fighting hard in the village. Column and KMZ. The command gave the order to start the evacuation.
On May 17, the Germans broke through in the village. Lighthouse and settlement Zhukovka. 41 thousand people were evacuated.
On May 18, the defense was broken in the area of ​​​​the plant. Voikov. The armored train No. 74 is conducting its last battles outside the city of Mithridates, the station, Bulganak, the approaches of the plant.
On May 19, the Nazis in the city began mass executions of the male part of the population.
Breakthrough from the factory. Voikov to connect with P.M. Yagunov is carried out by a group of Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Burmin (up to 2000 people).
Yenikale-Kapkany - defense sector of the 77th Rifle Division, 302nd Rifle Division, 404th Rifle Division, 95th Border Regiment (commander V.V. Volkov, M.K. Zubkov, N.I. Ludvigov, P.M. Tatarchevskiy).
May 20 Yenikale - the last bridgehead. The last defenders were evacuated at night.
May 21 - Temryuk. Commander D.T. Kozlov indicated the following figures in the report: 138923 people were evacuated. (30 thousand people wounded); losses - 176566.
Front-line soldiers know that the most difficult and ungrateful thing is to cover the withdrawal of troops. The fate of the people of the cover (rearguard) in the initial period of the war was often deplorable and ungrateful. Unknown heroes often died without a trace, they simply did not get orders and other awards.
For 5.5 months, two underground garrisons fought the enemy in the Adzhimushkay quarries - the Central and Small quarries. 170 days and nights of unparalleled courage and stamina put the feat of soldiers on a par with the Brest Fortress and the Sevastopol Fortress.
Now the command of the 11th German army was faced with the task of capturing Sevastopol. To do this, the enemy group concentrated 10 divisions (about 204 thousand people), 670 guns (including siege artillery with a caliber of up to 600 mm.), 655 anti-tank guns, 720 mortars, 450 tanks and about 600 aircraft. Strengthened the blockade of Sevastopol from the sea.
By July 4, the organized resistance of the SOR units had ceased. On this day, the Sovinformburo transmitted a message that the Soviet troops had left Sevastopol by order of the Supreme High Command. 8 months, was one of the brightest events of the Great Patriotic War.
For the soldiers of the underground garrison of Adzhimushkay, Sevastopol was a support and hope, the organization of new landing operations by the command in the bloody battle for the Crimea.

1942 Adzhimushkay

May 21 - Defense Regiment of Adzhimushkay quarries named after. Stalin.
85% officers. Order of P.M. Yagunov on the formation:
Com. garrison - Colonel P.M. Yagunov
Commissioner - Art. baht. com. I.P.Parakhin
NSh - Art. Lieutenant P.E. Sidorov
Deputy com. - Colonel F.A. Verushkin
N.floor otd. - bat. com. F.I. Khramov
Beginning rear - quartermaster 2nd rank S.T. Kolesnikov
Com. 1 baht. - Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Burmin
Com. 2 baht. - Captain A.P. Panov
Com. 3 baht. - Captain V.M. Levitsky
May 22 - An attempt to break through to the coast by the regiment was not successful.
May 23 - Explosions and collapses of galleries by the enemy become systematic.
May 24 - Chemical attack of the 88th sapper battalion (Cap. G. Frelich, com.
46 div. General Gactius). Central quarries - approx.
5000 people, Small ~ 2011 people After the gas attack: surrender - 1000 people, died - 1000; 1500 people.
May 25 - Gas chemical attacks continue
May 29 - Small quarries. The entire command and political staff of the 3rd battalion died from the blockage, in the Central one of the hospitals.
June 01 - About 3000 people left. in the Central Quarries. 20 people were shot for treacherous intentions, 100 for violation of discipline, 5 people for theft. (for 4 buckets of water - losses up to 100 people)
June 03 - Water. Undermining 20 meters to the salt well (group of G.F. Trubilin). Throwing of the reconnaissance group of the NKVD (there were 8 attempts in total to send the reconnaissance group and troops from 47A to contact the regiment).
June 15 - Food ran out. There is no bread.
July 08 - On the night of July 9, P.M. Yagunov died after the battle
July 12 - The Germans were replaced by the Romanian units. About 1000 people remained in the central quarries.
July 15 - 1st breakthrough from the Small Quarries to the coast.
August 14 - Small quarries: the exit of the group of Colonel Ermakov S.A. Povazhny's group is demoralized, delaying the exit. Ration - 150 gr. Sahara,
20 gr. soup. prod., bones, skins, hooves, spikelets of barley, grass.
September 02 - German landing on the Taman Peninsula.
September 22 - Explosions. Crashes. Organized resistance ceased (about 100 people remained)
October 28, 29, 31 Germans in adits. Captured: G.M. Burmin, I.P. Parakhin, V.M. Levitsky, F.I. Khramov, V.I. Zheltovsky, A.A. Povazhny, V.P. Shkoda, B.A. Driker, S.F. Ilyasov, N. Shevchenko, L.F. Khamtsova, Z.V. Gavrilyuk.

1942 The second period of the occupation of Kerch

On July 11, Manstein, while at the command post in the village of Yukhara-Karales, heard a special message on the radio about the assignment to the rank of field marshal general. After the capture of Sevastopol, Hitler apparently perceived Manstein as a great expert on sieges. Therefore, he instructed him to move with the 11th Army to Leningrad, where the situation became more and more difficult.
On August 27, the command arrived at the Leningrad Front.
In the summer of 1942, the fascist German command, taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, planned extensive offensive operations in the east. It was envisaged to strike the main blow on the southern sector of the front in order to reach the Volga and take possession of the Caucasus. To implement this plan, the enemy concentrated exceptionally large forces: 37% of infantry, cavalry and 53% of tank and motorized formations.
On July 9, Army Group South was divided into two groups - A and B. The first received the task of capturing the Don, Kuban and the Caucasus, and the second - to capture Stalingrad and go to the Volga.
On July 17, at the turn of the Chir River, the Battle of Stalingrad began.
On July 25, the enemy launched an offensive in the Caucasus. It was attended by 17 German and 3 Romanian field armies, 1 and 4 tank armies and part of the troops of the 11 army located in the Crimea. The enemy threw 167 thousand soldiers and officers, 1130 tanks, 4540 guns and mortars, up to 1000 aircraft into battle.
In connection with the haste of leaving the peninsula by the troops of the Crimean Front, underground groups and partisan detachments arise spontaneously from among the patriotic residents and the Soviet prisoners of war who escaped with their help. The fight against fascism is becoming massive.
Since May 27, intelligence officer E.D. Dudnik, together with associates S. Boboshin and A. Rodyagin, members of their families, have been collecting information about the enemy and transferring it to the headquarters of the 47th army. 87 radiograms - the result of the feat of the courageous girl "Tony" and her associates.
Communication with the Adzhimushkay garrison, sabotage, agitation and the release of leaflets, the release of Soviet prisoners of war - all this is in the most severe surveillance and atrocities of repression by the fascist authorities of the second period of occupation.
V.I.Malkevich, O.Shuldishov, V.G.Yakush and hundreds of other unknown patriots who were shot for their connection with the soldiers who remained in the quarries and ruins of the plant named after. Voikov.
Girls help the resisting fighters. With their desperate courage and determination, escapes from the transit camps in the Engels club and on the Snake Cape of prisoners of war are arranged. These are Yu.Dyakovskaya, M.Bugaeva, M.Rudenko and T.Kolesnikova, Evdokia Vasilievna Dunaeva, N.Stroganova, Lucy Dumartseva and many others.
The first underground organization in Kerch - August 1942 - a group of A.G. Strizhevsky and N.V. Kudryashov establishes contact with the Simferopol underground, 48 escaped from captivity join the ranks of those fighting the invaders. Explosions of ammunition depots on the Shirokoy Mole, the collapse of a military echelon at the Kerch II station ...
On November 7, underground workers hang out the flag of the USSR in the city.
November 14 - battle in the Adzhimushkay quarries. A group of 20 people fired at a Romanian post. Presumably it was a group of fighters of the regiment of P.M. Yagunov, headed by Art. Lieutenant P.E. Sidorov. They died with weapons in their hands - the forgotten soldiers of the 42nd.
December. About 2 thousand civilians were killed in Adzhimushkay; 1 thousand were shot in the mine of the plant. Voikov; 500 people driven into the quarry galleries and blown up; 5 thousand soldiers and civilians were poisoned with gases; 400 people were burnt alive in the plant's engineering and technical club...
During the 17 months of occupation, the following died: prisoners of war - about 15 thousand people; 14 thousand civilians; 14342 people were taken to Germany.

Hiding from the fascists in the Bagerovsky, Adzhimushkaysky and Starokarantinsky quarries, partisan detachments are formed. Thanks to the work of underground groups, detachments are replenished, mainly from among former prisoners of war. One of these groups was the group of V.S. Pushkar.
Young Komsomol members, printing press workers, underground workers in the Leninsky and Mayak-Salynsky districts ... nothing can stop the struggle of the patriots against the enemy.
In the spring of 1943 in the village. Marfovka created an underground organization "Young Guard". It was headed by an underground committee consisting of: A. Chub, A. Nagolov, V. Motuzov, A. Ilyasov. Sabotage, disruption of communications, destruction of the enemy.
The failures and death of the Kerch patriots are a heavy burden for young underground groups; lack of experience and the strictest secrecy in the conditions of well-functioning work of enemy punitive services.
The partisan detachment in the Starokarantinsky quarries was headed by K. Mukhlynin and commissar D. Vasyunin. The combat activity of the detachment is activated in the directions: Kamysh-Burun and Eltigen, where the enemy is concentrating forces in November 1943 to strengthen the defense.
In September-October 1943, two partisan detachments were formed from among the prisoners of war and local residents - “Red Stalingrad” (commander K.I. Moiseev) and them. Stalin (commander P.I. Sherstyuk).
In September 1943, mass arrests and executions, provocations and surveillance began. But even this could not stop the growing hatred of the invaders and their henchmen.
After the death of the group of P. Tolstykh, the banner of struggle was raised in the village of the plant named after. Voykov on November 7, underground workers M.R. Rusanova, K. Karaseva, N. Komarova ...
The German command, starting in October 1943, began to evacuate the population of Kerch. The quarries become a refuge for those who preferred the fight against the enemy to slavery.
The fourth detachment stands out for active combat operations - Bagerovsky, the backbone of which was 103 military personnel led by S. Parinov, F. Zarudsky and I. Belov. And again - tunnel explosions, gases, lack of water ...
In the hardest struggle and an attempt to break out of the encirclement in January-February 1944, most of the partisans of the Bagerovo quarries perish, chaining two enemy infantry regiments and three battalions to themselves.
The period of the second occupation of Kerch became the bloodiest page military history cities are mass executions in the Adzhimushkaysky and Kamysh-Burunsky ditches, the Starokarantinsky quarries; burned at the school. Voikov; executions of prisoners in the streets and camps - st. Chkalova, Cooperage plant, Enegels club, pos. 3 Samostroy, mines of the plant. Voykov, the building of school number 24 on Vokzalny Highway ... Typhus, hunger, death from wounds.
In October-December 1943, the front approached the Kerch Peninsula. The Nazis were in a hurry to take out the remaining "useful" for Germany from these scorched steppes - these are children and youth from 13 years old and older.
Old men and women are driven to the construction of defensive lines and then, by order of Chief of Staff Keitel on July 8, 1943, all men from 16 to 55 years old are considered prisoners of war and are to be transferred to camps to work in Germany. For refusing to "evacuate" - execution! The Nazis, trying to intimidate the population, for not arriving at the assembly point, burned and buried alive, sparing neither the elderly nor the babies.

On April 11, 1944, the depopulated and destroyed city was liberated. Retreating, the Nazis created the so-called "desert zone", guided by the order of the German command of September 7, 1943 - on the methods of carrying out destruction during the retreat of military units: - some degrees can be useful to the enemy: living quarters, cars, mills, wells, haystacks ... "
On April 11, the city of Kerch met the liberators in ruins and ashes.
In the South-West direction at the beginning of 1943, as a result of the rapid advance Soviet troops from Stalingrad to Rostov, the Nazi group of troops operating in the North Caucasus was under the threat of encirclement and began to retreat. The troops of the Transcaucasian Front (since January 24 - the North Caucasian Front) went on the offensive.
By the spring of 1943, almost the entire North Caucasus was liberated. Only on the Taman Peninsula did the enemy gain a foothold on the so-called Blue Line, which flanked the Azov and Black Seas.
In the autumn of 1943, the Taman Peninsula was cleared of the Nazis.
On October 23, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front liberated Melitopol, on October 31 they reached Sivash, and on November 1 they captured the enemy’s heavily fortified positions near the Turkish Wall on the Perekop Isthmus. The Nazi troops in the Crimea were completely isolated from the land.
On October 13, the commander of the North Caucasian Front, General of the Army I.E. Petrov and the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral L.A. Vladimirsky, submitted to the General Staff a plan for the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation, which was approved by the Headquarters. The concept of the operation provided for the simultaneous landing of the Azov military flotilla - 3 divisions of the 56th Army in the main, Yenikalsk, direction and the Black Sea Fleet - one division of the 18th Army in the auxiliary, Eltigen, direction.
The 386th Separate Marine Battalion (commander N.A. Belyakov) and the battalion of the 255th Marine Brigade (commander Major S.T. Major N.V. Sudarikov) of the Azov Flotilla.
After landing, the landing troops were to strike in converging directions northeast of Kerch and Eltigen, to capture the city and port of Kerch and the port of Kamysh-Burun. The Kerch Strait and approaches to it were mined. In addition to fortifications on the coast, the enemy built three lines of defense with a total depth of up to 80 kilometers. About 30 high-speed landing barges, 37 torpedo and 25 patrol boats, 6 minesweepers were based in the ports of Kerch, Kamysh-Burun and Feodosia. The Soviet command involved in the landing operation: about 130 thousand soldiers and officers, over 2000 guns and mortars, 125 tanks, more than 1000 aircraft, 119 warships and 159 landing craft.
To distract the enemy's attention from the landing sites of the main forces, demonstrative actions were envisaged in the areas of Cape Tarkhan and Mount Opuk.
Due to stormy weather, the landing was postponed from October 28 to October 31 in the Eltigen area, and on the main direction - to November 3.
On the evening of October 31, the landing took place: 5,6,7 detachments - in Taman; 1,2 - near Salt Lake; 3.4 - in Krotkovo (detachments of commanders D.A. Glukhov, A.A. Zhidko, N.I. Sipyagin, M.G. Bondarenko, G.I. Gnatenko).

1943 fiery foothold

... It began on the night of November 1st. Having stuffed more than 6 thousand mines from Cape Takil to Cape Zyuk on Azov, the Germans were waiting for the repetition of the Kerch-Feodosia landing and were preparing for it.
The first foothold in the lead storm was wrested from the enemy by the courage and stamina of the sailors of the 386th OBMP and 318th Rifle Division who made their way through.
By the end of November 1, the paratroopers had captured a bridgehead up to 5 km wide. and up to 2 km deep.
Loaded motorboats rested on the shallows and those few whose fate extended their lives, having passed through mines and fire, rushed at the enemy, overcoming wire and minefields, breaking the back of the enemy for those - who remained in the strait, for those - who were left in 41 and 42 th year...
Landing forces on the main and auxiliary directions landed in different time, the enemy could freely maneuver reserves. In this regard, the landing on Eltigen was in an exceptionally difficult situation.
The feat of Galina Petrova and Georgy Titov, Alexei Elizarov, sailor N.A. Dubkovsky, pilots - B.N. Volovodov and V.L. Bykov ... 15 enemy attacks per day withstand the fighters of Captain P. Zhukov and Major A. Klinkovsky, Alexei's platoon Shumsky... 61 Hero of the Soviet Union - warriors of the first throw.
On the night of November 3, the main part of the guards regiment of Colonel P.I. Nesterov arrived.
In total, by the end of November 3, 9418 people, 39 guns, 28 mortars, 257.2 tons of ammunition and 61.8 tons of food were delivered to the Eltigen area. Colonel V.F. Gladkov and his headquarters hold the bridgehead of "Land of Fire" with the fighters of the first landing, who have already beaten off up to 50 enemy attacks, in a complete blockade.
The enemy pulled almost all of his reserves to the Eltigen bridgehead. This put the landing force in a difficult position, but, on the other hand, facilitated the landing of units of the 56th Army north of Kerch on the night of November 3.
At 10 p.m. on November 2, powerful artillery and aviation preparations began in the Gleika and Zhukovka area. After that, armored boats with assault groups of marines rushed to the shore, ships and vessels of all five detachments, together with landing troops (commander senior lieutenant I.S. Solyanikov, senior lieutenant D.R. Mikaberidze, art. Lieutenant I.G. Chernyak, Captain Lt P.N.Sorokin, Senior Lt A.E.Tugov). In three hours, they landed 2274 paratroopers delivered from Temryuk with 9 guns from the 2nd Guards Taman Division and the 369th OBMP (commander of the landing cap. 3rd rank P.I. Derzhavin), and then the 1st, 3rd, The 5th detachment transferred the remaining units of the 2nd Guards Taman Division here from the Ilyich cordon area. By 5 o'clock in the morning on November 3, more than 4 thousand fighters and commanders were already fighting on the bridgehead in the Gleika, Zhukovka area.
In the Opasnoye, Fishery (Yenikale) area, after artillery preparation, which began at 3 hours 25 minutes, the 2nd and 4th detachments carried out an assault landing from among the troops of the 55th Guards SD, delivered from the Chushka Spit (1900 people).
By 7:30 a.m., the remaining troops were delivered from the berths of the Chushka Spit, thereby bringing the total number to more than 4 thousand people.
The enemy's lack of significant reserves and the diversion of his forces in the Eltigen area made it possible to build up the landing forces of the 56th Army in the daytime as well. (by November 3 - 4440 people, 45 guns).
By the end of November 11, the landing force had captured an operational foothold in the sector from the Sea of ​​Azov to the outskirts of Kerch. By that time, there were already 27,700 people here.
The marines of the assault groups under the command of officers N.S. Aidarov, A.V. Mikhailov, I.D. Shatunov, M.G. Spelov fought bravely and boldly.
Meanwhile, the position of the landing force in the Eltigen area became more and more difficult. For 26 days, boats managed to break through to the bridgehead only 16 times. The soldiers experienced an acute shortage of ammunition and food, it was not possible to evacuate the wounded.
The pilots of the 46th Guards Women's Regiment Evdokia Bershanskaya came to the aid of the paratroopers. At night, dropping vital cargo and at the same time, having no weapons on the light PO-2, the regiment did not lose a single crew!
The bitter fate of the wounded with a lack of painkillers and disinfectants, cold and dampness, thirst and malnutrition, blood loss, helplessness and hopelessness, bombing and all this - to the lot of the courageous doctors of the medical battalion of the 318th division.
Surgeon major V. Trofimov and more than 1000 people who passed through the operating room, which served as a cemented water storage ...
An incredibly difficult task was the evacuation of the wounded by boat sailors. Breaking through the blockade of armored and fast-moving German barges, they sacrificed their own lives, rushing to rescue the fighters, doing their duty to the end.
On December 5, the Germans broke the defense of the paratroopers.
December 6 - the center of the bridgehead was lost; With a desperate counterattack at dusk, the soldiers beat off our wounded from the Germans ...
Two nights are the main ones in the Eltigen epic: on the eve of November 1 and on December 7. Capturing the bridgehead and leaving Tierra del Fuego!
On the night of December 7, by order of the front command, 386 OBMP was the first to break through the encirclement. Army units follow them. The rear of the enemy was ahead, but not everyone was destined to break out.
The group of Colonel Nesterov is heading to Cape Ak-Burun, but having accepted the battle on the way, they are forced to take refuge in the Starokarantinsky quarries. The division commander, Colonel Gladkov, led the fighters, having made a daring raid, to the outskirts of Slobodka, along the coast, to Mount Mithridates, where he entrenched himself. The wounded and fragments of small groups of resisters who remained on Eltigen were suppressed. Captivity and executions. The result - 1562 people. prisoners, and no one considered the wounded ...
The success of Gladkov's capture of the Mithridatic bridgehead was not developed, as were the attempts of the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army (56th Army) to break into the city.
On the night of December 11, the ships of the Azov Flotilla took out 1080 people. Parts of the 83rd brigade remained in cover ... (about 450 killed and 600 captured).
Eltigen, for all its tragedy, serves the faith in a better future, the true values ​​of historical memory, pride and gratitude, the departed generations and the responsibility of each person living today.
For crossing the Kerch Strait, landing and capturing a bridgehead, 129 soldiers, including 33 Black Sea sailors, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

1944 Liberation

In an effort to hold the right-bank Ukraine and the Crimea, the enemy concentrated 105 divisions and 2 brigades on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, which were part of Army Groups South and A. Here were 76% of his armored and 41% of his infantry divisions. The troops of all four Ukrainian fronts and the Separate Primorsky Army participated in the liberation.
In January-February, the troops of the Ukrainian fronts defeated the main forces of Army Group South, eliminating the bridgehead in the Nikopol area, from where the enemy expected to release his troops in the Crimea.
On March 6, 3, the Ukrainian Front struck at the German army grouping "A" in the area between the rivers Ingulets, the Southern Bug.
In the period March 26 - April 14, the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian fronts carried out the Odessa offensive operation.
On March 28, Nikolaev was liberated.
On April 10, Soviet troops liberated the city of Odessa.
By the beginning of April 1944, the fascist command had 7 Romanian and 5 German divisions in the Crimea (about 200 thousand soldiers and officers, up to 3600 guns and mortars, over 200 tanks and assault guns, 150 aircraft).
Fascist Germany gave the holding of Crimea great importance, since its influence on Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, as well as on the situation on the entire southern flank of the Soviet-German front, depended on this.
In the event of a retreat, the Nazi command prepared several intermediate defensive lines in the areas of Simferopol, Ak-Monai, the valleys of the Bulganak, Alma, Kacha rivers, but its troops could not hold on to any of them.
April 8, 1944 begins the last act in the fate of the German group in the Crimea. With an overwhelming advantage, with two tank corps and eighteen divisions, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front began a breakthrough to Perekop and in the Sivash direction.
On April 10, our tankers were already in Dzhankoy. At 22.00, the Separate Primorsky Army under the command of General I.E. Petrov went on the offensive with the right flank. Before dawn, units of the 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps occupied the Bulganak stronghold and rushed to the Turkish Wall. The left-flank 16th Rifle Corps on the northern outskirts of Kerch defeated the enemy's barriers.
By 06:00 on April 11, the Separate Primorsky Army, with its left flank, completely captured the city and port of Kerch.
***
Late in the evening and all night long, a fluttering tongue of flame was visible on Mount Mithridates, wandering among the mixed Soviet soldiers frozen in a mortal battle with the enemy. The old mother was looking for her son among the fallen, looking into the open eyes of those who had gone into the sky. Legend or reality? Since then, in the spring, when twilight descends into the ancient city, both young and old, merging into a burning human river, rise to the heart of the city - the obelisk of Glory, to find their memory. And then an invisible thin thread is connected, which came from time immemorial through the storms of hard times of the Great Patriotic War and goes through the heart of every little Kerchant, there - into the Future!
On the gray-haired Mount Mithridates soaked in the blood of a Soviet soldier in August-October 1944, the soldiers of the 9th motor-engineering battalion, Lieutenant Colonel F.I. He immortalized the glory of the heroic paratroopers and liberators of Kerch from the Nazi invaders.
On April 13, the cities were liberated: Feodosia, Simferopol and Evpatoria; April 15 - Yalta, and on April 16, the Soviet units reached the approaches to Sevastopol.
On May 9, with a joint attack by units of the 51st and Primorsky armies from the south and the 2nd Guards Army, which forced the Northern Bay from the north, the Nazis were driven out of Sevastopol.
Three days after the liberation of Sevastopol, the last remnants of the Nazi troops laid down their arms in the area of ​​Cape Khersones.
The victorious spring of 1944 came to Crimea.

From mid-July the sun dries the steppe. Today, the scorched steppe is the work of human hands, those whose conscience and head are not burdened with pain and thoughts, and 66 years ago this land burned from tears, grief and the blood of compatriots.
Everything goes away, and the pain dulls, the wounds heal little by little. There are fewer and fewer participants and witnesses to those fiery years, and books are written differently and speak differently, or even completely silent when they do not lie.
What remains for us today from our grandfathers and from those guys of 1942 who never became fathers, for our hearts, for our souls?
This is a word spoken and written to us in our native language, the only thread connecting the souls of those lost in the steppe and now living. A word born of grief, pain, despair, truth, hope and feat for the sake of us who forget.
And also - this is nature, our Kerch, steppe, with a transition to the blue of water sparkling in the sun. Every year, replacing rainy May with blooming June and hot July, she, with silent perseverance, returns those who seek their memory, repeating and repeating, repeating and repeating in the history of those days ...
I want you to believe in this and feel with all your heart the voice of our Fatherland and its best sons. And the words and lines of those who are no longer among us and the genius of Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin will help to return to July 1942 in the Adzhimushkay steppe.
In the early days, Sevastopol fell - the last hope of the defenders of the underground fortress; The 11th German Army is transferred to Leningrad; by mid-July - the Germans near Voronezh, Rostov ...
By the will of fate, the genius of the Great Russian poet, A.S. Pushkin, was called from above to strengthen the spirit of our soldiers. In his diary for August 1, Alexander Klabukov wrote: "I read and listen to Pushkin's collected works several times." The commander of the garrison of the Small Quarries, Mikhail Grigoryevich Povazhny, wrote in his memoirs: “One book miraculously survived with us - Pushkin's The Captain's Daughter. We knew almost all of it by heart, but we read page after page out loud again and again.
What did Alexander Sergeevich say when he turned the will of the soldiers and commanders to resist the invaders into an alloy harder than Krupp steel?
The fate and path of the Russian soldier according to A.S. Pushkin is the fate of Ivan Kuzmich: “... Having become an officer from soldier’s children, he was an uneducated and simple man, but the most honest and kind.”
Here, near Kerch, the children of those who created the Great Power fought and survived the fire of the civil war, when half the world took up arms against new Russia. Here the heirs of courage, heroic fortitude, grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the defenders of Sevastopol in the Crimean War died in battle.
The amazing words of A.S. Pushkin are the key to unraveling the spiritual height of the Great Dead Adzhimushkay: “My parents blessed me. The father said to me: Farewell, Peter. Serve faithfully to whom you swear; obey the bosses; do not chase after their affection; do not ask for service; do not excuse yourself from the service; and remember the proverb: take care of the dress again, and honor from youth.
In each chapter of The Captain's Daughter, the soldiers return in their memory to the places where they left their relatives and loved ones, and Alexander Sergeevich is their heartfelt guide in this: “Left alone, I plunged into reflection. What was I to do? ... Duty demanded that I appear where my service could still be useful to the fatherland in these difficult circumstances ... Although I foresaw a quick and undeniable change in circumstances, I still could not help but tremble, imagining the danger of her position (about Marya Ivanovna).
Here, in the adits, in complete surroundings, not desperate rage hovered over them, but love for life, for us - living today. Dying - they believed in Our victory. They fought and died, went into battle, knowing that it would be the last: “Why are you, kids, standing? shouted Ivan Kuzmich. “To die, to die like this: a service business!”
This is the truth of the Russian soldier - above his own life - the honor of the Fatherland! The truth of the present situation also entered the hearts of the defenders of Adzhimushkay with the phrases of the Great Poet: “... This siege, due to the negligence of the local authorities, was disastrous for the inhabitants, who suffered hunger and all kinds of disasters. Everyone despondently awaited the decision of their fate... In these skirmishes, the preponderance was usually on the side of the villains, well-fed, drunk and good. Sometimes our hungry infantry went out into the field ... "
Each of the fighters sooner or later asked himself the last question, and perhaps the main one: What memory will remain after ... July, August, September, October 1942? Alexander Sergeevich answered. And this answer is in the wise and perspicacious, simple words folk song, taken out by the Poet above his own in the epigraph:

"My head, little head,
Head serving!
Served my head
Exactly thirty years and three years.
Ah, the little head did not last
Neither self-interest, nor joy,
No matter how good a word
And not a high rank;
Only the head survived
Two tall poles
maple crossbar,
Another loop of silk!

Those who remained in the burning July 42 remain in our hearts and in the songs that the people pass on to their children.
Life is cruel and rich in trials for every generation. The more history is eradicated from memory, poets and the language in which they think, love and sing folk songs are banned, the stronger the connection between generations becomes - this is the will of the People! This is love for life and for the Fatherland!
“18.07.42. What a wonderful morning: the sky is blue, the air filled with aroma comes to our quarry. After yesterday's night rain, the air on the field is also refreshed, you can feel the coolness. The wind also helped us, it cleared our passages and compartments (rooms) from soot and smoke, drove out with a draft.
(From the diary of A.I. Klabukov)
Surprisingly, it is a fact - on July 17 the weather was cloudy all day, and at times it rained, but this is already in 2008 - 66 years after ...

Reference.
Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis - as a representative
Headquarters of the Supreme Commander.
Crimean Front - 1942
I

1889 13.01. was born in Odessa.
1903-1911 6-year education, at the rate of a real school; then - served as a clerk, gave private lessons.
1905-1907 member of the Jewish workers' self-defense unit.
1907 Jewish Social Democratic Labor Party.
1911 drafted into the army; until 1917 on the Southwestern Front (there is no information about participation in hostilities).
January 1918 - participated in the establishment of Soviet power in Odessa. Joined the RCP(b).
April 1919 - political commissar of the 46th rifle division - until May 1920 (for assignments to the Revolutionary Military Council). Meets Stalin.
1920 October - December - military commissar of the 46th rifle division (participant in the liberation of the Crimea from Wrangel).
1920 elected to the 8th Congress of Soviets; seconded to the location of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).
1922-1926 - Assistant Secretary of the Central Committee I.V. Stalin.
1926-1927 - Marxism courses.
1927-1930 - student of the Institute of red professors (economic department).
1930-1937 - editor-in-chief of Pravda; elected a member of the Central Committee; deputy Supreme Council USSR I convocation.
1937-1940 Head of the political department of the Red Army, deputy. People's Commissar of Defense, army commissar of the 2nd rank, participant in campaigns - Western Ukraine, Belarus, Bessarabia, the Soviet-Finnish Company, Khasan Lake, Khalkhin Gol River.
September 6, 1940 - People's Commissar of State Control of the USSR.
May 1941 - deputy. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
June 21, 1941 - Head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda. Deputy Defense Commissar.
1942 January-May - Acts as chairman of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the Crimean Front.
June 1942 - removed from office, reduced to corps commissar; Member of the Military Council of the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front.
December 1942 - lieutenant general.
1944 Colonel General; released from duties. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
1946 - Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 2nd convocation.
1946-1950 Minister of State Control of the USSR.
02/13/1953 - died. Buried on Red Square, near the Kremlin wall
Awards: 4 Orders of Lenin, Order of Suvorov 1st Class, Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, 2 Orders of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star.

A.M. Vasilevsky: “In case of emergency on one or another front, in the preparation of responsible operations, the Stavka sent its representatives to the front ...
Assess the capabilities of the troops on the spot, work together with the military councils of the fronts, help them better prepare for operations, establish interaction between the fronts, assist in providing the troops with supplies of everything necessary, be an effective link with the Supreme Civil Code "...
Arrived on January 2, 1942 with the task of the GK - com. front, Lieutenant-General D.T. Kozlov, after the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, expand the bridgehead and go on the general offensive by January 12.
On January 15, the Germans launched a preemptive strike.
Conditions on the Kerch bridgehead: slush, poor logistics front, lack of vehicles, special. units, provision of ammunition, fuel, thaw and mud at airfields, poor communications, insufficient provision of air defense systems.
From 01/20/1942 to 01/22/1942, Mekhlis reported “Comfront Kozlov does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as the enemy’s groupings ... Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander who was confused and unsure of his actions ...”
Order to the troops of the front No. 12 of 01/23/1942. On the appointment of senior and higher com. composition, which allowed the loss of control of the troops and the "shameful flight to the rear", arrest, betrayal to the tribunal: gene. major I.F. Dashichev, brigade commander V.K. Moroz (22.02 shot), battalion. Commissioner A.I. Kondrashov, p.p. P.Ya.Tsindzenevsky, early. political department s.d. N.P. Kolobaeva ... to put things in order in 3 days!
He acted energetically. Using the powers of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the representative, deputy. People's Commissar of Defense, actually removed Kozlov from full-fledged one-man command of the troops and took over all the threads of control. Thanks to the Mehlis, the Crimean Front will gain independence from January 28. He is trying to get Malinkov to replace the hp from Transcaucasia with Russian and Ukrainian servicemen (up to 15,000); personally selects and replaces the command staff, political staff (about 1,300 people of the commission staff, and then another 1,255 political fighters and political officers).
The positive is that a real increase in the combat capability of the troops has been achieved, and the negative is gross interference in operational affairs and total control over the actions of the com. front.
On February 27, the offensive was forced (13 Soviet divisions against 3 German). Failure. Military commander of the Red Star Konstantin Simonov: “... in February, a blizzard started along with the rain, ... carried ... got up ... the tanks did not go, the density of troops driven by Mekhlis, who led this offensive, replacing the actual commander of the front - the weak-willed General Kozlov, was monstrous . Everything was pushed close to the front line, every German shell, every mine, every bomb, exploding, inflicted huge losses on us ... A kilometer - two, three, five, seven from the front line, everything was in corpses ... it was a picture of mediocre military leadership and complete, monstrous mess. Plus, this is a complete disregard for people, a complete lack of concern in preserving manpower, in order to protect people from further losses ... "
On March 5, they resumed the offensive, ... replenished the front with 2 military commissars of divisions, 1 military commissar of a brigade, 9 military commissars of regiments, 300 political officers, 750 political officers and 2307 political workers (in April - another 400 political officers and 2000 political workers).
Since April 11, offensive attempts have ceased.
Relying on the quantitative factor, on the enthusiasm of people, at the same time, underestimating the training of headquarters, com. composition, personnel, a supporter of the pressure of a naked order ...
A correct assessment of the situation at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the Supreme Command was prevented by dizziness from a successful counter-offensive near Moscow and underestimation of the best strategist of the Wehrmacht, Colonel-General Erich von Manstein.
Mehlis, not being a military man in the full sense, sought to replace Kozlov (“a glutted gentleman from the peasants”), removed General F.I. Tolbukhin from the post of chief of staff (replaced by Lieutenant General Eternal). He is characterized by suspicion, activity in an atmosphere of detective work, slander, and covert surveillance. Only com did not raise doubts. 51 Army Lieutenant General Lvov.
Mehlis ordered to shoot captured Germans.
N.G. Kuznetsov (Commissar of the Navy): “And here we are at the headquarters of the front. There is confusion there. The commander of the Crimean Front, D.T. Kozlov, was already “in the pocket” of Mekhlis, who interfered literally in all operational affairs. Chief of Staff P.P.Vechny did not know whose orders to carry out - the commander or Mehlis. Marshal S.M. Budeny (Commander-in-Chief of the North Caucasus direction, in whose subordination was the Crimean Front) - also did not dare to do anything. Mekhlis did not want to obey him, referring to the fact that he receives instructions directly from the headquarters.
Konstantin Simonov: “He was a man who, during that period of the war, without entering into any circumstances, considered everyone who preferred a convenient position a hundred meters from the enemy to an uncomfortable one fifty meters away - a coward. He considered everyone who wanted to simply protect the troops from possible failure - an alarmist, considered everyone who realistically assessed the strength of the enemy - unsure of their own abilities. Mekhlis, for all his readiness to give his life for the Motherland, was a pronounced product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938.”
During the fighting in February-April, the losses amounted to 225 thousand people.
(The enemy has 2 times less HP, 1.2 times less tanks, 1.8 times more artillery, but 1.7 times more aviation).
On April 21, preparations for the offensive began, and already on May 6, the task was set - to gain a foothold in the defense.
On May 10, the front commander and the chairman of the headquarters lost control. On May 11, at 11:50 p.m., the headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered Marshal Budyonny to restore order ...

Documentary portrait
and combat characteristics of the commander of the underground garrison
Colonel Pavel Maksimovich YAGUNOV

The basis of the documentary portrait and combat characteristics of the outstanding personality P.M. Yagunov are the memoirs and notes of participants in the military events in Kerch in the period May-October 1942, as well as the memoirs of his daughter Klara Pavlovna Yagunova.
Pavel Maksimovich Yagunov was born on January 10, 1900 in the village of Cheberchina, Dubensky district, Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian by nationality. After graduating from a rural school in 1913, he left home early in search of work: first he worked as a peddler of letters and documents under the volost government, and then, when the civil war began, the young man volunteered for the Red Army, in the Separate Turkestan Communist Regiment. Until 1923, he studied at the 4th Tashkent United Military School, served in the Red Army, and then, from 1930 to 1931. studied at the officer courses "Shot". P.M. Yagunov participated in battles with Denikin and the White Cossacks near Aktobe. He happened to take part in the battles with the cavalry of Enver Pasha and the gang of Junaid Khan's Basmachi on the Transcaspian front. Until 1938 he commanded the 65th Rifle Regiment with the military rank of colonel in the Far East. In June 1939, Yagunov, as an experienced officer, was sent to Baku, first as a teacher, and then as head of the infantry school department. During the civil war, P.M. Yagunov joined the ranks of the Communist Party.
With the outbreak of World War II, combat officer Yagunov went to the front as commander of the 138th Mountain Rifle Division, which crossed the Kerch Strait, carried out a number of successful operations in the Crimea, but suffered heavy losses. In March 1942, P.M. Yagunov was appointed head of the combat training department of the headquarters of the Crimean Front. On May 14, 1942, he led a combined detachment of reserve units, which was ordered to occupy a vital defensive line in the area of ​​​​Kerch.
In the personal file of P.M. Yagunov, no shortcomings have been indicated in performance appraisals since 1925. He was a strong-willed, militarily competent commander, he was a sensitive and sympathetic boss, an exceptionally modest and fair person.
According to Lieutenant Colonel A.Sh. Avanesov, Pavel Maksimovich was remembered for his outward smartness, accuracy, exactingness towards himself and his subordinates.
Captain V.S. Buzoverov characterizes the commander as an officer with a high degree of dedication and determination, concentrated and strict in his work. Cadets talk about P.M. Yagunov as a man of principle, firm views, extraordinary kindness and generosity. He deeply despised flattering, cunning and cowardly people.
His daughter, Klara Maksimovna, noted: “Father did not like to stand out in anything, did not tolerate when he was given special signs of attention. And, nevertheless, he was a man of great erudition, versatile ... This is how I remember my father: brave, strict, in love with his work and people, caring and merciless, cheerful and serious, always smart and neat, kind and shy, intolerant no frills, a modest person in everything and always.
An officer of the 138th division, Mikhailov, said simple and understandable words to every soldier: "Dad is like a father to all of us, and we will take care of him."
In heavy, bloody battles, the Crimean Front during May 1942 lost tens of thousands of people. On May 13, the enemy broke through positions in the central section of the Turkish Wall, and by the end of May 14, broke into the western and southern outskirts of the city of Kerch. In this situation, Marshal of the USSR S.M. Malinovsky, with the permission of the Stavka, ordered the evacuation of the troops of the Crimean Front from the Kerch Peninsula.
Restrain the onslaught of the enemy in the area of ​​​​the village of Adzhimushkay - plant
them. Voikov, in order to organize a crossing through the Kerch Strait and evacuate the troops of the Crimean Front, was ordered to the most experienced officer with the highest authority - Colonel P.M. Yagunov.
On May 21, 1942, a full-fledged, with the strictest military discipline, with all the attributes of organization, a military unit from disparate forces was organized - a separate regiment of the Adzhimushkay quarries, skillful and decisive resistance to the enemy. Despite the difficult situation associated with limited capabilities in weapons and ammunition, a large number of wounded in the underground army hospital, lack of proper food and water, systematic enemy gas attacks, the underground garrison, thanks to the high organizational talent of the command staff, personal courage, example and dedication of the commander , survived and fought. Under the protection of the fighters and commanders of Adzhimushkay there was a civilian population: the elderly, women, children.
The command of the garrison systematically organized breakthroughs from the encirclement, but for objective reasons it was unsuccessful - there were not enough forces.
On May 29, 1942, in the order of the commander of the North Caucasian Front, Marshal of the USSR S.M. Budyonny, it was noted: “According to all types of intelligence, our commanders and fighters are in the area of ​​​​Adzhimushkay quarries, who continue to stubbornly resist the enemy.”
The main thing that helped the fighters to live and endure all the trials was their daily and systematic struggle with the enemy. The underground garrison of Adzhimushkay performed its combat mission in the same way as thousands of other units and subunits of the Red Army were performing it at that time along the entire thousand-kilometer stretch of the front.
Despite the tragic outcome of the events of July 1942 in Sevastopol, the underground garrison continued to fight the enemy, organized combat sorties - a response worthy of the Adzhimushkay defenders. According to Major A.I. Pirogov: “After a large, very successful sortie, combat trophies were checked, and a trap grenade exploded in Yagunov’s hands, which was often used by the enemy in the fight against the fighters of the underground garrison.”
The personal feat of Pavel Maksimovich Yagunov is contained in his selfless devotion to the Motherland and his Soviet people, is a vivid example of courage, stamina, will and organizational talent, high duty, honor and professionalism of a Soviet officer and Man.

Documentary portrait
and combat characteristics of the commander of the Central Quarries
Adzhimushkaya in the period from July to October 1942
Lieutenant Colonel Grigory Mikhailovich BURMIN

The basis of the documentary portrait and combat characteristics of the commander of the Central Quarries, Lieutenant Colonel G.M.
Grigory Mikhailovich Burmin was born in 1906 in the village of Sloboda, Spassky District, Ryazan Region, Russian. After the death of his mother in 1916, he was homeless, ended up in an orphanage, escaped from there, and on August 25, 1918, he signed up as a volunteer in the Red Army. From March 1919 he fought with the troops of Denikin, then with the White Poles. In September 1920 he was seriously wounded. And all this at the age of 14!
In January-February 1921 G.M. Burmin fought with the Antonov rebels in the Tambov region. In 1922 he joined the Komsomol, and in 1923 he became a member of the CPSU/b/. In 1925 he graduated from the 7th grade of an evening school, in 1929 he passed an external exam for a military school. In 1933 he graduated from advanced training courses for the command staff of the armored forces.
From the certification of 1936: “A strong-willed commander, disciplined, initiative and courageous. Constantly working to improve his level of knowledge. Very honest, conscientious, truthful commander. He is well oriented in the mountain-taiga area.
Grigory Mikhailovich is a man of a heavy soldier's lot, inseparable from his Fatherland in the most difficult years of the formation of the young workers' and peasants' Republic.
GMBurmin started the war against fascism back in Spain, where he honestly and courageously fulfilled his international duty. On February 24, 1938, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for special military merits. Then he taught tactics at the Orel Armored School. From September 1940 to April 1, 1941 he served as deputy commander of the 11th tank regiment of a separate tank division. Since August 1941 he was the commander of the 108th tank regiment, introduced into Iran. From the end of 1941, he served as deputy commander of the 24th tank regiment on the Transcaucasian, and then on the Crimean fronts. From February 28, 1942 he commanded the Crimean regiment. The newspaper of the Crimean Front in the spring of 1942 noted: "the heroic deeds of Comrade Burmin's unit."
During the fighting on the Akmonai Isthmus, Burmin was wounded in the neck and throat, was treated in the Kerch hospital, after which he immediately took part in the battles as the commander of a consolidated group. The rank of lieutenant colonel was awarded to him on May 6, 1942.
During the period of bloody battles for Kerch, from May 17, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bAdzhimushkaysky quarries, a group of troops was finally surrounded, covering the withdrawal and evacuation of units of the Crimean Front through the strait. Their months-long defense began. In the first days of the encirclement, underground garrisons became the center of consolidation of other, smaller groups northeast of Kerch. From the factory area. Voikov on May 19-20, 1942, a group of Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Burmin broke into the Central Quarries, who later, after the death of P.M.
With the greatest dignity, honor, courage and heroic tenacity, its last commander, Grigory Mikhailovich Burmin, led his garrison. He understood with all responsibility and knew the price of a soldier's life to continue the fight against fascism until the last minute, until the last breath - this is his whole life, the life of a real Soviet soldier.
In early September 1942, when units of the 47th Army were forced to withdraw from the Taman Peninsula to the Caucasus, the defenders of the quarries no longer had hope for an early landing of Soviet troops in the Crimea. It was the most difficult time - mortality from starvation, disease and wounds increased sharply. G.M. Burmin decides to go to the surface in small groups and try to contact the underground and partisans.
The German command planned to eliminate the desperate resistance of the remnants of the Adzhimushkay garrison with carefully prepared directed explosions. But the command takes away the surviving participants of the defense to distant areas of the quarries, where they continue to resist.
The command of the garrison is preparing, as the fascists reported in the report, a “forced exit”, therefore, together with the Romanian command, they are liquidating the last resistance groups - they knew about the condition of the fighters and commanders, the capabilities of weapons from the traitors. But, judging by the "report", in the Central Quarries, when the last group was captured, there was a fierce hand-to-hand fight - 20 people were injured.
Grigory Mikhailovich Burmin was in captivity and died on November 28, 1944. From the few memoirs of the participants, it is known that until the end of his days he remained faithful to his duty and devoted to the Motherland.
A.I. Trofimenko wrote in his diary found in the quarries: “I will not forget the famous words of the famous Russian writer Nikolai Ostrovsky. He wanted to commit suicide, but later he wrote: anyone and anyone can commit suicide, but in such conditions to save their lives and benefit the state - this, perhaps, would be more expedient, and not every one of us can do it. And in such difficult conditions, each of us must deal with such a task.
Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Burmin set such a task for himself, and completed it to the end. He did not become a scoundrel and a traitor, he did not put a bullet in his forehead, but courageously and steadfastly continued to fight the enemy, while remaining a commander, a communist, a Man.

Documentary portrait
and combat characteristics of the senior battalion commissar
Ivan Pavlovich PARAKHIN

The basis of the documentary portrait and combat characteristics of the communist I.P. Parakhin are the memoirs and records of participants and eyewitnesses of the military events in Kerch in the period May-October 1942.
Ivan Pavlovich PARAKHIN was born on March 29, 1903 in the village of Uspenye, Orel Region. Later, together with his parents, he lived at the Debaltseve station in the Donbass. In 1912, I.P. Parakhin finished 2 classes elementary school and continued his studies on his own. In 1920, Ivan Pavlovich joined the Komsomol, and in 1921 became a member of the Communist Party. In 1921-22. was the secretary of the Alichevsk district committee of the Komsomol of the Donetsk region. In 1926 I.P. Parakhin graduated from the Communist University in Kharkov. From June to October 1926 he was the secretary of the Aleksandrovsky district party committee. From November 1929 to December 1930 - secretary of the party committee of the mine "Ilyich" of the Kadievsky district. In 1932, Ivan Pavlovich was drafted into the Red Army for party mobilization. In the army, Parakhin served mainly in aviation units, his last position in May 1942 was as a senior instructor in the Department of the Political Administration of the Crimean Front. On April 27, 1942, he was awarded the military rank of senior battalion commissar.
From the diary of Alexander Ivanovich Trofimenko, found in the Central Quarries: “But can you imagine what several thousand people are doomed to?.. Strangely enough, and sometimes terribly, the struggle goes on as usual.
And one can feel the spirit of struggle and confidence in one’s strength, hopes that everything will be experienced, each of us lives in the fact that the hour will come and we will come to the surface to pay off the enemy.”
In the memoirs of the participants in the Adzhimushkay defense of 1942, in the diaries found in the catacombs, they talk about the great educational work that the communists and political workers did in the garrisons, raising the morale of the soldiers, helping them withstand the hardships of siege life in incredibly difficult conditions of the dungeon, politically providing operations conducted by the command of the garrison. This is also evidenced by the lines from the register of political studies found in the quarries.
But, probably, I.P. Parakhin, as the organizer of military-political work in the underground garrison, received the most accurate assessment of his work in the words of the occupiers: “... Propaganda was in the hands of political officers and commissars. It was aimed at inducing the people there to the greatest resistance ... it was accepted by everyone there as the truth.
From the words of the assistant chief of radio communications in the rifle division
F.F. Kaznacheev, later a participant in the defense of Adzhimushkay: “Commissar Parakhin is a great master of instilling in the hearts of people confidence in his strength, confidence that we will definitely defeat the insidious and hated enemy. This hatred of the enemy helps us endure the hardships and hardships of underground life.
Their party recall of a member of the CPSU / b / Guba dated May 8, 1938: Parakhina I.P. I know from joint service since 1932. This is an excellent mass activist-agitator and propagandist, in his work he is inseparable from the masses. Among the Red Army men and commissars, he enjoys excellent and lively prestige. Parakhin's favorite method in working with people is a lively conversation, deep, interesting, leaving no ambiguities in his conviction ... A friend of the Red Army men and commanders, he knows how to identify the best people loyal to the party, knows how to show their qualities as an example for others. In his personal life, Parakhin retained the psychology of a working miner, he never boasts or “boasts”. From the personal file it is clear that Ivan Pavlovich, reading a lot of political and military literature, knew Russian prose and poetry perfectly.
As a fourteen-year-old boy, Mikhail Petrovich Radchenko fell into the catacombs, now living, the last participant and witness of the heroic defense of Adzhimushkay. He wrote: “...Recalling the past, I only realized much later that the task was given to me by the commissar for the sake of my salvation. He knew that I would not leave the dungeon so easily. And he came up with a convincing excuse in the hope of one chance in a thousand that I would survive. He was a father himself, He was a commissar. And that's it".
“We were children plunged into the maelstrom of the terrible events of the war. Adults understood this and tried to protect us with their love. It was the love of hard days. The situation made demands on us as adults, but for adults we still remained children. I remember how once the commissar, sending us on reconnaissance, explained the task to us, and after finishing the briefing, he pulled out two pieces of sugar from his pocket and gave them to us. This simple, ordinary human caress of a warrior will remain in the soul forever, for it was given to us in the most difficult hour of life. Precisely because people managed to remain people in the inhuman conditions of the dungeon, the Adzhimushkay garrison managed to withstand 170 days in the face of the enemy and fight.
Ivan Pavlovich had a big heart of a big man. He was the father of four children. He knew what he was fighting for and going to his death. A man of honor and great love for the Fatherland.
Ivan Pavlovich Parakhin died brutally tortured by the Nazis in the dungeons of the Simferopol Gestapo.

The underground darkness receded
And the dawn rose before us.
It's time for the truth itself
Spoke your words!

When compiling combat portraits of the commanders of the underground garrison, documentary stories and memoirs of fellow soldiers, historians and researchers were used.

Mikhail Grigorievich Povazhny.
The commander of the garrison of the Small Adzhimushkay quarries.

“It so happened that, having passed the Gestapo, fascist prisons and death camps, I survived. Maybe in order to tell the young people about everything that we had to go through, about the bestial appearance of fascism, about our steadfast and courageous comrades who fought on Kerch land in the quarries of Adzhimushkay.
(M.G. Povazhny)

The first to leave memories of M.G. Importantly, the remarkable military historian Vsevolod Abramov became.
“He lived in an old barrack and was engaged in harvesting scrap. He did not have a wife, but he had a teenage son, adopted by him from some woman, whom he unusually loved and spoiled. From his documents and stories, I understood that he never had a permanent wife, but all the time there were women with whom he cohabited. True, when in Kerch he became famous person, he married quite officially. I found Mikhail Grigoryevich when no one had yet recognized him as the commander of the underground garrison, although his name had already begun to appear in the central press, but the Crimean press was stubbornly silent about him.
In search of housing M.G. Importantly, I walked for a long time in the rain and strong wind, which often happen in Kerch in winter and spring, through the village of Arshintsevo (Kamysh-Burun). Very wet, I introduced myself as M.G. In an important way, He was very happy that he was "finally visited by a military comrade from the center." Seeing my miserable appearance, he immediately ran to the store and brought a bottle "for warming up." M.G. Povazhny I immediately liked, I even spent the night with him. When he undressed before going to bed, I admired his young, completely youthful body. Only the wrinkles on his face betrayed an older man. I was told that some people, after a long hunger strike, become internally healthy, then get sick a little, but die quickly, one might say on the go.
Conversations dragged on, the memories that I wrote down in detail, Mikhail Grigorievich kept several sheets of papers with the dates of captivity and stay in fascist camps and prisons. M.G. Povazhny was cheerful, optimistic and quite satisfied with life. He was very similar to an old, retired pre-revolutionary soldier, still strong, active, believing that the best part of his life was still ahead of him. Then I learned that he enjoyed authority in his circle, was not a member of the party, but actively participated in social work, for many years he was the chairman of the comrades' court at the house management, he was repeatedly threatened by local hooligans, even beaten, but he stubbornly continued to fulfill the duties of a "judge ", because he was sure that this could bring "benefit to society." Only in a conversation about his work he complained: “They ordered me to collect a ton of broken glass, and where I take it, I’ll have to climb garbage dumps.” He carefully watched his appearance, was not only clean-shaven, but also had a beautiful mustache. His height was below average, squat, they say about such people: "the old man-boletus." His hair was neatly cut, curly, it was clear that even at this age (at 67) he was a success with women.
After the historic conference in honor of the 25th anniversary of the start of the defense of the Adzhimushkay quarries in May 1967, the position of M.G. Povazhny in Kerch changed dramatically. He was recognized. During one of his visits, he proudly told me that now he works as a "lecturer". “The work is very good, I am constantly invited to lecture at schools, state farms, industrial enterprises and they pay well.” Mikhail Grigoryevich did not differ in high erudition, but acted in the spirit of a good wartime political instructor: very emotional, sensible and intelligible, he liked to screw something humorous into his “lecture”. In personal conversations, he was distinguished by his spontaneity, a critical attitude towards himself, but he constantly emphasized that "he was the commander of the underground garrison of the Small Adzhimushkay quarries from the very beginning and remained so until the very end." For the "ceremonial event" and "lecturing" he acquired a military tunic, trousers, army officer's boots. I learned with surprise and delight from archival sources that in May 1942 he was awarded the rank of "captain", but the order did not reach him due to the German offensive. He received a comfortable apartment, it had an exemplary order, all the walls were decorated with diplomas, honorary addresses, souvenirs. Later he began to receive a personal pension.”
Student club named after P.M. Yagunova has been caring for the grave for many years.
M.G. Important. Every year, 2 times a year, in April and at the end of October (the last days of the defense of Adzhimushkay), I, with students of the Kerch Polytechnic School, come to the grave of the commander of the garrison of the Small Adzhimushkay quarries, paying tribute to the memory of the heroes of 1942 in the person of their commander, who found peace in the central cemetery of the city of Kerch. Kerch, and how many heroes the Kerch steppe from sea to sea will remain the last refuge ...
Unexpectedly, in December 2009, we were contacted by the daughter-in-law and grandchildren of M.G. Important. The son of Mikhail Grigorievich lives in Yevpatoria today, with whom the Club began to correspond. In one of the letters, Mikhail Mikhailovich tried to answer my questions.
Povazhny Mikhail Grigorievich was born in Krasnokutsk, Kharkov region in 1897. He had 3 classes of a parochial school. From May 1916 to February 1917 he fought near Riga with the Germans as part of the 173rd Kamenetz-Podolsky Regiment. From February 1919 to October 1920, he participated in the Civil War, fought with the rebels of Makhno and Antonov. As a cadet, as part of the Kotovsky brigade, he participated in the defeat of the "green" gang. In 1921, after completing 51 infantry courses in Kharkov, he served in the Red Army in command positions. In the service he had modest performance, often received comments from senior bosses. Mikhail Grigorievich told about himself with humor: “It used to be that the commander would call me and begin to pronounce the notation for me with these words: “Comrade Povazhny, you don’t serve well ...” In 1935, M.G. Povazhny was dismissed from the army as a commander unpromising in the future. It seems that at that time the leadership did not see in him a good middle-level commander, like the artillery officer Tushin, described
L. N. Tolstoy in the novel "War and Peace". M.G. Povazhny, like Tushin, was very modest, inconspicuous, "afraid of the authorities", but very conscientious, honest, knew his job well. Such commanders, as a rule, are close to the masses of soldiers, and therefore they enjoy authority among their subordinates. Povazhny all his life had a quality that is called "military bone". It was visible to everyone. He was always disciplined, tidy, collected and sociable. After his dismissal from the army, he immediately found himself in economic work in Sevastopol (Before the war, he worked as the head of supply at the Inkerman wines factory. In his last position, before the war, he was head of the secret department of the Tauride District in Sevastopol.), From where he was mobilized on July 20 in 1st reserve regiment. In early March 1942, he was appointed commander of a battalion of the 83rd Marine Brigade, was wounded in the battles on the Akmonai Isthmus, and after the hospital was again in the 1st Reserve Regiment.
On the outskirts of Adzhimushkay, the defense was held by a group from the 1st reserve regiment of the Crimean Front under the command of Major A.G. Golyadkin and senior battalion commissar A.N. Eliseev. The regiment was formed in the autumn of 1941; it was then part of the 51st Army. The permanent composition of the regiment consisted largely of immigrants from the Crimea. The order for the defense of the 1st reserve regiment here was given personally by S.M. Budyonny, who had flown in by plane from Krasnodar. Calling A.G. Golyadkin and A.N. Eliseev, he demanded: “I order you to detain the Nazis at all costs. The longer you hold out here, the more you will detain the Nazis, and hence the more we will be able to transport people to the mainland. Stop retreating singles and small groups of fighters and commanders, put together units from them. We will strengthen you as much as possible.”
On May 15, as a result of a mortar attack, A.G. was wounded. Golyadkin. The wounded orderlies put him in a horse-drawn cart, he called the battalion commander M.G. Povazhny and ordered to take command of the 1st reserve regiment. There were quite a lot of personnel in the regiment who were not fit for military service, there was a battalion of convalescents (these were soldiers who had returned from hospitals), a unit of female signalmen. An order was received to send all these people to the crossing for the purpose of evacuation to Taman. Political instructor V.M. was ordered to lead this mass of people. Ognev. With the onset of darkness, people began to be taken out of the quarries. Ognev safely led the convoy to the Kerch Strait and was transported with it to the Taman Peninsula that same night.
The headquarters of the 1st reserve regiment was located in the Small Adzhimushkaysky quarries, located about 250–300 m from the Central ones. The medical unit of the regiment, a food warehouse and some units were also located here. This circumstance led to the fact that after the encirclement, another garrison arose here, part of which continued to be commanded by Senior Lieutenant Povazhny. Another part of the personnel of this regiment ended up in the Central Quarries. A single underground garrison in the Small Adzhimushkay quarries, as in the Central ones, where P.M. Yagunov, it didn't work out. At least three groups were formed here, headed by Lieutenant Colonel S.A. Ermakov, Senior Lieutenant M.G. Povazhny and Captain S.N. Barlite. A prominent figure in the defense of these quarries was the battalion commissar M.N. Karpekin, who, during the rearguard battles east of Kerch, was sent to the quarry area by Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov as a representative of the headquarters of the front and the political administration. Education S.A. Ermakov, his work and social hardening, rapid growth in military ranks overshadowed the modest track record of Mikhail Grigoryevich Povazhny. CM. Ermakov, senior in rank in the Small Adzhimushkay quarries, was proud, somewhat arrogant, and therefore did not immediately like M.G. Povazhny and S.N. Barlit. Of the senior commanders, no one appointed him to command here; he ended up in the quarries by accident. His group was small, and therefore he had no one to rely on. In addition, he had absolutely no food, and he was forced to stand "on allowance" at first with S.N. Barlita, and then from M.G. Important. All these reasons influenced the fact that a garrison with a strong unified command did not form in these quarries.
From the memoirs of M.G. Povazhnogo: “... We lived as it should be for a military garrison. Every day an officer on duty for the regiment, orderlies for companies, and a duty company were appointed. Secrets were exposed, at the exits from the quarries - guards.
It is difficult to describe in words everything that happened to be experienced. When the last food ran out and hunger began to torment more and more every day, the skins and hooves of horses were used as food. They ate lice. The corpses of dead comrades, buried right there, decomposed. The air was heavy. The Germans continued gas attacks ... "
In the most difficult conditions, the personnel of the regiment worked out, as M.G. Povazhny - "their methods of struggle." They learned to deal with gases and smoke, but more and more often the fighters were “thrown off their feet by hunger, thirst, fatigue, gases, the heavy air of the dungeon…”
The last refuge in the last days of October 1942 in the catacombs were two stone rooms, in which the headquarters was located at the beginning of the defense. Obviously, the traitor remembered these rooms and brought the Germans here. "No matter how we hid, the fascists discovered and captured us - the last unarmed defenders of the Small Quarries."
We know about the feat of those who fought in the Small Adzhimushkay quarries from the legendary diary of Alexander Klabukov.
“10.7.42 ... Comrade. Povazhny bought himself a daughter, Svetlanochka. Svetlana was left without parents. Her parents left the catacombs for food on May 20 and did not return: they were killed or with the Germans. The girl is very smart beyond her years ... She understands perfectly. They gave her a cracker, she asks: “Uncle, is this for today or in general?” How prudent! If she had been told at all, then, of course, she would not have eaten it right away, but would have stretched it out for two, three days. Povazhny regiment commander, if he comes out of the catacombs and saves her life, he is a lucky man.
Fate was very cruel to everyone whom Mikhail Grigorievich dearly loved, and these wounds were added to the front: shortly before the war, his first-born twins died in a fire, and subsequently such a strong family was not created; Svetlana Tyutyunnikova died in the quarries (although Mikhail recalls that “after the war she lived in Kerch and often came to her father”), and the fate of her beloved son Misha was unenviable ... the son of a front-line soldier who went through captivity, German and Stalinist camps ... suspicions and humiliations .
In general, he was a cheerful, hospitable person. He loved to receive guests. My favorite holiday was the New Year. May 9 for M.G. Important - it's sacred! The most important holiday, which brought together all friends and associates. This is what he endured it all for. Of the veterans, after the war, he often met with L.T. Karatsuba, with Titov - a member of the Eltigen landing, I.A. Kiselev and many other comrades. M.G. Povazhny until the end of his days was a combat member of the Kerch veterans' organization.
Today, his awards and memoirs are kept in the Kiev Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War. Died M.G. Povazhny from stomach sarcoma in the Kerch oncological hospital.
The words of Adzhimushkayts N.D. sound today as a testament. Nemtsov. Words of our Memory: “Young and old! If you have a clear conscience and a good heart, if you, with good motives and a disinterested feeling, want to know the truth about people and about the events of those distant days of 1942, trust the sacred stones of Adzhimushkay, lean against their mighty and kind walls with a shershavinka, and they will tell to you about military youth, true friendship and boundless devotion to the Motherland and military duty.

Books about Kerch in the war of 1941-1945.

1. Abramov V. "Kerch catastrophe 1942" Moscow "Yauza" "Eksmo" 2006
2.Azarov V.B. The sailors went first. Simferopol Tavria. 1974
3. Akulov M.R. "Kerch - a hero city" Ot.TR.Kr.Zn.Voen.Izd. M. 1980
4. Batov P.I. "Perekop 1941" ed. "Crimea" Simferopol 1970
5.Combat way of the Soviet Navy. Edited by A.V. Basov, M. "Military Publishing House" 1988
6. But N. "Adzhimushkay 1942" Moscow Visual Arts 1985
7. In the catacombs of Adzhimushkay. Edition 4. Simferopol. Ed. "Tavria" 1982
8. In the catacombs of Adzhimushkay. Comp. B.E. Serman. Ed. "Crimea" Simferopol 1966
9. Military diary of F. Halder. In 3 volumes. Military publishing house MO.SSSR Moscow. 1971
10. Gladkov V.F. Landing on Eltigen. M. Military Publishing. 1981
11. Gusarov F., Chuistova L. "Kerch" Krymizdat 1955
12. Efremov N. "Dungeon Soldiers" publishing house "Crimea" Simferopol 1970
13. Zotkin N.F. and others. Red Banner Black Sea Fleet. M. Military Publishing, 1987
14. Zubkov A.I. "Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation" Ot.TR.Kr.Zn. Military Ed. M.O.USSR. Moscow 1974
15. History of the Second World War 1939-1945. In 12 volumes. Main editorial committee. Chairman Ustinov D.F. O.R.Tr.Kr.Znamya Military Publishing House of M.O.SSSR, M. 1982
16. Kerch military (collection of articles). KGIKZ. Kerch 2004
17. Kerch. Documents and materials on the history of the city. Simferopol. Editorial Department of the Crimean Press Committee 1993
18. Knyazev G.N., Protsenko I.S. Valor is immortal. About the feat of the defenders of Adzhimushkay. M. Izd polit. Literature, 1986
19. Crimea during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Collection of documents and materials. Publishing house "Tavria" Simferopol 1973
20. Litvinova L. They fly through the years. Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, M. 1965
21. Manstein Erich Von. Soldier of the 20th century. Transitbook. Moscow. 2006
22. Manstein Erich Von. Lost victories. M. Military Publishing House 1957
23. Markov I.I. Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. M. Voenizdat 1956
24. Martynov V., Spakhov S. Strait on fire. Kiev Ed. "Political Literature" Ukraine 1984
25. Mochulsky K.V. Seaport of Kerch. Historical story. Publishing house Typography Kerch - 1996
26. Pervushin A.N. Roads we didn't take. M. DOSAAF publishing house. 1974
27. Pirogov A. Fortress of soldiers' hearts. Ed. "Soviet Russia" Moscow 1974
28. Pirogov R.A. Banner over Mithridates. Simferopol 1973
29. Rubtsov Y. “Mekhlis. The Shadow of the Leader" M. "Eksmo", "Yauza", 2007
30. Sarkisyan S.M. 51st Army. M. Military Publishing 1983
31. Sirota N. “This is how Kerch fought” Documentary essay. Simferopol 1976
32.Cheremovsky Yu.Yu. Russian roulette. Simferopol "Tavrida", 2000
33. Shcherbak S.M. Battle glory of Kerch. Simferopol "Tavria" 1986

Germany
Romania Commanders D. T. Kozlov,
E. von Manstein,

von Sponeck,
Himer,
von Richthofen

Side forces Crimean Front:

• 47th Army
• KV and T-34 battalions
• RGK artillery

Losses more than 300 thousand, incl. more than 170 thousand prisoners
1100 guns, 250 tanks; about 10 thousand people

Kerch landing operation- a major landing operation of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Passed from December 26 to May 20. Despite initial success, the operation ended in a major setback: three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated. The total losses amounted to more than 300 thousand people, including about 170 thousand prisoners, as well as a significant amount of heavy weapons. The defeat of the landing party had a serious impact on the fate of the besieged Sevastopol and facilitated the Wehrmacht's summer offensive into the Caucasus.

Previous events

1st stage: landing

Side forces

Soviet troops The landing force included 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades, 2 mountain rifle regiments - a total of 82,500 people, 43 tanks, 198 guns and 256 mortars:

For their support, 78 warships and 170 transport ships were involved, in total over 250 ships and vessels, including 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 52 patrol and torpedo boats:

• Black Sea Fleet (Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky)
• Azov Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov)

The air forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the armies operating on the Taman Peninsula, as of December 20, had a total of about 500 aircraft (excluding air defense fighter aircraft), the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet had approximately 200 aircraft.

German troops: the protection of the Kerch Peninsula was carried by:

• Part of the troops of the 46th division (42nd army corps of the 11th army)
• 8th Romanian Cavalry Brigade
• 4th Mountain Brigade
• 2 field regiments and 5 anti-aircraft artillery battalions

Landing

Monument to the participants of the Kerch-Feodosia landing in Feodosia

At that moment, the enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula were represented by one German division - the 46th Infantry and the Romanian Regiment of Mountain Riflemen, guarding the area of ​​the Parpach Range. The landing forces in Kerch were many times superior to the forces of the Wehrmacht in this area, in addition, the landing in Feodosia threatened encirclement, so the commander of the 42nd Corps, Gen. von Sponeck immediately gave the order to withdraw. Later, Manstein ordered to hold the defense, but it was no longer possible to fulfill it. The German troops retreated, thus avoiding encirclement, but at the same time leaving behind all heavy weapons. For a formal violation of the order, von Sponeck was removed from command and put on trial.

results

As a result of the landing, the position of German troops in the Crimea became threatening. The commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein wrote:

If the enemy took advantage of the situation that had arisen and quickly began to pursue the 46th [infantry division] from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would be created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged sector ... the fate of the entire 11th Army.

However, the 51st Army, advancing from Kerch, did not move forward fast enough, and the 44th Army from Feodosia, with its main forces, moved not to the west, but to the east, towards the 51st Army. This allowed the enemy to create a barrier at the turn of the Yaila spurs - the Sivash coast west of Ak-Monai. The defense of the line was held by the 46th division of the Wehrmacht, reinforced by an additional infantry regiment, and the Romanian mountain units. To strengthen the combat capability of the Romanian units, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the rear units of the German army, including those from the army headquarters, were included in their composition.

Planning errors

When planning the operation, significant miscalculations were made:

• there was not a single medical institution on the bridgehead, the nearest hospital was in the Kuban. The wounded fighters, having received the initial dressing in the regimental squadron, were brought from their positions to Kerch, from there they independently reached Novorossiysk on steamboats.
• air defense systems were not delivered to the port of Feodosia in a timely manner. As a result, before January 4, 5 transports were killed by enemy aircraft: Krasnogvardeets, Zyryanin, and others; the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz received heavy damage.

Losses

During the landing, the losses of Soviet troops amounted to more than 40 thousand people, of which about 32 thousand were killed, frozen and missing, 35 tanks, 133 guns and mortars.

2nd stage: battles for the Parpach Range

In the first days of January 1942, for the troops that landed at Feodosia and approached from Kerch, the path to the vital artery of the 11th Army, the Dzhankoy-Simferopol railway, was actually opened. The weak defensive front that we managed to create could not withstand the onslaught of large forces. On January 4, it became known that the enemy already had 6 divisions in the Feodosia region.

However, the commander of the landing forces, D.T. Kozlov, postponed the offensive, referring to the insufficiency of forces and means.

Loss of Theodosius

Despite the loss of the port in Feodsia, the Soviet command retained the ability to deliver reinforcements across the ice of the Kerch Strait.

Crimean front

This time, 8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades advanced in the first echelon. Of the latter, during the first three days of the offensive, 136 tanks were knocked out. Nevertheless, a critical situation was created in a number of areas. How stubborn the fighting was is evidenced by the fact that the regiments of the 46th [infantry division], in the zone of which the main blow was delivered, repelled from 10 to 22 attacks during the first three days.

Despite all efforts, decisive success was not achieved this time either.

The Kerch-Feodosia operation of December 1941 became one of the first naval landings of World War II and for a long time remained the largest in terms of the number of troops involved. This operation is not deprived of attention in the literature, but most of the works devoted to it have two drawbacks: firstly, they almost do not use German documents, and secondly, they are based mainly on the documents of the Soviet fleet and almost do not describe the landing operations on the coast. A new cycle of publications dedicated to the events on the Kerch Peninsula on December 26–30, 1941 is intended to correct both of these gaps.

Operation plan

The landing on the Kerch Peninsula was planned by the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet and the Transcaucasian Front since the end of November 1941. It was supposed to be carried out in three different places: the Azov Flotilla landed on the northern coast of the peninsula, the Black Sea Fleet landed on the southern coast, and the Kerch Naval Base (KVMB) evacuated to Taman directly in the Kerch Strait. The operation involved parts of two armies - the 51st and 44th. Moreover, the latter was supposed to act immediately in large formations - landing on the Black Sea coast made it possible to use warships and seagoing ships to transport troops. In the Kerch Strait and the Sea of ​​Azov, landings were carried out by small ships and boats.

Directly on the western coast of the Kerch Strait, the 302nd mountain rifle division of the 51st army of Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov (823rd, 825th, 827th and 831st regiments), as well as units of the Kerch base (Head - Rear Admiral A. S. Frolov) - first of all, her engineering company. They were supported by the coastal artillery of the base, which had at its disposal the 140th separate coastal defense artillery division of six batteries: three 203-mm, four 152-mm, nine 130-mm and four 75-mm guns (although not all of them could fire on the opposite side). In addition, the 25th Corps Artillery Regiment was located on Taman - three 152-mm and nine 122-mm guns. The air defense of the base was carried out by the 65th anti-aircraft artillery regiment.

Head of the Kerch Naval Base, Rear Admiral A. S. Frolov. Photo from the exposition of the Central Naval Museum

Small naval forces were subordinate to the base: three divisions of water area protection boats (“small hunters” and minesweepers), two raid protection groups and floating battery No. 4, rebuilt from a non-self-propelled barge (displacement - 365 tons; armament - three 100-mm guns , one 37-mm machine gun and anti-aircraft machine guns). In addition, to participate in the operation, the Black Sea Fleet transferred to the base the 2nd brigade of torpedo boats and a group of "small hunters" from the 4th and 8th divisions of sea hunters.

Kerch Peninsula, topographic map of 1938

It was decided to land south of Kerch in a twenty-kilometer strip from Cape Ak-Burun to the collective farm Commune Initiative near Lake Tobechik. Troops were supposed to land at five points. The main forces of the 302nd division unloaded in the harbor of the village of Kamysh-Burun and on the Kamysh-Burun Spit; part of the forces landed north of the bay near the village of Stary Karantin, as well as south of Kamysh-Burun - in Eltigen and the Commune Initiative. In the area of ​​the plant. Voikov and Cape Ak-Burun were supposed to make demonstrative landings. The starting point for the landing movement is Taman, 25 km (2nd and 3rd detachments) from the landing site and the village of Komsomolskoye to the west of Taman (1st detachment).

Kamysh-Burun Bay, view from the north, modern photo. On the left you can see the spit and the fish factory on it, on the right - the Zaliv plant (a former shipyard)

landing forces

To participate in the operation, 37 fishing seiners were allocated (of which 6 were armed with 45-mm cannons) and three tugs, dragging two barges and a bolinder, a landing barge from the First World War without an engine. In addition, the landing was provided by 6 patrol boats of the MO-4 type and 29 torpedo boats (the torpedoes were removed from them, and the gutters at the stern were adapted for landing fighters). Subsequently, the minesweeper "Chkalov", the floating battery No. 4 and the armored boat No. 302 were added to these forces. Torpedo boats took on board 15-20 people, seiners - 50-60 people each. All ships could carry 5,500 people and up to 20 field guns in one flight.

Azov fishing seiner with a displacement of 80 tons. Such boats were the main means of transporting troops
Source - A. V. Nemenko. The story of one landing

To deliver the first amphibious assault to each of the four landing points, two torpedo boats and 4–6 seiners were intended. Assault groups with walkie-talkies were the first to land from torpedo boats, then the main train was landed by seiners. The staff of the headquarters of the Kerch base were appointed heads of the landing points, they were also the commanders of the assault groups. After landing, two seiners were to remain at each point: one for observation, the second for evacuating the wounded. The following points were chosen for the landing:

• No. 1 - Old Quarantine(technician-quartermaster of the 1st rank A. D. Grigoriev, head of the command and control unit of the headquarters of the KVMB);
• No. 2 - Kamysh-Burun Spit(senior lieutenant N. F. Gasilin, flagship gunner of the KVMB);
• No. 3 - Eltigen(Major I. K. Lopata, head of the mobilization unit of the headquarters of the KVMB);
• No. 4 - berth of the sinter plant in Kamysh-Burun port(captain of the 3rd rank A.F. Studenichnikov, chief of staff of the KVMB). Here, from four "small hunters" (MO-091, MO-099, MO-100 and MO-148), a reinforced company of the 302nd rifle division landed. At the same time, Studenichnikov led the entire detachment of the first throw, and then had to carry out general coordination of the landing from the board of the MO-100 boat. With him was the head of the political department of the base, battalion commissar K. V. Lesnikov.

General plan of the Kerch-Feodosiya operation
Source - Kerch operation. M.: Military publishing house, 1943

The first throw was labeled as 1st Landing Squad, it also included mooring teams, signalmen and scouts - a total of 225 people at each point (rifle company and sapper squad) from the 823rd and 825th regiments of the 302nd mountain rifle division, the 831st regiment of the 390th rifle division. According to the final report of the base, a total of 1154 people were taken on the ships of the 1st detachment.

It is worth noting that the base command took direct control of the landing, acting in the forefront. Rear Admiral Frolov himself was going to place his command post on the "small hunter" and be directly in the strait - only a direct order from the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F. F. Oktyabrsky, made him stay in Taman.

2nd squad landings under the command of senior lieutenant Petrovsky, in fact, it was a reinforcement of the 1st detachment - it consisted of three companies of the same regiments (200 people each), unloaded from ten seiners and two motorized boats. Each company was reinforced with two 76mm field guns. According to the final plan, one company landed in Stary Karantin, one in Kamysh-Burun itself, and another in Eltigen. In total, 744 people were accepted on the ships. The detachment was accompanied by 2 "small hunters" and 6 torpedo boats.

3rd squad Captain-Lieutenant N. Z. Evstigneev made up the main part of the landing force and landed at the same three points as the 2nd detachment. It consisted of the 823rd, 825th and 831st rifle regiments - 1200 people each with four 76-mm guns each. A barge with a tugboat and three seiners were assigned to each regiment. A serious danger was that the main part of the personnel was transported on a non-self-propelled barge.

Alas, units of the 302nd division had no combat experience, they were not preparing either for landings or for night operations. Only since December 15 in the Taman Bay, with parts of the division, it was possible to conduct ten exercises with the involvement of the minesweeper "Chkalov" and eight seiners. The landing was to be carried out suddenly - in the dark, without artillery preparation, only under the cover of a smoke screen from torpedo boats. The suppression of enemy firing points was assigned to the 45-mm guns of the MO-type boats. At dawn, the artillery of the Kerch base was supposed to support the landing force - for this, spotters with walkie-talkies landed on the shore together with the paratroopers.

Enemy forces

On the German side, the Kerch Peninsula was defended by the 42nd Army Corps, but in fact only its 46th Infantry Division was in the Kerch area. The 72nd Infantry Regiment was intended to defend the northern coast of the peninsula, the 97th Regiment was in reserve west of Kerch. The 27-kilometer strip on the coast of the Kerch Strait was defended by the 42nd Infantry Regiment, which had 1,529 people in combat strength (without rear and support services), including 38 officers, 237 non-commissioned officers and 1,254 privates. The German documents do not report the total strength of the regiment.

The eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula and the location of enemy forces according to Soviet intelligence
Source - Kerch-Feodosiya operation. M.: Military publishing house, 1943

In addition, a rather strong artillery group was located in the Kerch area: the 114th and 115th artillery regiments, parts of the 766th coastal defense artillery regiment (four batteries of the 148th division, two batteries of the 147th division and one battery of the 774th division), as well as the 4th battery of the 54th coastal defense artillery regiment - a total of 35 serviceable 105-mm field howitzers and 15 heavy 150-mm howitzers, as well as 7 long-range 100-mm guns. Of the last four (captured Dutch) were permanently installed at Cape Takil, all other artillery had mechanical traction and could change positions. The main part of the artillery was located on the coast of the Kerch Gulf, the 1st division of the 64th anti-aircraft regiment of the Luftwaffe was also located here (at least sixteen 88-mm guns and several 20-mm machine guns).

The area from Cape Ak-Burun to Kamysh-Burun was defended by the 3rd Infantry Battalion with the support of the 3rd Battery of the 114th Artillery Regiment. Further south, in the area of ​​Eltigen and the Commune Initiative, was the 3rd Infantry Battalion with the 1st Battery of the 114th Artillery Regiment. Judging by the German descriptions, the coastline itself was guarded only in the villages of Eltigen and Stary Karantin, and only on the Kamysh-Burun Spit was there a reinforced patrol of the 1st battalion with two anti-tank guns and several machine guns. The main forces of the 1st and 3rd battalions were located where it was more convenient to live - in the villages of Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen, Commune Initiative and Tobechik, as well as on the territory of the iron ore plant.

The ruins of the iron ore plant, modern view

On the morning of December 26, it was raining in the Kerch region, the temperature was 3-5 degrees Celsius, the excitement in the strait was 3-4 points. By evening, the temperature had dropped to zero, sleet began to fall.

Landing of the 1st detachment

The command of the Kerch base received an order for landing on December 24, the landing was required to be carried out on the night of the 26th. By dawn on December 25, the ships were concentrated at pre-planned landing points - Taman and Komsomolsk. Despite drills and pre-designed planning tables, the boarding was slow and disorganized. At the appointed time (by one in the morning), only the 1st detachment (the detachment of the first throw) completed it. The 2nd detachment was late with the exit for an hour, the 3rd - for two hours.

For the transition to Kamysh-Burun, a route was chosen through the shallow Tuzla ravine and south of the Tuzla spit, since to the north of it the strait was visible and shot through by the enemy. Part of the fences and signals installed here was torn off by a storm - as a result, the barges of the 3rd detachment ran aground, their removal was delayed until 11 am. The rest of the ships approached the designated landing points at different times, as a result, landing troops not where the plan was supposed - sometimes by order, sometimes without prior notice.

A fragment of a modern topographic map of the area of ​​the settlements of Kamysh-Burun (Arshintsevo) and Eltigen (Geroevskoye)

At about 5 o'clock in the morning, Senior Lieutenant Gasilin from the Kamysh-Burun Spit reported on the radio that the assault group had landed from torpedo boats covertly and without losses, and that landing point No. 2 was ready to receive paratroopers. A little later, quartermaster technician Grigoriev from Stary Karantin (point No. 1) reported that he had landed on the shore and was fighting with superior enemy forces (after that, the connection was interrupted). From Eltigen (point No. 3) there were no messages from Major Lopata.

But the main events took place in the harbor of Kamysh-Burun, where a group of four torpedo boats and six seiners moved. Having already entered the harbor, the flagship MO-100 ran aground literally fifty meters from the pier. It turned out that the harbor was covered with silt, and the depth here does not exceed one and a half meters (with a draft of a boat of the MO-4 type of 1.25 m). As a result, the helmsman Konstantin Kozlov wade reached the pier and fixed the mooring line on it, for which the boat was pulled to the pier. Following him, MO-148 approached the pier, also disembarking paratroopers without enemy opposition. Only after that did the Germans discover the landing: the next two Soviet boats were already moored under fire. Nevertheless, the landing took place practically without losses, the fighters of the assault group successfully entrenched themselves in the shops of the sinter plant.

Until the situation was cleared up, Captain 3rd Rank Studenchikov did not dare to land the rest of the landing force in Kamysh-Burun itself and sent the seiners that came up to land on the spit. The MO-148 boat went to Taman, the other three remained off the coast for fire support. Alas, the Kamysh-Burun Spit was under constant fire from enemy artillery (three 105-mm guns of the 3rd battery of the 114th artillery regiment). According to a German report, "good results were achieved against the enemy who landed on the Rybachy Peninsula". Apparently, as a result of this shelling, the head of landing point No. 2, Senior Lieutenant Gasilin, was killed.

The German patrol withdrew from the spit without a fight to the south and by noon took up positions near the road from Eltigen to Kerch. The Germans took with them a heavy machine gun and two anti-tank guns, but the limber with ammunition for one of them had to be thrown on a spit.

Fight on the beach

What happened at the other landing sites? At Old Quarantine, only an assault group from torpedo boat No. 15 was able to land - 25 people, led by the head of landing point No. 1, technician-quartermaster of the 1st rank Grigoriev (according to the report of the base headquarters, 55 people were landed here - that is, both boats were unloaded ). A heavy battle immediately ensued, about which Grigoriev reported by radio to the headquarters of the base. Soon the radio went out of order, and the connection was interrupted.

The Eltigen group of ships, for unclear reasons, was divided into two detachments in the Tuzla ravine, moving along different routes. The first to go were two torpedo boats with an assault group and two seiners, one of which was the group commander. Behind and somewhat to the north are two other boats and four other seiners.

At Eltigen, torpedo boat No. 92 was the first to approach the shore. While the paratroopers were disembarking, it was turned around with a lag, and then thrown into the shallows. On the shore were 25 paratroopers and 4 sailors, including the commander of the boat, Senior Lieutenant Kolomiets; four more sailors supported them with heavy machine gun fire from the boat. During the battle that began, the radio operator was one of the first to be killed - as a result, Major Lopata was never able to contact the base headquarters. The paratroopers managed to occupy a large stone shed fifty meters from the boat, turning it into a stronghold.

Seeing the battle, the team of one of the seiners turned their ship to the north and, without opposition from the enemy, unloaded it at the base of the Kamysh-Burun Spit. Another seiner did not unload and, accompanied by a torpedo boat, returned to Komsomolskoye. But the second group of ships, apparently, turned to the south and, without opposition from the enemy, landed troops at the Commune Initiative - where it was envisaged by the original plan of the operation.

Shore in the area of ​​the Commune Initiative, modern photo

Having received no information from Eltigen and Stary Karantin, the head of the KVMB, Rear Admiral Frolov, ordered the commander of the first throw detachment, Senior Lieutenant I. G. Litoshenko, with the rest of the ships, to unload on the Kamysh-Burun Spit. However, the large seiners of the 1st detachment were able to approach the shore only one and a half hundred meters, ran into a shallow and were forced to unload the paratroopers (about 250 people) at a depth of 1.2-1.5 m. As it turned out, there was only a sand bar, beyond which the depth again exceeded two meters. As a result, many paratroopers drowned. Only after that, the landing site was transferred to the berth of the sinter plant - the Kuban seiner was sent there, and, possibly, other vessels.

Landing area for topographic map 1941

For the Germans, the landing was a complete surprise. The first report about it was received by the headquarters of the 42nd regiment from the headquarters of the 1st battalion in Kamysh-Burun at 4:45 (Moscow time - at 5:45). It reported that "many large and small ships" they are trying to land on the spit and in the area of ​​​​the shipyard south of the village (ship repair plant No. 532, now "Zaliv"), as well as in Stary Karantin. Five minutes later, a report was also received from the 3rd battalion stationed in Eltigen - it was reported that 70 people landed in the southern part of the village (the number of paratroopers was more than doubled).

At 06:10, the command of the 42nd Regiment reported to the headquarters of the 46th Infantry Division that the Russians had managed to establish bridgeheads in two places - in Kamysh-Burun and near the Commune of Initiative. The landing at Stary Karantin was quickly defeated: the 3rd company of the 1st battalion reported on the destruction of the enemy and the capture of 1 officer and 30 privates, one commissar was shot. Possibly, it was a 1st-rank quartermaster technician Grigoriev, whose body, according to Soviet army newspapers, was later found with signs of torture. The fact is that the insignia of the quartermaster of the 1st rank coincided with the insignia of the political instructor of the company - three "heads over heels". As for the landing commissar, he was the senior political instructor Grabarov - on the morning of December 27, he and several paratroopers on a randomly found boat reached the Tuzla spit. There were no other commanders among the landing group. It should be noted that after the war, speaking in court, the former commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, assured that the “order on commissars” (Kommissarbefehl) in his army was not brought to the attention of the troops and was not executed.

The command of the 42nd regiment began to transfer its reserves to the landing site: at 6 o'clock in the morning (7 o'clock Moscow time), an infantry platoon from the 13th company, stationed in Churubash, was sent to Kamysh-Burun, as well as an anti-tank platoon from the 14th company , located in Kerch - both of these units were transferred to the disposal of the 1st battalion.

Sources and literature:

1. Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union at the Black Sea theater. Issue 1. From June 21 to December 31, 1941 M.-L: Office of the Naval Publishing House of the NKVMF, 1945
2. Kerch operation. December 1941-January 1942 General Staff of the Army, Military History Department. M.: Military publishing house, 1943
3. A. I. Zubkov. Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. M.: Military Publishing, 1974
4. V. A. Martynov, S. F. Spakhov. Strait on fire. Kiev: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1984
5. S. S. Berezhnoy. Ships and vessels of the Navy of the USSR. 1928–1945 M.: Military Publishing, 1988
6. A. V. Nemenko. The history of one landing http://www.litsovet.ru/index.php/material.read?material_id=490298
7. Report on the landing operation to capture the Kerch Peninsula and the cities of Kerch and Feodosia 26–31.12.41. Operational department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet. Sevastopol, 1942 (TsAMO RF, fund 209, inventory, 1089, file 14)
8. Report on the operation to force the Kerch Strait and the landing on the Kerch Peninsula of the Kerch naval base of the Black Sea Fleet on December 26–29, 1941. Operational department of the KVMB Black Sea Fleet, 1942 (TsAMO RF, fund 209, inventory, 1089, file 1)
9. Operational reports of the headquarters of the Transcaucasian and Caucasian fronts 11/22/41–01/15/42 (TsAMO RF, fund 216, inventory, 1142 case 14)
10. Combat Log of the 42nd Army Corps (NARA, T-314, R-1668)

A new super project of a leading military historian.

From Manstein's breakthrough through the Perekop positions to the failure of the first assaults on Sevastopol, from the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation and the unsuccessful offensive of the Crimean Front to the Kerch disaster and the fall of the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet, from the long German occupation of the peninsula to the swift (in just a month) liberation of Crimea in the victorious spring of 1944 year, when our advancing troops lost four times less than the defending enemy - this book analyzes in detail all the operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in the struggle for the Crimea.

Separately considered as the actions of our ground forces - tankers, infantry, artillery - and combat work Soviet Air Force and the Black Sea Fleet.

Sections of this page:

The general counteroffensive of the Red Army, which began in November near Tikhvin and Rostov and continued near Moscow in December 1941, could not leave the Crimean peninsula aside. The interception of the strategic initiative by the Soviet troops in the winter of 1941/42 took place according to a single scheme: a strike on the extended flank of the enemy strike force. Accordingly, in the Crimea, a blow was struck on the coastal flank of the 11th Army. The coast of the peninsula was a fairly long area that needed to be defended, even if in sparse formations. The concentration of the main efforts of the German troops in the Crimea against Sevastopol made the defense of the entire coast almost formal. She focused on several areas.

The plan for the landing of sea and air assault forces on the Kerch Peninsula appeared at the command of the Transcaucasian Front at the end of November 1941, shortly after the Soviet troops left the Crimea. The first report outlining the main ideas of the operation was sent to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command on November 26, 1941. The proposal was received with interest, and on November 30, a detailed report was sent to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command by the Military Council of the front, detailing the plan and calculating the number of allocated troops. Initially, it was supposed to seize the landing force only in the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula and move further to Feodosia. In this document, for the first time, two armies appear, which subsequently carried out a landing - the 51st A and the 44th A. The first was supposed to use three rifle divisions and one sbr, as part of the second - three rifle divisions with reinforcement units. Accordingly, the first aimed at capturing Kerch, and the second - to the south, to the Chongelek Tatar region. Also in the plan dated November 30, for the first time, a landing appears in the area of ​​​​the city of Opuk (by the forces of one gp). At the same time, the front command planned an airborne landing in the area of ​​​​the Salyn and Bagerovo stations in order to capture the Turkish Wall and prevent the approach of enemy reserves. In the first days of December, there were already relatively detailed studies with the order of forces and specific landing sites. Planning for the 51st Army was led by General P.I. Batov, later replaced by V.N. Lvov. Already in the plan, dated December 2, 1941, Tarkhan, Khroni and Mama Russkaya appear as landing sites on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula.

Landing on the cruiser "Red Caucasus". On December 28, 1941, the cruiser was to land infantrymen at night, moored to the Feodosia pier.

Landing on board the "small hunter". Kerch-Feodosiya operation, December 1941

In early December, the front command issued preliminary orders, in particular on artillery. The landing was supposed to be supported by artillery from the triangle m. Akhileon, Spit Chushka, Battery. It also provided for the landing of artillery and mortars already in the first echelon of the landing, without means of traction, based on rolling manually. At the same time, orders were given to prepare infantry units for landing with exercises with boarding and disembarking from ships and ships.

Transports from the Temryuk pier went to sea at 14.00-17.00 on December 25, from the Kuchugury pier - at 19.00, from the Taman and Komsomolskaya piers - at 2.00-3.00 on December 26, 1941. Already during the landing period, Lieutenant-General V.N. Lvov changed his mind, reducing the Ak-Monai detachment to 500 men, and ordered it to be landed not at Ak-Monai, but in Kazantip Bay. Due to this detachment, the landing at Cape Khroni was intensified. However, at the end of the day, the weather worsened, which seriously hampered the landings. As the commander of the AzVF S.G. Gorshkov: “Due to the large difference in speed, different seaworthiness, the marching order of ships and vessels of various types was violated, many of them fell behind and were forced to follow alone. The seiners, canoes and boats that were towed by the landing craft were flooded with water, and sometimes they were torn off and carried away to the sea. Due to the storm, headwind and rolling waves, the landing forces were late in approaching the landing sites from two to six hours and landed already in daylight.

The 1st detachment, delayed by a storm, did not reach the Kazantip Bay, and the landing force landed somewhat to the west of the 2nd detachment. As a result, instead of an ambitious landing at Ak-Monai, it was landed in the area of ​​heights. 43, 1 (3 km west of Novy Svet) an incomplete battalion of the 83rd MBR under the command of Lieutenant Kapran (193 people), who took up defense 2 km from the coast.

The 2nd detachment approached the shore in the area to the west of Cape Zyuk by 07:00 on 26 December. From the shore, fire was opened by the "47-mm cannon", suppressed by the Don gunboat. The seiners could not come close to the shore due to their draft, the boats were thrown ashore and wrecked. As indicated in the naval report, the landing fighters went ashore chest-deep in icy water. It was not possible to unload artillery and tanks. Toward the middle of the day, the situation worsened due to the appearance of enemy aircraft. The self-propelled scow "Fanagoria" was sunk, taking with it about 100 people. Already in the dark, the Khoper barge was brought closer to the shore, gangways were made and three tanks and artillery were unloaded along them. According to the order for the defense of the coast of the 46th Infantry Division, the entire section from Cape Zyuk to Chelochin was entrusted to ... a communications battalion of the formation. Accordingly, the resistance to landing on the coast was less than in other areas where infantry units were defending (see below).

A collision occurred at the landing site of the 2nd detachment, showing how important it is to use specially trained units for landing operations. When about 1000 people had already been landed, the commander of the 224th Rifle Division, Colonel A.P. Degtyarev demanded to make ... a reverse landing. He motivated this by the impossibility of completing the task by the forces landed per day (according to the plan, it was supposed to land 2900 people). The return landing was not made. As a result, in the region 43, 1 west of Cape Zyuk, 878 people, 3 tanks, 2 37-mm guns (anti-aircraft), 9 120-mm mortars, 2 76-mm guns were landed. According to the operational report of the 51st Army, a rifle company of the 185th Rifle Regiment, a battalion of the 143rd Rifle Regiment and 200 Marines landed.

To parry the landing at Cape Zyuk, the German command had to advance the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 97th Infantry Division of the 46th Infantry Division, located in the depths and on the coast of the Kazantip Bay. Their first task is to form a barrier on the dominant heights to the west of Lake Chokrak. The estimate of the number of those who landed in the report on the actions of the 97th paragraph, it must be said, was quite accurate - 1000 people.

At Tarkhan, the 3rd detachment, under fire from the shore and air strikes, according to the army report, landed only about a platoon. The Voroshilov dredger of the 3rd detachment, which delayed the landing, came under air attack and was sunk, killing 450 people. 200 people were rescued by the Hurricane Hurricane, the Dofinovka tugboat and KL No. 4 and Dniester. Crowded with people raised from the Voroshilov, the boat minesweeper returned to Temryuk due to the obvious disruption of the landing.

On the first day of the landing, the 4th detachment operated most successfully near Cape Khroni, landing with the help of the Taganrog barge (bolinder), which was later used as a berth. "At Cape Khroni" here means that it was actually landed at the heights. 71, 3 west of Cape Khroni for a battalion from the 143rd joint venture, 160th joint venture and 83rd MBR (1556 people) and three tanks. The landing force was led by the commander of the 83rd MBR, Colonel I.P. Leontiev, who immediately launched an offensive in the direction of Adzhimushkay. The landing force manages to reach Bulganak, where it engages in battle with the soldiers of the German rear units.

As indicated in the report on the actions of the 72nd checkpoint, already at 3.30 a strong noise of battle was heard in the area of ​​​​the neighboring 42nd checkpoint (where the KVMB landing force landed). Soon the command of the division reports that "the Russians have landed at Kamysh-Burun". To conduct a counterattack, the 1st battalion of the regiment is withdrawn from positions in the Kerch region, but the counterattack does not begin immediately, but only closer to 15.00. The action report notes that the attack, supported by artillery, is "not in the direction of the bridgehead, but in the direction of Hill 164.5 into the deep flank of the enemy." The army report on the results of the operation indicates that the units of the 143rd joint venture “began to flee, throwing their weapons and surrendering.” However, the disorderly retreat was stopped, and the detachment entrenched itself on the northern slopes of the heights for the night. 154, 4. According to German data, the counterattack does not really achieve a decisive result. According to the report of the 72nd paragraph, "The left wing is stopped by a large enemy force, which has entrenched itself in well-equipped old field fortifications and is offering fierce resistance." Also, the German strike group is fired from the flank from the sea (gunboats remaining off the coast). The capture of any significant number of prisoners on December 26 does not appear in the German data; probably, the army report was somewhat ahead of events.

The 5th detachment did not land at all. Due to strong resistance in the Yenikale area, it was redirected to the Khroni metro station, but eventually stopped at the Akhileon metro station. According to the naval report, the minesweepers of the detachment lost the canoes and boats that were in tow, the storm also upset the movement of the seiners. The detachment commander turned back to search for boats and seiners, as a result, the landing of the detachment on December 26 did not take place.

As a result, on the first day of the operation, about 2,500 people were landed on a wide front, with very approximate observance of the landing areas, some of the ships returned to Temryuk with a landing force. In essence, this can be called, if not a failure, then a great failure of the landing force landed by the Azov military flotilla.

On the same day, December 26, the Kerch naval base began landing units of the 51st Army in the Kamysh-Burun area. According to the plan of the KVMB, it was supposed to land at the points of Stary Karantin, Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen, Nizhne-Burunsky lighthouse and the Initiative commune. Kamysh-Burun was chosen as the direction of the main attack. The first throw at each landing point, consisting of 325 fighters, was supposed to be made from 2 torpedo boats and 4 seiners. In total, 1300 fighters and commanders landed in the first throw. The 302nd Rifle Division, allocated by the army for landing, had no combat experience, but still managed to receive minimal landing training. Since December 15, 10 landing and disembarkation exercises from seiners and a minesweeper have been conducted with its fighters.

As in the case of the AzVF, the KVMB ships allocated for the landing were divided into detachments, there were three of them. The landing began at 16.00 on 25 December. As noted in the naval report: "Despite the predetermined plan, the landing was slow and disorganized." At the appointed time, only the 1st detachment completed the landing of troops (by 1.00 am on December 26). This was due to the fact that the seiners approached the berths from the raid at their own discretion, out of plan, and also with the delay of some parts of the landing force. In total, 1154 people were accepted by the 1st detachment, 744 people by the 2nd detachment and 3327 people by the 3rd detachment.

The disorganization of the landing was exacerbated by stormy weather, as a result, only the 1st detachment reached the landing site in a timely manner. Accordingly, the 2nd detachment was late with the release by an hour, and the 3rd detachment - by 2 hours. The situation was aggravated by the need to follow the detachments through the ravine between the Tuzla Spit and Cape Tuzla, which was difficult in navigation due to the shallow depths and narrowness of the fairway. However, following another route between Pavlovsky Cape and Tuzla Spit was excluded due to the danger of enemy shelling. The passage at night in stormy conditions, with the fencing of dangerous areas torn off by the storm, led to the grounding of part of the vessels. Transports, barges, "bolinder" were removed from the shallows before 11.00 and followed the shore already in the light of day.

As a result, by 5.00 on December 26, almost on schedule, only the 1st detachment, consisting of 20 seiners and 8 torpedo boats, reached Eltigen, Kamysh-Burun and Stary Karantin. According to German data, the landing begins at about 4.45 am Berlin time. The report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph reported on a report from the 1st battalion at 4.45: “Several large and small ships are trying to moor to the Rybatsky Peninsula near Kamysh-Burun. At the same time, boats are trying to enter the bay near the shipyards. At 4.50 a message follows from the III battalion: "The enemy numbering 70 people landed in the southern part of Eltigen." At that time, the 42nd Regiment of the 46th Infantry Division consisted of 1461 soldiers and officers and defended the coastline with a length of 27 km. The 1st and 3rd battalions of the regiment were the main opponents of the landing by the forces of the KVMB, the 2nd battalion was in Kerch and the surrounding area.

The landing at Kamysh-Burun turns out to be the most productive, where the first throw was fixed on the Kamysh-Burun Spit and the pier of the shipyard. The landing force was supported by artillery, the Germans especially note this: “During the entire time, the entire coast is under fire from the enemy’s heavy and heaviest guns from the opposite coast.”

Much more dramatic is the fate of other units. Due to strong opposition in the Old Quarantine, only 55 fighters were landed, led by the commander of the landing point, quartermaster 1st rank Grigoriev. The rest of the landing force went to Kamysh-Burun. This is confirmed by the report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph, which says about the landing in the zone of the 1st battalion: "Most of the enemy boats under concentrated fire are forced to turn back." Regarding those who landed, the German report cites the testimonies of the prisoners, according to which "the boat approached the shore by several hundred meters, and the soldiers were forced to wade through shallow water."

Grigoriev's group was quickly defeated, which is confirmed by both the naval report and the report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph. The latter states: “Parts of the 3rd company destroy the enemy who landed on its sector and take prisoner an officer and 30 soldiers. One commissar was shot." According to Soviet data, the detachment broke into two groups and tried to break through to Kamysh-Burun, a group of fighters led by Grigoriev was surrounded and died, the second group, led by senior political officer Grabarev, found a boat and retreated to their ships. Landed in Eltigen, 19 people, led by the commander of the landing point, Major Lopata, fought surrounded. In the report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph on the resistance of this small group, it is written: “In the zone of the III battalion, the enemy manages to gain a foothold in the southern houses of Eltigen. Fierce street fighting unfolds. The last stubborn resistance was broken closer to noon, 2 commissars were shot dead. Scrupulous marks about commissars, most likely, are connected with the implementation of the notorious order about commissars.

The cruiser "Red Caucasus" in the sea. The cruiser was a completed ship, laid down before the First World War under the name "Admiral Lazarev". The main caliber of the cruiser was four 180-mm guns in single-gun turrets.

The next wave of landings approaches the shore already in the light of day and, as expected, meets a barrage of fire. Part of the seiners under fire turns back to Taman. The second detachment of 12 seiners approaches at 7.00. Moreover, the newly arrived German anti-tank guns open fire, even a slight delay worsened the situation. The main part of the landing force landed on the Kamysh-Burun Spit and the pier of the ship repair plant, where the first throw was fixed. Here, at Kamysh-Burun, the landing achieves partial success, surrounding and defeating the 2nd and 12th companies of the 42nd Infantry Division, which made their way to their own, leaving the transport. Another private success is the landing south of Eltigen (it is not possible to land in Eltigen itself). As indicated in the report of the 42nd paragraph, "the enemy manages to capture the iron plant, not occupied by our troops, located west of the Kamysh-Burun-Eltigen road." Here, by all indications, there was an omission in the organization of the defense of the coast by the Germans.

The 3rd detachment, consisting of 9 seiners, 3 tugs, a "bolinder" and 2 barges, arrived only at 13.00. According to German data, this happened a little earlier, around noon. The main forces of the 823rd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 302nd Guards Rifle Regiment on a "bolinder" (removed from the shoal, which it ran into in the dark) reached the Kamysh-Burun Bay. Here he becomes a victim of artillery fire and air strikes, killing up to 300 people and almost all of the materiel. As stated in the report of the 42nd paragraph: “One large tug gets hit and lists. About 200 Russians jump overboard and swim or wade to the Rybatsky Peninsula. The sinking of the "bolinder" by an air strike confirms the report of the 42nd paragraph. According to an army report, part of the landing party did swim to the shore: "the personnel rushed into the sea, to the shore." As the commander of the 51st A V.N. Lvov in negotiations with the headquarters of the front, most of those who escaped from the "bolinder" did not have weapons. It was obviously thrown into the sea as it interfered with getting to the shore by swimming. The barge with the main forces of the 825th Guards Rifle Regiment (up to 1,000 landing troops) caught fire and was returned back to Taman.

As a result, as indicated in the naval report, on December 26, about 2,200 people were landed by the KVMB. Of these, 1,500 people are in Kamysh-Burun, 120 on the Kamysh-Burun Spit, 500 people south of Eltigen (in the area of ​​the Commune "Initiative") and 55 - in the Old Quarantine. Small detachments were almost immediately destroyed. As it is directly written in the army report: "The main forces of the 302nd Guards Rifle Division did not land." Simultaneously with the landings by the forces of the AzVF and the KVMB, on December 26, an attempt was made to land the “B” detachment near Mount Opuk. However, already at sea, the ships were scattered in the dark by the wind. Arriving at the place on the “Red Adjaristan” canoe, the commander of the detachment, Rear Admiral N.O. Abramov did not find the rest of the ships and decided to return to Anapa, gather the detachment together and land on December 27th. In essence, the landing was thwarted. Summing up the events of December 26, one has to admit that the successes of the first day of the landing were extremely limited.

The Soviet troops failed to turn the tide in their favor on the second day of the operation. On December 27, the landing was practically not carried out due to a strong storm (7–8 points). The German command, in turn, tried to drop landings into the sea with counterattacks. The gathering of forces of the 97th point for a counterattack on the units landed near Cape Zyuk (more precisely, height 43, 1) is completed only on the morning of December 27, as a result, the counterattack on the bridgehead took place only at 13.00. The landing response was a counterattack with tanks, but all three vehicles were hit by the Germans. Also, this detachment was isolated from other landing groups by mining the isthmus near Cape Zyuk (which was the result of a miss with the landing site).

Despite the lack of reinforcements, the detachment of Colonel Leontiev tried on the morning of December 27 from the area of ​​high. 154, 4 to resume the attack on Adzhimushkay. According to German data (report of the 72nd paragraph), he manages to achieve initial success with competent actions: “Shortly before dawn, the enemy passes between the positions of the 2nd and 3rd companies and, with the forces of about two companies, attacks the positions of anti-aircraft guns on the northern outskirts of Adzhim-Ushkay” . However, this attack was eventually repulsed by the Germans. At the same time, Leontiev's attack forces the Germans to postpone their own counterattack on the bridgehead, it begins after 9.00 in the morning. According to the report of the 72nd Infantry Division, two battalions were used by the Germans against this bridgehead (which coincides with the Soviet estimate). The detachment turns out to be quite a “tough nut”, the report on the actions of the 72nd paragraph notes “stubborn resistance from a well-entrenched enemy and artillery fire from ships”. Later, when summing up the results in the report of the 72nd paragraph, it was noted: "The frequent fire of enemy naval artillery created great difficulties for our troops." Enemy pressure and the threat of encirclement force the detachment to withdraw to the sea at high altitudes. 106.6. Detachment Art. Lieutenant Kapran is attacked, but holds the position, having suffered minor losses.

Destroyer Nezamozhnik. The ship belonged to the "novik" destroyers inherited from the tsarist fleet.

An attempt by the Germans to drop the landing force of the KVMB into the sea was also unsuccessful. The counterattack on the detachment in the area of ​​Eltigen (Commune Initiative) fails. The report of the 42nd paragraph states: “In a completely devoid of shelters, in conditions where the enemy has dug in for more than a kilometer, only a little can be advanced. The enemy is supported from the other side of the strait and from ships with guns of heavy and heavy caliber. On the whole, an unstable balance is maintained on the bridgeheads.

At the same time, due to the pause that has arisen, the German defense in the Kerch region is being strengthened. South of Kerch, on Cape Ak-Burnu, 88-mm and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns are placed, which can flank both the approaches to Kerch and Kamysh-Burun. The Battalion of the 97th Infantry Division of the 46th Infantry Division, removed from Feodosia II, arrives in Kerch.

The landing resumes on 28 December. In the area of ​​Cape Khroni, the landing is carried out early in the morning by the forces of the 3rd detachment, about 400 people are able to land (according to the army report, 300 people of 143 joint ventures). The report of the 72nd paragraph confirms the fact of the landing, despite the shelling: "The Russians are landing up to the battalion and are trying to move south."

In general, the pause that arose on December 27 had a negative impact on the position of the detachments on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. They did not receive additional forces, and the enemy received time to assemble strike groups and provide them with artillery support. The attack of two battalions of the 97th pp on located near the heights. 43, 1 detachment begins on the morning of December 28, and by noon the landing force is pushed back to a narrow space near the steep bank. Here the paratroopers take the last battle. The report of the 97th paragraph stated: “Here he defends himself especially stubbornly in crevices and between cliffs. Sometimes enemy soldiers stand in the water, they have to be killed one by one, because they mostly do not surrender. Soon the main landing forces are defeated. The Germans claimed 468 prisoners (including one officer), 300 killed and wounded Soviet soldiers. Unloaded guns, including two 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 5 tractors, became their trophies. The remnants of the detachment held several nests of resistance on the shore, in which, according to the prisoners interrogated by the Germans, there were about 200 more people. This fits in perfectly with the number of 878 men mentioned in the naval report. It should be said that nothing is said in the army report about the fate of this detachment, which resisted to the end.

On December 28, Leontiev's detachment was knocked out of position, suffered heavy losses, and began to retreat to Cape Tarkhan. As a result of the counteroffensive, the Germans manage to take the landing site. The report of the 72nd paragraph states: "The remnants of the enemy are still holding on to the very shore and in the quarries just to the east of height 115.5." Detachment Art. Lieutenant Kapran was cut off from the sea and surrounded, although his destruction did not take place.

Events developed south of Kerch somewhat less dramatically. December 28 KVMB at 4.00-5.00 lands in Kamysh-Burun 678 people of the 827th gp. The landing at night is confirmed by the enemy. However, attempts to develop the offensive from the bridgehead held at Kamysh-Burun to the west and to connect with the landing force at Eltigen were not successful. At the same time, the Germans' attempts to liquidate the bridgeheads end in nothing. The factory in the area of ​​Kamysh-Burun passes from hand to hand. Only in the area north of Eltigen do they manage to somewhat limit the size of the Soviet bridgehead, in the report of the 42nd paragraph it is described as follows: “The offensive is developing well, the enemy has been thrown back to a small coastal strip and forced to huddle in a narrow space.”

Detachment "B" of the 44th Army (2393 people) was also redirected here, to Kamysh-Burun, on three gunboats, originally built as landing craft, and another "bolinder". However, this landing was not particularly successful. The gunboats ran aground 50–150 m from the shore, the landing force had to be transported by boats. Bolinder is out of order.

As a result, by the morning of December 29, the landing of the 51st Army found itself in a difficult, close to catastrophic, position. In the ZhBD of the 11th Army, the assessment of the situation near Kerch was quite unambiguous: “The army command believes that on December 28 the situation on the Kerch Peninsula is under control, the destruction of enemy units still on the peninsula will take place on December 29.” Given the plight of the landing forces, this statement does not look like empty boasting. In the report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph, the situation on the morning of December 29 is assessed as stable: “In the morning of December 29, both enemy bridgeheads were reliably blocked, after receiving reinforcements, counterattacks were launched, and the first successes were outlined.” In negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky, held on the night of December 28-29, D.T. Kozlov admitted: "The situation at the end of the day today on the front of the 51st Army was not in our favor." At that moment, the situation changed dramatically in favor of the Soviet troops - a landing took place in Feodosia, deep in the rear of the German troops on the Kerch Peninsula.

Another Black Sea “novik” is the destroyer Shaumyan.

While fighting was going on on the Kerch Peninsula with landing forces pressed to the sea, at 13.00 on December 28 in Novorossiysk, the landing of the first landing on the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz and Krasny Krym, the destroyers Zheleznyakov, Shaumyan, Nezamozhnik began and transport "Kuban". At 17.00, 300 fighters of the assault groups and a hydrographic party were taken on 12 patrol boats at 17.00. As part of the first landing, 5419 fighters and commanders, 15 guns and 6 mortars, 100 tons of ammunition and 56 tons of food sank. As indicated in the report of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet: "Despite the fact that the ships were placed in the Novorossiysk port according to a pre-approved disposition, well known to the leading command staff of the Red Army units, the loading and landing of the troops were not organized enough." Parts approached late, confused the names of the ships. Some ships were loaded with more troops than planned.

Despite the withdrawal of the 79th brigade from the troops planned for landing, the front command tried to select the most well-trained units for the first strike. As D.T. Kozlov in negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky on the night of December 28-29, 1941: “The first echelon is one regiment of the 9th Guards Rifle Regiment, a regular regiment trained for amphibious assaults, a battalion of marines and one regiment of the 157th division, staffed by Kuban”. On the whole, the formations of the 44th Army were well equipped by the standards of December 1941 (see Table 1).

In advance, from the evening of December 26, in Novorossiysk, the loading of materiel and horses began on the transports of the 1st detachment ("Zyryanin", "Jean Zhores", "Shakhtar", "Tashkent", "Azov" and "Kr. Profintern"). Two more transports, "Serov" and "Nogin", were busy transporting to Sevastopol and got up for loading, respectively, on the morning of December 28 and the evening of December 27. The loading of the troops of the 44th Army on the transports began at 17.30 and ended at 23.00 on December 28. The 236th Rifle Division was loaded onto the 1st detachment of transports, and the 63rd Guards Rifle Division (without one regiment) onto the 2nd detachment. As a result, 11,270 people, 572 horses, 26 45-mm guns, 18 76-mm guns, 7 122-mm howitzers, 199 vehicles (mostly "one and a half"), 18 tractors, 20 light tanks, ammunition, food forage and other property. At 3.00 on December 28 in Tuapse, the loading of materiel and horses began, and then the landing of the personnel of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division on the transports of the 2nd detachment (Kalinin, Dimitrov, Kursk, Fabricius and Krasnogvardeets). 6365 people, 906 horses, 31 76-mm guns, 27 122-mm howitzers, 92 vehicles, 14 tanks, ammunition, food forage and other property were accepted for transports of the detachment. Thus, by the evening of December 28, the Soviet command had assembled a fairly large force of infantry and artillery capable of radically changing the situation in the Crimea.

Scheme from the report of the commander of the 46th engineer battalion. It is clearly seen that at night the battalion was a stone's throw from the harbor.

It would be expected that the non-simultaneity of the landings in the Crimea would have a negative impact on the conditions of the landings in Feodosia. However, the situation was very ambiguous. On the one hand, the landing in the Kerch region weakened the German defense in the Feodosia region due to the withdrawal of reserves. According to the defense plan, the 46th Infantry Division of the II Battalion of the 97th Infantry Division formed the Feodosiya coastal defense section from Koktebel to Dalniye Kamyshi (including settlements). With the beginning of the landing of the 51st Army, he was removed from Feodosia and hastily sent to the eastern tip of the Kerch Peninsula. The German defense of Feodosia is deprived of units that had the opportunity to explore the city and its environs. On the other hand, in the last days of December, the regrouping of the 11th Army was in full swing with the general goal of countering the landings, both those that had already landed and those that were just planned. To strengthen the defense of the Kerch Peninsula, the command of the 11th Army advanced the 46th sapper battalion (a separate motorized unit) under the command of Captain Streit, previously involved in the assault on Sevastopol. It was then, even before the landings, called "the last reserve of the 11th Army."

Moreover, it should be emphasized that Streit's battalion was not intended to organize the defense of Feodosia. As indicated in the report on the actions of the 46th Sat, the end point of the route was Ak-Monai: “Here the battalion was supposed to take over the coastal defense and, together with 6 companies of various construction battalions that were planned to be subordinated to it, build a position in the narrowest point of the peninsula Kerch from Ak-Monai in a southerly direction. That is, the task of the 46th Sat was to re-equip the Soviet Ak-Monai positions in the event of a radical change in the situation on the Kerch Peninsula. On the afternoon of December 28, while in Novorossiysk, with varying degrees of organization, Soviet troops were boarding ships and vessels, the 46th Sat was on the march from Karasubazar to Ak-Monai. The battalion goes to the area of ​​Feodosiya in the afternoon.

A night march to a designated area in an unfamiliar area on bad roads was deemed inexpedient, and the 46th Sat makes a stop. As indicated in the action report, "with the permission of the commander of the sapper units of the corps, the battalion settled down for the night in Feodosia, so that the next morning at dawn, resume movement on Ak-Monai." That is, by and large, the battalion ends up in Feodosia by chance. Later, two companies of the road construction battalion join him. The commandant's office of the city indicates the location to the sappers and builders.

A very significant issue for assessing subsequent events is the action plan of the German units in Feodosia. In his report on what was happening, the commander of the 46th SB, Captain Streit, wrote the following on this issue: “... there was no information about the plan of action for alarm, there were no instructions about the actions of the battalion in the event of an enemy landing or other attack. As it turned out later, there was an action plan for alarm and defense for the units located in Feodosia, in addition, a few days earlier everyone should have been put on high alert. In this situation, the fact that the relevant orders were not brought to the attention of the units arriving in Feodosia had a negative impact.

Here Streit, most likely, has in mind the plans of the 46th Infantry Division and its bringing to combat readiness at the signal "Christmas Man" (see above). This allows us to conclude that, firstly, the command of the 11th Army did not undertake a purposeful radical reinforcement of troops in Feodosia after the landings in the Kerch region, and secondly, that the commanders on the ground showed a general careless attitude to the organization of defense. The orders and defense plans were not brought to the attention of the units following in transit through Feodosia. The situation was aggravated by the fact that German sappers arrived already at dusk in an unfamiliar city. At the same time, despite the flagrant facts of negligent attitude to the organization of defense, the very fact of the presence in the Feodosia region of the 46th Sat, which had extensive combat experience, worsened the conditions for the landing of the planned Soviet landing. Also in Feodosia there was a company of heavy weapons of the 186th subdivision of the 73rd infantry regiment, in division from the 77th artillery regiment and the 54th artillery regiment, and the 902nd assault boat team (100 people), one anti-tank company, one coastal battery. Another factor influencing the situation in the Feodosia region was the presence in the city of a senior commander in the person of Colonel Boehringer, chief of the sapper units of the 11th Army. He could subjugate any units in the city.

At 3 am on December 29, a detachment of warships approached Feodosia. Orientation at night for entering the port was given by the lights of the Shch-201 and M-51 submarines, advanced to the port in advance, this was typical for the navigation support of Soviet landing forces. Under the cover of naval artillery fire, specially assigned boats broke into the Feodosia harbor and landed a group of scouts on the protective pier, who captured the lighthouse and two anti-tank guns. Not only was the harbor not mined, but the boom gates were opened on the night of the landing. In total, 266 people of the assault detachment were landed by boats in the harbor.

Following the boats, the destroyers broke into the harbor: the first, according to the report of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, entered the port of the Shaumyan EM at 4.40, followed by the Nezamozhnik EM at 4.56 and the Zheleznyakov EM at 5.00. The first landed 330, the second - 289 and the third - 287 people. The destroyers completed the landing by 5.35-5.51 (Shaumyan and Nezamozhnik), the last was Zheleznyakov - by 7.00.

For the reasons described above, the beginning of the landing of Soviet troops becomes a very unpleasant surprise for the German sapper units located in the city. On the one hand, all units of the 46th sb were located approximately in the center of the city, partly near the harbor (according to the map attached to the report, south of the harbor). On the other hand, they were completely unfamiliar with the area and did not have a clear plan of action. At the first, most important moment of the landing, they only took up the defense of their location. Communication with construction companies in the southern part of the city was absent.

With an experienced ear, sappers define "the shooting of a large number of Russian automatic weapons," that is, a landing in large forces. In the documents of the 11th Army (appendices to the ZhBD) there is evidence that Boehringer contacted the army headquarters. It sounds like this: “At 7.00, a call from Colonel Boehringer from Feodosia. He established contact with the field commandant's office (lieutenant colonel von Kohler). Fierce fighting in the harbor of Feodosia". The response to Boehringer's report was the order to "defend every quarter."

However, the head of the engineering service of the army, Manstein, did not comply with this order. On the contrary, he makes a radical decision to withdraw the sappers from Feodosia (which threatened to become a mousetrap) and orders the withdrawal of the 46th Sat to the fork in the roads Kerch - Simferopol (on the outskirts of Feodosia). The order is immediately transmitted to the companies, in addition, an order is given to immediately withdraw transport from the city. By that time, some of the vehicles that were in the immediate vicinity of the harbor were lost. The purpose of such a maneuver was, as the commander of the 46th Sat later wrote, "to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to advance both to Simferopol and to Kerch." How justified was the failure to comply with the order? Moreover, the artillery battalions of the 46th Infantry Division remained in the city.

Actually, it was the German artillery battalions located in Feodosia that provided the first opposition to the landing. At 05.08, the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz received a hit in the area of ​​​​the first pipe, which caused a fire. At 5.21 a German shell hit the cruiser's turret, pierced the armor and caused a fire. On the cruisers and destroyers were killed and wounded from fire from the shore. Boehringer himself reported all this to the headquarters of the 11th Army by phone: “Fierce battles in the harbor of Feodosia. German artillery takes in them Active participation. One enemy ship is on fire.

However, the pace of the landing left much to be desired. At 5.02 the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz approached a wide pier from the outside and began to moor. At the same time, the landing of part of the landing force by longboats began. The cruiser's mooring took place in extremely difficult conditions due to strong squeezing winds. For the mooring of the cruiser, the tug "Kabardinets" was included in the detachment, which arrived at the landing site from Anapa in a timely manner. However, seeing the intense shelling of the ships, the tug captain got cold feet and returned to Anapa (he was put on trial).

"Red Caucasus" managed to unmoor and give the gangway only at 7.15. Because of the cluttered berth No. 3, only fighters and commanders landed, unloading artillery and vehicles turned out to be impossible. Under these conditions, a few companies with combat experience could significantly change the situation in the harbor. Instead, Boehringer leaves the city and takes them with him. The height of cynicism in this regard is Boehringer's report already from Karasubazar (on the road to Simferopol) around 15.00: "The coastal artillery fired to the last shell, then the gunners picked up carbines." The question of why the subordinates of Boehringer himself did not stand shoulder to shoulder with the gunners remained unanswered.

The reaction of the command of the 11th army to the landing in Feodosia was quite quick. Already between 6.30 and 8.00, orders are given to send the Romanian 4th mountain brigade and 3rd MP (Cornet regiment) and the 240th anti-tank division to Feodosia. That is, in the first place, either closely spaced or motorized units were put forward. Aviation was ordered to operate only in Feodosia. At 8.00 a meeting was held with the participation of Manstein. The head of the operations department, T. Busse, receives the task of finding out what forces, primarily artillery, can be released for Feodosia on the west coast and in the XXX AK zone. Artillery is requested, including from near Kherson (210-mm howitzers). At 9.30, Manstein's decision follows on the immediate withdrawal of one regiment of the 170th Infantry Division from the front and send it to Alushta at night, as well as prepare the withdrawal of another regiment from the front.

On the morning of December 29, when a battle had been raging in Feodosia for several hours, attempts by units of the 46th Infantry Division to drop landing detachments into the sea were still ongoing in the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula. A surprise for the Germans was an attempt by the Kapran detachment to break through to the sea. This forced the 97th Infantry Division to go on the defensive. Thus, an attempt was made to eliminate 200 daredevils who had settled in the coastal rocks. Leontiev's detachment, according to the Soviet version of events, tried to advance, but later "the detachment fought in an environment." According to the German version of events, the detachment was defeated. The report of the 72nd paragraph states: “At 9.15, the List group and the 2nd battalion jointly destroy the last enemy forces (300 prisoners). The enemy's landing site has been completely cleared, the enemy in the regiment's sector has been eliminated. The Soviet detachment at Kamysh-Burun itself tried to advance, there were battles with varying success on the territory of the factory. The Germans considered the attack on the bridgehead near the Commune Initiative to be very effective, the report of the 42nd paragraph states: “The offensive is developing well, the Russians are suffering heavy losses. They account for at least 100 killed and 200 wounded, 60 people were taken prisoner. At the same time, it is not claimed that the bridgehead has been liquidated.

However, the psychological effect achieved by the very fact of the landing in Feodosia exceeded even the wildest expectations. Boehringer's disregard for a direct and unequivocal order faded before the actions of XXXXII AK headquarters. If at the headquarters of the 11th Army the mood was far from panicky, on the ground things came to direct arbitrariness. Closer to noon on December 29, Manstein gives the order to the XXXXII AK command: “The 46th infantry division must destroy the landed enemy. The main forces should be concentrated on the northern coast. I forbid leaving. The army takes over the isthmus at Feodosia. The orders given there to the Romanian CBR and MP remain in force. The order is transmitted at 11.09 December 29. However, already at 10.00 on December 29, the commander of the XXXXII Corps, Count Shponek, orders the 46th Infantry Division to leave the Kerch Peninsula. This infuriated Manstein, Sponeck was removed, subsequently arrested and imprisoned in a fortress. Later, in his memoirs, E. von Manstein wrote: “The case of Count Sponeck shows how tragic the conflict between the obligation to carry out an order and his own opinion about operational necessity can be for a military leader.”

Aerial view of the Feodosiya Bay.

What annoyed Manstein the most was that Sponeck gave the order to withdraw and turned off the radio, that is, he acted in such a way as not to hear a reciprocal ban. Such “tricks” were periodically thrown out by various German commanders, but in this case for Sponeck this had the most far-reaching consequences.

The losses of the 46th Infantry Division in a rapid retreat along the snowy Kerch Peninsula amounted to 9 heavy field howitzers, 12 light field howitzers, 4 heavy and 8 light infantry guns, 14 heavy and 73 light machine guns, 12 heavy and 25 light mortars, 3 heavy and 34 light PTO. Casualties from 25 December to 3 January were moderate, with 152 killed, 429 wounded and 449 missing.

While the scandal was unfolding with the withdrawal of the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, the sappers withdrawn from Feodosia tried to hold the crossroads north of the city. However, they were soon outflanked and driven from their original position. Command of the defense in the area of ​​Feodosia is taken by Lieutenant Colonel von Alfen (commander of the 617th sapper regiment). Artillerymen depart from the city, having abandoned their materiel. Meanwhile, the Soviet units are moving forward, covering the positions of the 46th sb.

Finally, the idea of ​​​​defending the crossroads was buried with the landing of a small detachment (reinforced company) in Sarygol, on the road from Feodosia to the east. According to the report of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, he was landed at about 23.00 from the BTShch-26. The detachment shells the positions of the 46th sb with mortars. For the night, Lieutenant Colonel von Alphen orders to take up a circular defense around the village of Blizhnyaya Baibuga. This is quite consistent with the Soviet data, which speak of the advance of the landing force to the city of Lysay to the north-west of Feodosia and nearby heights with the right flank 5–6 km and the left flank 3–5 km from the city. In Feodosia itself, at that moment, small scattered groups of Germans were destroyed. By the morning of December 30, Feodosia was completely liberated from the enemy. 2,000 Red Army soldiers were released from captivity. Judging by the loss report of the quartermaster of the 11th Army on December 31, 1941, 7 leFH18, 3 sFH18, 1 10-cm K18 and 2 sFH M / 37 (t) were lost during the previous ten days. In all likelihood, most of the lost refers specifically to Feodosia (the losses of the 46th Infantry Division were higher and were dealt with later). During the night, parts of the Romanian mountain brigade approached the Near Baibuga area.

The counterattack scheduled for the morning, the striking force of which was to be the Romanian units, ended in complete failure. As the commander of the 46th Sat later reported: “It was impossible to induce the Romanians to take at least one step forward. The Romanian officers were not with their units, but in a house located in the rear. Artillery was lost, so not a single shot was fired as artillery preparation.

Meanwhile, the units that landed in Feodosia went on the offensive. The decisive advantage was gained through the use of tanks. As indicated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army: “The Russian tanks that broke through caused the same panic among the Romanians as in September during the breakthrough north of Melitopol. The panicked retreat of the Romanians, unfortunately, dragged the German soldiers along with it. As the commander of the 46th Sat later wrote, the two anti-tank guns he had jammed due to frost, and the Romanians did not use their anti-tank guns. The attack of Soviet tanks pushes back the Romanians and the 46th sb 1.5 km west of the village of Dalnie Baibugi. Here are the Romanian units, reinforced by German artillery.

In the period from December 29 to 31, 23 thousand people, 1550 horses, 34 tanks, 109 guns, 24 mortars, 334 vehicles and tractors, 734 tons of ammunition and 250 tons of other cargo were transported and landed in the Feodosia region. By the end of December 31, the troops of the 44th Army, which landed in Feodosia, managed to advance 10-15 km from the city and capture Vladislavovka. The Romanian units pulled up to Feodosia, although they were not able to drop the landing into the sea, could still hold back its advance until the German divisions approached. On the morning of December 31, the chief of staff of the 11th Army, in a conversation with the chief of staff of the GA "South", uttered a phrase that largely determined the further development of events: "The situation at Feodosia may pose a danger to the Crimea and the 11th A". Accordingly, it was proposed to stop the offensive against Sevastopol and reinforce XXXXII AK at the expense of forces withdrawn from LIV AK. As a result, Hansen receives an order to stop attacks on Sevastopol.

During January 1, 1942, the troops of the 44th Army could not advance in a northerly direction. By the end of January 2, Soviet troops reached the line of Kiet, Nov. Pokrovka, Izyumovka, Koktebel, where they met organized enemy resistance. The losses of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division, the 236th and 157th Rifle Divisions, the 251st Guards Rifle Regiment and the naval detachment of the 44th Army during this period can be assessed as moderate. From 30 December 1941 to 2 January 1942 they lost 431 killed, 161 missing and 705 wounded.

The landing of the 51st Army continued, and the landings switched to pursuit. Commander of the Caucasian Front D.T. On January 1, 1942, Kozlov reported to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command a plan for the liberation of Crimea by a blow to Perekop, approved the next day.

In negotiations with the Chief of Staff of the 44th Army on Christmas Day on January 2, D.T. Kozlov said bluntly: "The question is this - who will concentrate troops sooner and more, I want General Pervushin, you and all your workers - to understand this." However, the conditions of the troop concentration race were extremely difficult. In negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky in the evening of the same day, the front commander admitted: “The ice situation on the Kerch p / o [probably still a“ strait ”. - Note. auth.] doesn't allow anything to be forwarded" .

In the vicinity of Kerch, the 51st Army took rich trophies, however, part of the weapons and equipment were domestic samples recaptured from the enemy. So, as of January 10, 1942, ABTU 51st A reported the capture of 232 domestic and 77 German trucks, 44 domestic and 41 German cars, 35 tractors and 12 Soviet-made tanks. All this equipment was defective.

4 steam locomotives of the OB brand and 80 wagons and platforms became an exceptional value trophy. They managed to be repaired and brought to a condition suitable for movement. The capture of 10,000 tons of coal in Kerch became a serious help. This made it possible to organize a railway. transportation in the interests of the troops of the front, albeit on a limited scale. This was another omission on the part of the command of XXXXII AK and the 46th pd - railway. the transport was not taken away or destroyed.

The dead in Feodosia transports. In the foreground "Zyryanin", behind him "Tashkent".

However, in addition to the obvious advantages, the idea of ​​​​landing in Feodosia also had obvious disadvantages. The large distance from the bases of the front aviation did not allow providing reliable air cover. As a result, German bombers hit the transports in the port. The Tashkent was the first to die (5552 brt), which had time to unload. The next on January 4 was the Zyryanin (3592 brt), carrying liquid fuel and shells, hit by bombs at the time of pumping fuel. On the same day, the Nogin (2150 brt) was attacked and sunk. On January 9, Spartakovets and Chatyr-Dag were sunk. January 16 was blown up by a mine "Jean Zhores" (3972 brt). Cargoes were also slowly taken out from the berths of Feodosia, and therefore a lot of ammunition was destroyed during the bombardment of the port by enemy aircraft.

All this led to a decrease in the rate of accumulation of troops in the bridgehead near Feodosia and a shortage of the most necessary supplies. On the contrary, the Germans hastily concentrated the troops withdrawn from the grouping aimed at Sevastopol. This allowed them to achieve a quantitative and qualitative superiority and go on the counteroffensive. E. von Manstein writes: “It was to be carried out by three and a half German divisions and one Romanian mountain brigade against the enemy, whose forces have now increased to eight divisions and two brigades. While the enemy had tanks, albeit in limited numbers, we had none. Here Manstein is somewhat disingenuous, because the assault group assembled near Feodosia included assault guns. In the realities of 1941–1942 they were an extremely problematic model of German armored vehicles for the Soviet anti-tank defense and light tanks. As of January 8, XXXXII AK had two assault gun platoons under its control: 4 self-propelled guns from the 197th battalion and 2 self-propelled guns from the 190th battalion. The main body of these two assault gun battalions remained under the control of LIV AK near Sevastopol.

The German offensive began on January 15, and by January 18, the attackers completely occupied Feodosia, surrounding part of the forces of the 44th Army. It was announced the capture of 10 thousand prisoners, 177 guns and 85 tanks. The remnants of the 44th Army retreated to the Parpach Isthmus. The commander of the army, General A.N., was seriously wounded. Pervushin, member of the Military Council A.G. Komissarov, the chief of staff, Colonel S.E., was shell-shocked. Christmas. General I.F. took command of the army. Dashichev. The main consequence of the German counterattack was the loss of Feodosia as a supply port for Soviet troops in the Crimea.

The state of the troops of the 44th Army after Feodosia can be assessed as depressing (see Table 2).

Entrusted to the ill-fated D.T. Kozlov, the troops tried to recapture the peninsula in a difficult period for the Red Army in peculiar natural conditions. The landing in Feodosia on December 29, 1941 was a "knight's move" that dramatically changed the operational situation in the Crimea, but this success was not consolidated. The accumulation of troops, ammunition, fuel in Feodosia was slow. The advance along the thaw-soaked roads of the Kerch Peninsula of the 51st Army was also late. All this allowed the German 11th Army to counterattack on January 15, 1942 and soon re-occupy Feodosia.

Already on the evening of January 17, order No. 0183 / OP of the front headquarters follows: "The Caucasian Front in the morning of 17.1 goes on the defensive on the line of the Ak-Monai positions." Accordingly, Tulumchak, Korpech, Koi-Asan and Daln were designated as a cover position. Reeds, and Ak-Monai positions became the main line of defense.

In the middle of the day on January 17, a conversation took place between D.T. Kozlov with A.M. Vasilevsky, where the front commander firmly and consistently defended the expediency of the measures taken. Kozlov motivated his orders as follows: "I did not decide to risk the final loss of divisions and offered to withdraw to the Ak-Monai positions in order to pull up and exhaust the enemy." Moreover, he stated bluntly: "The situation that has developed today does not necessitate a review of the decision taken." In a conversation with Moscow, the front commander also assessed the enemy's intentions as the most resolute: "Blow from the right and left to throw our units into the sea." In the end, Vasilevsky, who began his conversation with Kozlov with a rather capricious assessment of the enemy near Feodosia, by the end of two hours of rather intense negotiations, agreed with the arguments of the comfort front. As a result, the troops retreated to Ak-Monai positions.

Faced with a serious crisis in the Crimea, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent its representatives to the Crimea - army commissar 1st rank L.Z. Mekhlis and Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, Major General P.P. Eternal. Mehlis arrived at the front already on January 20, 1942. A new stage of the struggle for the Crimea began.

Conclusions. The Kerch-Feodosiya operation and the struggle for Feodosia that followed it give rise to polar assessments in Russian historiography, both positive and negative. An important issue is the viability of the bridgeheads formed as a result of the landing of the troops of the 51st Army by the forces of the AzVF and the KVMB. The study of the documents of the parties leads to the disappointing conclusion that by the morning of December 29, 1941, most of the landing detachments were either defeated or were on the verge of defeat. On the other hand, it cannot be said that all bridgeheads were close to disintegration. The most stable was the position of the units of the 302nd Guards Rifle Division near Kamysh-Burun. The liquidation of this detachment on December 29 (as indicated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army) seems unlikely. Unlike other bridgeheads, it was also supported by the artillery of the 51st Army. At the same time, the elimination of other bridgeheads made it possible to release at least two or three infantry battalions to attack the bridgehead. This would be a serious test for him, if not a disaster.

The tragic fate of a significant part of the landing detachments makes us think about the viability of the plan for the landing operation on the Kerch Peninsula as a whole. Here, the study of German documents leads to the conclusion that the positions of the 46th Infantry Division near Kerch were by no means an impregnable fortress. The area of ​​\u200b\u200bCape Zyuk, defended by signalmen, could become a gap in the defense of the 46th Infantry Division and XXXXII Corps as a whole. However, this required the massing of landing craft for landing and supplying large forces. For example, the involvement of gunboats (former "epildiphores") from the Black Sea Fleet for landing in the Sea of ​​Azov.

At the same time, failures in the Kerch region simultaneously became a magnet for German reserves. In particular, the battalion of the 97th paragraph put on the defensive in the Feodosia region. This paved the way for the success of the landing in Feodosia, which made it possible to seize the initiative from the enemy for a long time.

However, as practice has shown, it was not enough to land troops, they still needed to be fully supplied. In this regard, the assessment made in the hot pursuit of the events in 1943 in the "Collection on the study of the experience of the war" is indicative. An unsightly picture was given of the release of weakened formations onto the peninsula: “Some division was loaded and transported, weakened in artillery terms and without convoys, and its “rear” (as it was customary to call the remnants of the division, although these rears included 7/8 artillery regiment) with several thousand horses and a hundred (sometimes more) vehicles remained on the Caucasian coast. As a result, the transported units could not “really fight or live” for a long time. The 44th Army, in the face of the concentration of large enemy forces, needed to really fight.

Kerch landing operation- a large landing operation of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Passed from December 28, 1941 to May 20, 1942.

Despite initial success, the operation ended in a major setback: three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated; total losses amounted to more than 300 thousand people, not including about 170 thousand prisoners, as well as a significant amount of heavy weapons. The defeat of the landing had a serious impact on the fate of the besieged Sevastopol and facilitated the Wehrmacht's summer offensive on the Caucasus.

Encyclopedic YouTube

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✪ Alexey Isaev about the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation

✪ Kerch-Eltigen landing operation.avi

✪ Fights in Kerch. german chronicle

✪ Vyazemskaya airborne operation

✪ Feodosia 1941

Subtitles

Previous events

Operation plan

• 44th Army (Major General A. N. Pervushin) consisting of: 157th, 236th, 345th and 404th rifle divisions, 9th and 63rd mountain rifle divisions, 1st and 2nd detachments of sailors 9th Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet under the 44th Army.
• 51st Army (Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov)) consisting of: 224th, 302nd, 390th and 396th Rifle Divisions, 12th Rifle Brigade, 83rd Marine Brigade

For their support, 78 warships and 170 transport ships were involved, in total over 250 ships and vessels, including 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 52 patrol and torpedo boats:

• Black Sea Fleet (Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky)
• Azov Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov)

The air forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the armies operating on the Taman Peninsula, as of December 20, had a total of about 500 aircraft (excluding air defense fighter aircraft), the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet had approximately 200 aircraft.

German troops: the protection of the Kerch Peninsula was carried by:

• Part of the troops of the 46th division (42nd army corps of the 11th army)
• 4th Mountain Brigade
• 2 field regiments and 5 anti-aircraft artillery battalions

Landing

At that moment, the enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula were represented by one German division - the 46th Infantry and the Romanian Regiment of Mountain Riflemen, guarding the area of ​​the Parpach Range. The landing forces in Kerch were many times superior to the forces of the Wehrmacht in this area, in addition, the landing in Feodosia threatened encirclement, so the commander of the 42nd Corps, Gen. von Sponeck immediately gave the order to withdraw. Later, Manstein ordered to hold the defense, but it was no longer possible to fulfill it. The German troops retreated, thus avoiding encirclement, but at the same time leaving behind all heavy weapons. For a formal violation of the order, von Sponeck was removed from command and put on trial.

results

As a result of the landing, the position of German troops in the Crimea became threatening. The commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein wrote:

If the enemy took advantage of the situation that had arisen and quickly began to pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would be created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged area ... The fate of the entire 11th would be decided. th army.

However, the 51st Army, advancing from Kerch, did not move forward fast enough, and the 44th Army from Feodosia, with its main forces, moved not to the west, but to the east, towards the 51st Army. This allowed the enemy to create a barrier at the turn of the Yaila spurs - the Sivash coast west of Ak-Monai. The defense of the line was held by the 46th division of the Wehrmacht, reinforced by an additional infantry regiment, and the Romanian mountain units. To strengthen the combat capability of the Romanian units, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the rear units of the German army, including those from the army headquarters, were included in their composition.

Planning errors

When planning the operation, significant miscalculations were made:

• there was not a single medical institution on the bridgehead, the nearest hospital was in the Kuban. The wounded fighters, having received the initial dressing in the regimental squadron, were brought from their positions to Kerch, from there they independently reached Novorossiysk on steamboats.
• air defense systems were not delivered to the port of Feodosia in a timely manner. As a result, before January 4, 5 transports were killed by enemy aircraft: Krasnogvardeets, Zyryanin, and others; the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz received heavy damage.

Losses

During the operation, the total losses amounted to 40 thousand people, of which more than 30 thousand were irretrievably: killed, frozen and missing, 35 tanks, 133 guns and mortars.

2nd stage: battles for the Isthmus of Parpach

By January 2, 1942, Soviet troops completely occupied the Kerch Peninsula. Given the weakness of the German defense, the Headquarters pointed out to General Kozlov the need for an early exit to Perekop and strikes in the rear of the enemy's Sevastopol grouping.

The enemy also understood the danger of a possible offensive. According to E. von Manstein:

In the first days of January 1942, for the troops that landed at Feodosia and approached from Kerch, the path to the vital artery of the 11th Army, the Dzhankoy-Simferopol railway, was actually opened. The weak defensive front that we managed to create could not withstand the onslaught of large forces. On January 4, it became known that the enemy already had 6 divisions in the Feodosia region.

However, the front commander D.T. Kozlov postponed the offensive, citing insufficient forces and means.

Loss of Theodosius

In the first half of January 1942, the troops of the Crimean Front were preparing for a further offensive deep into the Crimea. To support the future offensive, the Sudak landing was landed. However, Manstein was ahead of Kozlov by several days. On January 15, the Germans suddenly went on the offensive, delivering the main blow at the junction of the 51st and 44th armies in the Vladislavovka area. Despite the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops and the presence of armored vehicles, the enemy broke through the positions of General Pervushin and recaptured Feodosia on January 18