The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 was a military conflict between the empire of Napoleon III and the German states led by Prussia, who was seeking European hegemony. The war, provoked by the Prussian Chancellor O. Bismarck and formally started by Napoleon III, ended with the defeat and collapse of France, as a result of which Prussia was able to transform the North German Confederation into a single German Empire. Causes of the war

1. The rivalry between France and Prussia for hegemony (ie, domination) in Europe.

2. The desire of the ruling circles of France to overcome the internal crisis of the Second Empire through war.

3. The firm intention of Prussia to complete the unification of all German lands under its rule, to annex the southern German lands to the North German Alliance

Reason for war

Succession dispute in Spain

In the summer of 1870, a dispute arose between the French emperor and Bismarck over who of their henchmen would get the Spanish crown. The offer to take the Spanish throne was received by a relative of William I, the French government opposed. William I was in a peaceful mood, but this did not suit Bismarck. And when the German king sent a telegram to Napoleon III, Bismarck intercepted it and corrected the text, adding offensive facts. The telegram was sent to the newspapers for publication. The French took this message as an insult. And declared war on Prussia on July 19, 1870

The first battles turned out to be the bitterness of defeat for France. Prussia began an offensive war, and France was forced to defend itself. The real disaster happened on September 1, 1870 at Sedan. The French lost the battle, and the remnants of the army took refuge in the Sedan fortress. The Germans occupied all the heights around Sedan, their artillery smashed the surrounded troops. French troops fought bravely, but could not get through. On September 2, 1870, Napoleon III ordered a white flag to be raised. The second empire in France ceased to exist. By the end of the year, the Prussian troops managed to advance deep into France, take the Metz fortress and completely blockade Paris. A peace treaty was signed.

Outcomes

1. On January 18, 1871 at Versailles, the creation of the German Empire was proclaimed as part of the North German Confederation and the southern German states. The unification of Germany is over.

2. The reunification of Italy ended. France withdrew its troops from Rome, the Roman region became part of Italy. Rome became the capital of the Italian kingdom.

3. Provinces of Alsace and Lorraine passed to Germany.

4. France pledged to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs in gold.

The consequences of the war for France Napoleon lost his crown, and was replaced by Adolphe Thiers. He became the first president of the Third Republic, which was proclaimed after the Paris Commune. During the war years France lost 1,835 field guns, 5,373 fortress guns, more than 600,000 guns. The human losses were enormous: 756,414 soldiers (of which almost half a million were captured), 300,000 civilians killed (in total, France lost 590,000 civilians, including demographic losses). According to the Frankfurt Peace, the former empire was inferior to Germany, Alsace and Lorraine (1,597,000 inhabitants, or 4.3% of its population). In these areas, 20% of all mining and metallurgical reserves of France were concentrated.

The consequences of the war for France Even after the conclusion of the peace in France there were 633 346 German soldiers (569 875 infantry and 63 471 cavalry) with 1,742 guns. At any moment, at least 250,000 more soldiers could be called up from Germany, which in total would give the Germans a huge numerical advantage over an already defeated enemy. The French army had only eight corps, which is approximately 400,000 soldiers. But of them, in reality, there were no more than 250,000 in the ranks, the rest, according to the testimony of the Germans, were listed only on paper. Proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles. Bismarck (in white in the center of the picture) wanted to unite the warring German principalities in order to achieve the creation of a conservative, Prussian-dominated German state. He embodied these three military victories: the Second War for Schleswig against Denmark in 1864, the Austro-Prussian-Italian war against Austria in 1866, and the Franco-Prussian war against France in 1870-1871.

Consequences of the war for Prussia On January 18, 1871, at Versailles, Bismarck and William I announced the creation of the German Empire. Bismarck's dream came true - he created a united German state. The Empire was quickly joined by states that were not part of the North German Confederation - Saxony and other South German countries. Austria did not become part of Germany. The five billion francs that the French paid the Germans as indemnity provided a solid foundation for the German economy. Bismarck became the second person in Germany, but this is only formally. In fact, the prime minister was practically the sole ruler, and William I was not persistent and greedy for power. So a new powerful state appeared on the continent - the German Empire, the territory of which was 540 857 km², the population of 41 058 000 people, and the army reached almost 1 million soldiers.

After the Austro-Prussian-Italian War of 1866, Prussia sought to unite all German lands under its rule and weaken France. France did not want a strong political enemy to appear on its borders, so a war between them was inevitable.

Background and reason for war

Prussia strengthened significantly in the 19th century and became one of the leading countries on the continent. Having secured an alliance with Russia, Prussia began to unite the German lands without fear of a major war.

In 1868, a relative of the Prussian king, Leopold Hohenzollern, was a contender for the Spanish throne. France, not wanting to see him on the throne, put forward a demand to William to withdraw Leopold's candidacy. King William, not wanting war, compromised and satisfied their demands. France put forward tougher conditions, demanding forever Leopold to give up a possible crown, provoking a war. The answer to this demand was not given by Wilhelm, but by Chancellor O. von Bismarck, and, moreover, quite harsh. In response to this, a violent reaction from French deputies followed in Paris, who instantly voted for war with Prussia, the date of which was June 19, 1870.

Course Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871

Already in the first days of the war, three German armies under the command of Wilhelm I, with the support of Otto von Bismarck and Minister of War Roon, crossed into France, preventing them from starting a war on German territory. Already during the occupation of Alsace and Lorraine by the Germans, revolutionary ferment began in Paris.

Under the influence of the public, Napoleon III had to resign as commander-in-chief, handing them over to Marshal Bazin. At Metz, Bazin's army was surrounded by the Germans, and the way was blocked for the second army that was marching to her aid.

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In the battle of Sedan on September 2, 1870, the main catastrophe of the French army occurred: 80 thousand soldiers surrendered and Napoleon III himself was taken prisoner.

Rice. 1. Battle of Sedan 1870.

General MacMahon's attempt to break through to Metz to Bazin was repelled by German troops and the latter remained completely surrounded by the enemy. The defeat at Sedan became known in Paris, and on September 4 there was a revolution. Crowds of people walked around the capital, demanding the abdication of the French emperor, the Parisian deputies announced the proclamation of the Third Republic.

Rice. 2. Captured Napoleon III talks with Bismarck after the Battle of Sedan.

The formed government was ready to make peace with Prussia, but Bismarck demanded Alsace and Lorraine from France, to which he received a decisive refusal from Jules Favre, who was in charge of foreign policy in the new government.

Two months after the start of the war, the Germans began the siege of Paris. It began on September 19, 1870. At the end of September 1870, Strasbourg fell, and the famine that began in Metz forced Bazin to surrender to the German army.

Interesting: By October 1870, there were two French armies in German captivity with a total of about 250 thousand people.

In the meantime, the siege of Paris lasted for 19 weeks. The headquarters of the German command was located in Versailles. In the city, there were about 60-70 thousand soldiers, but the small amount of supplies gave rise to a terrible famine. In January 1871, the Germans brought up siege artillery to the city and began shelling. Attempts to throw off the siege were unsuccessful; dissatisfaction with the command grew among the two million population of Paris.

On January 18, 1871, in one of the Versailles halls, the king of Prussia, in the presence of the sovereigns of other principalities, was proclaimed emperor of Germany.

Rice. 3. Map of the Franco-Prussian War.

On January 23, 1871, Jules Favre went to Versailles to ask for peace. On January 28, an act of surrender of Paris and an armistice for three weeks was signed.

A preliminary peace treaty was concluded on February 26, and the final one was signed on May 20 in Frankfurt am Main. As a result, France lost Alsace, Lorraine and paid 5 billion francs in indemnity.

The result of the Franco-Prussian war was the unification of Germany. The victory in this war was of great importance, making Germany the strongest country in Europe.

What have we learned?

In an article on history (grade 8), we talked briefly about the Franco-Prussian war. It should be noted that it turned into a disaster for the ambitious France, which lost it on all counts. Germany has shown itself to be a powerful modern power, which is the main military and economic force in Europe.

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In 1869, Bismarck, preoccupied with the unification of the German lands into one empire, invited Bavaria and Württemberg, the two most important independent states of southern Germany, to join the North German alliance and proclaim its president - the Prussian king - German emperor. Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, as a result of the defeat they suffered together with Austria in 1866, and the tendency of Napoleon III to seize the left bank of the Rhine, were forced to enter into a defensive alliance with Prussia in the fall of 1866. However, Southern Germany, which remembered the long centuries of independent economic and cultural development, separated from Northern Germany by political and religious interests, did not express its readiness to voluntarily merge with the Protestant-Junker Prussia. Particularly in Bavaria, separatist tendencies were strong; the reigning dynasties strove to preserve their independence; Bismarck did not succeed in seducing the South German bourgeoisie even by offering him a guarantee of assistance to Prussia against any outbreak of a revolutionary movement. The separatist leaders in power gave Bismarck a negative answer and entered into secret negotiations with French politicians to support them in the event of Prussia's transition to the path of violence.

The idea of ​​forcing the South German states through war to unite with Prussia did not smile at Bismarck: the unity of the victors and the vanquished created by violence could not be lasting, and the war would have developed in difficult conditions: Prussia had no legal basis, and a coalition from France, Austria-Hungary and probably Italy. The war with France, in any case, could not be avoided in order to achieve the goal set by Bismarck. In this war it was much better for Prussia to have the South German states on their side than on the side of France. A successful war with France was undoubtedly bound to arouse national and chauvinistic feelings in Germany. In this atmosphere of war, the leaders of the South German separatists had to lose ground; indeed, with the help of documents that fell into the hands of Bismarck about their relations with France and preparations for a joint rebuff, Bismarck had the opportunity by the end of 1870 to gag his opponents. Bismarck needed a war, but a war that France would declare and that would put Prussia in a position of seeming political defense; the Bavarians and Württembergians under these conditions would have to oppose France - the main pillar of their political independence.

The goal put forward by Bismarck for his diplomacy turned out to be quite achievable due to the presence of a strong tendency among the Bonapartists in power in France in favor of war as a means of "derivational" (deviating); for Napoleon III's France, success in an external war should also have been a means of overcoming internal difficulties, breaking opposition, and allowing the dynasty to take root in the country. The aspirations of the military party in France were all the more dangerous because they did not rely on military training that would correspond to the requirements of a European war. From the beginning of the sixties, Napoleon III set about building the colonial power of France. The conquest of Indochina, Britain's support in its second war with China (1857-1860), the attempt to unite the Latin American states under French hegemony, the Mexican expedition, which cost a lot of money - all these were attempts to establish a lasting French influence in the Pacific Ocean.

In the interests of his world politics, Napoleon III strove to maintain good relations with Bismarck. While the civil war was raging in the United States of North America, the fantasy of Napoleon III met with no resistance. But after the successes of the Northern States, France had to retire in disgrace from Mexico in 1865. A lot of time, money and energy has been wasted on "Pacific" and "Latin" politics to no avail. A few decades later, the French bourgeoisie was skeptical of colonial policy; and even now France is not yet disposed to repeat in China its experience of 1860 - military aid to England. Napoleon III began his active policy in 1854 by interfering in favor of England in her age-old litigation with Russia. The second empire in foreign policy grew up on the siege of Sevastopol. Russia temporarily faded into the background. In the sixties, only England and France pursued a global policy. England, despite the powerful help it received from France, looked with envy at her trade and overseas successes, and was not averse to betraying her rival to be torn apart by the Germans.

The victory of the Prussians at Königgrez signaled to Napoleon III of the growing danger of Prussian militarism at his side. Napoleon III failed to compensate France in any way for the strengthening of Prussia. Sluggish work began to strengthen the French army and the secret work of Napoleon himself on the preparation of an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Austrian emperor and the king of Italy promised their support to Napoleon III in writing, but the conclusion of formal agreements of alliance did not go well. Austria, beginning in 1867, pursued a policy in Galicia directed against Russia and designed to educate a Polish and Ukrainian irredenta hostile to Russia. Austria, opposing Prussia, would probably face Russia.

Napoleon III could have achieved a favorable attitude from Russia only by agreeing to revise the Paris Treaty of 1856, which concluded an offensive for Russia prohibition to keep a navy in the Black Sea; Russian diplomacy made this clear, but Napoleon III refused to give his consent, fearing to irritate England. Austria-Hungary needed at least to secure its rear from Italy. And the latter demanded, as a prerequisite for the signing of a union treaty, the elimination of the remnants of the church area, the withdrawal of the French garrison and the occupation of Rome; without completing the unification of Italy, the Italian king was powerless to help Napoleon III - he himself would have been threatened by the Italian national revolutionary movement. And Napoleon III could not sacrifice the pope's secular power as a sacrifice to the Italians, since a strong Catholic party in France represented a most valuable support for him. If we take into account that Austria-Hungary and Italy, under the pressure of financial difficulties, reduced the available composition of their armies, that the masses of their population were indifferent to the Franco-Prussian clash, that the Germans and Hungarians of Austria were even hostile to any active opposition to the German cause as a whole, - it will become obvious that France could only entertain her imagination by relying on alliances.

While there was a strong underground current in France in favor of war, it was officially headed by the weak parliamentary government of Emile Olivier, ignorant of the dynastic alliance negotiations and striving for peace. Emile Olivier viewed the creation of German unity as an inevitability, which France can recognize without losing her dignity and not falling into a disastrous position because of this; everything that will be done against Prussia will facilitate her task, and will not block her path. The moment to stop the ascent of Prussia has already been missed. A few months before the war, Olivier cut the French military budget by 13 million francs and reduced the next draft by 10 thousand recruits.

The situation was extremely favorable for Prussia. It was only necessary to provoke, to give freedom of action to the French military party, to put big trump cards in its hands. The latter was done by Bismarck artistically: he secretly nominated one of the Hohenzollerna princes for the vacant Spanish throne, which infuriated the French. The weak Emile Olivier was unable to keep the peace under these conditions: the Prussian king was asked not only to forbid the Hohenzollerna prince to be elected to the Spanish throne, but also to guarantee that in the future such a candidacy would be rejected by him. The Prussian king, a feudal lord, dissatisfied with Bismarck, preparing to resign him, not interested in the unification of Germany, who considered the hereditary royal crown of Prussia higher than the crown of the German emperor, received demands from France that were very close to apologizing. He politely refused the French ambassador Benedeti, who had come to his resort in Ems, and informed Bismarck about it. The latter remade the king's dispatch for printing in such a way that the French could understand that the king had expelled their ambassador, and the Germans that the French ambassador had insulted the Prussian king. This Ems dispatch had all the effect that Bismarck had hoped for. The French government did not fulfill its duty, failing to either evade a military strike from Prussia or meet it with a proper rebuff. On July 16, France declared war on Prussia.

Bismarck's diplomacy was so successful in exposing France as an attacker that even the General Council of the International was deceived and admitted that on the German side the war was defensive. The overwhelming majority of the young German Social Democracy took a defensive point of view and did not approve of the behavior of Liebknecht and Bebel, who courageously abstained from voting on credits for the war. However, the voting of the Social Democratic deputies in 1870 had only modest significance, since Germany in 1870 was still an agrarian, grain exporting country with a relatively poorly developed metallurgy (38.8 Kg cast iron per person, and in 1900 - 139.1 Kg per person) and poor capital development; the labor movement in Germany was still insignificant in comparison with the French one.

Bismarck could count on his provocation for sure, since in fact power in France belonged to the military party, whose aspiration for war coincided with his own. Napoleon III was powerless to ward off the impending clash. Bonapartism was a military seizure of power at a time when the bourgeoisie and the working class, in a tense struggle, weakened and balanced each other, were politically tired and power was lying on the streets. But in the two decades of the Second Empire's existence, both the bourgeoisie and the working class rested and re-emerged in the political arena. Napoleon III, in order to oppose the revolution on the left, by the beginning of 1870 decided to rely on the bourgeoisie and established a parliamentary regime. The military party saw the growth of revolutionary opposition and blamed all the troubles on the failures of foreign policy, on the forced passivity of France in 1866.

The war party, which was essentially Bonapartism, could maintain its position within France only by victories on the external front. Not preparing for war, they went to war. The lack of readiness in the area of ​​domestic policy was especially great. On the eve of the declaration of war, Minister Plichon said to Napoleon III: “The struggle between your Majesty and the Prussian king is not equal. The king can be defeated in several battles. And for Your Majesty, defeat is a revolution. " With opposition currents in the French bourgeoisie and the revolutionary upsurge of the working class, waging war was politically extremely constrained, and strategy was deprived of any possibility of retreating maneuver.

After the Austro-Prussian War, only the Second Empire stood in the way of creating a unified Germany. Outside the North German Confederation remained the German states lying south of the Main - Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden. Although in August-September 1866 they concluded defensive and offensive alliances with Prussia, separatist and anti-Prussian sentiments continued to be heard in them. The South German lands historically gravitated towards France and Austria, associated with them by the common Catholic religion. The views of Napoleon III on southern Germany were no secret to anyone, and the French ruling circles were making far-reaching plans to liquidate the North German Confederation, restore the former German confederation, and return Prussia to the borders of the Duchy of Brandenburg.

European diplomacy on the eve of the war.

The changing situation in Central Europe posed a serious threat to the predominant influence of France on the continent. Her passive behavior during the Austro-Prussian War and the uncompensated strengthening of Germany drew sharp criticism from the French public.

On top of this, in 1867, the French colonial expedition to Mexico ended in failure. Its seizure, planned by Tu-Ilry and called by the court flatterers "the greatest idea" of the regime, in fact turned into a shame. After the evacuation of the French troops, the Mexican rebels captured and shot the "emperor" of Mexico - the henchman of Napoleon III Maximilian Habsburg (brother of the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph). The Mexican expedition dealt a huge blow to the prestige of the Second Empire; the French emperor appeared before the world as an adventurer who abandoned his ally to the mercy of fate. The political crisis that was going through the empire pushed Napoleon to war as a means to improve internal affairs.

O. Bismarck, all the more, was not going to retreat. He made no secret of his intention to eliminate the "Main line" and complete the national unification of Germany under the auspices of the Hohenzollerns. O. Bismarck conducted diplomatic preparations for the war with France excellently, as, incidentally, for the campaigns of 1864 and 1866.

France found itself in international isolation. Its alliance with England during the Crimean War lay in ruins by 1870. During this time, a large number of disagreements have accumulated between them on issues of European and colonial policy. London began to see in the powerful Prussia a counterbalance to France on the continent. Back in September 1865, Prime Minister G. Palmerston wrote to the head of the Foreign Office D. Russell: “Taking into account the interests of the future, it is highly desirable that Germany as a whole become strong, so that it would be able to resist two ambitious and the warlike powers - France and Russia ”.

Like Palmerston, both parliamentary factions - the liberal and the conservative - began to associate the provision of British political interests in Europe with the strengthening of Prussia, and were ready to replace Austria with a stronger Prussian-Germany.

The attitude towards what is happening in Germany and at Buckingham Palace has changed. Queen Victoria, who was very worried about the fate of her beloved reigning nieces and nephews, uncles and aunts, stopped publicly calling Bismarck an aggressor, the instigator of conflicts at the German courts. When in August 1866 in Berlin they began to create a new organization of the Germanic countries, Victoria, who had never particularly sympathized with the Hohenzollerns, expressed the opinion that Germany "strong, united ... would be England's most useful ally." That's why, Prussian successes in 1870, as well as in 1866, did not bring the British cabinet out of the state of "observant" neutrality.

The position of neutrality was also taken on the banks of the Neva. As noted above, the Russian government, represented by Foreign Minister A.M. Gorchakova, relying on the planned alliance with France, hoped to achieve the abolition of the neutralization of the Black Sea and offered the Tuileries Palace in exchange friendship and cooperation. However, the support by French diplomacy of the St. Petersburg cabinet in the Eastern question in the first years after the Crimean War was very limited. Napoleon III stubbornly did not want to revise the articles of the Paris Peace Treaty and help restore Russian positions in the Middle East. The weakening of the rapprochement between Russia and France was outlined after Napoleon's intervention in the Polish uprising of 1863. Nevertheless, until the crisis of 1870, Gorchakov took steps to develop an agreed political line with Paris. In conversations between the Russian minister and the French ambassador, the idea of ​​the importance of establishing an agreement between the two courts in the Balkans and in Istanbul was emphasized. However, at Cad'Ors they pretended not to understand Petersburg's hints. The ambassador was instructed to act in such a way as to prevent any formal proposals from Russia regarding the treaty of 1856, which, in Napoleon's opinion, was France's “political capital”, “one of the largest and happiest acts” of its policy, and also regulated “the situation in The East in a spirit that best suits our traditional interests and the common interests of Europe. " Refusal of an alliance with Russia and even a reluctance to improve relations with it was a serious miscalculation, if not a fatal mistake, of Napoleon's diplomacy.

Prussia turned out to be the state that could help Russia free itself from the fetters that bind her in the Black Sea. Petersburg was wary of the actions of the Berlin court aimed at subjugating all of Germany and completely destroying the European equilibrium, but this threat was inclined to underestimate. Affected by the sympathy of influential circles of the high nobility and Alexander II himself to the Hohenzollern dynasty. Gorchakov considered it necessary to oppose Bismarck's pan-German plans through diplomatic channels and very cautiously approached rapprochement with Berlin. Only the stubborn reluctance of France to come to an agreement with Russia led the Russian minister to believe that an agreement with Prussia was a "less disadvantageous policy." Bismarck, having learned about Alexander's dissatisfaction with violations of the legitimate rights of the German princes as a result of the annexation of their possessions by Prussia and Gorchakov's proposal to convene a congress to consider German affairs, immediately expressed his readiness to pay the price desired by the tsarist government.

In the summer and autumn of 1866, Adjutant General E. Manteuffel and the Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich visited St. Petersburg. An agreement was reached: Prussia will support Russia in abolishing the articles of the Paris Treaty on the neutralization of the Black Sea, and Russia will not hinder the creation of the North German Union headed by Prussia.

These visits had far-reaching consequences. IN 1868 g. as a result of Russian-Prussian negotiations on coordinated actions in the event of a Franco-German war Alexander II and William/ came to oral agreement, actually had the force of the contract.

Russia pledged not only to maintain neutrality, but also to send large forces to the border of Austria-Hungary and thereby force it to refrain from supporting France; in the event that Austria-Hungary entered the war, Russia did not rule out the possibility of occupying Galicia; Prussia confirmed its intention to assist Russia in revising the Paris Treaty.

In the early days of the Franco-German war, loyal to his obligations, Alexander specifically warned the Austrian emperor against the desire to intervene in the war, assuring him on his own behalf and on behalf of the Prussian king that the security of the borders of Austria-Hungary was guaranteed if it remained neutral.

Bonapartist diplomacy made great efforts to make the Habsburg monarchy an ally of France. Napoleon III offered Franz Joseph to choose between South Germany or Prussian Silesia. In August 1867, a meeting of the monarchs took place in Salzburg, and in the spring of the following year, the Austro-French negotiations on a military-political alliance began. They dragged on until the start of the Franco-German war, but did not lead to positive results.

The military and aristocratic circles, the highest Catholic clergy of Austria did not reconcile themselves to the defeat of 1866 and were eager for revenge. Bismarck's mortal enemy was F. Beust, who, after the surrender of Saxony (Austria's ally), at the request of the Berlin cabinet, left the post of head of the Saxon government. He soon joined Franz Joseph, first as Foreign Minister and then Chancellor of Austria-Hungary.

The Austrian monarchy needed time to recover from the blow received at Sadovaya and to complete the reorganization of the army. Franz Joseph could not have much confidence in Napoleon, and Beust was constantly tormented by the thought that the French emperor was able to lure the Viennese court into a trap, for example, by confronting him with Prussia, and he himself would come to an agreement with Bismarck.

The position of Hungary and its Prime Minister D. Andrássy played an almost decisive role in thwarting Vienna's aspirations to continue its traditional anti-Prussian policy. Pest did not want the annexation of the German territories to Austria, which was inevitable in the defeat of Prussia, since this would upset the existing balance in the dualist state in favor of Austria. In Salzburg, Andrássy bluntly told Napoleon that in the event of a war with Prussia, France should not count on Pest to support her against Vienna.

The Austrian Germans also opposed Austria's participation in the war and, through their press, tried to activate feelings of German kinship and old grievances against France. For all their hostility to the Hohenzollerns and Prussian Junkers, the Austro-German liberals understood that revenge was least of all feasible through participation in the anti-German war as a French ally. Fearing acute internal political complications, Austrian Chancellor Beust did not dare to give the Tuileries military obligations.

Convinced of the impossibility of concluding an alliance with France on the basis of German affairs, Boyst tried to use the Eastern question. In his opinion, for the sake of this issue, Vienna could agree to an anti-Prussian agreement with France, focusing on a war with Russia. However, Napoleon sought help from the Austrians in the West, not in the East.

In addition, Eastern problems sharply affected the interests of England, and the bilateral Austro-French agreement in this area could cause her ill will. Boyst sought to interest London with the idea of ​​reviving the 1853-1856 combination. - the alliance of Austria with the Western powers against Russia and for the isolation of Prussia. The British showed no interest in her. In the evolving situation, it was more profitable for the Saint James cabinet not to stimulate complications in the East, but to play a game on the contradictions between France and Prussia in Europe, because here

England could count on the role of an arbitrator, while in the East it would act as a participant in the conflict.

During the Austro-French negotiations, it was decided to involve the Italian kingdom in them. The government of Victor Emmanuel II was disappointed with the outcome of the Italian-Austrian war, continuing to make plans for South Tyrol and Trieste.

In December 1866 French troops left the Papal States, but several thousand French soldiers and officers remained in the service of Pius IX as volunteers. The Florentine cabinet naturally protested. In the fall of 1867, Napoleon again sent an expeditionary corps to the Papal State in connection with the second campaign of D. Garibaldi to Rome to abolish the secular power of the Pope and reunite the Roman region with the rest of Italy. Under Mentan, the combined forces of French and papal forces defeated the Garibaldians (November 3). The French corps remained to guard Pius. Napoleon continued to oppose the incorporation of the pope's secular possessions into the Italian state, which aroused the hatred of the Italian patriots and extreme irritation at the Florentine court. The repeated attempts of the French emperor to resolve the "Roman question" that was painful for him by submitting it to an international conference were unsuccessful. The powers did not show any desire to help the Tuileries extricate themselves from the situation; the fate of the pope's possessions did not bother them too much. Having received an invitation to take part in the Austro-French negotiations, Victor Emmanuel showed his readiness to conclude a triple alliance, but demanded the withdrawal of the French corps from the Papal States. Napoleon refused.

Italian-Austrian contacts developed more successfully. In Austria, developing plans for possible military operations against Prussia, they paid great attention to the security of their southwestern borders on the border with Italy. From this point of view, the conclusion of the Austro-Franco-Italian alliance seemed to be very expedient. Chancellor Boyst promised Victor Emmanuel assistance in conquering Rome and even in the possible transfer of South Tyrol to Italy. However, the "Roman question" was a stumbling block in Franco-Italian relations. In the end Vienna and Florence decided to remain neutral in the conflict between France and Prussia and wait for the development of hostilities.

The alignment of forces on the eve of the war. An important milestone in the history of Western Europe was the war between France and Germany. It is usually considered the beginning of the second phase of modern history. This war was engendered by deep contradictions between Germany and France. For many years this war was called Franco-Prussian, although not only Prussia, but almost all German states, united by the Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck into the North German Alliance, fought with France. Only four German states - Baden, Bavaria, Württemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt - fought in an alliance with France, since they were economically and religiously closely connected with it (belonging to Catholicism - a common denomination).

The "Iron Chancellor" who created the North German Union of fourteen North German principalities, three free cities and the kingdom of Saxony, the Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck sought to complete the process of uniting Germany "with iron and blood" under the leadership of the Prussian Junkers through a new dynastic war. The leaders of the North German Confederation believed that it was impossible to complete the unification of the German states without a military victory over France. In 1871, the military treaties concluded between the German states expired, so the war with France should have been started as early as possible. The majority of the population of the North German Confederation supported the final unification of Germany and was in favor of declaring war on France. In the Reichstag, the law on increasing the army was passed easily and quickly (its number was supposed to be one percent of the total population). After the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Bismarck considered a war with France inevitable and was looking for only an advantageous pretext, a pretext for starting a war with France. In case of victory, he hoped to achieve the main goal of the war: to seize Alsace and Lorraine from France. The army of the North German Confederation under the leadership of Prussian generals carefully prepared for the upcoming war. Already in 1868, the chief of the German general staff, Moltke, developed a plan for a war against France. By 1870, Prussian troops were concentrated on the borders of France.

France wanted to go to war with Prussia during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. But the quick end of hostilities played into the hands of the Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck and delayed the inevitable start of the war between France and Prussia for several years. Beginning in 1866, Emperor Napoleon III sought an ally for himself, conducted unsuccessful negotiations with Austria and tried to find ways to conclude an alliance with Russia. The French emperor Napoleon III was arrogant towards Prussia, he considered the North German alliance a weak enemy. The Second Empire in France was going through a deep systemic crisis; inside the country, wide sections of the population were dissatisfied with the regime of Napoleon III. The Emperor of France sought to consolidate his shaken prestige through foreign policy adventures. He sought to attack Prussia even before Bismarck would have unified all of Germany, seized the left bank of the Rhine and thwarted the unification of Germany.

The Junkers and the large military industrialists of Prussia, for their part, also strove for war. They hoped, by defeating France, weakening it and capturing the iron-rich and strategically important French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Otto von Bismarck, already from 1866, considered war with France inevitable and was looking only for a convenient excuse to declare it. Bismarck wanted France, not Prussia, to be the aggressor and start the war first. In this case, the war would inevitably provoke in the German states a national movement for the acceleration of the complete unification of Germany. Then Bismarck could easily enlist the support of the last German states (Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse and Baden) not joined to the North German Alliance. In this case, the war with France could be presented as an aggression against the North German Confederation and act as a defender of the German states from the aggressive French. Bismarck's next step would be the transformation of the North German Confederation into a more powerful, unified and centralized state - the German Empire under the rule of Prussia.

War between Prussia and France became inevitable. Both Napoleon III and Bismarck - both leaders were looking for only a convenient excuse to start it. The international situation continued to be favorable for Prussia. The competitive struggle between France and England for colonies forced the British government to view Prussia as a counterweight to France. Russia wanted to use the difficulties of France in Europe to achieve the elimination of the humiliating Paris Treaty, which forbade Russia to build fortresses and have a navy on the Black Sea. These conditions were imposed by France, who lost the Crimean War to Russia under the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty (was concluded on March 18, 1856). Italy wanted to weaken France, since the policy of Napoleon III now prevented the completion of the unification of Italy. Napoleon III always obstructed the incorporation of the Papal States into the Italian state. The French Emperor Napoleon III patronized the Pope and did not allow the liquidation of the Papal States. The Austro-Hungarian government was hostile to Prussia. But it was afraid of the threat of war on two fronts: against Prussia and against Italy. Austria-Hungary did not support the alliance against Prussia proposed by Napoleon III in 1867.

All the European powers did not want to allow the unification of Germany, they did not want the emergence of a new, strong German state in Europe. Then they did not even imagine that the main result of the Franco-Prussian (Franco-German) war would be the creation of the German Empire. The governments of European countries hoped that in the course of a joint war, both Prussia and France would economically and politically exhaust and weaken each other. The European powers were inclined towards a favorable outcome of the war for France, the success of France seemed more and more probable and predictable. Therefore, they treated Prussia more favorably in order to prevent the strengthening of France at its expense.

France did not have to count on the help of any other European powers. Great Britain could not forgive France for its penetration into China, Indochina, Syria, New Caledonia - zones of British colonial interests and considered France as a rival in the struggle for the redivision of the world. After the defeat in the Crimean War, Russia became close to Prussia and could not be an ally of France. But the Minister of War of France Leboeuf assured that the country was completely ready for war, right down to the last button on the gaiter of the last French soldier. Only a small handful of Republicans, led by Louis Adolphe Thiers, did not support the declaration of war, while the entire French public was in favor of war. In fact, France was not ready for war: the fortifications were not completed, the roads had not been repaired for a long time, the mobilization was carried out in an disorganized manner, the supply trains were always late. There were not enough hospitals, doctors, dressings. Soldiers and officers vaguely imagined the goals of the war, the General Staff did not take care of properly providing operational maps of military operations. There were no plans for military action.

Soon, Bismarck was presented with a convenient pretext for declaring war in connection with the question of the monarch's candidacy for the vacant royal throne in Spain. On the vacant throne, not without the participation of Bismarck, the Spanish government proposed the Prussian prince Leopold Hohenzollern. This caused deep discontent and protest from Emperor Napoleon III, since the French could not allow the same Hohenzollern dynasty to rule both in Prussia and in Spain. This posed a threat to France from both borders. In July 1870, the French government demanded from Wilhelm that the German prince Leopold of Hohenzollern renounce the Spanish crown offered to him. Under pressure from France, the prince's father, King of Prussia, Wilhelm, renounced the throne for his son, Prince Leopold. Prince Leopold also abdicated the throne. But Napoleon III, through his ambassador Benedetti, presented to Wilhelm, who was then resting in Ems, an impudent demand that the Prussian king, as the head of the Hohenzollern dynasty, officially approve such a refusal and, in addition, "for all future times" forbade Leopold to occupy the Spanish crown. The French demanded from the Prussian king William a guarantee that such claims to the Spanish crown would never be repeated. The Prussian king Wilhelm was deeply humiliated and insulted and did not make such a promise. At the same time, Leopold politely promised the French ambassador to continue negotiations on this. On July 14, 1870, a close associate of King Abeken sent a telegram to Berlin to Bismarck from Ems, informing him of the negotiations in Ems. Bismarck, a master of provocations and forgeries, personally shortened the text of this "Ems dispatch" and deliberately distorted the information. Now it turned out as if King William had abruptly refused the French ambassador and thereby insulted him. Bismarck hoped that Napoleon would not tolerate the insult of the French ambassador and would be the first to start a war. The distorted text of Abeken's telegram was passed on to the press. When the text of the telegram was forged, Generals Roon and Helmut Moltke were at Bismarck's and dined. Abeken's telegram upset them, they even interrupted lunch. But as soon as Bismarck showed them the fake, the generals cheered up. They welcomed Bismarck's idea and rejoiced in advance of the war with France.

Napoleon also knew how the negotiations between Ambassador Benedetti and the king actually proceeded, but he was not interested in the truth. He used the published text of the Emsky dispatch to declare France outraged. It seemed to him that a favorable and plausible moment for an attack on Prussia had finally arrived. Otto von Bismarck achieved his goal by falsifying the so-called “Emsky dispatch”. On July 19, 1870, France, represented by the government of the Second Republic, was the first to officially declare war on Prussia. To declare war on Prussia, Napoleon III was called upon by the favorite of Rouer, the new Prime Minister Emile Olivier, Empress Eugenie. The French press launched an extensive propaganda campaign in support of the war with Prussia. France thus acted as the attacking side.

The beginning of the war and the course of hostilities. In the coming victorious war, the Bonapartist clique saw a way out of the deepening political crisis, which was taking on rampant proportions. The conflict between France and Prussia over the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne was used by both sides to hasten the start of the war, the declaration of which Bismarck provocatively granted to Napoleonic France.

In order to finally secure his rear on the part of Great Britain, Bismarck published his hidden written statement of the secret demands of Napoleon III four years ago regarding negotiations with Prussia and the capture of Belgium. As expected, the British royal court and the British government were outraged and finally believed in the aggressiveness of France.

During the declaration of war, four days after its start, on July 23, the General Council of the International issued an appeal to the workers of all countries, written by Marx, in protest against the outbreak of the Franco-German war. However, the protest of the International turned into demagogic chatter: not one of the soldiers of the Landwehr (the so-called Prussian system of manning the troops) did not heed the advice of the MTP and did not defect from the war, did not dare to lay down their arms and leave the battlefield. The General Council of the International called for this to the German soldiers in its appeal. Marx predicted the inevitability of the imminent collapse of Napoleon III's Bonapartist empire. The proclamation said: "Whatever the end of the war of Louis Bonaparte with Prussia, - the death knell for the Second Empire has already sounded in Paris." The appeal exposed the so-called “defensive” nature of the war for the German states and revealed the aggressive, reactionary nature of the war, and showed the provocative role of Prussia in unleashing the war.

The French command, led by Napoleon III (during his stay in the army as commander-in-chief, Empress Eugenie was declared regent) relied on lightning war, dictated by military and political considerations. The French army was not prepared for a protracted, regular campaign. The Prussian army was better trained, had high combat qualities and outnumbered the French. The people of France did not want war and were afraid that the war of Prussia against France would turn into a war with the French people. Further, the argument of the absence of allies in France at the time of entering the war was important. True, France harbored empty hopes that the first victories of French arms would induce Italy and Austria to enter the war with Prussia on the side of France. For these reasons, Napoleon III planned to swiftly invade Germany and achieve a military advantage even before the completion of mobilization in Prussia. The French personnel system made it possible to mobilize their troops earlier and faster than the Prussian Landwehr system. This gave a gain in time and disrupted the possibility of connecting the North German and South German troops. By isolating the North German Confederation from the non-aligned South German states (Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse and Baden), Napoleon III achieved the neutrality of these states (anti-Prussian sentiments were strong in them).

However, for the implementation of these plans, full preparedness was needed to conduct a lightning-fast, offensive war. But from the very beginning, hostilities developed extremely unsuccessfully for France. The plans of the French command to conduct a lightning war failed even before the first shot was fired. July 28, 1870, when the commander-in-chief of the French armed forces, Emperor Napoleon III, personally arrived at the Metz border point (in Lorraine) to be present at the crossing of the Prussian border the next day. The emperor found only one hundred thousand French soldiers at the border, and the remaining forty thousand were still in the Strasbourg region. This lagging contingent was not provided with either marching uniforms or equipment, there was no ammunition and provisions. The disorganized, belated mobilization of the French army proceeded somehow, very badly. The railways were also in disorder and confusion, the soldiers were thrown under their own power for hundreds of kilometers. The opportune moment for the offensive was missed. The French army did not set out on July 20 (according to the original plan), or on July 29, according to the personal plan of Napoleon III. Engels aptly remarked on this matter: “The army of the Second Empire was defeated by the Second Empire itself” (Soch., 2nd ed., Vol. 17, p. 21). Meanwhile, Prussia did not lose a single day. The Prussian Minister of War von Roon managed to complete the mobilization of the North German and South German troops and concentrated them on the left bank of the Rhine. 4 august pruss but Ki were the first to go on the offensive, forcing the French to take defensive positions from the very beginning of the war. Having missed the opportune moment and the initiative of the first strike, the French went on to a long-term defensive war, for which they were not ready. The French command was opposed by the first-class German army for that time. Its number was much, twice as large as the French army, organizational skills, military knowledge, experience of the commanding staff of the German army, the structure of the general staff, combat training of soldiers, tactical training - in all these indicators, the French were much weaker than the Germans. The Prussian command had an elaborate military campaign plan, the author of which was the Prussian field marshal Moltke. German artillery was equipped with guns loaded from the breech: they significantly exceeded the French cannons in range and rate of fire. The superiority of the French concerned small arms (Chaspo rifles), but they were not properly used by them. Finally, the Germans had an idea that inspired them, for which they gave their lives: the completion of the unification of the German fatherland. Germany's economy was ready for war: military warehouses were overflowing, railways and the transport system operated without interruption.

The troops of the German states were divided into three armies to facilitate management. All three armies were located close to each other and, if necessary, it was easy to put them together. In early August 1870, these three armies crossed the Rhine and positioned themselves along the Alsatian and Lorraine frontiers. The command of the French troops (eight corps)) was taken over by the aged and sick Napoleon III, and the chief of his general staff was the Minister of War Leboeuf. French troops deployed on the northeastern border from Saarbrücken to Belfort.

On August 4, 1870, at Wissambour or Weissenburg (in Alsace) and on August 6 at Werth (also in Alsace), the Prussian army defeated the southern group of French forces (the southern group of French troops was commanded by Marshal MacMahon). At Weissenburg, five thousand Frenchmen held back the forty-thousand-strong group of Germans all day and retreated to Strasbourg. French troops, concentrated north of Strasbourg, numbering forty-six thousand soldiers, fought against a 20-thousand-strong German group. This superiority of forces allowed the German troops in the first days of the war to defeat the corps of Marshal MacMahon and cut it off from the rest of the French troops.

On the same day, August 6, at Forbach (in Lorraine), the second corps of the Rhine army under the command of the French general Frossard was defeated (the northern French group was commanded by Marshal Bazin). As a result of the first three defeats of the French army, the Germans occupied parts of Alsace and Lorraine. The French fought valiantly, bravely, as noted by the commander-in-chief of the Prussian army, Field Marshal Helmut Moltke. The courage and valor of the French soldiers was not enough for the successful conduct of the war. On August 12, the aged Emperor Napoleon III handed over the command of the French troops to Marshal Bazin and left for Chalon. Bazin's troops (90 thousand soldiers) were trapped in Metz by two German armies in a narrow corridor between the Meuse River (Meuse) and the Belgian border. Bazin's corps never entered the war until the French surrendered on October 27.

The government of the Second Empire tried to hide the true state of affairs from the population, but rumors of defeat leaked to Paris and shocked the capital. The masses of Paris responded to the news of the defeat on August 4 and 6, 1870 with numerous anti-government demonstrations. Already from August 7, mass spontaneous demonstrations began and went on for three days in a row, until August 9. In different parts of Paris, there were spontaneous clashes between protesters and the gendarmerie and government troops. Demands for the deposition of Napoleon III were heard. The demonstrators demanded the immediate proclamation of a republic and the arming of all citizens capable of bearing arms. Those gathered believed that only under a republican system would it be possible to achieve victory in the war with the German states. The demonstrators demanded the coming to power of deputies of the left (republican) faction of the Legislative Corps. The Republican deputies, acting in concert with the supporters of the constitutional monarchy - the Orleanists, believed that now, at the time of the external threat to France, it was not the time to stage a coup d'état. "The breath of the revolution was felt in Paris." People's demonstrations were spontaneous; no one organized, led or directed them. The working class at that time was deprived of its leaders - they were imprisoned or hiding in exile. The opportunity for the overthrow of the monarchy on August 7, when confusion and confusion reigned at the top and the capital remained without power for several hours, was missed. The ministers rushed about, crowds buzzed on the boulevards, the police and gendarmerie received no instructions. The government was very afraid of the actions of the workers of Paris under the leadership of the Republican deputies. But the fears turned out to be unfounded: the deputies of the left factions did not join the people, but preferred to send a delegation to the chairman of the legislative body Joseph Eugene Schneider (it included the Republicans Jules Favre, Jules François Sim O n, K. Pelletan, etc.) with a request to transfer executive power to a committee of Bonapartists alone. Joseph Schneider did not give his consent to the transfer of power, and this news encouraged the Bonapartists. They came to their senses and went on the offensive.

Already on August 7, the government took a number of extraordinary measures to suppress possible actions of the people. Paris was declared a state of siege and reinforced with a contingent of forty thousand soldiers deployed from various points. A number of departments were transferred to a state of siege. The opening of an emergency session of the legislative body was scheduled for August 9. The deputies of the left faction entered into an agreement with the Orleanists to save the monarchy at the expense of the Bonaparte dynasty, to create a provisional coalition government. Thus, in fear of the revolution, the deputies of the left faction rushed into the camp of monarchist reaction. Together with the bourgeois parties, they sought to prevent the revolutionary overthrow of the empire and the establishment of a republic. This calmed the Bonapartists even more: they were now convinced that the left-wing deputies were incapable of risking a coup. The Bonapartists were ready to seize the political initiative from the left-wing deputies and dismiss the liberal cabinet of ministers Émile Olivier. All the blame and responsibility for the failures in the war was placed on Olivier and his cabinet. The Bonapartists had a new cabinet at the ready, headed by the ardent Bonapartist Count Palicao.

In such conditions, on August 9, in the Bourbon Palace, under heavy guard, a meeting of the emergency session of the legislative body opened in the afternoon. One hundred thousand Parisians, mainly workers, filled the square in front of the palace, the slogans were heard: "Long live the republic!" Attempts by the demonstrators to enter the palace building were suppressed by police and cavalry units. First, the head of the Cabinet of Ministers Emile Olivier spoke, trying to save his cabinet, followed by the Republican Deputy Jules Favre on behalf of thirty-four deputies of the left faction. He made two proposals: on the general arming of the people and on the removal of Emperor Napoleon III from government and the transfer of executive functions to a committee of fifteen deputies of the legislative body. The first proposal passed almost immediately (it was supplemented by an amendment on the arming of the people in the provinces - the Bonapartists wanted to counterbalance revolutionary Paris with reactionary peasant elements from the provinces). The second proposal to relinquish power of Napoleon III caused a storm of protest and was rejected by the Bonapartist majority. Even left-wing deputies were worried about the prospect of a revolutionary seizure of power by the people. Leftist MP Jules Ferre and went out onto the terrace of the palace and appealed to the crowds of people to refuse to enter the premises of the legislative body. Another leftist MP Ernest Picard proposed postponing the question of the resignation of Emile Olivier's cabinet. But Olivier's cabinet did not resist and resigned himself. The formation of the new cabinet was entrusted to the ardent Bonapartist Count Charles Montauban de Palicao. The Bonapartists were triumphant: they won a temporary victory.

So, thanks to the complicity of left-wing deputies, the events of August 7-9 extended the days of the Second Empire and brought to power in France the right-wing Bonapartist clique headed by Count Charles Palicao (he received the portfolio of Minister of War). This clique sought to prolong the agony of the Bonapartist regime at any cost, which hastened the military defeat of France. The new cabinet called itself the "Ministry of National Defense", making it clear that its main task is the fight against German troops. The first measures of the new cabinet of ministers of Count Charles Palicao were aimed at suppressing anti-Bonapartist sentiments: on August 10, the republican newspapers Revy and Rappel were closed. Instead of supporting the Rhine army, some of the French troops from the border departments were withdrawn and transferred to Paris. British diplomats and the socialist press considered Palicao's ministry unviable: "The empire is approaching its end ...". Republican deputies, including their leader Leon Gambett, from the rostrum of the legislative body extolled the patriotism of Charles Palicao's cabinet and loyally thanked the count and his ministers for their good intentions in the defense of the country. On the night of August 12, the leader of the Socialists, Auguste Blanqui, illegally arrived in Paris from Brussels. The socialists attempted to overthrow the empire on August 14, but were defeated: there was no support from the workers, time was lost. Blanca's appeals to the people: “Long live the republic! To arms! Death Pruss but cam! " were left unattended. The leading people of France, Louis Eugene Varlin, Jules Valles, Louise Michel) condemned the Blanquists for their recklessness. The bourgeois republicans called the attempted coup on August 14 "the heinous deed of the Prussian spies." On August 17, Leon Gambetta expressed gratitude to the Palicao government for "immediately attacking the trail of Bismarck's spies" and demanded the most severe punishment for the participants in the speech - the socialists. Emile Ed and Breed, arrested on 14 August O were sentenced to death by the tribunal. The government of Count Charles Palicao was supported by the Orleanists led by Louis Adolphe Thiers. The Orleanists (supporters of the restoration of the Orleans dynasty) and Louis Thiers considered the military defeat of the Second Empire inevitable and were preparing the Orleanist restoration. Both princes of Orleans petitioned the government of Count Charles Palicao to return to France “to participate in the defense of the fatherland,” but their request was not granted (to the delight of Louis Thiers, who considered their appearance in France premature). In addition to the Orleanist monarchist grouping, the legitimists (supporters of the restoration of the legitimate, legitimate Bourbon dynasty) acted on the political field of France. Finally, the third monarchist group was the party of the current ruling Bonaparte dynasty - the Bonapartists.

Meanwhile, events at the front brought the Second Empire closer to a complete military defeat. On August 14, Prussian troops imposed a battle on the French near the village of Born and to cut off their path to Verdun, where the French command was pulling together troops, intending to create a new, Chalon army there. The Prussian command involved the French in two new bloody battles: on August 16 at Mars-la-Tour - Rezonville and on August 18 at Gravlot - Saint-Privat. Despite the courage and heroism shown by ordinary French soldiers, they completed the military defeat of the Rhine army. The culprit for both defeats was Marshal Bazin, who had replaced Emperor Napoleon III as commander-in-chief shortly before that (August 12). Bazin left the troops without reinforcements and leadership. The treacherous inactivity of the French Marshal Bazin brought victory to Prussia but cam. After five days of fighting in the vicinity of Metz, Bazin's 150,000-strong army was cut off from Chalon and blocked in Metz by seven corps of the first and second armies of German troops (totaling 160 thousand people). The third German army moved unhindered to Paris, and the fourth (reserve) German army and three cavalry divisions also rushed there.

On August 20, Engels wrote: "The military might of France has been destroyed." In Paris and the provinces, unbridled Bonapartist terror raged. Mistrust, suspicion, spy mania led to lynching and bloody massacres of the population over suspicious persons. The Bonapartist press encouraged these reprisals in every possible way, presenting them as "a just revenge of the people to the traitors to their homeland."

As for the creation of an armed national guard, it was deliberately delayed and sabotaged by the local authorities. The haves were enrolled in the National Guard, and the workers, formally enrolled in the lists of guardsmen, were left unarmed. Fear of the coming republic stopped the authorities - it was very, very dangerous to arm the people. The National Guards were trained in the craft of war with sticks, umbrellas, walking sticks, and wooden dummies of guns. The same anti-national policy was pursued by the Bonapartist authorities in relation to the Mobile Guards. The government did not trust her, was afraid to arm, for she was republican in its majority. The Bonapartist clique dragged France into an irreversible crisis, the bourgeois republicans played the role of a buffer between the people and the empire. Engels rightly remarked: "The National Guard was formed from the bourgeoisie, small merchants and became a force organized to fight not so much with an external enemy as with an internal enemy." (Soch., 2nd ed., Vol. 17, p. 121).

In August 1870, the political adventurer, reactionary and demagogue, Orleanist General Louis Jules Troche won great popularity in France. Yu who skillfully used the difficult situation in the country for his own purposes. Relying on the bourgeois republicans, with their help, Louis Jules Troche Yu managed to inspire himself with the disposition of the masses, who naively believed in the sincerity of his intentions and his ability to lead the country out of the impasse. On August 16, Louis Trochu, at the behest of Count Charles Palicao, arrived in Chalon and assumed command of the 12th Army Corps. He aspired to become military governor of Paris and commander of the Paris garrison. But his ambitious plans were not limited to this: Louis Jules Troche Yu was sure that the war was lost, and the fate of Emperor Napoleon III was a foregone conclusion. He was ready to transfer power into the hands of the Orleanists or Legitimists and personally rise on this.

Count Charles Palicao ordered Louis J. Troche Yu move the Chalon army to Metz to connect with the blocked army of Bazin and, uniting them, defeat the Pruss but kov in the vicinity of Metz and stop the advance of the third and fourth German armies to Paris. But the Orleanist Louis J. Trochu was not going to carry out the order of the Bonapartist Count Palicao. He decided to send one army of Chalon to Paris in order to pacify the revolutionary Parisians and prevent revolution. The Orleanist Louis Jules Trochu did not believe in the plan of the Bonapartist Count Charles Palicao; it was more important for him to save the monarchy by removing the Bonaparte dynasty from power. Arriving on August 17 in Chalon, on the night of August 18, General Louis Jules Trochu departed back to Paris, having in his hands a document signed by Napoleon III on the appointment of L.J. Trochu as military governor of Paris and commander-in-chief of the capital's troops. Together with the general, eighteen battalions of the Parisian Mobile Guard followed to Paris. The Chalon army was to immediately begin the movement towards Paris. With the help of the army and eighteen battalions of mobiles, Louis J. Trochu hoped to wrest the authorization from Count Charles Palicao for his new appointment. Upon arrival in Paris, a fierce struggle broke out between Count Charles Palicao and General Trochu, which took on a sharp character. Each of them ignored the orders of the opponent, and this greatly weakened the defense of Paris. The popularity of the Orleanist Louis Jules Trochu grew every day, he became "the idol of the French bourgeoisie", "the supreme arbiter of the fate of the government and defense of Paris."

Meanwhile, in the vicinity of Metz, the last act of the war drama was played out. On August 21, Marshal Marie Edmé MacMahon, Duke of Magenta, transferred troops from Chalon to Reims, in order to march from there on August 23 in the direction of Paris. But on August 23, for an incomprehensible explanation, he moved his troops not to Paris, but towards Metz, which was associated with the loss of the last active French army. Apparently, this was insisted on by a dispatch received by Marie Edmé MacMahon, Duke of Magenta, from Count Charles Palicao, who insisted on joining with Bazin the day before.

The movement of the ten thousandth army of Marie Edme McMahon, unsuitable for crossing the Ardennes, not provided with either provisions or equipment, demoralized by the previous defeat, proceeded extremely slowly. The Germans blocked McMahon's path to Metz and came close to Metz on 28 August. Charles Palicao, meanwhile, had sent Marshal MacMahon a new dispatch demanding a connection with Bazin: "If you leave Bazin, there will be a revolution in Paris." On the night of August 28, Marshal McMahon began to retreat westward to the Mezieres, otherwise he could be locked in a narrow corridor between the Meuse River (Meuse) and the Belgian border. On August 28, Marshal Marie Edmé MacMahon arrived at Mezieres and resumed moving east towards the Meuse River.

On August 30, 1870, the Germans, who advanced to the Meuse River (Meuse) and captured the crossing over it, attacked the troops of Marshal MacMahon and defeated them. The French troops were thrown back to the outskirts of Sedan, where the emperor's headquarters was located. At dawn on September 1, not allowing the French to come to their senses, the Prussian command launched a counteroffensive and fought the largest artillery battle of the nineteenth century near Sedan, well described in the historical literature. The Germans had first-class artillery and large positional advantages, inflicting a crushing defeat on the French. Their one hundred-thousand-strong group with powerful artillery attacked the French. Marshal McMahon was wounded and was replaced by General Wimpfen, who ordered the troops to fight to the end. The situation of the French became more and more desperate and hopeless, the ammunition ran out. The battle lasted twelve hours.

The encircled and disorganized French troops, together with Emperor Napoleon III, concentrated in the Sedan fortress. In the afternoon, a white flag was raised over the central fortress tower of Sedan by order of the Emperor Napoleon III, who was there. Despite the courage and dedication of the French soldiers, the outcome of the military defeat, the agony of the Second Empire was as follows: three thousand killed, fourteen thousand wounded, three thousand disarmed on Belgian territory, over five hundred surrendered guns, eighty-three thousand captured soldiers, officers and generals together with Emperor Napoleon III. The Germans got large trophies of war - this is the outcome of the military catastrophe of the French at Sedan. Emperor Napoleon III sent a shameful message to King William of Prussia: “My dear brother, since I have not been able to die among my troops, it remains for me to hand over my sword to your Majesty. I remain your Majesty's good brother. Napoleon ”. Apparently, the aged emperor still hoped to retain the throne.

The next day, September 2, by order of the emperor, the French general Wimpfen and the Prussian commander-in-chief, General Moltke, signed the act of surrender of the French army. The success of the Prussian army was ensured in no small measure by the numerical superiority of the Prussians in almost all battles (except for the only battle on August 16 at Mars-la-Tour). The war with France proceeded for the Prussians on one sector of the front.

Assessing the tragedy near Sedan, K. Marx exclaimed: “The French catastrophe of 1870 has no parallels in the history of modern times! She showed that Louis Bonaparte's France is a rotting corpse. " (Soch., Vol. 17, p. 521).

Bourgeois Democratic Revolution on September 4, 1870. Despite the signing of the act of surrender, hostilities continued. On September 2, the third and fourth German armies, setting out from Sedan, marched on Paris. The government of the Second Empire did not dare to announce to Paris the fact of the defeat of the French army at Sedan and the signed act of surrender. The authorities cowardly concealed from the country the military catastrophe that had befallen it. On September 3, in Paris, nothing was yet known about the situation at the front. The Minister of War spoke in the legislative body and did not say a word about the defeat at Sedan. The authorities wanted to gain time and take measures to prevent revolution before the official announcement of surrender. The left-wing deputies invited the Orleanist Louis Adolphe Thiers to head a coalition government with the Orleanist General Louis Jules Trochu as Minister of War. Orleanist Louis Adolphe Thiers refused the offer to head the coalition government: he assumed that the new government would not last long and preferred to stay on the sidelines, waiting for its fall. At the next meeting, leftist legislators proposed the candidacy of the Orleanist General Louis Jules Trochu for the post of military dictator of France. “Before this dear, beloved name, all other names must recede,” the bourgeois republican of the right wing, Jules Favre, appealed to the deputies. The Bonapartist majority rejected the proposal of the deputies of the left faction. Then the left proposed the transfer of power to a triumvirate of two Bonapartists (Joseph Eugene Schneider, Charles Montauban de Palicao) and one Orleanist (Louis Jules Trochu). On the next day, Engels expressed himself on this matter as follows: “Such a bastard O I have never seen the light of the company ”.

The course of events soon completely upset the intricacies and political intrigues of bourgeois politicians, who sought to prevent the revolution and the republic by any means. By the evening of September 3, finally, there was a message about a military disaster at Sedan. The report underestimated the real losses of the French army by half. And then Paris rose !. An eyewitness to the events, the bourgeois republican A. Rank described what he saw: “Workers descend in crowded columns from everywhere. There is one cry in all of Paris. The workers, the bourgeoisie, the students, the national guards welcomed the deposition of Bonaparte. This is the voice of the people, the voice of the nation ”. The demonstrators went to the Bourbon Palace, the Louvre, the residence of the Orleanist General L.J. Trochu with the slogans: “Deposition! Long live the republic! " Left-wing MPs, led by Republican Jules Favre, begged for a night session of the legislative body and announce the transfer of power to the legislative body. "In case of delay, Paris will be at the mercy of demagogues!" - the bourgeois republican Jules Favre pleaded with Schneider. The legislators had at their disposal no more than four thousand soldiers and officers, and they were ready to go over to the side of the people. There was only one way to prevent the people's revolution - to get ahead of the people and to abolish the Second Empire by parliamentary means. Almost all the deputies were unanimous in this: the Orleanists, the Republicans, and even the majority of the Bonapartists (the only exception was a pitiful handful of "die-hard" Bonapartists who did not want to make any concessions). At the night meeting on September 4, the left faction prepared and proposed a draft statement on the dethroning of the emperor. It began with the words: "Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte is declared deposed." The Orleanists wanted to add the wording: "in view of the vacancy of the throne" (the emperor was held captive by the Germans). Bonapartist Count Palicao was opposed to the transfer of power to the legislative body. At a night meeting at about one in the morning, the Minister of War briefly informed the deputies about the defeat at Sedan and the capture of Napoleon III. The meeting closed exactly twenty minutes later without adopting any resolution. The explanation for this lay in the fact that the Parisian workers were already ahead of the deputies, they surrounded the Bourbon Palace and demanded the establishment of a republic. Only the eloquence of the deputy, the leader of the Republicans, Leon Gambett, who stood on a dais behind the closed fence of the Bourbon Palace, who called the rebellious people to "prudence", prevented the spontaneous seizure of the legislature by the people. At two o'clock in the morning, seized with horror and fear in the face of the impending revolution, the deputies left the palace. Jules Favre, a right-wing bourgeois republican, left the Bourbon Palace in the carriage of the Orleanist Louis Adolphe Thiers. On the streets of Paris, from the night and all the morning of September 4, unprecedented excitement reigned. The words "deposition" and "republic" passed from mouth to mouth. The Blanquists launched an active propaganda, calling on the people to revolt.

A new meeting of legislators was scheduled at the Palais Bourbon for two o'clock in the afternoon. Republicans, Orleanists, Bonapartists, Legitimists, leftists frantically tried to agree with each other on the form of transferring power to the legislative body. The demoralized government troops on the outskirts of the Bourbon Palace at night were hastily replaced by the bourgeois battalions of the National Guard and the loyal Orleanist General Louis Jules Trochu with eighteen battalions of mobiles returning to Paris from Chalon. But it was no longer possible to save the empire, the Second Empire was actually dead. By twelve o'clock in the afternoon, the square and the approaches to it were again filled with demonstrators. The meeting was opened at one fifteen in the afternoon (13:15), it lasted exactly twenty-five minutes. The Bonapartists managed to submit their proposal to create a "government council of national defense" under the leadership of Count Palicao as a military dictator.

At that moment, demonstrators broke into the Bourbon Palace, among them the Blanquists were the first. The crowd rushed into the lobby of the palace, occupied the inner stairs and rushed to the stands with exclamations: “Long live the republic! Deposition! Long live France! " Right-wing Republican Leon Gambetta found himself on the podium, calling on the people to “maintain order” and vacate the premises of the legislative body. Bonapartist Joseph Eugene Schneider was with Léon Gambetta. Left-wing deputies replaced each other on the podium. Leon Gambetta took the podium eight times, trying to calm the masses. The Blanquists left the hall, leading their supporters away. It was about three o'clock in the afternoon. Due to the unimaginable noise, the presiding officer was forced to close the session and left his chair. In his place, the Blanquists returned and demanded the adoption of a decree on the deposition of the emperor and the proclamation of a republic. Crowd resistance was becoming dangerous. The left-wing deputies removed the Blanquists from the chair of the presiding officer with the help of the guards and proposed to limit themselves to the deposition of Emperor Napoleon III. The bourgeois republican Leon Gambetta read out a draft resolution prepared by the left. But the ruse did not work. The demands for the establishment of a republic were heard with renewed vigor.

Then the bourgeois republicans, tired of vain exhortations and intimidation, turned to the last resort: according to the established tradition, the republic should have been proclaimed in R but touch. Right-wing Republicans Jules Favre and Leon Gambetta called to follow them in R but carcass. Confused t O Following Jules Favre and Léon Gambetta, the people of the people headed to the Town Hall in two streams along the embankments on both banks of the Seine River. Thus, the House of Legislators was cleverly freed from the people. On the way to the Town Hall, Favre met with General Trochu, who had been sitting in the Louvre since the evening of September 3, waiting for a favorable situation. Louis Jules Trochu approved the actions of the deputies. Both streams of demonstrators arrived at about four o'clock in the afternoon at Greve Square. On the pediment of the Town Hall, a red banner hoisted by the workers was already fluttering. In the crowded hall of the Town Hall, the Blanquists and neo-Jacobins tried to announce the list of members of the revolutionary government they had planned. It featured the names of Auguste Blanc and, Gustave Flour but nsa, Charles Delecle Yu over, Felix Pi but... To wrest the initiative from the hands of the Blanquists, the Republican Jules Favre was compelled to proclaim a republic personally from the rostrum. The deputies who remained in the Bourbon Palace conferred feverishly about their list of members of the provisional coalition government from the Orleanists and bourgeois republicans. The Neo-Jacobins and Blanquists missed the favorable moment for the creation of a revolutionary government. Some of the Blanquists at that moment were releasing political prisoners from prisons - among those released was the bourgeois republican Henri Rochefort, whose arrival the Blanquists were eagerly awaiting at the Town Hall. Belted with the red scarf of the mayor of Paris, Henri Rochefort marched out of prison through the streets of the capital. He was asked to announce the composition of the revolutionary government. The popular republican Henri Rochefort was offered participation in their government by the neo-Jacobins and Blanquists, but he preferred to be included in the list of bourgeois republicans. Each faction wanted to have Henri Rochefort as mayor of Paris, but he joined the list of bourgeois republicans. By joining the bourgeois republicans, Henri Rochefort played into their hands: he prevented the neo-Jacobins and Blanquists from coming to power. As for the post of mayor of Paris, he did not go to Henri Rochefort: the post of mayor was given to the most moderate republican Emmanuel Arag O, an elderly leader of the revolution of 1848, long gone from the political arena. Henri Rochefort supported his candidacy for mayor. The question of the head of government remained unresolved. According to the original draft, this post was intended for the Republican of the right wing, Jules Favre. Orleanist Louis Jules Troche Yu the posts of minister of war and military governor of Paris were intended. But General Louis Jules Troche Yu agreed to join the new government only as its head. This demand was satisfied, and the bourgeois republican of the right wing Jules Favre became the deputy of the Orleanist Louis Jules Troche. Yu... Henri Rochefort did not object to the participation of Louis Jules Troche Yu as part of the government.

Regent Eugenie stayed in the Tuileries Palace, the Senate sat in the Luxembourg Palace - both palaces were not attacked by the people. On the evening of September 4, at the first meeting of the government, the Republican Jules Favre received the portfolio of the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Republican Leon Gamb e tta - became the minister of the interior; Republican Ernest Peak but r - became the Minister of Finance; Republican Gaston Cremie e- headed the Ministry of Justice; Republican Jules Francois Sim O n - Ministry of Education. Orleanist General Adolphe Charles Emmanuel Lefl O became minister of war; Orleanist Admiral Martin Furisch O n - Minister of the Sea; Frederick Dory but n - Minister of Public Works; Joseph Magn e n - Minister of Agriculture and Trade. Henri Rochefort did not receive a ministerial portfolio, as did the deputies Eugene Pelletant, Louis Antoine Garnier-Page e c, Alexander Olivier Gle-Bizou NS n. Orleanist Louis Adolphe Thiers also did not receive a ministerial portfolio, he himself refused to participate in the government, but in fact played a large role in the government.

So on September 4, 1870, a bourgeois provisional government was formed in France, which usurped power in the country conquered by the people. The government pompously called itself the "government of national defense." The Bonapartist empire was crushed by the Parisian workers and, despite the resistance of the bourgeois republicans, the republic was nevertheless proclaimed. Marx emphasized that "the republic was proclaimed on September 4, not by the miserable solicitors who settled in the Paris city hall as the government of national defense, but by the Parisian people." (Soch., 2nd ed., Vol. 17, p. 513).

The news of the fall of the Second Empire and the establishment of a republic was met in France with satisfaction. In Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, new republican authorities began to be created - revolutionary Communes. In their composition, in the nature of the first events, they were much more radical than the central government in Paris. In the provinces, the opposition of the bourgeoisie was much weaker than in the capital.

The revolution of September 4, 1870 was the fourth bourgeois revolution in the history of France (first: in 1789-1794; second: in 1830; third: in 1848). It ended the Bonapartist regime of the Second Empire and led to the establishment of the regime of the Third Republic. The workers of Paris played a decisive role in the events of late August and early September 1870. The democratic transformations of France, begun by the Great French bourgeois revolution of 1789-1794, were continued by the revolution of September 4, 1870.

From the bourgeois democratic revolution on September 4, 1870 to the proletarian revolution on March 18, 1871. From the first days of being in power, the government of the September republic stood up to defend its fatherland. Already on September 6, 1870, Republican Foreign Minister Jules Favre, in a circular sent to French diplomatic representatives abroad, announced the government's determination to "fulfill its duty to the end" and not yield to the German aggressors "not an inch of land, not a stone of French fortresses." At the same time, the "government of national defense" was looking for a way out of the state of siege. On September 12, the French government sent Louis Adolphe Thiers on a diplomatic voyage to European capitals (Vienna, London and St. Petersburg), instructing him to ask the European governments of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and tsarist Russia to facilitate the conclusion of peace on acceptable (less enslaving) terms for France. All three European countries flatly refused mediation and military intervention in the conflict between France and the German states. On September 19-20, French Foreign Minister Jules Favre visited the headquarters of Otto von Bismarck (in Ferrier), but he also failed to agree with the Prussian chancellor on an armistice. Only a second attempt by the government of national defense on 30 October was successful and the Parisians were given "good news."

The National Defense Government announced elections for October 16, which were then postponed until October 2. The position of Paris was extremely difficult due to the advance of the third and fourth armies of the Prussian troops to the capital. Another part of the German army was shackled by the blockade of Metz and the large army of Marshal Bazin stuck there. In accordance with government decrees, a national guard was formed from all strata of the population, and weapons were issued to workers. There were not enough supplies of food and weapons for the defense of Paris. Orleanist Prime Minister General Trochu took a surrender position and declared that "in the present state of affairs, an attempt by Paris to withstand the siege of the Prussian army would be madness." Almost all ministers (with the exception of two or three) shared the surrender position of Louis Jules Troche Yu... The leaders of the new government were ready to conclude peace with the German aggressors on any terms. After the battle of Sedan, the nature of the Franco-German war changed: the German aggressors sought to sever Alsace and Lorraine from France. The General Council of the International exposed the predatory plans of the Prussian Junkers and the German bourgeoisie. On the part of France, the war took on a defensive, patriotic character. In the occupied French lands, the German aggressors committed bloody crimes.

Not meeting resistance, in two weeks, by September 16, 1870, German troops approached Paris. On September 19, after an unsuccessful battle for the French at Chatillon, the Germans blocked Paris and began a siege. By the beginning of the blockade, an army of one hundred thousand soldiers and two hundred thousand national guards had already been formed in the capital. It became clear that the Prussian army would not be able to take Paris outright. In September, Paris was surrounded. The headquarters of the German command was located in Versailles. The thirty-two-day (132-day) siege of Paris by the Germans began. Prussia was seriously worried that other European powers would intervene in the conflict.

In France, patriotic calls were heard to stand up for her, to defend the freedom and independence of their homeland. Great Patriot of France, writer Vict O r Gug O wrote: "Let every house give a soldier, let every suburb become a regiment, every city turn into an army!" Volunteers from other countries were in a hurry to help the French volunteers. The famous hero of the national revolutionary movement in Italy, Giuseppe Garibaldi, took an active part in the struggle against the German invasion. His international detachment operated in the mountainous region southeast of Dijon. The number of fighters of partisan detachments (frantiarers) reached fifty thousand people. The operations of the French armies were conducted without sufficient preparation, did not agree with the actions of the Paris garrison and among themselves, and did not lead to serious results.

On September 24, the Tulle fortress surrendered, on September 28, after a seven-week defense and a long artillery bombardment, Strasbourg surrendered. On October 29, after forty days of passive defense, Marshal Bazin surrendered the fortress of Metz along with one hundred and seventy-five thousand (175 thousand) French - the last regular French army - to German troops. An ardent reactionary, Bazin, even after the September 4 revolution, continued to regard the former Empress Eugenie as regent of France and conducted secret negotiations with her, seeking her consent to the peaceful conditions put forward by Bismarck. Marshal Bazin regarded his surrendered army to the Germans as a force capable of “restoring order” (ie, the Bonapartist regime).

The task of ensuring the national independence of France and strengthening the republican system fell to the new organ of power - the Commune. Initially, the Commune was viewed by the population as a kind of city council, an intermediary between the government and the population. In one of the documents of October 1870, it was emphasized that the Paris Commune should not consist of lawyers and the bourgeois, but of revolutionary, progressive workers. The news of the treacherous surrender of the Metz fortress to the Germans aroused great indignation in the capital. At the same time, the masses became aware of the defeat of the French troops at the village of Le Bourges. e(in the vicinity of Paris). The National Guard first recaptured Le Bourges e the Germans, but without waiting for reinforcements from General Louis Jules Troche Yu, was forced to surrender the village to the Germans again. Due to the inaction of General L.Zh. Trosh Yu the number of dead and captured French reached two thousand people. Louis Adolphe Thiers arrived in the capital, who, on behalf of the government, took the initiative to conduct peace negotiations with Bismarck on the conclusion of a truce. Negotiations began at the headquarters in Versailles. On October 30, the government informed the people of Paris "good news" about the course of negotiations with Otto von Bismarck on the issue of concluding an armistice between the German states and France.

On the morning of October 31, actions of defiance began in Paris against the defeatist actions of the government. Assessing the surrender of Metz as a betrayal, the crowd of demonstrators with the slogans “No need for a truce! War to the end! Long live the Commune! " burst into the Town Hall building. The members of the government were taken into custody, it was decided to immediately hold elections to the Commune. The creation of the Commune was secured. Prominent revolutionary Gust but in Flour but ns proclaimed the creation of the Committee of Public Safety, which, in addition to Gust but wa Flour but nsa, Auguste Blanqui and Charles Delecluse were also included. The leading role in the events of October 31 was played by the vigilance committee created in September, headed by the Central Committee of the twenty arrondissements of Paris. However, the rebels were unable to consolidate their victory. Active participants in the events of October 31 - Blanquists (supporters of Auguste Blanc and) and neo-Jacobins (“new Jacobins”) sharply disagreed with each other in their understanding of the tasks facing them. Neo-Jacobins Charles Delecluse and Felix Pia, who became members of the Committee of Public Safety, objected to the overthrow of the government and only sought the election of the Commune. The new Commune, following the example of the Commune of 1792-1794, would act alongside the government. Auguste Blank and and the Blanquists believed that it was necessary to overthrow the government and establish a revolutionary dictatorship of the people, although they were powerless to carry out this plan. This news caused strong discontent among the petty-bourgeois democrats. Troops loyal to the new bourgeois government, led by an ardent reactionary, General Auguste Alexandre Ducre, were withdrawn from the front. O, who rushed to the Paris City Hall to "deal with the rebels."

While the neo-Jacobins and Blanquists were discussing, the remaining members of the government, with the help of the battalions of the National Guard loyal to them, freed the arrested ministers and by 4 am on November 1 again took possession of the Town Hall. Having regained power, the government, contrary to its promise, did not resign and did not announce elections to the Commune. It called for mayors alone on November 6, and hastily held a confidence plebiscite on November 3. Through machinations, the government secured a majority of the votes. Having strengthened its position in power and regained its senses, the government immediately made arrests of all those involved in the attempted coup on October 31st. Blanqui and his supporters, neo-Jacobins and other participants in the failed coup on October 31, 1870, fled to escape prison.

The disagreements among the leaders of the movement, the tactical mistakes of the Blanquists, the vacillations of the petty-bourgeois democrats, the illusions of the "government of national defense" that have not been completely eradicated, the fear of the threat of civil war in besieged Paris - these are the reasons for the unsuccessful outcome of the uprising on October 31, 1870. ...

Revolutionary uprisings also took place in other provincial cities. In Lyon, under the leadership of Mikhail Bakunin and his supporters, a speech took place, in which the workers of the "national workshops" took an active part. The crowd captured the Lyon R but carcass. The anarchist leaders of the movement urgently created a “Central Committee for the Salvation of France” and issued a series of decrees proclaiming “the destruction of the administrative and governmental state machine”, but did not take measures to consolidate the success. Soon the bourgeois battalions of the National Guard approached the Town Hall. The "Committee for the Salvation of France" liberated the Town Hall building without a fight. The uprising was suppressed. In Marseille, on November 1, revolutionary-minded workers also captured the Town Hall and hoisted a red banner over it. Power passed into the hands of the Revolutionary Commune, made up of anarchists and radicals. It was headed by Andr, a member of the International, close to the Bakuninists. e Bastel and ka. The Committee for Public Safety was established and began a series of democratic reforms. But on November 4, battalions of the National Guard surrounded the Marseille Town Hall. The uprising in Marseille was also suppressed.

According to the same scenario, revolutionary demonstrations in Brest (October 2) broke out and tragically ended; in Grenoble (September 21 and October 30); in Toulouse (October 31); in Saint-Etienne (October 31). The garrison of the city of Chateaudin showed steadfast courage during the resistance to the troops on October 18. An unequal struggle went on all day, the German troops got the smoking ruins of the city.

On October 7, a member of the national defense government, the left Republican Gambetta, flew from besieged Paris to neighboring Tours in a hot air balloon and developed a vigorous activity there to form new armies. In a short time, the tour delegation formed eleven new corps with a total number of two hundred and twenty thousand people. The newly formed troops operated successfully: on November 9, the Loire army entered Orleans and began to advance towards Paris. A month later, on December 4, under the onslaught of the enemy, the French troops again left Orleans. Failures pursued the French not only near Paris, but also on other fronts. There was only one reason for the failure: the defeatist sentiments of the French generals, who did not believe in the success of the resistance and did not support the partisan movement of the common people. In the hands of the German invaders were Strasbourg, Dijon.

The siege of Paris lasted over four months. The Paris garrison was commanded by General Louis Jules Troche Yu... Parisians suffered from unemployment: many businesses closed. The National Guardsman received a meager salary of thirty sous a day (small copper coin). The food policy of the national defense government in the besieged capital was also antipopular. The norms of bread in January 1871 were reduced to three hundred grams per person per day, and even this semblance of bread could not be called bread, it was made from what would have to be. Also, according to the cards, they gave out a piece of horse meat, a handful of rice, some vegetables - but even for them people had to stand in long queues from the early morning. Cat and dog meat was sold at the price of a delicacy. The working population of Paris was starving, the speculators were enriching themselves for the needs of the people. Cold, hunger and disease have led to an all-time high mortality rate.

On December 27, for all the disasters of the Parisians, one more thing was achieved - artillery shelling. For a whole month, the shells of German batteries daily and methodically exploded over the heads of the Parisians, sowing death and destruction everywhere; left after each shelling the ruins of houses, museums, libraries, hospitals; objects of no military significance. Many Parisians were left homeless. But they bravely endured the scourge of the siege and still demanded to continue fighting the enemy. Louder and louder were the voices of dissatisfied with the government of national defense, which brought France to military disaster. These protest moods were reflected in numerous Blanquist literature, in the press, in harsh speeches at meetings, in political clubs.

On January 6, 1871, the indignation of the Parisians at the surrender tactics of the government was vividly expressed in the "Red Billboard" published by the Central Republican Committee of Twenty Arrondissements (it was created at the end of 1870 and united the district committees of vigilance). The appeal put forward the demand for a general requisition of food products, the issuance of free rations. “The government did not call a general militia, it left the Bonapartists in place and imprisoned the Republicans ... With its slowness and indecision, it brought us to the edge of the abyss. The people are dying from the cold and starving ... the rulers of France do not know how to govern or fight. Place - Commune! " - these words ended with "Red Poster". The slogan of replacing the bankrupt government of national defense and replacing it with the Commune elected by the people, entrusting it with the functions of defense and administration of Paris, sounded with renewed vigor. It was in the Commune, endowed with government powers, that the masses of Paris saw the only force capable of saving France from destruction. Memories of the Commune of Paris in 1792-1793 were combined with the ideas of the creation of self-governing communes and their federation promoted by the socialists and Proudhonists. They talked about the Commune at the meetings of the "red clubs", hatched plans to confiscate the property of the fugitive owners, Bonapartists, the church, create workers' associations, and transfer joint-stock companies into the hands of workers. The Revolutionary Commune was often thought of as composed of delegates from the socialist groups of Paris, while the French government was composed of delegates from the country's revolutionary communes and the main workers' centers. Attempts were made to establish revolutionary communes in the provinces during popular uprisings in Lyon and Marseille.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 1871, the victors gathered in the German-occupied Versailles - monarchs, kings, dukes, members of the governments of all German states that fought with France, the entire diplomatic corps arrived. In a solemn atmosphere in the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles, the Grand Duke of Baden, on the instructions of all German sovereigns, proclaimed Wilhelm I of Hohenzollern Emperor of Germany. The Prussian king became the hereditary German emperor. As desired by the Prussian Junkers and the Liberals, Wilhelm received the crown from the hands of the monarchs. Otto von Bismarck (1871-1890 reign) became Chancellor of the German Empire. The unification of Germany ended “from above”, through a dynastic war, with the formation of the German Empire. From the first days of its existence, the German Empire, united under the leadership of the Prussian Junkers, from the very beginning showed its reactionary character. The monarchy and the positions of German reaction in Europe and their country were strengthened. The European powers watched with dismay at a dangerous new competitor that changed the balance and balance of power in Europe. Germany became one of the great powers in Europe.

On January 19–20, 1871, the National Defense Government organized a major military sortie at Busenval (near Paris). As always, a poorly prepared operation led to the deaths of thousands of people's soldiers, who bravely and selflessly fought against the well-armed German enemy. By throwing the National Guards into a trap set by the Germans, the government hoped to finally demoralize the population of Paris and break their resistance.

Outraged by this cynicism of the government of national "defense" (and in fact - treason), the working class of Paris raised a new uprising on January 22, 1871. The rebels tried to capture R again. but carcass, but were fired upon and thrown back by the troops. But this time too, its initiators - the Blanquists - showed their inability to properly prepare him and ensure victory. As in the uprising of October 31, 1870, the leaders of the Paris organization of the International did not take part in the January uprising. The result was the same: the anti-government uprising on January 22, 1871 was defeated. The defeat was followed by massive a