At the very end of World War II, the Seelow Heights, located east of Berlin, were stormed. This truly great battle showed the heroism and incredible self-sacrifice of many soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army at a time when there was less than a month left before the Great Victory.

Hills, located 50-60 km east of Berlin, on the left bank of the Oder. Their length is about 20, and their width is up to 10 km. They rise above the river valley by no more than 50 m.

German military fortifications

The Seelow Heights of 1945 is a defense in depth of troops. They were a military fortification that took almost 2 years to build. The main task of the 9th German Army was precisely to defend the Seelow Heights.

The Nazi command created here the 2nd line of defense, consisting of trenches, trenches for anti-tank weapons and artillery, a large number of bunkers and machine-gun sites, as well as anti-personnel barriers. Separate buildings served as strongholds. Directly in front of the heights there was a dug anti-tank ditch, the width of which was 3.5 and the depth was 3 m. In addition, all the approaches to the defensive structures were carefully mined, and were also shot through by cross rifle-machine-gun and artillery fire.

The German 9th Army, which defended the Seelow Heights, consisted of 14 infantry units, had more than 2.5 thousand artillery and anti-aircraft guns and about 600 tanks.

German defense

On March 20, General Heindrizi was appointed to command the Vistula Army Group. He was considered one of the best specialists in defensive tactics. He knew in advance that he would direct his main attack along the freeway, not far from which the Seelow Heights were located.

Hendritsi did not become a river. Instead, he took advantage of the favorable location of the heights through which the Oder flowed. spring was always full of floods, so the German engineers first destroyed part of the dam, and then released the water upstream. Thus, the plain turned into a swamp. Behind it there were three lines of defense: the first - a system of various barriers and trenches; the second - the Seelow Heights, the battle for which will last from 16 to 19 April; the third is the "Wotan" line, located 17-20 km behind the front line itself.

By the beginning of the battle, the 56th German Panzer Corps numbered about 50 thousand people. After the battle, only 13-15 thousand fighters were able to break through to Berlin, who later became the defenders of the fascist capital.

On April 9, Koenigsberg fell - the last stronghold. After that, the 2nd Belorussian Front, commanded by Marshal Rokossovsky, occupied the eastern bank of the Oder. Then, within two weeks, the redeployment of Soviet troops was carried out. Meanwhile, the 1st Belorussian Front concentrated its troops opposite the heights. To the south, units of the 1st Ukrainian under the leadership of Marshal Konev were located.

In total, there were 2.5 million people in the Seelow Heights area, more than 6 thousand Soviet tanks, this also included self-propelled artillery mounts, 7.5 thousand aircraft, about 3 thousand Katyushas and 41 thousand mortar and artillery barrels.

Battle

On April 16, the 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive and overcame the first line of defense. By the evening of the same day, they met with strong resistance from the Germans defending the Seelow Heights. The battle was extremely fierce. The enemy reserve divisions managed to approach the second line of defense. The density of artillery on both sides of the main highway, which ran along the heights, reached about 200 guns per 1 km.

On the first day, an attempt was made to speed up the advance of the Soviet troops. Why were two tank armies brought into battle? But this did not bring the desired result. Mobile formations and infantry were forced to engage in a grueling battle. It should be noted that almost all tank battles of World War II were extremely fierce and bloody. Only by the end of the day on April 17, after the most powerful aviation and artillery preparation, the enemy defenses in the main directions were broken through.

Ring around Berlin

Now historians are trying to understand whether this bloody battle was necessary and whether Marshal Zhukov did the right thing by abandoning a simpler path - the encirclement of Berlin. Those who are of the opinion that it is expedient to encircle the German capital, for some reason do not notice the obvious, namely the quantitative and qualitative composition of the city's defense garrison. The 9th German and 4th armored armies, which took advantageous positions on the Oder, numbered about 200 thousand people. It was impossible to give them even the slightest opportunity to retreat to Berlin and thereby become its defenders.

Zhukov's plan

A brilliantly simple plan was devised. According to him, the tank armies were to take up positions located on the outskirts of Berlin and form something similar to a cocoon around it. His task was to prevent the strengthening of the garrison of the German capital at the expense of the many thousands of the 9th Army, as well as reserve troops that could approach from the west.

At the first stage, the entrance to the city was not planned. First, it was necessary to wait for the approach of the Soviet combined arms formations. Then the "cocoon" was supposed to open, and after that the assault on Berlin would begin.

An unexpected turn to the German capital, as historians note, led to some change in Zhukov's original plan. The conceived "cocoon" turned into a classic environment with the help of adjacent flanks of two adjacent fronts. Almost all the forces of the 9th German Army were squeezed into a ring in the forests located southeast of the capital. This is one of the largest defeats of the Nazi troops, which so undeservedly remained in the shadow of the storming of Berlin itself.

As a result, the capital of the Third Reich was defended only by members of the Hitler Youth, the remnants of the units defeated on the Oder and the police. In total, there were no more than 100 thousand people. Such a number of defenders for the defense of a huge city, as history has shown, was insufficient.

Battle for the Seelow Heights

By April 1945, the fate of the Third Reich was already decided. The armies of the USSR and Western allies squeezed the ring. The whole question now was in what configuration and at what cost the war would end. The Allies blocked the main forces of the German Western Front in the Ruhr with a series of maneuvers. The Red Army, on the other hand, stood on the bridgeheads beyond the Oder, a few tens of kilometers from Berlin, and was preparing for the final push.

He noted that a breakthrough to Berlin with bare flanks would lead to a supply crisis, and in a military sense, it was necessary to break up the group surrounded in the Ruhr and prevent the Wehrmacht from retreating to the so-called Alpine fortress in Bavaria and western Austria.

Interestingly, no one even mentioned earlier agreements with the Soviet Union. Military considerations prevailed. Therefore, a headlong dash to Berlin from the west did not take place.

Meanwhile, Stalin was well aware that Berlin was giving serious political preferences to the one who occupied it, so he was not going to lose such valuable booty from his hands. There were also purely military reasons to defeat the Nazis as soon as possible. The Wehrmacht was not at all incompetent. The German army still numbered several million soldiers, and the stocks of weapons allowed them to conduct active battles for several more months.

A little-known fact is that the Germans tried to impose their will on the Allies until the very end, and the last cauldron of the war dates back to April 1945, when several Polish divisions were surrounded near Bautzen, from where they were rescued with difficulty. In a word, to stop and complacently wait for the allies to pull up from the west was in any case a bad idea.

Georgy Zhukov presented two plans for the conquest of Berlin to the headquarters. The "long" plan assumed the consolidation of bridgeheads beyond the Oder and the encirclement of the Germans in Frankfurt an der Oder. According to this plan, two Soviet fronts bypassed Berlin from the south with combined forces, inflicting only auxiliary blows from Kustrin. The ramming of two fronts immediately south of Berlin, no doubt, would have demolished everything in its path: in reality, much fewer forces managed there. However, it took at least a few more weeks to implement it.

According to Stalin, the Red Army did not have a few weeks. Therefore, it was necessary to implement a "short program": Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front was operating south of Berlin, and Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front was advancing directly on the German capital. He left for the 1st Belorussian Front to prepare an attack on the German capital.

Thus began the battle for the Seelow Heights.

ZELOVSKIE (Zeelovskie) HEIGHTS, a ridge of heights in the North German Plain, 50-60 km east of Berlin, passing along the left bank of the old riverbed. Oder.

The length is up to 20 km, the width is 4-10 km, the excess of heights above the valley of the river. Oder 40-50 m, slope steepness up to 30-40°. The fascist German command created a second line of defense on the Elovsky heights, which had solid trenches, a large number of bunkers, machine-gun sites, trenches for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In front of the heights, an anti-tank ditch was dug up to a depth of 3 m, a width of 3.5 m, and the approaches to the heights were mined and shot through with multi-layered cross artillery and rifle-machine gun fire. The enemy turned individual buildings into strongholds. The German fascist troops (mainly the 9th Field Army) defending the Zelov heights were reinforced with artillery from the Berlin air defense zone.

Armored vehicles and motor vehicles could overcome the slopes of the 3elovsky heights, mainly along highways, which were mined and shot through by anti-tank and anti-aircraft (88-mm) guns. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, having gone over to the offensive on April 16 and successfully overcoming the first line of defense, by the end of the day met fierce enemy resistance at the 3elovsky heights, where the enemy withdrew from the first line and his divisions from the reserve approached. The density of enemy artillery on both sides of the highway running from Zelov to the west was increased to 200 guns per 1 km of the front. An attempt by the front commander to speed up the advance of the troops by bringing two tank armies into battle on the very first day of the offensive did not lead to the desired result. Mobile formations could not break away from the infantry and got involved in grueling battles. Only by the end of April 17, after a powerful artillery and aviation preparation, did the enemy defenses in the main directions of the Elovsky heights. was broken through by the troops of the 8th Guards Army in cooperation with the 1st Guards Tank Army.

German defense

He was considered one of the best specialists in defensive tactics. He knew in advance that the Soviet Army would direct its main attack along the motorway, not far from which the Seelow Heights were located.

Hendrici did not strengthen the river bank. Instead, he took advantage of the favorable location of the heights through which the Oder flowed. The river floodplain was always saturated with floods in the spring, so the German engineers first destroyed part of the dam and then released the water upstream. Thus, the plain turned into a swamp. Behind it there were three lines of defense: the first - a system of various fortifications, barriers and trenches; the second - the Seelow Heights, the battle for which will last from 16 to 19 April; the third is the "Wotan" line, located 17-20 km behind the front line itself.

Operation plan of the 1st Belorussian Front

The general plan of the operation of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal G.K. Zhukov was to deliver a crushing blow to the Wehrmacht grouping covering Berlin from the east, to develop an offensive against the German capital, bypassing it from the north and south, followed by an assault on the city and the exit of our troops to the river Elbe.
The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front occupied a section of the front 172 km wide, from Nipperwiese to Gross-Gastrose. The main strike force of the front deployed on the 44-kilometer sector Gustebize, Podelzig. The right flank of the front was deployed in the Nipperwiese, Gustebize sector. The left flank of the front deployed on the 82-kilometer section Podelzig, Gross-Gastrose.
The main blow was delivered by the forces of 4 combined arms and two tank armies from the Kustrin area. The troops of the 3rd shock army under the command of Vasily Ivanovich Kuznetsov, the 5th shock army of Nikolai Erastovich Berzarin and the 8th guards army of Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, deployed in the center of the Kyustrinsky bridgehead, were supposed to break through the German defenses, ensure the introduction of tank formations into the breakthrough and attack the German capital.

IN AND. Kuznetsov N.E. Berzarin

IN AND. Chuikov

On the sixth day of the operation, they were supposed to be on the eastern shore of Lake Havel (Havel) in the Hennigsdorf, Gatow section. The 47th army of Franz Perkhorovich received the task of bypassing Berlin from the northwest, advancing in the general direction on Nauen, Rathenov and on the 11th day of the operation to reach the Elbe. In addition, the 3rd Army of Alexander Gorbatov was located in the second echelon of the front in the main direction.
The tank armies were in the second echelon of the strike force and were supposed to develop an offensive around Berlin from the north and south. 1st Guards Tank Army commanded by Mikhail Efimovich Katukov was supposed to advance not from the north, together with the 2nd Guards Tank Army, as previously planned by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, but from the south, in order to take the southern part of Berlin.

The offensive of Katukov's army was also supported by Ivan Yushchuk's 11th Panzer Corps. This change in the task of Katukov's army was proposed by Zhukov, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin approved. The northern part of the bypass grouping was already very powerful, it included: the 61st Army of Pavel Belov, the 1st Army of the Polish Army Stanislav Gilyarovich Poplavsky, 47th Army of Perkhorovich, 2nd Guards Tank Army of Semyon Bogdanov, 9th Tank Corps of Ivan Kirichenko and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Mikhail Konstantinov.

S.G. Poplavsky

In order to ensure the offensive of the main strike force of the front in the center on the flanks, two auxiliary strikes were delivered from the north and south. In the north, the 61st Army of Belov and the 1st Army of the Polish Poplavsky Army were advancing. They struck in the general direction of Liebenwalde, Wulkau, and on the 11th day of the offensive were to reach the Elbe in the areas of Vilsnack and Zandau.
In the south, the second blow, ensuring the offensive of the main strike force, was delivered by the 69th army of Vladimir Kolpakchi, the 33rd army of Vyacheslav Tsvetaev and the 2nd guards cavalry corps. The Soviet armies advanced on the Podelzig, Briskov sector in the general direction of Fürstenwalde, Potsdam and Brandenburg. The armies of Kolpakchi and Tsvetaev were supposed to break through the German defenses in the Frankfurt direction and, advancing to the west, with access to the southern and southwestern parts of Berlin, cut off the main forces of the 9th German army from the capital.
In total, the 1st Belorussian Front had 9 combined arms and 2 tank armies, one air army (16th air army of Sergei Rudenko), two tank corps (9th tank corps of Ivan Kirichenko, 11th tank corps of Ivan Yushchuk ), two Guards Cavalry Corps (7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Mikhail Konstantinov, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Vladimir Kryukov). The 1st Belorussian Front was also supported by the 18th Air Army of Air Chief Marshal Alexander Golovanov (long-range aviation) and Dnieper military flotilla of Vissarion Vissarionovich Grigoriev.

The 1st Belorussian Front had at its disposal more than 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 18.9 thousand guns and mortars.
Three brigades of the Dnieper flotilla were armed with 34 armored boats, 20 minesweepers, 20 air defense boats, 32 semi-gliders and 8 gunboats. The boats were armed with 37-, 40-, 76- and 100-mm cannons, 8-M-8 launchers for firing 82-mm rockets, and heavy machine guns. The flotilla received tasks to support the advancing troops, to assist in forcing water barriers, to protect water communications and crossings; destroy enemy mines placed on rivers; to carry out breakthroughs into the depths of enemy defenses, to disorganize the German rear, to land troops. The 3rd brigade was supposed to capture the hydraulic structures in the Furstenberg area, preventing their destruction.

Battery of Soviet 152-mm ML-20 howitzer guns near Berlin. 1st Belorussian Front

Operation preparation

An artillery grouping with a density of about 270 barrels per 1 km of the front was formed on the main direction of the offensive (excluding 45-mm and 57-mm guns). To ensure the tactical surprise of the offensive, it was decided to carry out artillery preparation at night, 1.5-2 hours before dawn. To illuminate the area and blind the enemy, they concentrated 143 searchlight installations, which should have been earned with the start of the infantry attack.

30 minutes before the start of artillery preparation, night bomber aviation was supposed to strike at the headquarters of enemy communication centers. Simultaneously with the artillery preparation, the assault and bomber aviation of the 16th Air Army delivered massive strikes against enemy strongholds and firing positions to a depth of 15 km. After the introduction of mobile formations into battle, the main task of aviation was to suppress the anti-tank defense of the German troops. Most of the attack and fighter aviation switched to direct escort of combined arms and tank armies.
On April 14-15, our troops conducted reconnaissance in force in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the German defense, its firing positions and force the enemy to pull up reserves to the front line. The main events took place in the zone of 4 combined arms armies of the front's main shock grouping. In the center, the offensive was carried out by reinforced rifle battalions of divisions of the first echelon, on the flanks - by reinforced companies. The advanced units were supported by strong artillery fire. In different directions, our troops managed to penetrate the enemy's battle formations for 2-5 km.
As a result, our troops overcame the strongest lines of minefields and violated the integrity of the enemy's first line of defense, which facilitated the offensive of the main forces of the front. In addition, the German command was misled. Based on the experience of previous operations, the Germans thought that behind the reconnaissance battalions the main forces of the front would go on the offensive. However, neither on April 14 nor April 15 did our troops launch a general offensive. The German command made the erroneous conclusion that the offensive of the main forces of the 1st Belorussian Front was postponed for several days.

Soviet bombers are heading for Berlin

Soviet soldiers cross the Oder river

Breakthrough of enemy defense

At 5 am on April 16, 1945, artillery preparation began in complete darkness. At the front of the main strike force, artillery suppressed enemy targets for 20 minutes to a depth of 6-8 km and in some places up to 10 km. In such a short period, about 500 thousand shells and mines of all calibers were fired. The effectiveness of the artillery strike was great. In the first two trenches, from 30 to 70% of the personnel of the German units were disabled. When the Soviet infantry and tanks went on the attack in some directions, they advanced 1.5-2 km without encountering enemy resistance. However, soon the German troops, relying on a strong and well-prepared second line of defense, began to offer fierce resistance. Fierce fighting broke out along the entire front.
At the same time, bombers of the 16th Air Army attacked headquarters, communication centers, and 3-4 trenches in the enemy's main line of defense. The 18th Air Army (heavy aviation) also took part in the attack. For 40 minutes, 745 vehicles bombed the assigned targets. In just a day, despite the unfavorable meteorological situation, our pilots made 6,550 sorties, including 877 night ones. More than 1500 tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy. German aviation tried to resist. During the day there were 140 air battles. Our falcons shot down 165 German vehicles.

Defending in the offensive zone of the 47th Army of Perkhorovich, the 606th Special Purpose Division suffered heavy losses. German soldiers were overtaken by artillery preparation in the trenches and many died. However, the Germans offered stubborn resistance, our troops had to advance, repulsing numerous counterattacks. By the end of the day, our troops advanced 4-6 km, capturing a number of important strongholds in the depths of the enemy defenses. Over 300 prisoners were taken.
The 3rd strike army of Kuznetsov successfully advanced. The troops began their offensive by the light of searchlights. The greatest success was achieved in the offensive zone of the right-flank 79th Rifle Corps of General S. N. Perevertkin. Our troops repulsed several enemy counterattacks and captured the important strongholds of Gross Barnim and Klein Barnim. In order to increase the pressure of the 79th corps in its offensive zone at 10 o'clock. introduced the 9th tank corps of Kirichenko. As a result, our infantry and tanks advanced 8 km and reached the enemy's intermediate defensive zone. On the left flank, the 12th Guards Rifle Corps of General A.F. Kazankin advanced 6 km in a day. Especially stubborn battles here went for the Lechin stronghold.

German troops repulsed the frontal attack of the 33rd division of General V. I. Smirnov with strong fire. Then the 33rd division and the 52nd division of General N. D. Kozin bypassed Lechin from the north and south. So they took the stronghold. Thus, during the day of a heavy battle, the troops of the 3rd Shock Army broke through the enemy's main line of defense and reached the intermediate line with their right wing. About 900 prisoners were taken.
By the light of searchlights, the 5th shock army of Berzarin went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the central 32nd rifle corps of General D.S. Zherebin. Our troops advanced 8 km and by the end of the day reached the right bank of the Alt Oder River, to the second enemy defense line in the Platkov-Guzov sector. On the right flank of the army, the 26th Guards Rifle Corps, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, advanced 6 km. The troops of the left-flank 9th Rifle Corps also advanced 6 km. At the same time, units of the 301st Infantry Division of Colonel V.S. Antonov took an important enemy stronghold - Verbig.
In the battle for the Verbig station, the Komsomol organizer of the 1st battalion of the 1054th rifle regiment, Lieutenant Grant Arsenovich Avakyan, distinguished himself. Finding an enemy detachment preparing for a counterattack, Avakyan, taking the fighters with him, headed towards the house. Covertly sneaking up on the enemy, Avakyan threw three grenades through the window. The Germans, seized with panic, jumped out of the house, and came under concentrated fire from machine gunners. During this battle, Lieutenant Avakyan, together with his fighters, destroyed 56 German soldiers and captured 14 people, captured 2 armored personnel carriers. On April 24, Avakyan once again distinguished himself by capturing and holding a bridgehead across the Spree River on the streets of Berlin. Was badly wounded. For his courage and heroism, Lieutenant Avakyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Thus, by the end of the day, the troops of the 5th shock army, breaking the resistance of the enemy, advanced 6-8 km. Our troops broke through all three positions of the main line of German defense, and went out in the offensive zone of the 32nd and 9th rifle corps to its second line of defense.
The troops of Chuikov's 8th Guards Army went on the attack in the light of 51 searchlights.

It should be noted that their light stunned the Germans and at the same time lit the way for our advancing troops. In addition, the powerful illumination of the searchlights disabled the German night vision systems. Almost simultaneously with the infantry, the advanced brigades of the 1st Guards Tank Army of Katukov moved. The reconnaissance units of the advanced brigades entered the battles in the ranks of the infantry. Having broken through the enemy defenses and repulsed several counterattacks of the 20th motorized and 169th infantry divisions, our troops advanced 3-6 km. The enemy's main line of defense was broken through. By 12 o'clock, Chuikov's guards and the advanced units of the tank army reached the Seelow Heights, where the second powerful line of enemy defense passed. The battles for the Seelow Heights began.

The beginning of the assault on the Seelow Heights.

Zhukov's decision to send tank armies into battle

The German command managed to withdraw part of the forces of the 20th motorized division to this line of defense, and also transferred the Müncheberg tank division from the reserve.

The anti-tank defense of the Seelow direction was reinforced by a significant part of the artillery of the Berlin air defense zone. The second lane of the German defense had a large number of wood-and-earth firing points, machine-gun sites, firing positions for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. There was an anti-tank ditch in front of the heights, the steepness of the slopes reached 30-40 degrees and the tanks could not overcome them. The roads on which armored vehicles could pass were mined and shot through. The buildings were turned into strongholds.
The rifle corps of the 8th Guards Army did not reach the heights at the same time, so the 15-minute fire raid provided for by the offensive plan was carried out as they approached. As a result, there was no simultaneous and powerful artillery strike. The German fire system was not suppressed and our troops were met by strong artillery-mortar and machine-gun fire.

Repeated attempts by the guards infantry and advanced tank units to penetrate the enemy's defenses were unsuccessful. At the same time, the Germans themselves repeatedly launched counterattacks with forces from a battalion to an infantry regiment, supported by 10-25 tanks and self-propelled guns, and strong artillery fire. The most fierce battles took place along the Seelow-Müncheberg highway, where the Germans installed about 200 anti-aircraft guns (up to half of the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns).
Marshal Zhukov, taking into account the complexity of the upcoming battle, decided to move the mobile formations closer to the first echelon. By 12 o'clock. On April 16, the tank armies were already completely on the Kustra bridgehead, in full readiness to join the battle. Assessing the situation in the first half of the day, the front commander came to the conclusion that, despite the powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the enemy defenses in the second lane were not suppressed and the offensive of the four combined arms armies slowed down. The armies clearly did not have time to complete the task of the day. At 16 o'clock. 30 minutes. Zhukov gave the order to bring the guards tank armies into battle, although according to the original plan they were planned to be brought into battle after breaking through the second line of enemy defenses.

Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974) at the command post of the Seelow Heights.
Far right - a member of the Military Council of the front, Colonel-General K.F. Telegin, far left - commander of artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel General V.I. Kazakov, second from left - head of the rear of the front, Colonel-General N.A. Antipenko.

Mobile formations in cooperation with the infantry were supposed to break through the second line of enemy defenses. The 1st Guards Tank Army was deployed in the offensive zone of the 8th Guards Army. The 2nd Guards Tank Army of Bogdanov, with its 9th and 12th Guards Tank Corps, began to move in order to advance in the general direction of Neuhardenberg and Bernau. However, leaving at 19 o'clock. to the line of advanced units of the 3rd and 5th shock armies, the tank army could not go further.

A battery of Soviet 122mm M-30 howitzers fires at Berlin

Combat operations on auxiliary directions

On April 16, the 61st Army regrouped its forces in a new direction and prepared for the offensive the next day. The troops of the 1st Polish Army went on the offensive with three divisions. The Poles crossed the Oder and advanced 5 km. As a result, the Polish troops broke through the first line of enemy defenses by the end of the day. In the evening, the Oder began to force the troops of the second echelon of the Polish army.
The left-flank strike force - the 69th and 33rd armies went on the offensive at different times. The 69th army of Kolpakchi went on the offensive in the early morning in the light of searchlights. Our troops advanced 2-4 km, breaking fierce resistance and repulsing fierce enemy counterattacks. Our troops were able to break through in the strip of the Lebus-Schoenflis highway. By the end of the day, the army broke through the main line of defense and reached the Podelzig, Shenfis, Wüste-Kunersdorf line. In the area of the Shenfis station, our troops reached the enemy's second line of defense.
Tsvetaev's 33rd Army launched an offensive somewhat later. Our troops in the wooded and marshy terrain advanced 4-6 km, breaking through two positions of the enemy's main line of defense. On the right flank, the 38th Rifle Corps reached the defensive line by the end of the day. Fortress Frankfurt.

Thus, on the first day of the offensive, with the powerful support of artillery and aviation, our troops broke through only the main enemy line, advancing 3-8 kilometers in different directions. It was not possible to fully complete the task on the first day - to break through the second line of enemy defenses, which passed along the Seelow Heights. The underestimation of the enemy's defense played its role. The powerful enemy defense and the remaining unsuppressed fire system required a regrouping of artillery and new artillery and aviation training.
Zhukov, in order to speed up the offensive, brought into battle both main mobile formations - the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov. However, they began to enter positions in the evening and could not change the situation. The Soviet command on the evening of April 16 ordered to continue the offensive at night and on the morning of April 17 to break through the second line of defense of the German army. To do this, they decided to conduct a second 30-40-minute artillery preparation, concentrating up to 250-270 artillery pieces per 1 kilometer of the front. In addition, the army commanders were ordered not to get involved in protracted battles for enemy strongholds, to bypass them, transferring the task of eliminating the encircled German garrisons to the last units of the second and third echelons of the armies. Guards tank armies were instructed to organize interaction with the infantry.

Red Army soldiers are advancing on the Seelow Heights.

The German command hastily took measures to strengthen the defense of the Berlin direction from the east. From April 18 to April 25, 2 command and corps and 9 divisions were transferred from the 3rd and 4th tank armies and the remnants of the East Prussia army to the 9th army. So on April 18-19, the 11th SS motorized rifle division "Nordland" and the 23rd SS motorized rifle division "Netherlands" arrived from the 3rd Panzer Army; On April 19, the command of the 56th Tank Corps and the 214th Infantry Division arrived from the 4th Panzer Army. Then came the administration of the 5th Army Corps and other units. The Germans did their best to stop the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Soviet artillery preparation in the area of the Seelow Heights

Two Soviet tankers pose for a photo, lying in front of the German heavy tank Pz.Kpfw.VI Ausf.B "King Tiger" from the 502nd SS heavy tank battalion (SS-s.Pz.Abt.502), abandoned in the Seelow Heights . Germany, spring 1945.

The 102nd SS heavy tank battalion was formed on July 19, 1943 after an order according to which a tank unit equipped with Tiger tanks was to be created as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, on November 4, 1943, the formation was named the 102nd heavy tank battalion, from July to August 1944, the battalion fought in Normandy against the landing allied forces and destroyed at least 230 enemy tanks and 30 anti-tank guns. In September 1944, the battalion was reorganized in Sennelager and placed under the command of Sturmbannführer Kurt Hartramph. In March 1945, the unit received new Tiger II tanks and was renamed the 502nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion. As part of the Vistula-Oder operation, the battalion was sent to the front in the Kustrin area.

The unit participated in the last battles in the Halb pocket and southeast of Berlin, destroying about 70 enemy tanks in the second half of April. On May 1, 1945, the battalion had to abandon its last Tiger tank near Elzholz.
Yushchuk's 11th Panzer Corps achieved some success, he advanced north of the village of Zeelov. These tankers had a sense, they dragged mattresses and attached them to the front of the tanks - some salvation from " faustpatrons".

Still, Seelow stood inside the German line of defense, and not outside it, and the tanks pressed close to the roads, not wanting to become an easy target. The day was terribly difficult - and above all because it did not give the expected results.

German 105-mm howitzers leFH 18/40, captured by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front near the town of Zeelov. April 1945

April 18 was for Zhukov, among all the hard days, a particularly difficult day. The flow of wounded from the front line did not decrease.

A Soviet orderly takes out a wounded soldier to the rear on a cart pulled by dogs. Seelow Heights area.

The fourth day of his operation was approaching, and he had not achieved the goals intended for the second day. Soldiers and officers who had not slept for several days marched forward with phenomenal silent determination.

With this incredible, desperate determination, the troops entered the third line of the German defense. Can't the enemy stand before forces desperate in their selflessness? Fate loves the brave, Chuikov made his way this time too. Stalingraders are not lost. It will not be worse. Closer to the ground and smarter in motion. The village of Seelow is already behind us. Gradually, the German forces began to weaken. General Busset saw quite clearly that his left flank could no longer withstand the pressure. 56th Panzer Corps Helmut Weidling- the main reserve force of the Germans on this sector of the front - was melting before our eyes.

The requested SS divisions - the 18th and Nordland - were late. The 9th Parachute Division, which had taken the full force of Zhukov's initial terrible blow, began to lose its combat strength. It was at this moment that the Fuhrer of the Hitler Youth, Axman, suggested that Weidling send schoolchildren with faustpatrons.

To Weidling's credit, he refused such assistance. "You can't sacrifice these kids in a cause already lost." The rage of the general embarrassed Axman, and he withdrew.

Forgetting about themselves and actually dooming themselves, the troops broke into the key point of the German defense - Munsheberg. It was April 19, at 9 pm, when the 82nd Guards Rifle Division broke into the city from the east. A little to the north, Vriesen was taken. These were decisive milestones. Chuikov took the Seelow Heights. Not less than thirty thousand heroes died in this terrible battle, where our soldier did not spare himself. Being at the limit of his physical abilities, Zhukov saw the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel. It was late in the evening on Thursday, April 19, that the marshal saw real signs that the enemy was weakening and submitting. The third line of German defense was taken on a front 70 kilometers wide, from Alt-Oder to Kunersdorf. By April 20, its forward units reach the suburbs of the German capital.

War Memorial on the Seelow Heights

Date: 22.04.2012

67 years ago, on April 16, 1945, the famous assault on the Seelow Heights began - natural hills about 90 km east of Berlin. And this great battle, which showed massive examples of heroism and self-sacrifice of our soldiers and officers (and this at a time when, as everyone already felt, only a few days remained before the Victory), at the same time became one of the most slandered pages of the Great Patriotic War.

In our post-perestroika literature and in modern liberal journalism, it is customary to assert that the frontal assault on the Seelow Heights was a bloody massacre, unnecessary from a military point of view, arranged by the “butcher” - Marshal Zhukov. He, they say, started it only in order to get ahead of his other “butcher” colleague, Marshal Konev, who was advancing on the capital of the Third Reich to the south, in mastering the laurels of the winner of Berlin.

“The beams of the searchlights rest on the smoke, nothing is visible, in front are the Seelow Heights furiously snarling with fire, and the generals fighting for the right to be the first to be in Berlin are chasing behind. When the defense was nevertheless broken through with great bloodshed, a bloodbath followed on the streets of the city, in which the tanks burned one after another from the well-aimed shots of the Faustniks. Such an unsightly image of the last assault has developed over the post-war decades in the mass consciousness,” writes the well-known Russian historian Alexei Isaev, and with the involvement of archival materials he refutes this Russophobic nonsense.

So why didn't our troops just try to encircle Berlin? Why did tank armies enter the streets of the city? Let's try to figure out why Zhukov did not send tank armies around Berlin, writes Alexei Isaev.

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At the Nuremberg Trials, General Alfred Jodl, the permanent head of the Headquarters of the Operational Command of the Wehrmacht High Command, admitted: “It was clear to the General Staff that the battle for Berlin would be decided on the Oder, so the bulk of the troops of the 9th Army, defending Berlin, were brought to the front edge. The urgently formed reserves were supposed to be concentrated north of Berlin, in order to subsequently launch a counterattack on the flank of the troops of Marshal Zhukov.
During the battle for the Seelow Heights, the German 9th Army was crushed along with the remnants of the 4th Panzer Army in the so-called. Halbinsky (Frankfurt) boiler. There the Germans lost over 200,000 killed alone. Of the entire 9th Army, only separate units of the 56th Panzer Corps of General Weidling managed to break through to Berlin. By the beginning of the battle, there were about 50,000 people in the corps. From 13,000 to 15,000 fighters broke into Berlin. A few thousand more Germans scattered over the surrounding fields and forests, and only a few, who retained discipline, like the 11th SS Panzer Corps, made their way to the West to surrender to the Anglo-Americans.

Supporters of the theory of the expediency of encircling Berlin, the historian immediately notes, lose sight of the obvious question of the qualitative and quantitative composition of the city's garrison. The 9th German Army, stationed on the Oder, numbered 200,000 people. They could not be given the opportunity to withdraw to Berlin. Zhukov already had a chain of assaults on the encircled cities announced by the Germans as "festungs" (fortresses), both in his front line and among his neighbors. Isolated Budapest was defended from the end of December 1944 to February 10, 1945.

Therefore, Zhukov came up with a simple and, without exaggeration, ingenious plan, the authoritative historian believes. If the tank armies manage to break into the operational space, then they should go to the outskirts of Berlin and form a kind of cocoon around the German capital, which would prevent the reinforcement of the garrison at the expense of the 200,000-strong 9th Army or reserves from the west. It was not planned to enter the city at this stage. With the approach of the Soviet combined arms armies, the “cocoon” opened up, and Berlin could already be stormed in accordance with all the rules.

In many ways, the unexpected turn of Konev’s troops to Berlin, the historian notes, led to the modernization of the “cocoon” to the classical encirclement of two neighboring fronts by adjacent flanks. The main forces of the German 9th Army stationed on the Oder were surrounded in the forests southeast of Berlin. This was one of the major defeats of the Germans, undeservedly left in the shadow of the actual assault on the city. As a result, the capital of the "thousand-year Reich" was defended by Volkssturmists, members of the Hitler Youth, policemen and the remnants of the units defeated on the Oder front. They numbered about 100,000 people, which was clearly not enough to defend such a large city. Berlin was divided into nine defense sectors. According to the plan, the number of the garrison of each sector was to be 25,000 people. In reality, there were no more than 10,000 - 12,000 people. There was no question of any occupation of each house, only the key buildings of the quarters were defended. The entrance to the city of the 400,000th grouping of two fronts did not leave the defenders any chance. This led to a relatively quick assault on Berlin - about 10 days.

What made Zhukov delay his advance to Berlin, so much so that Stalin began sending orders to neighboring fronts to turn towards Berlin? Many will give an answer on the move: Seelow Heights. However, if you look at the map, then the Seelow Heights “obscure” only the left flank of the Kustrinsky bridgehead, Isaev notes. If some armies got stuck on the heights, then what prevented the rest from breaking through to Berlin?

The legend appeared due to the memoirs of V.I. Chuikov and M.E. Katukov, the scientist explains. Advancing on Berlin outside the Seelow Heights N.E. Berzarin (commander of the 5th shock army) and S.I. Bogdanov (commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army) left no memoirs. The first died in a car accident immediately after the war, the second died in 1960, before the period of active writing of memoirs by our military leaders. Bogdanov and Berzarin, at best, could tell about how they viewed the Seelow Heights through binoculars.

Maybe the problem was in Zhukov's idea to attack under the spotlights? Backlit attacks were not his invention. The Germans have been attacking in the dark under searchlights since 1941. So, for example, the bridgehead on the Dnieper near Kremenchug was captured, from which Kiev was later surrounded. At the end of the war, the German offensive in the Ardennes began with floodlights. This case is closest to the attack in the light of searchlights from the Kyustrinsky bridgehead. The main objective of this technique was to lengthen the first, most important day of the operation. Yes, the raised dust and smoke from explosions interfered with the searchlight beams; it was unrealistic to blind the Germans with several searchlights per kilometer. But the main task was solved: the offensive on April 16 was launched earlier than the season allowed. The positions illuminated by searchlights, by the way, were overcome rather quickly. Problems arose already at the end of the first day of the operation, when the searchlights had long been turned off. The left-flank armies of Chuikov and Katukov rested on the Seelow Heights, the right-flank armies of Berzarin and Bogdanov advanced with difficulty in the network of irrigation canals on the left bank of the Oder. Near Berlin, the Soviet offensive was expected. Zhukov initially had a harder time than Konev, who broke through the weak German defenses far south of the German capital. This hitch made Stalin nervous, especially in view of the fact that Zhukov's plan was revealed with the introduction of tank armies in the direction of Berlin, and not around it.

But the crisis soon passed, the historian writes, and this happened precisely thanks to the tank armies. One of the mechanized brigades of Bogdanov's army managed to find a weak spot among the Germans and break through far into the German defenses. Behind her, the mechanized corps was first drawn into the breach, and the main forces of the two tank armies followed. The defense on the Oder front collapsed already on the third day of fighting. The introduction of reserves by the Germans could not turn the tide: our tank armies simply bypassed them on both sides and rushed to Berlin. After that, it was enough for Zhukov to just turn one of the corps slightly towards the German capital and win the race that he did not start.

Losses on the Seelow Heights, Isaev notes, are often confused with losses in the entire Berlin operation. And he recalls that the irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops in it amounted to 80,000 people, and the total - 360,000 people. These are the losses of three fronts advancing in a strip 300 km wide - that is, the 1st Belorussian (commander - Zhukov), the 1st Ukrainian (commander - Konev) and the 2nd Belorussian (commander - Rokossovsky). Narrowing these losses to a patch of Seelow Heights is simply stupid. It's only stupider to turn 300,000 total losses into 300,000 killed. In reality, the total losses of the 8th Guards and 69th armies during the offensive in the area of the Seelow Heights amounted to about 20,000 people, and the irretrievable losses were about 5,000 people. Here you have Zhukov, the "butcher".

The breakthrough of the German defense by the 1st Belorussian Front in April 1945, Isaev believes, is worthy of study in textbooks of tactics and operational art. Unfortunately, due to Zhukov's disgrace, neither the brilliant plan with the "cocoon" nor the daring breakthrough of the tank armies to Berlin "through the eye of a needle" were included in the textbooks.

Summarizing all of the above, we can draw the following conclusions, the historian writes. Zhukov's plan was comprehensively thought out and corresponded to the situation. The resistance of the Germans turned out to be stronger than expected, but was quickly broken. Throwing Konev to Berlin was not necessary, but improved the balance of power during the assault on the city. Also, the turn of Konev's tank armies accelerated the defeat of the German 9th Army. But if the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front had simply followed the directive of the Headquarters, then the 12th Army of Wenck would have been defeated much faster, and the Fuhrer would not even have the technical ability to rush around the bunker with the question “Where is Wenck ?!”, sums up Alexei Isaev.

The Battle of the Seelow Heights was one of those cases where the public's perception of the situation was seriously distorted by a lack of information. Now we have the opportunity to slightly correct our ideas about what happened in April 1945 east of Berlin.

At the beginning of April it was not clear who exactly would enter the German capital. The collapse of the German front awakened Churchill's ambitions. The British leader wrote to Roosevelt about the need for an early breakthrough to the depth and the capture of Berlin. However, this plan was opposed by the commander of the Allied forces, Dwight Eisenhower. He noted that a breakthrough to Berlin with bare flanks would lead to a supply crisis, and in a military sense, it was necessary to break up the group surrounded in the Ruhr and prevent the Wehrmacht from retreating to the so-called Alpine fortress in Bavaria and western Austria.

Interestingly, no one even mentioned earlier agreements with the Soviet Union. Military considerations prevailed. Therefore, a headlong dash to Berlin from the west did not take place.

Thus began the battle for the Seelow Heights.

What exactly were they? This is about a twenty-kilometer range of rather steep hills 40–50 meters high east of Berlin. The Wehrmacht equipped a dense line of defense on them. They were defended by a tank corps of five divisions with armored vehicles. Not only were the heights a natural barrier, but also numerous irrigation canals: the Russians even interpreted these reclamation structures as anti-tank ditches. In addition, a deep ravine runs between the heights.

Zhukov initially understood that this operation would not be an easy walk. The 8th Guards Army of General Chuikov aimed at the heights. In 1942, under a different number, she defended the streets of Stalingrad, now she had to fight again inside a large city. However, before that, it was necessary to break through the defenses of the Wehrmacht at the heights.

Understanding all the difficulties of this attack, Zhukov reinforced Chuikov's shooters with Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army. This is one of the iconic formations of the second half of the war, having gone through the crucible of many battles, including Kursk and heavy battles in Poland. In the operation against Berlin, Katukov had a twofold task: firstly, to strengthen the army in a difficult direction, and secondly, to isolate Berlin from its potential saviors from the south.

Initially, the infantrymen of the 8th Guards were supposed to create a breakthrough: the tank army was theoretically already developing their success. One should not think that the infantry was thrown into battle under the protection of gymnasts: Chuikov had a whole scattering of tank and self-propelled regiments and brigades with a total strength of 175 tanks and self-propelled guns, almost half of which were heavy IS-2s. In addition, the guards received two breakthrough artillery divisions for reinforcement. A huge number of gun barrels made it possible to reduce the artillery preparation: the number of shells that were fired in several hours in other operations was used near Berlin in 30 minutes.

On April 14, reconnaissance took place in front of the army positions, and on April 16, after five o'clock in the morning, artillery preparation for a grandiose offensive began. 280 guns per kilometer of front created a huge density of fire. According to Chuikov, "the whole Prioderskaya plain seemed to be shaking." During the day of the battle, the Red Army fired more than a million shells.

The attack began half an hour later, under searchlights. Although this idea excited the imagination of writers and filmmakers, the essence of the idea was quite prosaic: to carve out extra hours of daylight hours. True, this idea yielded almost nothing because of the dense clouds of smoke and dust.

The rifle battalions of the 8th Guards went one by one into this smoke and dust. The first heavy battle was given to them at the turn of the canal east of the heights. The ISs dueled German tanks and anti-tank guns across the canal while the sappers tried to build bridges. The German artillery came to life, nailing the surviving crossings. The Russians relocated their guns closer to the battlefield to suppress their German counterparts. During the day, they broke through the channel, but then it was necessary to climb to the heights and remove the wide minefields found in the depths. Contrary to the well-known tale, Soviet instructions on overcoming minefields did not at all contain recommendations to launch infantry through them: sappers made passages while infantry and tanks secured themselves at the foot of the heights, and gunners on both sides waged a furious fight with each other.

Helmut Altner, a young German conscript, recalled:

The thunder of the cannons merges into a single roar, everything in the air howls, whistles, trembles and buzzes ... We are in a huge cauldron. Hell is in front of us, around us and behind us - the Russians are beating our trenches like a drum ... Shells screechingly cut the air and explode. Raised to their feet, the refugees look like ghosts - women, children and old people, not awake, half-dressed. On their faces - despair and deadly, indescribable fear.

By lunchtime, Zhukov realized that the advance of the guards was slow, and ordered to reinforce them with a tank army. Five thousand tanks and self-propelled guns is a serious argument, and they decided to use it on the first day. It cannot be said that they were directly beaten like a crowbar. Finding organized resistance, Katukov immediately began to feel for a weak spot in the enemy's redoubts. Tanks mainly fired from a place, supporting the infantry and firing shells in huge numbers. Therefore, on the first day, the tank army lost only 36 vehicles, and not burned out, but along with damaged ones.

In general, the first day gives the impression of a major, fierce battle, but the Russians moved forward quite confidently: the Wehrmacht was pushed back ten kilometers and forced to retreat to the very heights. The counterattack of the tank division on the "panthers" ended in beating them with heavy guns of the ISs and "St. John's wolves". Actually, already on the first day in the report of the headquarters of the Army Group "Vistula" there is a discouraged remark: "The last reserves have been used."

The next day the battle continued. Katukov did not try to push the colossus of his tank army through the narrow tunnels and passages on the heights. Tank brigades began to enter the fields north of the hills. Moreover, as soon as one of the brigades achieved success, a corps was deployed to its sector, and then the entire army. Chuikov was left with only a small force to support him. Sensing success, the tankers quickly orientated themselves and transferred the main forces to where they had reason to hope for a result. It should be noted that all this does not correspond much to the picture of frontal pressure and beatings in fruitless attacks: the armored armada demonstrated not only courage, but also professionalism. Zhukov is not tired of being criticized for the quick deployment of tank troops, but in fact it was the tankers who were the first to make a hole in the constructions of the adversary.

Chuikov's army at that time made its way through the heights. The constant counterattacks of the German reserves forced them to stagnate. The guardsmen did not advance, but crushed the German units, which were constantly attacking, including with heavy tanks.

Field reconnaissance soldier Alexei Ivanov spoke about the battles at the foot of the heights:

By running from funnel to funnel we reached our front trench.In one place, I see a German helmet. I kick her boo! Look, the German is getting up. Can you imagine? Forty or fifty years old, and most importantly, overgrown with such. Usually the Germans were neat, but this one was literally overgrown with bristles. I immediately dropped the rifle and raised my hands... I knew a few words in German and somehow explained to him with gestures: "Run there, to our rear." The German turned, raised his hands and ran. And it is clear that he is running and waiting for me to shoot him in the back now. But I didn't shoot. And then we look, about two hundred Germans raised their hands and come to us to surrender.

In general, the day of April 17 makes a strange impression. It seemed that things were going nowhere worse, meanwhile, in reality, it was on this day that the Wehrmacht commanders lost all opportunities to influence the situation, used not only all their own, but also the last reinforcements sent from the rear, and to the north of the heights the front began to spread under the blows of Katukov’s tankers.

April 18 brought an almost unexpected success: the main forces of the tank army were pushed into a narrow gap north of the heights, which immediately turned south. Behind the tankers, Chuikov's arrows entered the gap. In essence, the Seelow Heights were not hacked, but outflanked. The coverage meant that the redoubt east of Berlin would soon become a trap. In addition, to the north, in front of the neighbors of the 8th Guards and 1st Tank, the front simply collapsed. As a result, the Germans began to withdraw troops from the front on the heights. However, these efforts were already reminiscent of attempts to plug a dam break with a finger. Riflemen and tankers captured the town of Müncheberg in the evening and found that the enemy's resistance had sharply weakened. The main line of defense was broken through, and the Russians rushed to the rear of the heights.

The pace of attack increased dramatically. The 8th Guards and 1st Tank Corps knocked out the cork and knocked the enemy out of their positions. The 56th Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht retreated to Berlin, followed by Soviet divisions. The positions on the Seelow Heights were abandoned.

By April 22, the 8th Guards Army broke out to the outskirts of Berlin. This breakthrough had one important, although not immediately obvious, result: if the main forces of the 56th Panzer Corps were thrown back to Berlin, then everyone who defended to the south was pushed back not to the west, but to the southwest, into the forests south of the city. This meant that they would not be able to take part in the defense of the German capital. The battle on the Seelow Heights culminated in the fact that the potential defenders of Berlin were partly defeated in an open field, and partly knocked out of the struggle for the capital. The divisions thrown back to the south were defeated in a separate encirclement near the Halbe station. They did not participate in the battles for Berlin.

After the fact, the losses of Soviet troops on the Seelow Heights became the subject of speculation. All the victims of the Berlin operation from the Baltic coast to Thuringia were recorded in the losses at the heights, all the wounded were declared dead. Of course, any death is a tragedy, but even more so, one should not discuss the price of victory using such techniques.

From April 11 to May 1, 1945, the 8th Guards Army lost 4566 people dead and missing and about 19 thousand wounded. The 1st Guards Tank Army lost 1453 soldiers killed and missing, 5857 people were wounded. Thus, the price of the Seelow Heights and, we emphasize, also the city of Berlin for both armies amounted to about 6 thousand people dead or missing and up to 25 thousand soldiers and officers wounded. These sacrifices cannot be called insignificant.

However, this is not the mythical 300-500 thousand dead on the Seelow Heights, which they like to operate in discussions.

When considering the results of battles for heights, an extremely important element is usually missed: the condition and losses of the enemy. The Seelow Heights were defended by the 56th Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht, and its neighbors on the right and left also took part in the battle. It was these troops, retreating to Berlin, that made up the most combat-ready part of the garrison, and the commander of the 56th Corps, Helmut Weidling, turned out to be the last commandant of the Reich capital.

Panzer Division "Müncheberg" consisted of 6 thousand people with 35 tanks before the start of the fighting. The small number is due to the fact that shortly before the battles for Berlin, part of the division was cut off and destroyed in Kustrin. A few days later, the division withdrew to Berlin, with two hundred soldiers and four tanks in the ranks. The SS division "Nordland" was in a much better condition: it was reduced during the battles for the heights from 11 to 4 thousand soldiers and officers. The 20th Panzer Grenadier Division retained a thousand men out of 8 at the beginning of the battle. The 18th Panzergrenadier Division saved four thousand out of nine initially, and finally, the 9th Airborne Division saved only 500 out of 12 thousand soldiers at the beginning of the battle.

Let us emphasize that Weidling's interrogation protocols were not intended for publication and were extracted from the archives only in the 1990s, so it is hardly possible to talk about editing the document for propaganda purposes. From these testimonies, a picture emerges of the complete defeat of the Germans by the army of the Red Army.

Although Chuikov and Katukov did not have the opportunity to assess in detail the impact of their own forces on the enemy, we can now say that out of 40,000 soldiers in Weidling's divisions, less than 10,000 people managed to retreat to Berlin proper. Let us note that the obviously incomplete losses of the Wehrmacht are practically equal to the victims of the Red Army, which obviously include losses beyond the heights.

The battle for the Seelow Heights, on closer examination, leaves no stone unturned from the legend about itself. The image of "the victory we suffered" begins to fade. In the bottom line, only the fact of the stubborn resistance of the Wehrmacht in the height area turns out to be true.

Meanwhile, the assault on the heights was neither senseless nor unsuccessful. First of all, the 8th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies crushed the large Wehrmacht forces that could retreat to Berlin. The destruction of the main forces of the 56th Panzer Corps in the field meant less difficulty with them in the city.

Every extra soldier in the battle formations of the Red Army in Berlin accelerated the fall of the city. Much has been said - and rightly - about the weakness of the garrison of the German capital. Indeed, only a weak garrison could allow taking control of the metropolis within just 10 days. However, the weakness of the German troops defending Berlin is often taken for granted. The command of the Wehrmacht and personally Hitler were not going to give the protection of the capital to the mercy of militant schoolchildren and pensioners from the Volkssturm.

Zhukov formulated this task directly: "The more the enemy throws his troops towards our troops here, the easier and faster we will then take Berlin, since it is easier to defeat enemy troops in an open field than in a fortified city." And in fact, this scenario was realized: those troops that were almost the closest to Berlin were killed precisely on the Seelow Heights. So the battle for the heights can be safely called an important and subsequently underestimated success of the Red Army.

"Our Victory" No. 7 dated 04/09/15

By the beginning of April 1945, the outcome of the howl we were no longer in doubt, but the Germans were not yet going to capitulate. Even having lost the integrity of the Eastern Front, they continued to fight stubbornly in large and small "cauldrons" in Breslau, East Prussia and Courland. But the main grouping of the enemy was concentrated to protect Berlin, creating a defense in depth here.

Contrary to the legend

From the Oder, where the advanced units of the Red Army were located, 50-70 km remained in a straight line to Berlin. But besides the water barrier and three lines of trenches with pillboxes and bunkers, on the way of our troops were the Seelow Heights - a 10-kilometer-wide range of hills on the left bank of the old Oder channel. An anti-tank ditch up to 3 meters deep was dug in front of them, and the approaches to it were mined and shot through with crossfire.

Moreover, behind the regular units of the Wehrmacht, there were detachments with machine guns, who had orders to shoot without warning at everyone, up to the generals who left their positions.

The offensive on the Oder began on April 16 and became the first stage of the Berlin operation. The troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, as well as the 1st Ukrainian Front, commanded by our fellow countryman, Marshal Ivan Konev, had an overwhelming superiority over the enemy in tanks and artillery, but a threefold superiority in manpower, classic for offensive operations, still did not have.

After a powerful artillery preparation, the first to attack were units of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Georgy Zhukov. The predawn darkness was pierced by the rays of 139 powerful searchlights mounted behind the backs of the attackers. Already after the war, in the memoirs of Russian generals, a legend was born that the idea to use searchlights that illuminated the path for the troops and disorientated the enemy belonged to Zhukov. In fact, he borrowed it from the German assault units.

The idea with spotlights fully justified itself. The first defensive line of the Nazis, which was badly damaged during artillery preparation, was overcome by our units without much difficulty. But at the second one they got stuck, having encountered strong resistance.

But the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which began two hours later, developed more rapidly. Ivan Konev refused searchlights (it was already getting light). But on the other hand, a smoke screen was placed along the entire length of the front, hiding from the enemy observation posts the assault battalions and tank "fists" prepared for the attack. They immediately broke through two advanced lines of defense, advancing 10-14 km in the first day of the fighting.

At the cost of the lives of tankers and sappers

Even the enemy was forced to admit that the Soviet units were advancing according to all the rules of military science, trying first of all to suppress the defenders with intense fire, and not the infantry vulnerable to the offensive.

“Artillery preparation of extraordinary fury and strength ... seemed to lift the curtain on the third act of a terrible drama,” recalled German tanker Willy Fey. - Russian guns lined up for many kilometers along the front and in depth ... It was far before dawn, but in the survey mirrors we saw the sky flaming in the east ... A deadly storm was raging around us. Thousands of enemy guns rained steel death on the ground. Explosions were heard, probably, in tens of kilometers around ... Ahead, slightly to the right, bunkers and houses were exploding. Lightnings from guns of all conceivable calibers sparkled above our batteries. The minute hand of the clock crawled slowly as never before... The main part of the German front was in the iron embrace of the enemy. Reports from the positions of our infantry came less and less. Apparently, one after another, telephone wires were torn.

At the same time, Zhukov's troops unsuccessfully stormed the Seelow Heights, advancing mainly "on the forehead." In post-perestroika military literature, some pseudo-historians even claimed that Zhukov deliberately “driven entire divisions to slaughter” in an ambitious desire to be the first to break through to Berlin and take out
play a competition for glory with Ivan Konev. But an analysis of archival documents proves that Zhukov simply had no other choice. Bypassing the extensive Seelow Heights, stretching the front and substituting the flanks for a possible counterattack, is too risky. In addition, it was through the town of Zeelov that the shortest route ran to connect the Soviet armies advancing from different sides. Surrounding the enemy grouping, they did not make it possible to withdraw it to Berlin, where in the conditions of urban battles it would be much more difficult to destroy an additional mass of troops.

Breaks on the facts and another accusation against Zhukov - that he did not spare the lives of ordinary soldiers. In April 1945, this was definitely not the case. Convinced that the Seelow Heights could not be taken on the move by the forces of infantry and divisions of self-propelled artillery, already at the end of the first day of the offensive, Zhukov ordered two tank armies to be brought into battle.

At night, several sapper battalions were also sent to the front line - to fill up sections of the anti-tank ditch and make passages in minefields. Under the flashes of lighting rockets, the Germans shot our fighters from machine guns almost point-blank.

Heavy were the next day and losses in armored vehicles. Our T-34s, together with their crews, were killed by dozens of shells from anti-tank guns and faustpatrons. The sapper battalions also became half thinned. But on the scale of the entire front, no matter how cynical it may sound, losses during the assault on well-fortified defensive positions were significantly below the usual "norm". As a result of the battles for the Seelow Heights, Soviet troops lost about 5,000 people killed, and about 15,000 were wounded.

After the war, a monument was erected at the military cemetery in Seelow with the names of 220 Soviet soldiers who died during the liberation of the city. There are no Vologda residents in this mournful list.

Vlasov did not want to fight

Meanwhile, one of the mechanized brigades groped for the weak point of the Fritz and broke far into the depths of the German defense. Behind it, a mechanized corps and the main forces of two tank armies were drawn into the breach.

Note that on the Oder, as well as at the Seelow Heights, our troops were opposed not only by regular units of the Wehrmacht, the SS and Volkssturm detachments (German volunteers from teenagers and the elderly). Numerous units from the "Vlasovites" were also assigned to the defense. These were units of diverse composition - the so-called Russian Liberation Army, national formations (Turkestan, North Caucasian and other legions), Cossack corps.

Many of them were formed back in 1942-1943 and were first used by the Germans to protect rear communications, punitive actions against partisans, military operations against Yugoslav and Albanian rebels in the Balkans. But against the Red Army, "Vlasovites" as part of large formations were not used for a long time. The Germans were afraid that they would surrender or turn their weapons against the recent "allies". But in April 45, clutching at the last straw, they were sent to the front as well.

At the same time, the Germans pinned special hopes on the Cossack corps. Unlike the ROAVs, the bulk of which were prisoners recruited in the camps, faced with a dilemma - either die or serve Hitler, there were many volunteers and ideological ones in the Cossack units - including those who were repressed during and after the Civil War. But the “ideological”, famously prancing in the rear with a saber on a horse, as it often happens, being under bullets and shells, ran from positions among the first. The units of the ROA did not make a turning point in the battle - they also did not want to fight for real.

As a result, the defense on the Oder front collapsed on the third day of fighting. The Seelow Heights were taken. The 9th German Army was surrounded and partially destroyed. On April 20, Hitler's birthday, units of the 1st Belorussian Front took to the approaches to Berlin, presenting the Fuhrer with a "gift" - the center of the Nazi capital was subjected to devastating long-range artillery fire.

Four days later, the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front met west of Berlin with the advanced detachments of the 1st Belorussian Front. Berlin was surrounded. On the same day, the 34th guards corps of General Baklanov from the "Konevsky" front met with the Americans on the Elbe. The agony of the capital of the "thousand-year" Reich began, which in reality lasted only 12 years and fell under the blows of the Red Army.

Vladimir Romanov