The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945

Their aces were rightfully considered the best in the world.

Their fighters dominated the battlefield.

Their bombers razed entire cities off the face of the earth.

And the legendary "things" terrified the enemy troops.

The Air Force of the Third Reich — the renowned Luftwaffe — was as important a part of the blitzkrieg as the tank forces. Loud victories of the Wehrmacht would, in principle, be impossible without air support and air cover.

Until now, military experts are trying to understand how the country, which was prohibited from having military aircraft after the First World War, managed not only to build a modern and effective air force in the shortest possible time, but also to maintain air supremacy for many years, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy. ...

This book, published by the British Air Ministry in 1948, literally "hot on the heels" of the just-ended war, was the first attempt to comprehend her combat experience. It is a detailed and highly competent analysis of the history, organization and combat operations of the Luftwaffe on all fronts - Eastern, Western, Mediterranean and African. This is a fascinating tale of the meteoric rise and catastrophic fall of the air force of the Third Reich.

Summer Campaign 1942 (June - December)

Sections of this page:

Summer Campaign 1942

(June - December)

Faced with the prospect of continuing large-scale hostilities on the Eastern Front, German strategists were forced to admit that operations built on the same principles as those of the previous summer's offensives could hardly give the desired result. The great length of the Eastern Front inevitably prompted the conclusion that in order to obtain a satisfactory result, it was necessary to concentrate the maximum possible forces in one sector. Therefore, it was decided to conduct the main hostilities in the southern sector of the front with the aim of capturing the Caucasus (which would cut off the Soviet Union from the main sources of oil and at the same time provide oil for the ever-increasing needs of Germany) and open the way to the Middle East simultaneously with Rommel's strike through Egypt at the Mediterranean theater.

The first condition necessary for the implementation of this plan was the complete occupation of the Crimea, necessary to cover the southern flank of the German troops. Therefore, during April, Soviet troops were driven out of the Kerch Peninsula, and only the stubbornly defending Sevastopol remained in the Crimea. In May, the VIII air corps was transferred from the central front to the Crimea and was subordinated to the 4th air fleet. Thus, about 600 aircraft of various types were concentrated at the airfields of the Crimea, which were ready to take part in the full-scale assault on Sevastopol. The place of the VIII air corps in the central sector of the front was taken by the V air corps, withdrawn from the southern sector at the beginning of 1942. It was renamed Luftwaffe Command Vostok and received air fleet status (see Map 17).

The choice of the VIII Air Corps to participate in this assault was consistent with the already established practice of sending this formation under the command of Richthofen to support the most important operations, taking into account his experience and effectiveness of participation in massive support operations for ground forces.

At this stage of the war in the Soviet Union, the Germans attached great importance to operations in the Crimea, since the success of their summer offensive in the Caucasus depended on the occupation of the peninsula. Kerch had already fallen, but Sevastopol continued to stubbornly resist. Accordingly, the VIII Air Corps, which during this period of the war was usually assigned to carry out the most important operations, was transferred from the Moscow direction to the Crimea, where it entered the order of the 4th Air Fleet. The support of the VIII Air Corps undoubtedly contributed a lot to overcoming the resistance of the Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula.

The sector of the front, liberated by the VIII Air Corps, was occupied by the V Air Corps, which was renamed the Vostok Command of the Luftwaffe. This command had the status of the air fleet and was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation. In March, the IV air corps had to bear the burden of repelling the powerful and successful offensives of Soviet troops in the south, therefore, to strengthen it, units of direct support of ground forces were transferred from other air corps that fought on the Eastern Front.

The assault on Sevastopol began on June 2 and ended on June 6, and all this time the fortress was subjected to massive air strikes. On average, about 600 sorties were carried out per day, with a maximum of more than 700 (June 2). About 2,500 tons of high-explosive bombs were dropped, many of which were of maximum caliber. Nevertheless, on June 4, the German infantry, which went on the offensive, suddenly found that the fortifications were mostly intact, and the morale of the defenders was not broken. However, the Germans stormed so stubbornly that the resistance of the Soviet soldiers was overcome in a relatively short time.

While operations were underway against Sevastopol, a sudden Soviet attack on Kharkov forced the Luftwaffe to transfer part of its forces from the Crimea to help stop the enemy's advance, and intensive aviation was required to save the situation. The preemptive strike of the Soviet army not only inflicted losses that needed to be replenished, but also delayed preparations for the planned main summer campaign. However, at the beginning of June, the VIII air corps was again deployed to the north. Its headquarters was located near Kursk, in the northern part of the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet (see map 18). From May to June, active measures were taken to accumulate large stocks of bombs, fuel, etc. on the Southern Front, for which the railways were fully involved. At the same time, reinforcements were returning to the Eastern Front, rearmed after six months of fighting and additionally reinforced by aviation withdrawn from the Mediterranean after the end of the air offensive on Malta. Thus, by the beginning of July, the number of German aviation on the Eastern Front had again reached 2,750 aircraft and, thus, reached the level of the forces involved in the operations of last summer. However, now 1,500 of them were on the Southern Front as part of the 4th Air Fleet. That is, deterrent forces remained in the central sector of the front - about 600 vehicles, in the Leningrad direction - no more than 375, and another 200 aircraft were based in Northern Norway and Finland.

The German offensive began in the first week of July with the actions of the VIII Air Corps on a relatively narrow section of the front, where its aircraft supported the first German attack in the direction of Voronezh. The corps' area of ​​operations gradually expanded to the south as the tank units advanced along the Voronezh-Rostov railway east of the Donets River. The direct support forces of the ground forces quickly followed the German units advancing along the Don, and after the transfer of part of the long-range bombers to the south in the Voronezh region, which was subjected to strong attacks by the Soviet army from the northeast to the flank of the advancing Germans, only insignificant forces remained. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops were held back near Voronezh without resorting to the help of the forces participating in the offensive to the south with the constant support of long-range bomber aviation and units of direct support of ground forces.

Having fulfilled its task in the extreme southern sector of the Eastern Front, the VIII air corps was now transferred to a new important direction. The corps was transferred from the southern section of the 4th Air Fleet's area of ​​responsibility to the northern one. The redeployment took place while the Germans were preparing for an offensive from the Kursk region in the direction of Voronezh.

As a result of the movement of the VIII air corps, the southern sector of the front, adjacent to the Black Sea, occupied the IV air corps.

All the time, while the German troops were rapidly advancing along the Don from Voronezh in the direction of Stalingrad and from the Rostov region to the Caucasus in the direction of Maikop and Armavir, a significant part of the long-range bomber aviation participated in systematic raids on communications in the enemy's rear. These operations covered vast areas, including the North Caucasus, in which bridges, ferry crossings and railways were subjected to massive attacks. Communications in the deeper rear were also subjected to strategic bombing in order to cut supply routes between Stalingrad and Moscow, but no attempt was made to bomb cities far beyond the front line and not directly threatened by occupation. On the contrary, long-range bomber aviation concentrated its efforts exclusively on indirect support of the offensive, trying to disable Soviet communications. To this end, strikes were carried out on the ports of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus up to Poti, as well as attempts were made to mine the Volga on a small scale and ships were subjected to air strikes on the Volga up to Astrakhan.

Unlike the offensive on Stalingrad, which was supported by about 1000 aircraft of all types, the German offensive in the Caucasus after crossing the Don received almost no air support until the advance slowed down due to the hilly terrain, which prevented the massive use of tanks. Then it became necessary to strengthen the IV Air Corps, which was responsible for air operations in the Caucasus, and fighter units, armed with single-engine and twin-engine fighters, were deployed to bases located along a line that went approximately from east to west through Krasnodar.

In September and October, the defining factor of the air strategy was the inability of the German high command to achieve decisive success either at Stalingrad or in the Caucasus. At Stalingrad, the VIII Air Corps, which made up most of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet, conducted active operations. Dive bombers were especially active, often making 4 or more sorties per day.

Despite active hostilities for four months, until October the number of the Luftwaffe remained remarkably stable: 2,450-2,500 aircraft. A lot of aviation units during August and September were withdrawn to the rear for rearmament, but their places were occupied by fresh units, fully equipped with equipment and crews. Nevertheless, the concentration of forces in the south left only small forces for the Moscow and Leningrad directions. Probably, in this area, the Soviet aviation possessed an advantage in the air, since the Soviet offensive near Rzhev and in the area of ​​Lake Ilmen forced the Germans in September to transfer part of the aviation that participated in the battle for Stalingrad to the north. However, the strengthening of the Luftwaffe in the Leningrad region, which occurred in September, was planned, as well as the reinforcement of ground forces in this direction, in preparation for a full-scale offensive, planned with the expectation that Stalingrad would not last long. By the beginning of October, 550-600 aircraft were concentrated on the Leningrad sector of the front, but Stalingrad did not fall, and the preparations and movement of Soviet troops in the Moscow area and, to a lesser extent, in the south, forced the Luftwaffe to redistribute forces and weaken the grouping near Leningrad. In the second half of October, at least 300 aircraft were withdrawn from this sector.

At this stage, the dangers to which German aviation in the Soviet Union was exposed: its supply lines were stretched; it moved away from the bases equipped in the winter of 1941/42 and operated from poorly prepared airfields; its main forces were drawn into the battles at Stalingrad so much that it was impossible to ensure air superiority elsewhere; units of direct support of ground forces acted intensively, many crews made three or four sorties per day, which affected the state of equipment and crews and ultimately led to catastrophic consequences. At the same time, a continuous series of local operations and the threat of an offensive by Soviet troops in the north required a constant redeployment of units, leaving no pauses for rest and restoration of combat effectiveness.

In the Soviet Union, by the end of the summer, the zone of responsibility of the IV Air Corps expanded to the Caucasus, and the VIII Air Corps was tasked with supporting the offensive against Stalingrad. Taking into account the concentration of forces of the VIII Corps and the situation in the Don basin, it was decided to create a new operational formation to direct operations north of the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet, in the Voronezh sector of the front. Accordingly, the 1st Air Corps from the 1st Air Fleet was transferred here (he fought there from the very beginning of the campaign), which received a new designation - the Luftwaffe Don Command and, presumably, was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation. Not a single air corps remained in the 1st Air Fleet.

The map shows the approximate position of the German armies on the Eastern Front.

The Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad began at the end of October and was accompanied by the preparation and concentration of troops in the middle reaches of the Don below Voronezh, where the Germans had only a small force of 70-80 aircraft covering a front of about 500 km. However, this section of the front was considered important enough for the I Air Corps to be transferred here from the 1st Air Fleet, which received the designation "Don" Command of the Luftwaffe. Thus, in addition to a frontal attack from the east, the Germans also faced the threat of a flank attack from the northwest. Aviation operations at Stalingrad and in the Don bend were hampered by disruption of communications, lack of fuel and bad weather, and by mid-November it was decided to end the offensive and go over to the defensive.

The Soviet offensive from the Don bend in the southwestern direction deprived the Germans of their forward airfields and forced them to withdraw their direct support aircraft to the rear. As a result, Stalingrad was out of range of German single-engine fighters, and Soviet aviation gained superiority in the skies over the encircled German group. At the same time, the tension of constant battles began to affect, and the withdrawal of some units to the rear for reorganization became an urgent need. With the start of the Allied offensives in Libya and Tunisia, it was necessary to withdraw additional forces from the front to strengthen the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean, and by the beginning of December the number of German aviation in the USSR had dropped to about 2,000 aircraft, of which a significant part was inoperative. The number of VIII and I air corps in the Don area, which had previously reached 1,000 aircraft, dropped to about 650-700 aircraft.

After the transfer of about 400 aircraft to the Mediterranean, it became clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to cope with all the tasks on the Eastern Front, and activity in the Caucasus began to decline. After the transfer of almost all long-range and dive bombers, as well as part of single-engine fighters to other sectors of the front, the initiative in this direction passed to the Soviet troops, who used their numerical air superiority to support the offensive across the Kalmyk steppes to Rostov and through the western part of the Caucasus in the direction of Kerch strait.

The encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad and the almost complete encirclement of the 17th Army in the Kuban that followed, posed another serious task for the Luftwaffe: supplying the encircled troops by air. For this, the He-111 bombers were removed from combat missions and transferred to transport aviation. They suffered heavy losses not only due to unfavorable weather conditions, but also due to constant strikes against transport aircraft in the air and on the ground. These attacks forced the Germans to provide fighters for escort, with the result that the number of single-engine fighters that could be allocated for direct support of ground forces was reduced. By the end of December 1942, there were only about 375 single-engine fighters on the entire Eastern Front, and it was this lack of fighter cover that could be one of the reasons for the exceptionally high losses during the last few weeks of 1942. However, there was another reason for the high losses: non-combat losses of aircraft left on the ground during the retreat, and losses as a result of unfavorable weather conditions. If we add to this the losses of combat aircraft used as transport aircraft, then the losses in the second half of 1942, apparently, will be equal to the losses in the last six months of 1941, which, as is known, led to a noticeable weakening of the striking power of German aviation in 1942. year, having reduced its number to less than 4,000 vehicles by the end of the year after another peak - 4,800 vehicles in July 1941.

The shortage of aircraft of the first line at the end of 1942 is evidenced by the introduction of units of the second line into battle and the use of outdated types of aircraft (Xe-146) and reconnaissance aircraft for bombing strikes. During December, the number of German aircraft on the first line in the East was reduced by about 150 aircraft, despite the fact that the Soviet offensive required slightly less active actions than before the onset of winter.

The significant weakening of the Luftwaffe at the end of 1942, helped a lot by the previous six months of the Eastern campaign, is discussed in detail in Chapter 9. It will therefore only be enough to briefly describe the strategy and tactics of the Germans and the development of new ideas for the use of aviation, which became apparent by the end of the year.

The campaign in the East in 1942, as in 1941, showed that the Luftwaffe continued to strictly follow the traditional tactics of massive strikes aimed at direct support of tank units. Despite the successes in individual cases of the battle for France and the Balkan campaign, by the end of 1942 it became obvious that this approach did not give the necessary results on the Eastern Front. The reason for this was not only the enormous length of the front, as a result of which any concentration of forces for the strike left the flank of the German troops unprotected, but also the depth of the theater of military operations. The Soviet troops took full advantage of these circumstances, retreating, thereby stretching German communications until the Luftwaffe strike forces detached from their supply bases were exhausted due to problems with maintenance. Thus, despite the enormous initial successes, the specific conditions of the war in the USSR did not allow the Germans to use the proven strategy of combining the most powerful direct support of troops from the air and massive strikes against factories and rear supply bases to achieve final victory.

By the fall of 1942, the inability to achieve the expected results began to lead to a modification of German tactics and a reorganization of forces, but no radical changes followed. Thus, there was a tendency to increase the flexibility of the structure on a "functional" basis, and the new units were specially adapted to the tactical requirements dictated by the conditions on the Eastern Front. This tendency manifested itself in a greater focus on defense issues, which was facilitated by the Soviet strategy of organizing counter-offensives in the winter, when the Germans could not fight on an equal footing. Such a doctrine should have led to the creation of a balanced grouping of Luftwaffe forces on the Eastern Front, in which offensive and defensive functions would be more evenly distributed. Therefore, it meant a step forward tactically, a smarter, albeit less effective strategy and more flexibility than previous campaigns.

This concept manifested itself in the organization of auxiliary units and units of the second line. These included: units equipped with outdated Xe-46, Xsh-126 and Ar-66, whose tasks included harassing night bombardments of Soviet troop concentrations; anti-tank units equipped with Khsh-129, Me-110, Ju-87 and Ju-88, carrying special heavy weapons to fight Soviet tanks that were breaking through the German defensive line; and, finally, special squadrons for strikes on the railways, equipped with the Ju-88 in the fighter version and designed to strike the main transport arteries in order to impede the offensive actions of the Soviet troops. All of these units were relatively new categories that did not fall under the traditional organizational scheme of the Luftwaffe. These experiments and innovations mainly took place in early July 1942, after the appointment of the commander of the VIII air corps, General Oberst von Richthofen, as commander of the 4th air fleet, and there is reason to believe that it was von Richthofen who was the main supporter of the new tactics. His experience as the commander of the VIII Air Corps, which was the main unit engaged in direct support of ground forces, could well be used to solve defense problems, the main focus of which would be to eliminate those shortcomings that nullified all the successes previously achieved in the Soviet Union. However, the events of 1943 showed that these innovations, no matter how original they were, could not be brought to mind in the face of the increasing lag of the Luftwaffe, both quantitatively and qualitatively, which became overwhelmingly obvious the following year.

During the first six months of the war, both armies were weakened: the German - in the offensive from the border to Moscow, ours - in defensive battles in the same space. On June 22, 1941, Field Marshal von Bock set foot on our land at the head of the mighty Army Group Center - it had fifty-one divisions, including nine armored and six mechanized! And on December 3, looking at Moscow through a stereoscopic tube, the field marshal begged the Fuhrer to add at least a few battle-worthy battalions ... Soviet troops, also with their last strength, on the same enthusiasm, withstood the onslaught of the enemy. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, who doubted whether we could hold Moscow? - under the impression of successful counterattacks, he perked up, so much so that he swung on a general offensive from Lake Ladoga to the Black Sea! The winter offensive, however, did not bring significant results, and it was not possible to agree on a truce, which Stalin had hoped for. But on the other hand, they managed to neutralize Japan and get rid of the second front in the east. By April 1942, active hostilities on all fronts had ceased. What general strategic plan for the actions of our troops did Stalin develop after an unsuccessful general offensive? Stalin became convinced that we still do not have enough forces and means to launch large-scale offensive operations. For the near future, he considered it necessary to limit himself to active strategic defense. At the same time, he considered it necessary to conduct a number of offensive operations in the Crimea, in the Kharkov region, in the Lgovsko-Kursk and Smolensk directions, as well as in the regions of Leningrad and Demyansk ... doubts arises of our troops: they will consume our reserves without much benefit, and this will complicate the preparation for the subsequent general offensive of the Soviet troops in the summer campaign. Pay attention: the Supreme Commander, inspired by the success near Moscow, was still hoping to overturn the Germans in some direction and develop this private success into a large offensive. * * * Let us briefly recall how these four particular operations, outlined by Stalin, ended. The battles in the Crimea are described in great detail in my book "The Leader". The Crimean operation began successfully - with a landing in Kerch, Feodosia, and then in Evpatoria and Sudak. In a short time, the Crimean Front was created as part of three armies - the 44th, 51st and 47th. This undoubtedly pleased Stalin. In Crimea, our troops were opposed by the 42nd Corps under the command of Count Sponek and the 11th Army of Manstein - all the attention of the latter was paid to the assault on Sevastopol. For the fact that the 42nd corps allowed the landing in the Crimea, Hitler put Shponek on trial, which sentenced him to death (although it was later abolished). From Manstein, the Fuhrer categorically demanded to restore order in the Crimea. In such critical circumstances, Manstein proved himself to be an experienced military leader. He correctly, objectively assessed the situation: “In the first days of January 1942, for the enemy troops who landed near Feodosia and approached from the direction of Kerch, the way was actually opened to the vital artery of the 11th Army, the Dzhankoy-Simferopol railway ... If the enemy used the benefits of the situation and would quickly pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also hit decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a hopeless situation would be created not only for this newly emerged sector of the Eastern Front, the fate of the entire 11th Army would be decided. .. But the enemy failed to use the favorable moment. Either the enemy command did not understand its advantages in this situation, or it did not dare to use them immediately. " So Manstein seized the initiative. He first managed to create a front, stop our units, and then, seeing the inactivity of the opposing commanders, showed his character and achieved considerable success. This is how Manstein assesses the situation in which all this happened: “On the Kerch Front, the enemy still held his 44th and 51st armies. Their total composition was equal to seventeen rifle brigades, two cavalry divisions and four tank brigades by the end of April, that is, a total of 26 large formations.To these forces, the command of the 11th Army could oppose no more than five German infantry divisions and one tank division ... Since the Romanian formations (up to three divisions. - VK.) only conditionally were they suitable for offensive operations, the balance of forces in the planned operation, coded under the name "Hunting for the Great Bustard", was actually worse. In addition, the offensive on the Parpach Isthmus was to be carried out only frontally. Both seas ruled out any possibility of flanking maneuver. In addition, the enemy created a defense in depth. How was it possible under these conditions and with a 2: 1 ratio of forces in favor of the enemy to achieve the destruction of two of his armies? "In fairness, let us clarify: there were not two, but three of our armies: the 44th under the command of Lieutenant General S. I. Chernyak , 47th Army Major General KS Kalganov and 51st General Lvov Manstein understood that on a narrow, elongated isthmus between the Black and Azov Seas, he would not achieve anything by a frontal strike against a large mass of opposing troops. show military art, find some unexpected solution, rely on some factors that are at his disposal. And he found all this. First, surprise. Having superiority in forces, the command of the Crimean Front did not believe in the possibility of a German offensive Secondly, Manstein delivered a diversionary blow in the south of the isthmus, along the Black Sea coast, and with the main blow under the protruding positions of one of the armies in the Center, in fact, along the front, with the forces of a tank division, defense to the Sea of ​​Azov. And thirdly, Manstein used not only surprise, but also the maneuverability of his troops, their good controllability. Within ten days, from 8 to 18 May, Manstein cleared the Kerch Peninsula, defeating three armies! Only in the Adzhimushkay quarries from May 16 to October 31, 1942, did the soldiers and commanders who remained in them conduct a heroic defense. Frankly, Stalin was not to blame for the Crimean catastrophe, he was let down by mediocre slow-witted people who, having an overwhelming superiority in forces, could not resist the much smaller forces of Manstein. And Stalin quite rightly punished the culprits. Two eloquent documents have survived. One is Mehlis's telegram to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief dated May 8, 1942: “Now is not the time to complain, but I must report so that the Stavka knows the front commander. On May 7, that is, on the eve of the enemy's offensive, Kozlov convened a Military Council to discuss a project for a future operation to capture Koi-Asan. I recommended that this project be postponed and immediately give instructions to the armies in connection with the anticipated enemy offensive. In a signed order, the front commander pointed out in several places that the offensive was expected on May 10-15, and proposed to work through May 10 and study the army defense plan with all command personnel, commanders of formations and headquarters. This was done when the whole situation of the past day showed that in the morning the enemy would attack. At my insistence, the erroneous timing was corrected. Kozlov also resisted the advance of additional forces to the sector of the 44th Army. " Stalin did not hide the attempt of the representative of the Headquarters to evade responsibility, and in response he telegraphed: “You adhere to the strange position of an outside observer, not responsible for the troubles of the Crimean Front. This position is very comfortable, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the General Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command on the spot. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If “the whole situation showed that the enemy would attack in the morning,” and you did not take all measures to organize a rebuff, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. This means that you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Kryshfront not as the State Control, but as a responsible representative of the Headquarters. You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Gindemburg. But you must know that we do not have the Gindsnburgs in reserve. Your business in Crimea is not difficult, and you could handle it yourself. If you used assault aviation not for side business, but against enemy tanks and manpower, the enemy would not have broken through the front and tanks would not have passed. You didn't need to be Gindsnburg to understand this simple thing, sitting for two months in the Crimea front. " As a result of the Kerch disaster, the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Mehlis was removed from his posts as deputy. People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, demoted to the rank of corps commissar. The front commander, Lieutenant General Kozlov and Divisional Commissar Shamanin, were dismissed and demoted by one rank. The chief of staff of the front was removed from his post. Commanders Lieutenant General Chernyak, Major General Kolganov, Front Air Force Commander Major General Aviation Nikolayenko were demoted to colonels. Thus ended the first private offensive operation of the winter campaign. * * * The next private operation, conceived by the Supreme Commander, was the liberation of Kharkov through the implementation of a kind of Cannes - the encirclement of the Kharkov grouping with strikes from two directions: in the south - from Barvenkov, in the north - from Volchalskaya. At the next meeting of the Headquarters, at the end of March 1942, Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Vasilevsky and Khrushchev were present, it was quite stormy. Boris Mikhailovich began to talk about the need to limit ourselves to active defense. At the same time, the main reserves should not be put into battle, but concentrated on the Central and Voronezh directions. “As for the offensive operation of the Southwest Direction,” Shaposhnikov moved on to the main issue, “the General Staff is categorically against it. First of all, there are not enough reserves for this, and an offensive from the operational sack, which is the Barvenkovsky ledge, is very risky. “We can't sit on the defensive with folded arms and wait for the Germans to strike first,” Stalin interrupted. - We must ourselves inflict a series of preemptive strikes on a wide front and probe the enemy's readiness. Zhukov proposes to launch an offensive in the Western direction, and to defend on the remaining fronts. I think this is a half measure. Tymoshenko got up and confidently, clearly said: - The troops are now in a position - and, of course, they should - strike the Germans in the South-West direction with a preemptive strike, upset their offensive plans against the South-West and South Fronts, otherwise what happened will repeat at the beginning of the war. I also support Zhukov's proposals. This will shackle the strength of the enemy. Voroshilov immediately supported Timoshenko, and Zhukov supported Shaposhnikov, defending only the possibility of an offensive by the Western Front. Stalin became more and more irritated, and his insistence on carrying out the Kharkov operation began to take the form of an order. But he did not want to make such a decision on his own. - And what will Comrade Vasilevsky tell us? - he turned to Alexander Mikhailovich. - My opinion, like the opinion of the General Staff, has already been expressed by Marshal Shaposhnikov. I just want to draw your attention to the riskiness of an offensive from the Barvenkovo ​​ledge. “Well, it was difficult to hear something else from Shaposhnikov’s school,” Stalin remarked with displeasure. - So does the command of the direction insist on carrying out the operation? “We insist and we earnestly ask,” said Tymoshenko and Khrushchev. - Good. Let's stop here. The General Staff will prepare all the proposals in a day, and then consider the operation an internal matter of the direction and not interfere in their affairs. You, comrades Timoshenko and Khrushchev, will have to rely on your own strength ... On April 30, Vasilevsky presented to Stalin the "Action Plan of the Southwestern Direction for April - May 1942", which provided for the defeat of the Kharkov enemy grouping to ensure the subsequent actions of the Southern Front troops to Dnepropetrovsk and a solid defense, which the Southern Front should keep in the Barvenkovo ​​- Slavyansk - Izium area. - Do you still disagree with the direction command? Stalin asked. - How will you feel if Tymoshenko succeeds? - I will be infinitely happy about it. And if the trouble? Vasilevsky asked in turn. - We will prevent trouble, too. You will have to work even more, and you again look unimportant. How do you live? - I have been provided with an excellent apartment on Granovskogo Street. - Where do you rest? - There I rest, and more often in the General Staff, in the mansion of the Headquarters. There is a decent common room next to my office. - Do you have a dacha outside the city? - In the last two pre-war years, the family used the dacha of the People's Commissariat of Defense in Kraskovo in the summer months, but I practically did not have to go there ... (Further, I retell an episode from S. Kulichkin's book "The General Staff Believes".) A few days later Poskrebyshev conveyed Stalin's instructions to inspect and choose one of the dachas in Volynskoye on the banks of the Setun River. We went on the same day. The village was located just fifteen minutes from the Center in a picturesque location. Stalin's dacha was nearby. The cozy house surrounded by greenery seemed downright fabulous, and the amazing silence and tranquility promised a real rest. Alexander Mikhailovich did not hide his joy, although he understood that he would hardly have to use these benefits. Immediately the commandant of the village punched in a new lock, handed over the keys, informed about the security alarm system and passes. - I wish you a pleasant stay. Come more often, ”he said quietly. - It would be nice, - Vasilevsky doubted. His doubts were fully justified. As before, most of the time I had to spend the day and night at the General Staff. One of the April evenings, he nevertheless decided to stay overnight at the dacha. Knowing that Stalin did not rise before ten o'clock in the morning, he was in no hurry, drinking tea with village milk. The phone rang. “Comrade Stalin is looking for you,” Poskrebyshev's voice was heard, and the Supreme Comrade immediately entered the conversation: “Comrade Vasilevsky, you didn’t have time to settle down at the dacha, but you are already sitting there. It won't do. During sleep hours, you can sleep at the dacha, and during working hours, be at the General Staff. We have a responsible assignment for you. Could you come over now? - Yes sir! - answered the embarrassed Vasilevsky and, swearing to himself, began to quickly get ready. - Well, why are you so worried? his wife reassured him. - I spent only one night at the dacha ... - That's a shame that one night, and got caught on it. Damn it to this dacha. At least don't come here ... These spring days another interesting episode took place, which became a significant event in the service of Vasilevsky. Stalin at the meetings of the State Defense Committee, and simply at the meetings, repeatedly appealed to Vasilevsky on behalf of the Headquarters with a proposal to head the General Staff. Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov again fell seriously ill and also repeatedly asked for his resignation. Another conversation took place in the presence of Timoshenko, Khrushchev and Baghramyan, when Boris Mikhailovich fell ill again. Maybe there would have been no conversation, but the air raid forced the audience to descend into the bomb shelter. On the way, Khrushchev complained about his health, fatigue, and Stalin seemed to remember something. In any case, as soon as they went down to the shelter, he turned to Vasilevsky: - But Comrade Khrushchev is right. Health is a very important factor for the effective work of a leader. Boris Mikhailovich is very ill, it is difficult for him, and we must meet him halfway. The Politburo and the State Defense Committee are nominating your candidacy for the post of Chief of the General Staff. - Comrade Stalin, I have already reported to you on this issue and now I earnestly ask you to refrain from such a step. I have mastered the functions of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and am ready to devote all my strength to provide all-round assistance to Boris Mikhailovich. “You see,” Stalin turned to the others. - The rate insists, but comrade Vasilevsky categorically refuses. Is this in a party way? - I am reporting exactly as a communist, because I think that I am not ready to replace Marshal Shaposhnikov yet. - Who's ready? Stalin asked irritably. - Whom can you suggest for this position? - For example, Zhukov or Meretskov. - They have already been in this position, have shown themselves, but they will bring more benefits at the front. And what do you think? - He turned back to the others. “I think this person could be Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko,” Bagramyan said first. - He headed the People's Commissariat of Defense and is well aware of the content of the work of the General Staff. “I don’t agree,” Tymoshenko immediately reacted. - I recommend General Golikov for this position as an excellent military leader and political worker ... Khrushchev immediately supported him, but Stalin only grinned and spoke again about Vasilevsky. The conversation began to take on a tense character, and the Supreme Commander, sensing this, transferred it to front-line affairs, promising to return to an important personnel problem. On April 24, Stalin called and said: - Comrade Vasilevsky, due to the illness of Alexander Mikhailovich, you are appointed acting chief of the General Staff. * * * Events in the private Kharkov offensive operation developed as follows. At the final meeting of the Military Council, already at the headquarters of the South-Western direction, Marshal Timoshenko (he was also the front commander) said: - As a result of the defeats inflicted by us on the Nazi troops during the winter campaign, the initiative for hostilities was seized by the Red Army. .. In the near future we will be able to attract significant forces to defeat the enemy ... At this meeting, a detailed analysis of the situation was reported by the Chief of Staff of the Southwest Direction, General Baghramyan. He made the following conclusion: - The Kharkov enemy grouping cannot begin active hostilities until the arrival of a significant replenishment of personnel and materiel, the restoration of the operational formation of troops and the approach of large operational reserves. The enemy will begin active operations only with the onset of heat. Well, summing up the results of the meeting, a member of the Military Council Khrushchev said: - Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin himself set this task for the front troops, and this alone is a guarantee of success. In general - complete confidence in success. And there was something to achieve it - 22 divisions, 2860 guns and 5600 tanks were concentrated on the breakthrough area. In addition, two tank corps, three cavalry divisions and a motorized rifle brigade were supposed to enter the breakthrough. Moreover, the commander of the Southwestern Front had two rifle divisions, one cavalry corps and three separate tank battalions in reserve. In addition, the neighboring Southern Front allocated three rifle divisions, five tank brigades, fourteen artillery regiments of the RGK and 233 aircraft for reinforcement. On May 12, 942, after an hour of artillery preparation, this whole armada rushed forward to bypass Kharkov from the north and south and close the pincers west of the city. For five days, the troops made their way to a depth of 20-30 kilometers. But ... Here again this ill-fated "but" intervenes. It turned out that it was on this sector of the front that the Nazis were preparing an offensive operation, also private, under the code name "Fredericus I", for which they concentrated a powerful strike group here. Our headquarters - the General Staff, the Southwestern direction, the Southwestern and Southern fronts - were completely unaware of these enemy intentions! On May 17 at 5:30 am, after artillery and air preparation, the Nazis struck under the base of the wedge of our troops in the Barvenkovo ​​direction. An hour later, they had already covered 10 kilometers along the rear of the 9th Army! What did the command of the South-West direction undertake? Tymoshenko and Khrushchev considered this enemy blow to be a natural desire to close the gap. And, guided by their absolutely wrong previous assessment of the enemy ("he has no strength", "he will not succeed!"), They decided to continue the offensive to capture Kharkov. Vasilevsky (acting chief of the General Staff instead of the sick Shaposhnikov) proposed to immediately stop the offensive and take measures to repel the enemy's attempts to encircle the troops that were breaking through to Kharkov. Stalin did not like to change his decisions. After talking with Tymoshenko, he told the Chief of the General Staff that the measures taken by the command of the direction were quite enough to repel the enemy's strike against the Southern Front, and therefore the South-Western Front would continue the offensive ... The approaching disaster loomed more and more clearly - German tanks smashed the rear of the armies going to Kharkov. The city's Ado, as they say, was just a stone's throw away. Timoshenko and Khrushchev probably believed that when they seized Kharkov, all difficulties would be removed - the winners are not judged! And the troops after the capture of the city can be sent to counterattack from the rear. Zhukov confirms this persistence of the command of the South-Western direction: “I happened to be present on this day at Headquarters during one of the subsequent conversations of JV Stalin with the commander of the South-Western Front. I remember well that the Supreme Commander had already clearly expressed to SK Timoshenko his serious concern about the enemy's successes in the Kramatorsk region. By the evening of May 18, a conversation took place on the same issue with a member of the Front's Military Council, NS Khrushchev, who expressed the same considerations as the command of the Southwestern Front: the danger from the Kramatorsk enemy group was greatly exaggerated, and there was no reason to stop the operation. Referring to these reports of the Military Owner of the Southwestern Front on the need to continue the offensive, the Supreme Commander rejected the General Staff's considerations. The existing version about the alarming signals allegedly coming from the Military Councils of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts to the Headquarters does not correspond to reality. I testify to this because I was personally present at the negotiations of the Supreme Commander. " Well, against the counterattacking Germans, Tymoshenko sent the 2nd Cavalry Corps and the 5th Cavalry Corps of General Pliev. Cavalry against tanks - that's really complete ignorance of the situation! Imagine this picture: the horsemen, waving their sabers, are marching in lava against the tank divisions! In total, the German grouping that closed the breakthrough corridor included the 3rd Motorized Corps, the 44th Army Corps, the 52nd Army Corps, and they had eleven divisions, of which two were tank divisions, and all enemy units were fully equipped (fresh reserves) ... In addition to the dashing attack of the horsemen against the tanks, one more stupidity was committed (I beg your pardon: I can not find another word). In the same hours on May 17, when enemy tanks were crushing our rear, the front command brought 21st and 23rd Panzer Corps into battle. But not against those who threatened to cut off our units advancing towards Kharkov, but following those who went deep into the trap to Kharkov - according to the previously approved plan! As a participant in this battle, Marshal Moskalenko, says: "They themselves climbed into the sack, into the mouth of the enemy." This continued on May 17, 18 and 19. The danger of the encirclement of our units became a reality, and on May 22 the ring was closed. Not we, but the Germans made Cannes. Almost all of our group, with the exception of small groups, was destroyed. Captured, according to German documents, 240,000 soldiers and commanders. Later, all the military leaders who participated in this operation, in their memoirs, will claim that they timely tried to stop and return the advancing troops. Moreover, none of them will mention the initial miscalculation when they planned the offensive, absolutely not knowing the opposing forces of the enemy. This operation could not have been carried out at all with such a balance of forces! But, as usual in such cases (it happened this time), the blame was thrown on each other, and all together later on Stalin. The time has come to "debunk the cult of Stalin's personality." Changes of opinions and assessments of historical events began under the influence of the political environment - at first, isolated fabrications began to multiply chaotically, and later a massive revaluation of values ​​swept like an avalanche. Everyone knows striking examples of how prominent politicians, scientists, and writers almost overnight changed their judgments and beliefs to the exact opposite, turning from “fiery” communists into no less fiery dissidents-democrats. Finally, it remains to get acquainted with the last private operations planned by Stalin - in the north, in the regions of Leningrad and Demyansk. I will not go into detail about the course of hostilities in these operations. Let me just remind you that both of them ended unsuccessfully: in the area of ​​Demyansk, the troops of the North-Western Front surrounded the group of Germans, but they could not destroy it, the Nazis rescued their encircles. Several heavy, viscous, protracted operations took place on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. As a result of one of them - the Lyuban - the 2nd Shock Army wedged into the enemy's location, and so it got stuck there in the forests and swamps. In the spring thaw, the 2nd Shock Army was almost completely killed, and its commander, Lieutenant General Vlasov, surrendered. Not only articles, but entire books have been written about him and his activities to create the Russian Liberation Army and the leadership of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. This is directly related to our topic, because it was anti-Stalinist in the first place. Since all this has been published in huge print runs and is presented as events that actually took place during the war years, I consider it necessary to acquaint readers with the original documents and facts, so that the readers themselves figure out where the truth is and where the fiction is. In the course of the narration, in chronological order, we will come into contact with "Vlasovism" in order to bring complete clarity to its intricate, and sometimes far-fetched history. Let us turn to the circumstances of the capture of Vlasov. It must be admitted that there is no great fault of General Vlasov that the 2nd Shock Army was surrounded. He was appointed to replace the ailing General N.K. Klykov at the final stage of the unsuccessful Luban operation, on 04/16/1942, when the army was already surrounded. Depleted by hunger, without ammunition, the army perished in a swampy abyss. Attempts to break out of the encirclement were unsuccessful. There was only one, the last opportunity in such circumstances - to infiltrate to their small groups. Here is an excerpt from a memo of one of the entourage, Major Zubov: “... at 12 noon on June 25, the headquarters of the 2nd shock army and the headquarters of the 46th rifle division. were in the forest in one place. Commander of 46th Rifle Division Comrade Cherny informed me that we would now go to break through the enemy, but Commander Vlasov warned that there were no unnecessary people ... Thus, we turned out to be 28 people from the headquarters of the 2nd shock army and at least from the headquarters of the 46th rifle division. Lacking food, we went to Zamoshskoe, we walked on the 25th and 26th day. it is impossible to walk in quantity. " Later, one of the members of the group, who left with Vlasov, said that quarrels began among them because of different proposals on how to proceed, the group broke up. Front commander Meretskov in his memoirs writes about the measures he took to search and rescue Vlasov: “The command of the 2nd shock army, as the commander of the 327th rifle division I.M. surrounded by small groups, who wants where and how he knows. This order undermined the morale of the troops and completely disorganized management. Not feeling the leadership from the command and headquarters of the army, divisions and brigades scatteredly moved towards the exit, leaving the flanks uncovered. Some of the fighters, as a result of continuous fighting and malnutrition, were completely exhausted. Some were semi-conscious and lay on the ground. But where is the army leadership? What is his destiny? We took all measures to find the Military Council and the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army. When on the morning of June 25, the officers who had escaped from the encirclement reported that they had seen General Vlasov and other senior officers in the area of ​​the narrow-gauge road, I immediately sent a tank company with an infantry landing party and my adjutant, Captain M. G. Beard. The choice fell on Captain Beard not by chance. I was sure that this man would break through all obstacles. And now, at the head of a detachment of five tanks, Boroda now moved into the German rear. Four tanks were blown up by mines or were hit by the enemy. But, moving from tank to tank, Boroda, on the fifth of them, nevertheless reached the place where the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army was supposed to be. However, there was no one there. When they returned, a handful of brave men reported this to me in the presence of Headquarters representative A.M. Vasilevsky. Knowing that the army headquarters has a radio receiver with it, we periodically broadcast the order to leave by radio. By the evening of the same day, several reconnaissance groups were sent out with the task of finding the Army Military Council and withdrawing it. These groups also managed to complete part of the task and reach the indicated areas, but to no avail, since they did not find Vlasov either ... I called A.A.Zhdanov and asked him to give an order to the commander of the Oredezh partisan detachment F.I.Sazanov to find General Vlasov and his companions. Comrade Sazanov sent out three groups of partisans who surveyed the entire area around Podduby for many kilometers. Vlasov was nowhere to be found. Finally, after a while, a message came from the partisans that Vlasov in the village of Pyatnitsa had gone over to the Nazis. " Now let's get acquainted with the German documents, which have no reason to doubt the reliability. Hauptmann Ulrich Hardt, the former head of communications of the 4th Aviation Division, said: "Vlasov, in clothes without insignia, was hiding in a bathhouse near the village of Mostki, south of Chudov. He was found by the village headman and reported to a German officer passing through the village. up! ”, Vlasov shouted:“ Do not shoot, I am General Vlasov - the commander of the second shock army. ”Vlasov was interrogated on July 15, 1942 at the headquarters of the 18th German army and, as expected, the information received from the prisoner was sent out with an information letter No. 1379-42 for his units. Here is a summary of the document on the first interrogation of Vlasov. " Meretsko-ia, the former commander of the 2nd shock, gave detailed information about the structure of the Volkhov front, about the reasons for military failures, praised the work of German artillery and aviation, assessed the losses of his army as killed and captured - up to 60 thousand people. (This part of Vlasov's testimony is exculpatory. He clearly inflated his own worth, making it clear that everything that happened was the result of the activities of others. - VK.)... According to the testimony of Lieutenant General Vlasov, the plan for the military release of Leningrad remains in force. The implementation of the plan depends on how much the divisions of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts will rest, as well as on the arrival of reinforcements. With the available forces, the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts are not capable of any offensive actions in the direction of Leningrad. These forces are enough to hold the Volkhov front and the front between Kirishi and Lake Ladoga ... ... In the spring, numerous divisions were deployed to the south, and they stopped paying attention to the northern fronts. The Volkhov front did not receive any more reinforcements ... ... in the central zone Zhukov can once again go on a large offensive from Moscow, he has enough reserves ... "As you can see, the information given by Vlasov is, of course, military secrets, many our officers, who fell into the hands of the Nazis, even under torture did not divulge less significant military secrets, and Vlasov, being an experienced, well-informed general, at the very first interrogation with his testimony clearly seeks to win over enemies and promotes their successful military operations. detailed comments on this act of Vlasov, I will just give a note from his personal file: “February 1939 I took the military oath.” And it contains the following words: “... I take the oath and solemnly swear ... to strictly keep the military and state a secret ... If, by malicious intent, I violate this solemn oath of mine, then let the harsh punishment of the Soviet law, universal hatred and contempt of the working people befall me. " Something that was later called "Vlasovism" came into being.

# 1942 # war # history

The losses incurred in the winter of 1941-1942 no longer allowed the German army to conduct an offensive in several directions, as it was in the year. They had to choose only one main direction, and go on the defensive on the rest.

On April 5, the Fuehrer's headquarters issued orders for the upcoming summer campaign, which was to ensure the final victory in the East. Army Group North in the course of Operation Northern Lights was supposed to complete the encirclement of Leningrad and join up with the Finnish troops. The main blow during Operation Siegfried (later renamed Operation Blau) was supposed to be delivered on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.

It was planned to carry out a number of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov and after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasian directions.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, it was planned, first of all, to capture the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and the North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure the successful implementation of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus and was regarded as an auxiliary one. In this strategic plan, Germany's urgent need for fuel, which was constantly in short supply, was very strongly reflected. If during 1939-1940 the German troops met their needs through supplies from the USSR, and in the campaign against the USSR in 1941 they managed to seize huge reserves of fuel near the border, which greatly helped to meet the needs of the troops, then in 1942 Germany could rely only on supplies from Romania, which could not fully meet the needs of the German armed forces. In 1941, Romanian oil satisfied the needs of the Wehrmacht by about one third.

Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting of the command staff of Army Group South in the Poltava region, he said that if he did not receive oil from Maikop and Grozny, he would have to end this war

The choice of the south for the offensive was dictated by a number of other considerations, including a specifically military one. German troops in the central sector of the front were deeply wedged into Soviet territory and were under the threat of flank attacks by the Red Army. At the same time, German troops occupied an overhanging position in relation to the southern grouping of Soviet troops. The Red Army had no less forces here than in the western direction. However, the open area - the steppe expanses of the Don region, the Volga region and the North Caucasus - created the most favorable opportunities for the use of mobile formations and aviation. Of certain importance was the fact that in the south it was easier to concentrate the troops of the allies: Romanians, Hungarians and Italians.

The capture of the Caucasus pursued, in addition to the above, other important goals: it brought the German fascist troops closer to Turkey and accelerated the decision of its leadership to war against the USSR; With the loss of the Caucasus, the Soviet Union was deprived of links with the outside world through Iran, from where a significant part of the lend-lease supplies came; the seizure of the Black Sea bases doomed the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to death. Finally, in the event of a successful implementation of the planned offensive, it was supposed to open the way to the Middle East.

Preparing for the planned operations, the German leadership carried out a number of preparatory measures. In search of the forces and means necessary for the offensive, the allies of the Third Reich were not forgotten. A few weeks before the final decision on the plan for the summer campaign of 1942, the Chief of Staff of the High Command, Field Marshal Keitel, visited on Hitler's instructions the capital of Germany's European allies, which were to allocate significant forces for the operation. As a result, it was possible to obtain from the governments of Italy and Hungary a promise to allocate one reinforced army each. In Romania, I. Antonescu promised to provide the German command with new divisions in addition to the Romanian troops already operating in the East.

Among the measures of the German command aimed at preparing an offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, not the last place was occupied by the plan of the fictitious operation "Kremlin". Its goal is to misinform the Soviet command regarding the German plans for the 1942 summer campaign.

Operation Kremlin was developed at the direction of OKH and Hitler by the headquarters of Army Group Center. In the "Order on the attack on Moscow", signed on May 29 by the commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Kluge and the chief of staff, General Veler, the troops of the Army Group Center were tasked with: Moscow, encircling the city, and thereby deprive the enemy of the possibility of operational use of this area. " To achieve this goal, the order set specific tasks for the 2nd, 3rd tank, 4th, 9th armies and the 59th army corps. The beginning of both operations ("Kremlin" and "Blau") coincided in time. Everything was done, including radio disinformation, so that the plan of Operation Kremlin became known to the command of the Red Army. And this was achieved.

On May 10, the commander of the 6th Army, General of the Panzer Forces Paulus $ / From mid-January, he was appointed commander in place of the deceased Field Marshal von Reichenau. $ presented to the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Bock, a plan for an operation code-named "Friedrich", which provided for the elimination of the Barvenkovsky salient that arose during the January offensive of the Red Army, the restoration of the front line along the Seversky Donets and the capture of a bridgehead on the northern bank of this river in Raisin area.

On June 1, 1942, an extended meeting of commanders was held at the headquarters of Army Group South in Poltava. Hitler arrived accompanied by Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of Operations, Lieutenant General Heusinger, and Quartermaster General General Wagner. The following persons were invited to the meeting: Commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Bock, Chief of Staff of Army Group South, General of the Infantry von Sodenstern, Lieutenant General von Greifenberg, later Chief of Staff of Army Group A, Commander of the 1st Tank Army Colonel General von Kleist, Commander of the 17th Army Colonel General Ruoff, Commander of the 2nd Army Colonel General von Weichs, Commander of the 4th Panzer Army Colonel General Goth, Commander of the 6th Army General of the Panzer Forces Paulus, Commander 3 of the 1st Motorized Corps, General of the Panzer Forces von Mackensen, and from the Air Force, the commander of the 4th Air Fleet, Colonel General von Richthofen.

A plan of action in the southern direction was discussed. Hitler clarified the objectives of the offensive, outlined in the directive of April 5, 1942.

The plans were good, but the German command again made two mistakes. First, it overestimated its strength again. Second, it again underestimated the strength of the Red Army.

On June 19, Major Reichel, an officer in the operations department of the 23rd Panzer Division, flew in a command plane to units located on the front line. In violation of all the rules on observance of military secrets, he took with him detailed plans for the upcoming offensive. The plane was shot down near the front line. A patrol sent to the crash site to retrieve the bodies and documents found that the Russians were the first to reach the plane.

Hitler, upon learning of what had happened, was furious. He demanded that the divisional commander and the corps commander be tried by a military tribunal, and insisted on being shot. Stalin, when he was told about the seized papers, considered them another disinformation.

1.1 Plans of the Hitlerite military command

On the eve of the second year of the Great Patriotic War, the situation in the Soviet Union remained difficult. His material and human losses were enormous, the territories seized by the enemy were vast. However, the strategy of "lightning-fast" war of fascist Germany against the USSR failed. In a grandiose armed confrontation on the outskirts of Moscow, the troops of the Red Army defeated the main grouping of the Wehrmacht and threw it back from the Soviet capital. The Battle of Moscow had not yet finally decided the outcome of the struggle in favor of the USSR, but it marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of World War II and Patriotic War.

According to the plans of the German command, the forty-second year was supposed to be a decisive year in the war, because Hitler was sure that the United States and England would not undertake a landing of their troops in Europe this year, he still had his hands untied for operations in the east.

However, the defeat near Moscow, the losses of the summer of 1941, inflicted by the Red Army on the invaders, could not but affect. Despite the fact that by the spring of 1942 the Hitlerite army had grown in number and received significant technical equipment, the German command did not find the strength to attack along the entire front.

"At the end of 1941, the Nazi army was under arms 9500 thousand, and in 1942 already 10204 thousand." The overall strength of the army increased, and the chief of the Hitlerite General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Halder, entered in his diary the following significant entry: “As of May 1, 1942, 318,000 men are missing in the East. It was proposed to send 240 thousand people to the army in the East in May. For the period from May to September there is a reserve of 960 thousand young recruits. Then in September there will be nothing else. ”

A little later, at the headquarters of the OKW operational leadership, a more accurate document was drawn up regarding the general state of the Hitlerite army. The certificate intended for Hitler said: "The fighting efficiency of the armed forces as a whole is lower than in the spring of 1941, which is due to the impossibility of fully providing their replenishment with people and material resources."

“And yet, by the summer of 1942,” writes General Chuikov, “Hitler was able to concentrate quite significant forces against us. On the Soviet-German front, he had an army of six million, numbering up to 43 thousand guns and mortars, over three thousand tanks, and up to three and a half thousand combat aircraft. The forces are significant. Hitler started the war with lesser ones. "

Hitler undertook a campaign in the Caucasus with the aim of seizing oil sources, access to the Iranian border, to the Volga. He apparently hoped that at a distance from the center of the country the resistance of the Soviet troops would not be so solid.

By entering the Caucasus, Hitler hoped to draw Turkey into the war, which would give him another twenty to thirty divisions. By reaching the Volga and the Iranian border, he hoped to involve Japan in the war against the Soviet Union. The performance of Turkey and Japan was his last chance for success in the war against us. Only this can explain such a broad-based character of his directive for the spring-summer campaign in 1942.

Let us turn to the text of this directive, known as directive number 41. The introduction already contains not an analysis of the current situation on the Soviet-German front, but propaganda idle talk.

The directive begins with these words: “The winter campaign in Russia is drawing to a close. Thanks to the outstanding courage and readiness of the soldiers of the Eastern Front for self-sacrifice, our defensive actions were crowned with the great success of German weapons. The enemy suffered huge losses in people and equipment. Seeking to exploit his perceived initial success, he used up most of the reserves for further operations this winter. ”

"The goal is," reads the directive, "to finally destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers."

"... First of all, all the forces at our disposal should be concentrated for the main operation in the southern sector with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then seize the oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian ridge."

And then a caveat follows. "The final encirclement of Leningrad and the seizure of Ingermanland are postponed until a change in the situation in the encirclement area or the release of other forces sufficient for this create appropriate opportunities."

This reservation shows that Hitler, having forces greater than those with which he began his campaign in Russia, did not dare to carry out operations along the entire front, but concentrated everything in the south.

As General Chuikov wrote: “The directive is a document of a secret nature, a document with which a limited circle of persons had the right to familiarize themselves, this is a document in which there is no place for propaganda wording. He must accurately and soberly assess the situation. We see that, in its premise, the German command completely misjudges our forces, and is trying to portray its defeat near Moscow as a military success. By underestimating our strength, Hitler at the same time overestimates his own. "

Thus, the main goal of the enemy's offensive on the Eastern Front, according to the above directive No. 41, was to win a victory over the Soviet Union. “However, unlike the Barbarossa plan,” writes A.M. Samsonov, - the achievement of this political goal was no longer based on the "blitzkrieg" strategy. That is why Directive # 41 does not establish a chronological framework for the completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, seize the southern regions of the USSR rich in strategic raw materials. " To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a number of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov and after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasian directions. The operation to capture Leningrad and establish ground communications with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task in the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period had to improve its operational position through private operations.

Hitler announced on March 15 that during the summer of 1942 "the Russian army will be completely destroyed." It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the real strategy. But here it was more likely something else.

The essentially adventurous Hitler policy could not be based on deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations for 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack, and even whether to attack at all on the Eastern Front, became more and more difficult for Hitler's generals.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and the North Caucasus. The offensive on the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy's plan, the successful "first and foremost" of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus. In this strategic plan of the enemy, the acute need of Nazi Germany for fuel was very strongly reflected.

Speaking on June 1, 1942, at a meeting of the command staff of Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler declared that "if he does not receive oil from Maikop and Grozny, then he will have to end this war." At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the USSR's loss of oil would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. "It was a delicate calculation that was closer to its goal than is generally believed after its final catastrophic failure."

So, the German military command no longer had confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Yet the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. “The command of the Wehrmacht continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops begin hostilities on the continent of Europe. The Nazis had no doubts that the second front, at least in 1942, would not be opened. " And although the prospects for a war against the USSR were already outlined for some in a completely different way than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity in this.

“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the German high command faced the question of how to continue the war: to attack or defend. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of the chances of a successful continuation and end of the war in the East and in the West. 1942 was the last year in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in an offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to decide what should be done on a 3,000-kilometer front to ensure the success of the offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that on most of the front, the troops had to go on the defensive. "

The specific content of the plan for the 1942 summer campaign at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among the Hitlerite generals. “The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Kühler, proposed initially to carry out an offensive in the northern sector of the Soviet-German front with the aim of capturing Leningrad. Halder ultimately also stood for the renewal of the offensive, but, as before, continued to consider the central direction as decisive and recommended that the main attack on Moscow be carried out with the forces of Army Group Center. Halder believed that the defeat of the Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.

The point of war of the allied nations against the forces of aggression ”. The whole world learned about the heroic battle. Here are its results: 1. Under the influence of the Battle of Stalingrad, major changes took place in the international situation. The world realized that a radical change had taken place in the course of the Second World War, that the military potential of the Soviet Union is so great that it is capable of fighting to the bitter end. 2. The defeat of the Wehrmacht under ...

For a day without sleep and rest, the fire-fighting ship "Extinguisher" fought against the sea of ​​fire, taking part at the same time in transporting the evacuated population of the city and valuable cargo to the left bank. The logbook of the steamer, which is kept in the panorama museum "Battle of Stalingrad", testifies to the fact that the pumps of the "Extinguisher" on August 23, 1942 did not stop working for a minute. On August 25, enemy planes swooped down on ...

700 thousand killed and wounded, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1 thousand tanks and assault guns, and about 1.4 thousand aircraft. An interesting source of information when considering the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad in the history of mankind is the book published by the German general K. Tippelskirch in Bonn in 1954. and republished in Russia in 1999. This interest lies in the fact that we have been granted ...

He ordered to restore the city at any cost. And already in March 1943, restoration work began in the city. With a tragic impression, I think about how many lives were taken by the Battle of Stalingrad, and the war as a whole. Although our people had someone and something to boast of before the enemy, the ends did not justify the means. Millions of human lives that were taken away by the war (as they correctly said: “For ...

The General Staff headed by B.M. Shaposhnikov proposed to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the summer campaign of 1942 a plan of deep defense, since the main combat units of the Red Army were around Moscow in the stage of reorganization and replenishment. In addition, in the spring of 1942 near Leningrad, near the village of Lyuban, the 2nd Soviet Shock Army was defeated, and its commander, Lieutenant General A. Vlasov, surrendered. However, I. Stalin, despite these unfavorable conditions, insisted on carrying out large-scale offensive operations of the Red Army. In April 1942, in the Crimea in the Kerch region, as a result of inept actions by the front commander D.T. Kozlov and a member of the Military Council of the Front L.Z. Mehlis, the offensive of our troops ended in defeat: the total losses amounted to about 200 thousand people. On July 4, they had to leave Sevastopol, which had heroically defended for 8 months.

In May 1942, near Kharkov, the troops of the Southwestern Front (S.K. Timoshenko and N.S. The initiative in hostilities passed to the German troops. In June 1942, they occupied the Donbass and Rostov-on-Don, broke through the front of the Red Army in the bend of the Don and continued to advance on Stalingrad and the North Caucasus. There were no defensive structures on the approaches to Stalingrad, so German tank columns soon appeared on the outskirts of the city, and in the North Caucasus they reached the Main Caucasian ridge.

On July 28, 1942, I. Stalin issued order No. 227 "Not a step back!", Which introduced harsh punishments for commanders and commissars who allowed their units to retreat without orders from their commanders: they were declared enemies of the Motherland and brought to trial by a military tribunal. In addition, penal companies were formed, where ordinary soldiers and junior commanders were sent, "guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability ...". In the rear of some divisions, they began to deploy armed barrage detachments and ordered them "in case of panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units, to shoot panic-mongers and cowards on the spot." The blocking detachments were canceled only on November 13, 1944, but the punitive counterintelligence body “SMERSH” (“death to spies”) with unlimited powers continued to operate.

In the early summer of 1942, the fascist command deployed an additional 80 divisions and a lot of military equipment to the Eastern Front in order to cut off the Volga region and the Caucasus from the center of Russia and take Moscow by a roundabout route. The Hitlerite troops included Austrian, Hungarian, Italian and Romanian units, and Finnish troops blockaded Leningrad from the north.

On July 17, 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad began, which lasted 200 days until February 2, 1943; direct battles on the streets of Stalingrad unfolded on September 12, 1942. The city was defended by VI Chuikov's 62nd Army, M.S. Shumilov and the 13th youth rifle division of A.I. Rodimtsev, almost the entire staff who died in stubborn battles for every house.

The general leadership of our troops on the Volga was headed by representatives of the Headquarters, Marshals G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky and N.N. Voronov. According to the Uranus plan, on November 19, 1942, the Red Army launched an offensive with the forces of three fronts: South-West (NF Vatutin), Donskoy (KK Rokossovsky) and Stalingradsky (AI Eremenko). On November 23, 1942, the 330,000-strong Nazi group was surrounded, but did not surrender, hoping for outside help. On December 24, 1942, the tank corps of General V.M. Bogdanov, behind enemy lines, defeated the airfield near the village of Tatsinskaya, from where the group of Field Marshal F. Paulus was supplied by air. Tankers destroyed 430 Nazi aircraft.

On January 10, 1943, following the "Ring" plan, the Red Army began routing the encircled enemy grouping in Stalingrad. The attempts of Manstein's army group to unblock the encircled Nazis from the west ended in failure, and the enemy troops were driven back to the west by 170-250 km. Successfully advancing in the direction of Rostov-on-Don, the Red Army cut off the fascist troops operating in the North Caucasus, and they retreated to the Crimea.

During the fighting on the Volga, the enemy lost up to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured, lost 3.5 thousand tanks, 12 thousand guns, 75 thousand vehicles and 3 thousand aircraft. In Stalingrad alone, 91 thousand fascists were taken prisoner, including 2,500 officers and 24 generals led by Field Marshal F. Paulus. Hitler declared 3 days of mourning throughout Germany. The military power and prestige of Germany were undermined, the initiative in hostilities passed to the Red Army, and a radical change began in the course of the Great Patriotic War in favor of the USSR.

After the defeat of the fascist troops on the Volga, the Red Army launched a general strategic offensive, which lasted until the end of March 1943. During this time, the enemy troops were driven back 600 - 700 km. This made it possible for the troops of the Leningrad (L.A. Govorov) and Volkhovsky (K.A. Meretskov) fronts to break through the blockade of Leningrad in January 1943.

The success of the Red Army was largely determined by the valor of the home front workers, who in 1942 produced 25.4 thousand aircraft, 24.5 thousand tanks, 33.1 thousand guns, while Germany produced only 14 thousand aircraft during this time, 6 , 1 thousand tanks, 14 thousand guns, and almost all of the Europe conquered by it worked for fascist Germany.